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# Intelligence Community Spending: Trends and Issues

(name redacted)

Analyst in Intelligence and National Security

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## Summary

Total intelligence spending is usually understood as the combination of the National Intelligence Program (NIP), which supports strategic planning and policymaking, and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), which supports military operational and tactical levels of planning and operations. There are 4 defense NIP programs, 8 nondefense NIP programs, and 10 MIP programs. Six U.S. intelligence community (IC) components have both MIP and NIP funding sources.

Funding associated with the 17 components of the IC is significant. In fiscal year FY2017 alone, the aggregate amount (base and supplemental) of appropriated funds for national and military intelligence programs totaled \$73.0 billion (\$54.6 billion for the NIP, and \$18.4 billion for the MIP). For FY2018, the aggregate amount of appropriations requested for national and military intelligence programs totaled \$78.4 billion (\$57.7 billion for the NIP and \$20.7 billion for the MIP).

In comparison with national defense spending, intelligence-related spending has remained relatively constant over the past decade, representing approximately 11% of the total defense budget.

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## Introduction

This report examines intelligence funding over the past several decades, with an emphasis on the period from 2007 to 2018, during which total national and military intelligence program spending dollars have been publicly disclosed on an annual basis.<sup>1</sup> A table of topline budget figures (see **Table 1**) and accompanying graphs (see **Figure 2** and **Figure 3**) illustrate that in comparison with national defense spending, intelligence-related spending has remained relatively constant over the past decade, representing approximately 11% of annual national defense spending over that time period.

Various tables and graphs included in this report illustrate trends in intelligence spending. **Figure 1** illustrates highs and lows in NIP spending between 1965 and 1994. **Table 1** compares NIP and MIP spending to national defense spending from FY2007 to FY2019, reporting values in both nominal and constant dollars. **Figure 2** and **Figure 3** use the data in **Table 1** to provide an overview of intelligence spending compared to total national defense spending.

Additional tables in **Appendix B** and **Appendix C** provide an overview of the IC budget programs. **Table B-1** identifies 4 defense NIP programs, 8 nondefense NIP programs, and 10 MIP programs. **Table C-1** illustrates how those MIP and NIP intelligence programs are spread across different departments and agencies with an intelligence mission. **Table C-1** lists the 17 components of the intelligence community (IC) as defined by statute.

This report is published in conjunction with CRS Report R44681, *Intelligence Community Programs, Management, and Enduring Issues*, by (name redacted), which examines IC spending programs—to include specifics related to NIP and MIP subordinate programs such as the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) and National Reconnaissance Program (NRP).

## The Intelligence Budget

Intelligence spending is usually understood as the sum of two separate budget programs: (1) the NIP, which covers the programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence community oriented toward the strategic needs of decisionmakers,<sup>2</sup> and (2) the MIP, which funds defense intelligence activities intended to support operational and tactical level intelligence priorities supporting defense operations.<sup>3</sup>

The combined NIP and MIP budgets do not encompass the total of U.S. intelligence-related spending. Many departments have intelligence-gathering entities that support a department-specific mission, use department funds, and do not fall within either the NIP or the MIP. For example, the Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP) is sometimes referenced in intelligence-related legislation.<sup>4</sup> It is a small program that exists within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to fund those intelligence activities of the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis that serve predominantly departmental missions. With the exception of U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the NIP does not fund intelligence

<sup>1</sup> Intelligence-related spending (such as the Homeland Security Intelligence Program) that does not fall within the national and military intelligence programs is outside the scope of this report.

<sup>2</sup> The *topline* number for the NIP was classified until 2007—with two exceptions (October 1997 and March 1998). The exceptions are discussed later in this report. *Topline* is a frequently used colloquial term referring to any aggregated budget total.

<sup>3</sup> Dan Elkins, *Managing Intelligence Resources*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014), pp. 4-12.

<sup>4</sup> Note that per 6 U.S.C. §125(a) the House and Senate Intelligence Committees have jurisdiction over the HSIP.

activities of the Department of Homeland Security, nor does the NIP fund intelligence activities of state, local, and tribal governments. In addition, the MIP does not fund certain military platforms that can have an intelligence mission, such as the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) or the MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) air-to-ground strike platform.<sup>5</sup>

The intelligence budget funds *intelligence and intelligence-related activities*—defined in this report to include the following:

- The collection, analysis, production, dissemination, or use of information that relates to a foreign country, or a government, political group, party, military force, movement, or other association in a foreign country, and that relates to the defense, foreign policy, national security, or related policies of the United States and other activity in support of the collection, analysis, production, dissemination, or use of such information;
- Activities taken to counter similar activities directed against the United States;
- Covert or clandestine activities affecting the relations of the United States with a foreign government, political group, party, military force, movement, or other association;
- Collection, analysis, production, dissemination, or use of information about activities of persons within the United States, its territories and possessions, or nationals of the United States abroad whose political and related activities pose, or may be considered by a department, agency, bureau, office, division, instrumentality, or employee of the United States to pose, a threat to the internal security of the United States; and
- Covert or clandestine activities directed against persons within the United States, its territories and possessions, or nationals of the United States abroad whose political and related activities pose, or may be considered by a department, agency, bureau, office, division, instrumentality, or employee of the United States to pose, a threat to the internal security of the United States.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See for example Robert Mirabello, “Budget and Resource Management,” *Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies*, vol. 20, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2013), p. 68. The MIP specifically excludes the inherent intelligence gathering capabilities of a weapons system whose primary mission is not intelligence.

<sup>6</sup> For the purposes of this report, CRS uses the definition of *intelligence and intelligence-related activities* established by the Rules of the House of Representatives for the operations of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (see Rule X, clause 11, (j)(1) of U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States, 115th Congress, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., 2017*, H.Doc. 115-92, pp. 539-554). The definition was first adopted by the House through H.Res. 658 (95<sup>th</sup> Congress, July 14, 1977), which established the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and described the HPSCI as “oversee[ing] and [making] continuing studies of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities and programs of the United States Government.” In contrast, S.Res. 400 (94<sup>th</sup> Congress, June 23, 1976), which established the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), described the SSCI as “oversee[ing] and [making] continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States government,” and specified that any such *intelligence activity* “does not include tactical foreign military intelligence serving no national policymaking function.” Unlike S.Res. 400, H.Res. 658 did not specifically exclude “tactical foreign military intelligence serving no national policymaking function” from its definition of intelligence and intelligence-related activities.

## Origin of the Intelligence Budget

The intelligence budget, separate and distinct from the defense budget, dates to reforms initiated in the 1970s to improve oversight and accountability of the IC.<sup>7</sup> Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan gradually centralized management and oversight over what was then known as the *National Foreign Intelligence Program* (NFIP), which consolidated the CIA budget with portions of the defense budget associated with national intelligence activities such as cryptologic and reconnaissance programs.<sup>8</sup> Originally the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) managed the NFIP, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council (NSC) provided oversight.<sup>9</sup>

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 (see §1074 of P.L. 108-458) renamed and modified the NFIP as the NIP. The IRTPA also created the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The DNI was given greater budgetary authority in conjunction with the NIP than the DCI had in conjunction with the NFIP. Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 104 provides overall policy to include a description of the DNI's roles and responsibilities as program executive of the NIP.<sup>10</sup>

Military-specific *tactical* or *operational* intelligence activities were not included in the NFIP. They were referred to as *Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities* (TIARA) and were managed separately by the Secretary of Defense. TIARA referred to the intelligence activities “of a single service” that were considered *organic* (meaning “to belong to”) military units. In 1994, a new category was created called the *Joint Military Intelligence Program* (or JMIP) for defense-wide intelligence programs.<sup>11</sup> A DOD memorandum signed by the Secretary of Defense in 2005 merged TIARA and JMIP to create the MIP.<sup>12</sup> DOD Directive 5205.12, signed in November 2008, established policies and assigned responsibilities, to include the role of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) as MIP program executive and “principal proponent for MIP policies and resources,” acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, the DNI and USD(I), respectively, manage the NIP and MIP separately under different authorities.<sup>14</sup> A program is primarily NIP if it funds an activity that supports more than one department or agency, or provides a service of common concern for the IC.<sup>15</sup> The NIP funds the

<sup>7</sup> Dan Elkins, *Managing Intelligence Resources*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014), p.4-3.

<sup>8</sup> See E.O. 11905 (1976), E.O. 12036 (1978), E.O. 12333 (1981).

<sup>9</sup> Dan Elkins, *Managing Intelligence Resources*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014), pp. 4-3.

<sup>10</sup> ICD 104, “National Intelligence Program (NIP) Budget Formulation and Justification, Execution, and Performance Evaluation,” April 30, 2013, at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20104.pdf>.

<sup>11</sup> Dan Elkins, *Managing Intelligence Resources*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014), p. 4-13. See also DOD Directive 5205.9 “Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP),” April 7, 1995.

<sup>12</sup> Janet McDonnell, “The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence: The First 10 Years,” *Studies in Intelligence*, vol. 58, no. 1 (Extracts, March 2014): 9-16, p. 13. McDonnell cites the memorandum creating the MIP as follows: Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, Memorandum to the Secretaries of Military Departments et al., Subj: Establishment of the Military Intelligence Program, September 1, 2005.

<sup>13</sup> DOD Directive 5205.12, “Military Intelligence Program,” November 14, 2008; change 1, May 10, 2018 at <http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/520512p.pdf?ver=2018-05-10-083514-693>.

<sup>14</sup> For more information on the position of USD(I), see CRS In Focus IF10523, *Defense Primer: Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)*, by (name redacted) and (name redacted) .

<sup>15</sup> 50 U.S.C. Section 3003(6) defines the term “National Intelligence Program” as: [A]ll programs, projects, and activities of the IC, as well as any other programs of the IC designated jointly by the Director of National Intelligence and the head of a United States department or agency or by the President. Such term does not include programs, projects, or activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical

CIA and the strategic-level intelligence activities associated with the NSA, DIA, and NGA. It also funds Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) programs throughout the IC. A program is primarily MIP if it funds an activity that addresses a unique DOD requirement. The DNI and USD(I) work together in a number of ways to facilitate the integration of NIP and MIP intelligence efforts.<sup>16</sup> Mutually beneficial programs may receive both NIP and MIP resources.

The NIP may be perceived as more complicated than the MIP because it is an aggregation of programs that span the entire IC. In general, NIP programs are based on capabilities such as cryptology, reconnaissance, and signals collection that span several IC components. Each program within the NIP is headed by a program manager. Program managers exercise daily direct control over their NIP resources.<sup>17</sup> The DNI acts as an intermediary in the budget process, between these managers, the President, and Congress.<sup>18</sup> The DNI determines and controls defense and nondefense NIP funds from budget development through execution.

In contrast, the MIP encompasses only those defense dollars associated with the operational and tactical-level intelligence activities of the military services.<sup>19</sup> According to the MIP charter directive:

The MIP consists of programs, projects, or activities that support the Secretary of Defense's intelligence, counterintelligence, and related intelligence responsibilities. This includes those intelligence and counterintelligence programs, projects, or activities that provide capabilities to meet warfighters' operational and tactical requirements more effectively. The term excludes capabilities associated with a weapons system whose primary mission is not intelligence.<sup>20</sup>

Some experts have described the MIP as follows:

... the "take it with you" intelligence organic to the deployable units in all services at all echelons of command, for example, the Navy's anti-submarine ships with the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS), the Air Force's RC-135 Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft, the Army's and Marine Corps' tactical signals intelligence capabilities, and the Defense Intelligence Agency's analysts assigned to the theater joint intelligence operations centers.<sup>21</sup>

MIP dollars are managed within the budgets of DOD organizations by component managers—such as the senior leader for the intelligence element of the U.S. Air Force (USAF/A2) who

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military operations by United States Armed Forces.

<sup>16</sup> In May 2007, the Secretary of Defense and DNI formally agreed in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that the USD(I) position would be "dual-hatted"—the incumbent acting as both the USD(I) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI) within the ODNI in order to improve the integration of national and military intelligence. According to the MOA, when acting as DDI, the incumbent reports directly to the DNI and serves as his principal advisor regarding defense intelligence matters. See Michael McConnell, DNI and Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, "Memorandum of Agreement," May 2007, *news release* no. 637-07, May 24, 2007, "Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to be Dual-Hatted as Director of Defense Intelligence," at [https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2007%20Press%20Releases/20070524\\_release.pdf](https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2007%20Press%20Releases/20070524_release.pdf).

<sup>17</sup> See ICD-104 for the roles and responsibilities of NIP Program Managers.

<sup>18</sup> Dan Elkins, *Managing Intelligence Resources*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014), p. 4-5.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 4-11.

<sup>20</sup> DOD Directive 5205.12 (3) (a).

<sup>21</sup> Robert Mirabello, "Budget and Resource Management," *Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies*, vol. 20, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2013), p. 67. See also Dan Elkins, *Managing Intelligence Resources*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014), p. 4-11.

manages Air Force MIP dollars and the senior leader for the intelligence element of the U.S. Navy (USN/N2) who manages MIP dollars for the Navy—in accordance with USD(I) guidance and policy.<sup>22</sup> MIP components include the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the intelligence elements of the military departments; the intelligence element of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM/J2); and military intelligence activities associated with DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA.<sup>23</sup> Some DOD intelligence components make use of both NIP and MIP funds. The directors of DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA serve simultaneously as program managers for their NIP funds and component managers for their MIP funds.

## Secrecy vs. Transparency

Most intelligence dollars are embedded in the defense budget for security purposes. All but the topline budget numbers are classified. Disclosure of details associated with the intelligence budget has been debated for many years, with proponents arguing for more accountability<sup>24</sup> and IC leadership arguing that disclosure of such figures could damage national security.<sup>25</sup> In 1999, then-DCI George Tenet articulated the potential risk of disclosure as follows:

Disclosure of the budget request reasonably could be expected to provide foreign governments with the United States' own assessment of its intelligence capabilities and weaknesses. The difference between the appropriation for one year and the Administration's budget request for the next provides a measure of the Administration's unique, critical assessment of its own intelligence programs. A requested budget decrease reflects a decision that existing intelligence programs are more than adequate to meet the national security needs of the United States. A requested budget increase reflects a decision that existing intelligence programs are insufficient to meet our national security needs. A budget request with no change in spending reflects a decision that existing programs are just adequate to meet our needs.<sup>26</sup>

The 9/11 Commission agreed with critics who argued for more transparency but also found that disclosure of numbers below the topline could cause damage to national security. It recommended that the amount of money spent on national intelligence be released to the public:

[T]he top-line figure by itself provides little insight into U.S. intelligence sources and methods. The U.S. government readily provides copious information about spending on its military forces, including military intelligence. The intelligence community should not be subject to that much disclosure. But when even aggregate categorical numbers remain hidden, it is hard to judge priorities and foster accountability.<sup>27</sup>

In response to the 9/11 Commission recommendations, Section 601(a) of P.L. 110-53 (codified at 50 U.S.C. Section 3306(b)) directs the DNI to disclose the NIP topline number:

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<sup>22</sup> DOD Directive 5205.12 (3) (c).

<sup>23</sup> DOD Directive 5205.12 (3) (b).

<sup>24</sup> See for example, Cynthia Lummis and Peter Welch, "Intelligence Budget Should Not Be Secret," *CNN*, April 21, 2014, at <http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/21/opinion/lummis-welch-intelligence-budget/>.

<sup>25</sup> See U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Whether Disclosure of Funds for the Intelligence Activities of the United States is in the Public Interest*, 95<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., S.Rept. 95-274, June 16, 1977 (Washington DC: GPO, 1977), at <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/95274.pdf>.

<sup>26</sup> "Declaration of George Tenet," *Afergood v. CIA*, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civ. No. 98-2107, April, 1999, at <http://fas.org/sgp/foia/tenet499.html>.

<sup>27</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (Washington DC: GPO, 2004), p. 416.

Not later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 2007, the Director of National Intelligence shall disclose to the public the aggregate amount of funds appropriated by Congress for the National Intelligence Program for such fiscal year.

Section 601(b) (codified at 50 U.S.C. Section 3306(c)(1)(A)) allows the President to “waive or postpone the disclosure” if the disclosure “would damage national security.”<sup>28</sup> The first such disclosure was made on October 30, 2007.<sup>29</sup> The Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) of 2010 (P.L. 111-259) further amended Section 601 to require the President to publicly disclose the amount requested for the NIP for the *next* fiscal year “at the time the President submits to Congress the budget.”<sup>30</sup>

At the present time only the NIP topline figure must be disclosed based on a directive in statute. The DNI is not required to disclose any other information concerning the NIP budget, including whether the information concerns particular intelligence agencies or particular intelligence programs. In 2010, the Secretary of Defense began disclosing MIP appropriations figures on an annual basis and in 2011 disclosed those figures back to 2007.<sup>31</sup> These actions have provided public access to previously classified budget numbers for national and military intelligence activities.

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<sup>28</sup> P.L. 110-53, titled *The Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007* and was enacted August 3, 2007.

<sup>29</sup> ODNI, “DNI Releases Budget Figure for National Intelligence Program,” *press release*, October 30, 2007, at [http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2007%20Press%20Releases/20071030\\_release.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2007%20Press%20Releases/20071030_release.pdf).

<sup>30</sup> P.L. 111-259 §364. See for example, ODNI Releases Requested Budget Figure for FY2016 Appropriations for the National Intelligence Program,” ODNI *News Release* no. 24-15, February 2, 2015, at <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2015/item/1168-dni-releases-requested-budget-figure-for-fy-2016-appropriations>.


<sup>31</sup> Department of Defense, “DOD Releases Military Intelligence Program Top Line Budget for Fiscal 2007, 2008, 2009,” DOD *news release* no. 199-11, March 11, 2011, available at <http://archive.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=14328>. The release of the MIP topline was not directed by statute. According to this news release, it was a decision made by the Secretary of Defense.

# Trends in Intelligence Spending

## Historical Trends

**Figure 1. Intelligence Spending 1965-1994**

1994 constant dollars



**Source:** H.Rept. 103-254, *Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1994*, to accompany H.R. 3116, p. 14.

**Figure 1** illustrates highs and lows in NIP spending between 1965 and 1994. Due to the classified nature of the intelligence budget at that time, the graphic does not include dollar figures.<sup>32</sup> **Figure 1** suggests that NIP spending declined steadily from about 1971 to 1980, climbed back to 1968 levels by about 1983, and steadied to fairly constant levels between 1985 and 1994. The pattern of spending in **Figure 1** generally reflects world events and associated defense spending. Analyses of defense spending over the past several decades usually attribute higher levels of defense spending in the 1960s to the Vietnam War; lower levels of defense spending in the 1970s to the period of *détente* between the United States and the Soviet Union and to the worldwide economic recession; and higher levels of defense spending in the 1980s to the Reagan defense build-up.<sup>33</sup> A graph depicting defense outlays between 1950 and 2017 is provided in **Figure A-1**.

<sup>32</sup> U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee, *Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1994*, to accompany H.R. 3116, 103<sup>rd</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., H. Rept. 103-254 (Washington, DC: GPO, September 22, 1993), p. 14.

<sup>33</sup> For a more comprehensive graph of defense spending over time, see for example, Thaleigha Rampersad, "The History of Defense Spending in One Chart," *The Daily Signal*, February 14, 2015, at <http://dailysignal.com/2015/02/14/history-defense-spending-one-chart/>.

## Recent Trends

**Table 1** compares NIP and MIP spending to national defense spending from FY2007 to FY2019, reporting values in both nominal and constant dollars. Budget numbers appropriated for FY2013 show adjustments made in accordance with automatic spending cuts required under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25).<sup>34</sup> Topline numbers associated with national defense spending are reported in **Table 1** and illustrated graphically in **Figures 1** and **2**.<sup>35</sup>

**Table 1. Intelligence Spending, FY2007-FY2019**

Dollars in billions, rounded

		FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	FY12	FY13 <sup>a</sup>	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY19
<b>NIP<sup>b</sup></b>	Nominal	43.5	47.5	49.8	53.1	54.6	53.9	49.0 (52.7)	50.5	50.3	53.0	54.6	57.7	59.9
	Constant <sup>c</sup>	53.5	56.8	58.6	61.1	61.7	59.9	53.6 (57.6)	54.6	53.8	56.1	56.7	58.78	59.9
<b>MIP<sup>d</sup></b>	Nominal	20.0	22.9	26.4	27.0	24.0	21.5	18.6 (19.2)	17.4	16.5	17.7	18.4	20.7	21.2
	Constant	24.6	27.4	31.1	31.1	27.1	23.9	20.3 (21)	18.8	17.6	18.7	19.1	21.1	21.2
<b>NIP MIP Total</b>	Nominal	63.5	70.4	76.2	80.1	78.6	75.4	67.6 (71.9)	67.9	66.8	70.7	73.0	78.4	81.1
	Constant	78.1	84.2	89.7	92.2	88.8	83.8	73.9 (78.6)	73.4	71.4	74.9	75.9	79.87	81.1
<b>National Defense<sup>e</sup></b>	Nominal	626	696	698	721	717	681	610	622	598	615	619	677	727
	Constant	770	833	822	830	810	757	667	672	639	651	644	689	727

**Source:** CRS, using numbers available at <http://www.dni.gov>, <http://www.defense.gov>, and <http://www.whitehouse.gov>.

**Notes:**

- \$52.7 billion was reduced via sequestration to \$49.0 billion, DNI press release, October 30, 2013; \$19.2 billion was reduced via sequestration to \$18.6 billion, DOD press release, October 31, 2013. Automatic spending cuts were required under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25).
- NIP numbers include base budget and supplemental spending dollars known as Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) dollars.
- Constant figures are deflated using the Total Department of Defense index. Table 5-1, "Department of Defense and Selected Economy-Wide Indices," *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019* (Green Book), at [http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2019/FY19\\_Green\\_Book.pdf](http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2019/FY19_Green_Book.pdf), provides a Total Department of Defense price index with 2019 as the base year.

<sup>34</sup>P.L. 112-25. For more on required spending cuts and the Budget Control Act, see CRS Report R44039, *The Budget Control Act and the Defense Budget: Frequently Asked Questions*, by (name redacted) . See also CRS Report R42506, *The Budget Control Act of 2011 as Amended: Budgetary Effects*, by (name redacted) and (name redacted); CRS Report R42972, *Sequestration as a Budget Enforcement Process: Frequently Asked Questions*, by (name redacted) and (name redacted) and CRS Report R41901, *Statutory Budget Controls in Effect Between 1985 and 2002*, by (name redacted) .

<sup>35</sup> For Table 2, the values in columns for FY2018 and FY2019 are requested dollars.


- d. MIP numbers include base budget and OCO dollars.
- e. National defense spending (using topline numbers associated with Function 050 *National Defense*) is included for comparative purposes. See Office of Management and Budget, *Historical Tables*, Table 5.1, *Budget Authority by Function and Sub function: 1976-2020*. See CRS In Focus IF10618, *Defense Primer: The National Defense Budget Function (050)*, by (name redacted) for more information on national defense spending under Function 050.

The *nominal* dollars in **Table 1** suggest that the NIP topline steadily increased from FY2007 to FY2012. The MIP topline steadily increased from FY2007 to FY2010, then decreased from FY2011 to FY2015 before showing steady, yet small increases from FY2016 to the requested figures for FY2019. These NIP and MIP trends have changed the relative sizes of the NIP and MIP budgets. For example, of the \$63.5 billion appropriated in FY2007, the NIP portion (\$43.5 billion) was roughly twice the size of the MIP portion (\$20 billion). In contrast, by FY2015 (and subsequently) the NIP was approximately three times larger than the MIP.

The *constant* dollars in **Table 1** suggest that the NIP dollars appropriated in FY2017 (\$56.7 billion) were roughly equal to the NIP dollars appropriated in FY2008 (\$56.8 billion). The highest level of NIP spending, in constant dollars, was in FY2011 (\$61.7 billion). In contrast, the MIP dollars appropriated in FY2017 (\$19.1 billion) were significantly less than the MIP dollars appropriated in FY2007 (\$24.6 billion). The highest level of MIP spending, in constant dollars, was in FY2009-FY2010 (\$31.1 billion).

**Figure 2** uses the data in **Table 1** to provide an overview of total intelligence spending as a percentage of overall national defense spending. The almost flat percentage line suggests that annual intelligence spending has remained relatively constant over the past decade, consistently representing approximately 11% of annual national defense spending.

**Figure 2. Intelligence Spending as a Percentage of the National Defense Budget: FY2007-FY2018**



**Source:** CRS, using numbers available at <http://www.dni.gov>, <http://www.defense.gov>, and <http://www.whitehouse.gov>.

**Note:** See **Table I** for the topline numbers used to produce this graph.

**Figure 3** adds four additional NIP *topline* values—numbers available for FYs 1997, 1998, 2005, and 2006. The topline number for the NIP was classified until 2007, with two exceptions. In October 1997, then-DCI George Tenet announced that the intelligence budget for FY1997 was \$26.6 billion,<sup>36</sup> and in March 1998, DCI Tenet announced that the budget for FY1998 was \$26.7 billion.<sup>37</sup> In addition, IC officials retroactively declassified NIP topline numbers for FY2005 (\$39.8 billion)<sup>38</sup> and FY2006 (\$40.9 billion).<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, corresponding MIP topline dollars for 1997, 1998, 2005, and 2006 are not publicly available. **Figure 3** provides a snapshot of NIP

<sup>36</sup> CIA, “DCI Statement on FY97 Intelligence Budget,” *press release*, October 15, 1997, at <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-1997-1/pr101597.html>.


<sup>37</sup> CIA, “Disclosure of the Aggregate Intelligence Budget for FY98,” *press release* March 20, 1998, at <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-1998/ps032098.html>.

<sup>38</sup> James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, *Memorandum for the Record*, March 2015, attached to a cover letter to Mr. Steven Aftergood, May 20, 2015: “The aggregate amount appropriated to the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) for FY 2005 is \$39.8 billion, which includes funding to support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO),” at <http://fas.org/irp/budget/fy2005.pdf>.

<sup>39</sup> John Hackett, Director, Information Management Office, Office of the DNI, *Letter to Steven Aftergood*, October 28, 2010, in response to FOIA request from Steven Aftergood, March 24, 2009: “The aggregate amount appropriated to the NIP for fiscal year 2006 was \$40.9 billion,” at <http://fas.org/irp/news/2010/10/fy06-intelbud.pdf>.

spending over the past two decades, and despite the lack of data between 1999 and 2004, the values that are present suggest relative constancy in NIP topline dollar appropriations.

**Figure 3. Intelligence Spending Based on Publicly Available Numbers: FY1997-FY2018**



**Source:** CRS, using numbers available at <http://www.dni.gov>, <http://www.defense.gov>, <http://www.whitehouse.gov>. FY1997: CIA, “DCI Statement on FY97 Intelligence Budget,” *press release*, Oct 15, 1997. FY1998: CIA, “Disclosure of the Aggregate Intelligence Budget for FY98,” *press release* Mar 20, 1998. FY2005: DNI, Memorandum for the Record, March 2015, FOIA response, May 20, 2015. FY2006: ODNI, Letter to Steven Aftergood, FOIA response, Oct 28, 2010, Mar 24, 2009.

**Note:** Table I provides the other topline numbers used to produce this graph.

## Issues for Congress

### Transparency

Congress's and the American public's ability to oversee and understand how intelligence dollars are spent is limited by the secrecy that surrounds the intelligence budget process. DNI Daniel Coats has stated his commitment to transparency "as a foundational element of securing public trust in our endeavors."<sup>40</sup> Many believe the IC could exercise greater transparency with respect to budgetary matters, however, and that disclosure of intelligence-related spending other than the topline number would not be harmful to national security.

In the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress, legislation has again been introduced to address the issue of transparency and secrecy in the intelligence budgets, continuing efforts to require disclosure of the topline budget figure for each of the components of the intelligence community.<sup>41</sup> H.R. 5406, and a nearly identical bill, S. 2631, both titled "Intelligence Budget Transparency Act of 2018," would require the President to disclose, in his annual budget request to Congress,

[T]he total dollar amount proposed in the budget for intelligence or intelligence related activities of each element of the Government engaged in such activities in the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted and the estimated appropriation required for each of the ensuing four fiscal years.<sup>42</sup>

The bills were referred to the House and Senate Committees on the Budget, respectively. The 115<sup>th</sup> Congress may consider reexamining the arguments, directives, and statute that currently guide disclosure of numbers associated with intelligence spending.

### Questions for Congress

Some have asserted that America's intelligence agencies may spend more money on gathering and disseminating intelligence than the rest of the world's intelligence services put together.<sup>43</sup> Is it enough? And, to what extent is the IC providing value for the money? As Congress considers the FY2019 NIP and MIP budgets, and balances the need to protect both national security and taxpayer dollars, coming to agreement with the executive branch on *how much spending is enough* lies at the heart of much of its oversight responsibility and power of the purse. The following types of questions may be considered:

- Does the IC have the funding to develop or maintain collection capacity necessary to support national security policy?
- Does the IC have the funding necessary to develop the capacity for the timely processing and analysis of data?

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<sup>40</sup> Daniel R. Coats, "Issuance of Updated Intelligence Community Directive 107 on Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency," *Memorandum for Distribution*, March 22, 2018, at <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/ic-in-the-news/item/1861-issuance-of-updated-intelligence-community-directive-107-on-civil-liberties-privacy-and-transparency>.

<sup>41</sup> Such legislation is not new. Identical bills were introduced in 2014 (H.R. 3855), and 2015 (H.R. 2272 and S. 1307).


<sup>42</sup> §2(A) of H.R. 5406 and S. 2631.

<sup>43</sup> Bernd Debusmann, "US Intelligence Spending – Value for Money?" *Reuters*, July 16, 2010, at <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2010/07/16/us-intelligence-spending-value-for-money/>.

- Is the IC organized or sufficiently integrated to realize efficiencies in the collection, processing, analysis and sharing of intelligence across its 17 components?
- Where can the IC accept risk relative to budget limitations?
- Is the IC postured to leverage international partners for coverage of emerging issues or areas where the IC has limited investment?
- Does the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) process provide a useful means for prioritizing the allocation of resources?
- Does the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) have the authority, funding, and organization to enable oversight of the impact of intelligence programs of IC components?

# Appendix A. Defense Spending: FY1950-2017

**Figure A-I. DOD Spending in Historical Perspective, FY1950-FY2017**



Source: CRS estimates based on OMB and DOD data.

## Appendix B. Intelligence Programs (NIP and MIP)

**Table B-1. National and Military Intelligence Programs (NIP and MIP)**

<b>National Intelligence Program</b>	
<b>Defense NIP</b>	
Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP)	The NSA Director manages the CCP. Funds NSA and intelligence activities related to national-level SIGINT and information assurance (IA) across the IC. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard has a SIGINT collection entity as does each of the military services. SIGINT collection operations target electromagnetic communication systems such as radios and cellular phones, radar, and signals emanating from foreign missile tests. Information assurance activities are designed to keep defense communications systems secure.
General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP)	The DIA Director manages the GDIP. Funds DIA and a wide range of national-level defense intelligence activities to include (1) the intelligence centers that support the services and unified combatant commands (e.g., the Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center); (2) defense HUMINT; (3) biometric and identity intelligence; and (4) medical intelligence. Other examples of GDIP-funded activities include IC infrastructure; national-level activities related to CI; and the collection, processing, and dissemination of MASINT.
National Geospatial-Intelligence Program (NGP)	The NGA Director manages the NGP. Funds NGA and national-level GEOINT-related activities throughout the IC. NGA predominately relies on overhead reconnaissance platforms to provide the raw imagery it needs to produce finished intelligence products. Examples of GEOINT products range from three-dimensional maps and charts to computerized databases. For example, “the Globe” is an NGP investment that consolidates its legacy search tools into a single enterprise search system.
National Reconnaissance Program (NRP)	The NRO Director manages the NRP. Funds NRO and NRO efforts to develop, build, launch, and operate satellites associated with “multi-INT” collection—meaning that they collect a variety of signals from FISINT, COMINT, ELINT, to various forms of MASINT. The NRP provides the IC with capability to provide intelligence on topics like imminent military aggression, early warning of foreign missile launches, battle damage assessments, tracking high-value individuals, and monitoring treaty agreements and peacekeeping operations.
Special Reconnaissance Program (SRP)	Information concerning SRP management is not available at this time. Funds procurement of special intelligence-gathering devices (to include research and development), and specialized reconnaissance collection activities, in response to tasking procedures established by the DNI.
<b>Nondefense NIP</b>	
Central Intelligence Agency Program (CIAP)	The Deputy Director CIA manages the CIAP. Funds CIA activities to include HUMINT and OSINT. The CIAP funds everything related to the CIA. It includes funding for activities such as covert and clandestine operations, research and development of technical collection systems related to all-source analysis, operating the IC’s open source center, training for analysts and agents, and operating the entire CIA infrastructure. The CIAP funded development of the U-2 spy plane, for example.
CIA Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS)	The Deputy Director CIA manages CIARDS. Funds pension benefits to a selected group of the CIA’s workforce who were first hired before 1984 and were not enrolled in the Civil Service Retirement System. CIARDS is a CIA-only program, and is not part of the CIAP. It is unique because its costs are driven by the number of recipients eligible as opposed to mission requirements.

<b>National Intelligence Program</b>	
Intelligence Community Management Account (ICMA)	<p>The DNI manages ICMA.</p> <p>Funds expenditures associated with personnel and day-to-day activities of the organizational elements that make up the ODNI. It funds the staffs of the DNI, the Principal Deputy DNI, Deputy and Associate DNIs, and all activities associated with the ODNI's mission and support activities.</p>
Department of Energy NIP	<p>DOE's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE/IN) Director manages DOE NIP.</p> <p>Funds analysts who provide expertise in nuclear, energy, science and technology, and cyber intelligence. DOE NIP provides technically based intelligence analyses of foreign nuclear-related terrorist activities. Its counter-intelligence effort is focused on protecting its personnel, technologies, facilities, and intellectual property from foreign collection efforts (particularly cyber threats).</p>
Department of Homeland Security NIP	<p>The Under Secretary of DHS for Intelligence and Analysis (DHS/I&amp;A) manages DHS Office of Intelligence Analysis (OIA) NIP.</p> <p>Funds analysts who provide expertise on homeland security-related topics such as U.S. critical infrastructure. OIA combines information collected by DHS components as part of their operational activities (e.g., at airports, seaports, and borders) with foreign intelligence from the IC; law enforcement sources; private sector; and open sources.</p> <p>The Assistant Commandant for Intelligence and Criminal Investigations (CG-2) manages USCG NIP.</p> <p>Funds analysts and collection activities in order to provide expertise in all things related to illegal smuggling of weapons, drugs, and migrants.</p>
Department of Justice NIP	<p>The National Security Branch Director manages Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) NIP.</p> <p>Funds counterterrorism analysts and interagency efforts such as Joint Terrorism Task Forces. FBI NIP-related activities include producing analysis designed to prevent theft of sensitive information and advanced technologies, and use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.</p> <p>The Director, Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI) manages Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) NIP.</p> <p>Funds analysts who provide expertise on drug trafficking, and drug-related criminal activities.</p>
Department of State NIP	<p>The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (AS/INR) manages State NIP.</p> <p>Funds analysts who provide expertise on issues as diverse as economic security, terrorist group financing, strategic arms control, political-military issues, and cyber for the Secretary of State and other key policymakers. An example of State NIP-related spending is <i>INR Watch</i>—a 24-hour, seven-day-a-week center for monitoring, evaluating, alerting, and reporting time-sensitive intelligence to department and INR principals, which serves as liaison to other IC operations centers.</p>
Department of Treasury NIP	<p>The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (AS/OIA) manages Treasury NIP.</p> <p>Funds analysts who provide financial and economic expertise. Financial intelligence analysts focus on terrorist financing, counterfeiting, money laundering, funds transfers, weapons sales, and other national security-related financial transactions. Economic intelligence analysts focus on the strengths and vulnerabilities of national economies. OIA established joint intelligence, military, and law enforcement cells in Iraq and Afghanistan to help identify and interdict funding streams to terrorist and insurgent networks.</p>

<b>Military Intelligence Program</b>	
DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA MIP	<p>The DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA Directors manage separate MIP funds.</p> <p>Fund those agency activities that support tactical-level operations not funded by the GDIP, NGP, NRP, or CCP, respectively. For example, the NRO uses some of its MIP funds to counter improvised explosive devices; identify and track high-value targets; and improve battlespace awareness.</p>
OSD MIP	<p>The USD(I) manages OSD MIP.</p> <p>Funds those OSD-managed special technologies programs with DOD-wide application, not funded otherwise. For example, it funds the Advanced Sensors Application Program; Foreign Materiel Acquisition and Exploitation Program, and the Horizontal Fusion Program.</p>
U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) MIP	<p>The SOCOM Director of Intelligence (SOCOM/J2) manages SOCOM MIP.</p> <p>Funds analysts and activities directed toward building SOCOM's own organic capabilities and reimbursing support from military departments. SOCOM MIP is funding several current acquisition efforts focused on outfitting aircraft—both manned and unmanned, fixed and rotary wing—with advanced ISR and data storage capabilities that will work in multiple environments.</p>
Air Force MIP	<p>The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) (AF/A2) manages Air Force MIP.</p> <p>Funds tactical-level systems, people, and activities associated with air/space operations. Air Force ISR platforms most commonly used to collect intelligence are the RC-135, U-2, MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and the RQ-4 Global Hawk.</p>
Army MIP	<p>The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCS/G-2) manages Army MIP.</p> <p>Funds tactical-level systems, people, and activities associated with intelligence support to ground operations. Army MIP-related activities include GEOINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, MASINT, and CI. Army MIP employs physicists, chemists, engineers, and other technical specialists to analyze foreign weapon systems in order to provide intelligence on current and future foreign military armament performance and capabilities.</p>
Navy MIP	<p>The Director of Naval Intelligence, who also serves as the deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance (N-2/N-6), manages Navy MIP.</p> <p>Funds tactical-level systems, people, and activities associated with maritime operations. Navy MIP funds activities related to understanding the capabilities of foreign naval forces; foreign technologies, sensors, weapons, platforms, combat systems, and cyber capabilities; special collection and analysis for irregular and expeditionary forces; and cyberspace and cryptologic operations.</p>
Marine Corps MIP	<p>The Director for Intelligence (DIRINT) manages Marine Corps MIP.</p> <p>Funds tactical-level systems, people, and activities associated with littoral (the region along a shore) and ground operations. Marine Corps MIP funds intelligence-related activities such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and target analysis. It also funds activities associated with GEOINT, SIGINT, CI, and ISR.</p>

**Source:** CRS, based on agency websites; Joint Publication 2-0, “Joint Intelligence,” October 22, 2013; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “U.S. National Intelligence – An Overview,” 2013; Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The US intelligence Community*, 7<sup>th</sup> ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2015); U.S. Coast Guard, *Intelligence*, May 2010, and Dan Elkins, *Managing Intelligence Resources*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014).

**Notes:**

The descriptions are not comprehensive; they are representative of the primary focus of each entity.

Acronyms: COMINT = Communications Intelligence; CI = Counterintelligence; ELINT = Electronic Intelligence; GEOINT = Geospatial Intelligence; HUMINT = Human Intelligence; IMINT = Imagery Intelligence; MASINT = Measurement and Signature Intelligence; OSINT = Open Source Intelligence; SIGINT = Signals Intelligence.

## Appendix C. Intelligence Community Entities Receiving NIP and MIP Funding

Six U.S. intelligence entities—those organizations with an intelligence mission that include but are not limited to the IC components defined by statute—have both MIP and NIP funding sources. The directors of DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA serve as both Program Managers for their NIP funds and Component Managers for their MIP funds.

**Table C-1. Intelligence Community Entities Receiving NIP and MIP Funding**

COMPONENT	MIP SOURCES	NIP SOURCES
<b>CIA</b>		CIAP
<b>COCOMs (Except SOCOM)</b>	DIA MIP	GDIP, NGP, CCP
<b>DIA</b>	DIA MIP	GDIP
<b>DHS, DOE, DOJ, DOS, Treasury</b>		Department Specific NIP
<b>DOD (other than COCOMs)</b>	Department- and Service-Specific MIP OSD MIP	CCP, GDIP, NGP, NRP (associated with NSA, DIA, NGA and NRO)
<b>NGA</b>	NGA MIP	NGP
<b>NRO</b>	NRO MIP	NRP
<b>NSA</b>	NSA MIP	CCP
<b>ODNI</b>		CMA
<b>USDI</b>	OSD MIP	
<b>USSOCOM</b>	USSOCOM MIP	GDIP, NGP, CCP

**Source:** Dan Elkins, *Managing Intelligence Resources*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, (Dewey, AZ: DWE Press, 2014): Chapter 4 pp. 1-16

**Notes:**

DHS also has an intelligence-related program called the Homeland Security Intelligence Program. The HSIP does not fall under the NIP or MIP.

Acronyms: CCP = Consolidated Cryptologic Program; CIAP = CIA Program; CMA = Community Management Account; COCOMs = Regional Combatant Commands; GDIP = General Defense Intelligence Program; OSD = Office of the Secretary of Defense; NGP = National Geospatial-Intelligence Program; NRP = National Reconnaissance Program.

See Figure 3.4 in Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage/CQ Press, 2015), p. 67, for a budgetary view of the IC.

## Appendix D. Intelligence Community Components

In statute, the IC comprises 17 component organizations, spread across six separate departments of the federal government, and two independent agencies. NIP spending is spread across all 17, while MIP spending is confined to the DOD.<sup>44</sup>

**Table D-I. Component Organizations of the U.S. Intelligence Community (2018)**

<p><b>8 Department of Defense (DOD) Components:</b></p> <hr/> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)</li> <li>2. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)</li> <li>3. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)</li> <li>4. National Security Agency (NSA)</li> </ol> <p><i>Intelligence elements of the military services:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. U.S. Air Force Intelligence (USAF/A2)</li> <li>6. U.S. Army Intelligence (USA/G2)</li> <li>7. U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence (USMC/MCISR-E)</li> <li>8. U.S. Navy Intelligence (USN/N2)</li> </ol> <p><b>9 Non-DOD Components:</b></p> <hr/> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)</li> <li>2. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)</li> </ol> <p><i>Department of Energy (DOE) intelligence element:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence (I&amp;CI)</li> </ol> <p><i>Department of Homeland Security (DHS) intelligence elements:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&amp;A)</li> <li>5. U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence (USCG/CG-2)</li> </ol> <p><i>Department of Justice (DOJ) intelligence elements:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. Drug Enforcement Agency's Office of National Security Intelligence (DEA/ONSI)</li> <li>7. Federal Bureau of Investigation's Intelligence Branch (FBI/IB)</li> </ol> <p><i>Department of State (DOS) intelligence element:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8. Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)</li> </ol> <p><i>Department of Treasury (Treasury) intelligence element:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>9. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA)</li> </ol>
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Source: 50 U.S.C. §3003.

<sup>44</sup> See 50 U.S.C. §3003 for statutory definitions of the terms intelligence, foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, intelligence community, national intelligence, intelligence related to national security, and national intelligence program.

## **Author Contact Information**

(name redacted)  
Analyst in Intelligence and National Security  
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

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This report was originally written by former CRS Analyst in Intelligence and National Security Policy (name redacted).

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