("IAB and IESG
Statement") (attached at Appendix A).
Governmental restrictions on the export of encryption software --
and the draconian manner in which they are applied -- impede the
development of the secure global infrastructure that electronic
commerce requires. Less apparent is the effect of these restrictions
on the domestic development and use of privacy-enhancing
cryptographic technologies, to the detriment of individual rights and
commercial concerns within the United States. This domestic impact
occurs as a result of the global nature of computer technology and
networked communications. A global communications infrastructure
requires "interoperability" -- the ability of a user in the United
States to communicate with a European user through systems that
employ common technological standards. In the context of encryption
technology, this requires information to be encrypted and/or
authenticated using the same cryptographic system. If a user outside
of the United States cannot decrypt a message encrypted by a system
that may legally be sold only in the United States, the functionality
and marketability of that system is substantially limited.
The problem of interoperability, coupled with U.S. export
restrictions on encryption software, has led many U.S. software
manufacturers to produce relatively weak security products that can
be sold both at home and abroad. This is particularly true of
"integrated" products, such as word processing and spreadsheet
programs that contain cryptographic capabilities. As the NRC
Committee found,
U.S. export controls have had a negative impact on the
cryptographic strength of many integrated products with encryption
capabilities available in the United States. Export controls tend to
drive major vendors to a "least common denominator" cryptographic
solution that will pass export review as well as sell in the United
States. . . . Export controls distort the global market for
cryptography . . . .
NRC Report, supra, § 4.3.1, at 138 (footnote
omitted).
For more than a quarter of a century, the United States has led
the world in the development of computer and communications
technology. That leadership position is now being threatened by the
controls on cryptography at issue in this case./ As noted, a global
communications infrastructure has emerged (largely as a result of
U.S. innovation), requiring sophisticated techniques for the security
and privacy of communications. Individuals will increasingly demand
that their personal privacy be preserved in the new information
environment, and commercial entities will require the highest level
of protection for valuable financial and proprietary data.
For example, restrictions on the use of encryption technology render
it more difficult for U.S. companies to protect their valuable trade
secrets against industrial espionage. Many U.S. companies now use
software files -- instead of blueprints or other paper-based means of
storage -- to store their secret product designs./ Strong encryption
is an important means of protecting such product designs. The trade
secrets of U.S. companies have come under increasing attack not only
by U.S. competitors but also by foreign governments themselves./
Although Congress recently enacted the first-ever federal trade
secret law in the Economic Espionage Act (P.L. 104-294, 110 Stat.
3488 (1996)) to help prevent such industrial espionage, the far
preferable method of preserving U.S. companies' trade secrets is
through the use of strong encryption to protect such secrets
before they are misappropriated.
Future leadership in the field of information technology will depend
upon leadership in the field of information security. The demand for
security must be met, if not by U.S. engineers and software
developers, then by their foreign competitors. Although controls on
the export of encryption software are asserted to be necessary for
national security, "[t]he development of foreign competitors in the
information technology industry could have a number of
disadvantageous consequences from the standpoint of U.S. national
security interests." NRC Report, supra, § 4.4.2,
at 156.
In sum, the export restrictions on encryption software at issue in
this case have had, and will continue to have, a substantial
detrimental effect on the U.S. computer, communications, and other
industries. Because these export restrictions require U.S. software
manufacturers to market only products with weak and insufficient
security features, the restrictions hobble U.S. software
manufacturers and severely endanger their future world leadership.
The export restrictions also endanger U.S. national security
interests by allowing foreign encryption technology to flourish,
while stunting the development of U.S. encryption technology.
B. Restrictions on the dissemination of cryptographic
information infringe upon individual privacy rights.
Governmental regulation of the free flow of information concerning
cryptographic security techniques endangers personal privacy as well
as commerce. As the recent IAB and IESG Statement noted, oversight
bodies "are concerned by the need for increased protection of
international commercial transactions on the Internet, and by the
need to offer all Internet users an adequate degree of privacy." IAB
and IESG Statement, supra, at 1. Indeed, cryptographic
technology is becoming an increasingly vital tool for human rights
activists, political dissidents, and whistle-blowers throughout the
world to facilitate confidential communications free from intrusion.
For example, amicus Human Rights Watch increasingly uses
encryption in its communications with human rights activists around
the globe. Its Hong Kong office has routinely encrypted
communications since the July 1997 transfer of sovereignty over the
territory to the People's Republic of China, a government that has
punished peaceful expression of human rights criticism as
counterrevolutionary crime. See also David Banisar,
A Primer on Electronic Surveillance for Human Rights
Organizations, International Privacy Bulletin (July 1993).
Cryptographic techniques can also provide confidentiality of
electronic mail and personal records, such as medical information and
financial data, which are increasingly at risk of theft or misuse
when stored in a networked environment. Indeed, two decades ago the
Supreme Court recognized the risks to personal privacy created by
unwarranted disclosures of information maintained by the government
itself:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit
in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in
computerized data banks or other massive government files . . . .
much of which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing
or harmful if disclosed.
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (footnote
omitted). These risks have increased substantially as virtually all
vital records, both public and private, are now maintained
electronically, many of which are stored in networked environments
with insufficient security.
In short, the governmental regulations at issue not only hobble
the development of electronic commerce, but jeopardize personal
privacy interests as well.
ARGUMENT
I. The text at issue is itself protected expression under
the First Amendment.
A. The First Amendment protects a broad range of
scientific and artistic expression, including text expressed in
computer programming languages.
To communicate his ideas and theories on cryptography to other
scientists, Professor Bernstein sought and was refused a governmental
determination that text written in C programming language could be
freely disseminated. The District Court correctly determined that the
software at issue constitutes speech for purposes of First Amendment
analysis. See Bernstein I, 922 F. Supp. at 1436;
Bernstein II, 945 F. Supp. at 1287; see also
Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 9-10
(D.D.C. 1996) (holding that First Amendment protection extends to
encryption source code and embedded comments), remanded, 107
F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Mendelsohn,
896 F.2d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that computer
programs may warrant First Amendment protection). This Court should
uphold the District Court's determination that software is expression
protected by the First Amendment.
The First Amendment protects a broad range of scientific and
artistic expression. To be worthy of First Amendment protection,
expression need only be a vehicle for the communication of thoughts,
ideas, opinions, or emotions. Expression is protected if, given the
context or environment in which it is undertaken, it contains
sufficient communicative elements. See Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). As leading First Amendment
scholar Thomas Emerson explained in discussing the role of free
expression in a democratic society,
[E]very man -- in the development of his own
personality -- has the right to form his own beliefs and opinions.
And, it also follows, that he has the right to express these beliefs
and opinions. Otherwise they are of little account. For expression is
an integral part of the development of ideas, of mental exploration
and of the affirmation of self. . . . Hence, suppression of . . .
expression is an affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man's
essential nature. . . . From these concepts there follows the right
of the individual to access knowledge; to shape his own views . . .;
in short, to participate in formulating the aims and achievements of
his society and his state.
[T]hought and communication are the fountainhead of all expression
of the individual personality. To cut off the flow at the source is
to dry up the whole stream. Freedom at this point is essential to all
other freedoms.
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 879-81 (1963).
The purview of the First Amendment encompasses a wide variety of
scientific and artistic speech. Included within the First Amendment's
sphere of protection are, for example, the abstract paintings of
Jackson Pollack, the esoteric classical music of Arnold
Schönberg, rock music, modern dance, and the nonsense verse of
Lewis Carroll. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995); Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). To be granted
First Amendment protection, expression need not be communicative to
all members of a community or be meaningful to a general audience;
rather, protected expression may serve as a vehicle of communication
only among specialized communities (such as esoteric classical music,
experimental theater, abstract art, or abstruse scientific speech,
each of which is meaningful only to certain subsets of society).
Scientific expression, no less than artistic expression, falls
squarely within the rubric of First Amendment protection. See
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (works with
scientific, artistic, political, or literary value protected by First
Amendment).
Expression does not forfeit its First Amendment protection merely
because it interacts or may interact with a machine. Motion pictures,
recorded music, books on tape or on CD-ROM, and text on the Internet
are all protected by the First Amendment regardless of the fact that
they cannot be read, heard, or perceived by humans without the aid of
a device. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965); Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
Similarly, source code is not rendered outside the protection of the
First Amendment simply because it may interact with a computer.
Moreover, the fact that source code is stored in electronic form,
instead of on paper or some other traditional medium of expression,
does not render it unprotected by the First Amendment. On the
contrary, throughout this century the First Amendment gradually has
been extended to encompass expression via new media, to the point
where today, "[t]o an increasing degree, the more significant
interchanges of ideas [occur] in electronic media." Denver Area
Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374,
2414 (1996) (Kennedy, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part). It is
undisputed that the First Amendment applies to expression
communicated via new technologies such as the Internet. See,
e.g., Reno v. ACLU, supra. Thus,
notwithstanding the fact that the text at issue is stored in
electronic form instead of on paper, it nonetheless constitutes
protected expression under the First Amendment.
Furthermore, expression that may be susceptible to bad tendencies
or to being subverted for harmful results or that has perceived
harmful secondary effects is nonetheless protected by the First
Amendment. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (rejecting bad tendency and clear and present danger tests);
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986). Mere
recitations by the government that the expression subject to
regulation tends to endanger national security interests will not
render the regulations constitutional. See New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
Similarly, the government's self-serving statements that its motive
for enacting the regulations is not to suppress expression cannot
save the regulations from a finding of unconstitutionality.
See, e.g., Lakewood v. Plain Dealer
Publishing, 486 U.S. 750, 764 (1988).
B. Source code is a fundamental vehicle for
communication among scientists.
The expression at issue in this case -- source code written in C
programming language containing encryption algorithms -- is an
important vehicle for communication among scientists and
mathematicians of their theories and ideas. Whether or not source
code is associated with expression in the mind of the average member
of the community (see Brief of Appellant at 40), source code
is a commonly-used and fundamental medium of expression among
scientists and mathematicians, as described below. Moreover,
programming language is a uniquely-suited formal vehicle for the
precise communication of complex scientific and mathematical
concepts. Thus, it is not merely the case that programming language
is expressive; rather, in many instances, such language is the
only appropriate vehicle for the communication of precise,
complex ideas among scientists and mathematicians.
The fundamental expressive character of source code is best
articulated in the words of those who regularly use it as a medium of
scientific expression. As computer scientist Carl Ellison explains,
"computer languages are used to communicate between human beings . .
. . They are the natural and best means of communication of some
kinds of ideas, specifically mathematical concepts in the form of
algorithms. . . . [A] fundamental and essential use for [computer
languages] is for communication between people." Ellison Decl. ¶
8 (ER 00104-5). Similarly, computer programmer Richard M. Stallman
explains
[a]s an experienced programmer, I often communicate
certain of my ideas in computer languages in order to be more precise
about them -- just as mathematicians express equations in
mathematical notation and composers express music in musical
notation. . . . As a computer programmer, I can communicate using
computer programming languages, within the range of what they can
express, just as I would using human languages.
Stallman Decl. ¶¶ 3-4 (ER 00190). Computer Science
Professor Harold Abelson concurs: "[t]he notion that computer
programs are a medium of expression is widespread throughout computer
science education. . . . [C]omputer language . . . is a novel formal
medium for expressing ideas about methodology." Abelson Decl. ¶
8 (ER 00066) (internal quotations omitted).
Thus, source code -- such as the encryption source code at issue
in this case -- is essentially text written in a "high-level"
language, i.e., a form of language syntactically and
semantically similar to natural languages such as English or Spanish.
See Encyclopedia of Computer Science 962, 1263-64
(Anthony Ralston & Edwin D. Reilly eds. 3d ed. 1995). See
generally Marvin Minsky, Semantic Information
Processing 1-32 (1980). An essential function of such source
code, and of the English-language "comments" embedded in source code,
is to facilitate communication between and among scientists:
Just as a mathematics text or written music communicates to a
specially trained group of readers, a computer program communicates
to its own group of readers. When seen in this light, the First
Amendment implications of computer programs are no different from
those of many other copyrightable texts.
Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the
Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept
and Feel," 38 Emory L.J. 393, 431 (1989). Accordingly, as the
District Court correctly held, for First Amendment purposes, no
meaningful difference exists between high-level programming
languages, on the one hand, and natural languages like English and
Spanish, on the other. All languages, including high-level computer
languages, "participate in a complex system of understood meanings
within specific communities." Bernstein I, 922 F. Supp. at
1435.
Source code written in a high-level programming language such as C
-- the programming language at issue in this case -- shares many
features with other forms of expression that receive First Amendment
protection. The communicative nature and expressive qualities of
source code and its accompanying comments are readily apparent. To
understand this point, it is helpful to consider the following text
written in C programming language, which might be used in setting up
an interactive, politically-oriented site on the Internet:
/* Comment: This program sets forth interactive
responses
* to users' answers on a politically-oriented web site.
*/
enum { conservative, liberal, radical, unknown }
Political_Profile;
/* (insert code to set Political_Profile here) */
if (Political_Profile == conservative) {
printf("A conservative is a man who has two \
perfectly good legs who, however, has never \
learned to walk forward. --Franklin Delano \ Roosevelt.\n");
} else if (Political_Profile == liberal) {
printf("A liberal is a man who is willing to spend \ someone else's
money. --Carter Glass.\n");
} else if (Political_Profile == radical) {
printf("I never dared to be a radical when young, \
for fear it would make me conservative when old. \
--Robert Frost.\n")};
} else {
printf("The marvel of all history is the patience \
with which men and women submit to burdens \
unnecessarily laid upon them by their governments. \
-- William E. Borah.\n")'
}
The series of C programming language statements set forth above
expresses ideas in a formal, structured form. Similarly, the source
code at issue in the instant case expresses ideas in a structured
form to a specialized audience./ This expression of ideas, whether
emanating from an 18th Century printing press or from a 20th Century
source code editor, warrants the protection of the First Amendment./
The government suggests that the Export Administration Regulations
do not restrict expression because certain encryption
information expressed in certain media -- such as ideas about
cryptography set forth in books or articles -- may be freely
published under the Regulations. See Brief of Appellant at 38.
The government fails to credit, however, the averments of computer
science professionals themselves, which make clear that
English-language expressions of ideas of cryptography are not
sufficient vehicles for communicating their scientific and
mathematical ideas. Furthermore, the fact that the Regulations do not
restrict the publication of information or source code in paper form
that is already publicly available does not mean that the
Regulations are not speech-restrictive. The right to freely
disseminate what is already widely disseminated is inadequate to
guarantee scientists' freedom of expression.
For these reasons, this Court should uphold the District Court's
determination that source code constitutes protected expression for
purposes of First Amendment analysis.
II. The government cannot avoid First Amendment scrutiny by
spurious claims that the EAR encryption regulations do not restrain
speech.
The government expressly concedes that source code -- including
the encryption source code at issue in this case -- "can be read and
understood" by people trained in the particular language in which the
source code is written. See Brief of Appellant at 7, 27. That
concession should end any dispute about whether encryption source
code is entitled to First Amendment protection. In its brief,
however, the government attempts to escape the inevitable effect of
its concession by a sleight-of-hand. The government first asserts
that source code is merely a "product," and then asserts that "the
EAR requires a license for the export of encryption products,
[but] it does not require a license for the public dissemination of
cryptographic information." Id. at 20, 29. The
implication is that the Regulations do not restrain speech --
"information" -- in any significant way. But this attempt to draw a
false distinction between encryption source code and other kinds of
encryption information is not only contradicted by the central
importance of source code to communication among scientists, it is
also flatly contrary to the specific provisions of the Regulations.
A. The Act and Regulations explicitly recognize
that source code and other software are forms of information, not
mere "products" or "commodities."
The government's sleight-of-hand depends upon introducing a new term
("product") that is not used in either the Export Administration Act
or the Regulations, and then giving that term a meaning completely at
odds with the Act and the Regulations. The Export Administration Act
divides the subjects of its export control regime into two mutually
exclusive categories: "goods" and "technology." The Act defines
"goods" as "any article, natural or manmade substance, material
supply or manufactured product, . . . excluding technical
data." 50 U.S.C. App. ' 2415(3) (emphasis added). "Technology" is
defined in turn to encompass "information or know-how
[tangible or intangible] that can be used to design, produce,
manufacture, utilize or reconstruct goods, including computer
software and technical data, but not the goods themselves." 50
U.S.C. App. § 2415(4) (emphasis added).
The Regulations, based on the Act, follow an exactly parallel
structure and thus distinguish between mutually exclusive categories
of "commodities" and "technology." Indeed, the Regulations expressly
define "commodities" to include "[a]ny article, material, or supply
except technology and software." 15 C.F.R. pt. 772 (emphasis
added). Reflecting that division, software has always been treated
under the EAR as a form of technology -- i.e., information or
know-how -- and not as a commodity.
This distinction is not merely theoretical or formal: For
instance, non-encryption technology and information in all its forms
-- including source code, object code, and all other software -- are
free from the Regulations' licensing requirements when they become
publicly available through certain specifically-defined methods.
See 15 C.F.R. § 734(b)(3). Commodities, by contrast,
cannot qualify as publicly available under these exceptions and are
thus subject to the Regulations regardless of availability.
Thus, both the Act and the Regulations explicitly recognize that
source code and other software, by their very nature, are forms of
"information and know-how" that are distinct from "goods" or
"commodities." That is completely at odds with the government's
post hoc attempts to invent a new regulatory term, "products,"
that would encompass both commodities and software. The government
cannot defend the Regulations on grounds that are simply at odds with
the specific provisions of the Regulations themselves.
The government's claim that source code is fundamentally different
from blueprints or technical instructions, and thus can be treated as
a mere "product," is similarly misconceived. The fact that source
code can be read by a machine as well as an informed person cannot
obscure the essential fact that source code can be and
is read by people and indeed is a preferred vehicle for
communication among scientists, programmers, and others. And, once
again, the Regulations themselves belie the government's argument,
for the Regulations specifically recognize that blueprints, technical
instructions, and software are all simply different forms of
technical information. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 772. In sum, the
government's attempt to distinguish source code from other forms of
information is unavailing. In essence, the government seeks to
justify its pre-publication review of what it concedes to be speech
(source code) that has a particular kind of content (encryption
algorithms) by declaring that such speech is merely a "product." The
government could not escape First Amendment scrutiny of
pre-publication restraints on information or music published on
CD-ROM or audiotape simply by labeling these items "products" rather
than "information." This instant attempt must fail for the same
reasons.
B. Encryption information is not free from the
Regulations' licensing restrictions. '
The government attempts to support its pre-publication licensing
requirements on encryption software by suggesting that the Export
Administration Regulations impose no licensing restrictions on the
ability of Professor Bernstein or anyone else to disseminate other
kinds of encryption information. See Brief of Appellant at 20,
29. That suggestion cannot withstand scrutiny.
The Regulations plainly make encryption information -- defined as
information for the development, production, or use of encryption --
subject to the very same licensing requirements that apply to
encryption hardware and encryption software. See 15 C.F.R.
§§ 736.2(b)(1), (2), (3); 738 & Supp. 1, pt. 774, ECCN
5E002. The government points to certain exceptions in the Regulations
for information that has become "publicly available" through certain
limited and specifically defined means./ But it is undeniable that
some encryption information will fall outside these exceptions
and will therefore remain subject to the full force of the
Regulations' licensing requirements. Indeed, in its discussion of the
appropriate remedy in this case, the government not only recognizes
that encryption information is subject to full EAR licensing control,
but also argues that any remedy must leave those controls in place.
See Brief of Appellant at 47-48.
III. The Export Administration Regulations constitute an
unconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression.
A. The Regulations represent a classic prior
restraint that fails to comport with the Pentagon
Papers standard.
Because the Regulations require an individual to secure a
government-issued license before the publication or dissemination of
protected expression outside the United States/ -- or even
inside the United States via the Internet or to foreign
nationals -- they embody a classic form of prior restraint on
expression. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
[a statute which] makes the peaceful enjoyment of
freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the
uncontrolled will of an official -- as by requiring a permit or
license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such
official -- is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon
the enjoyment of those freedoms.
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51
(1969). As the Supreme Court explained early in this century, "the
chief purpose of the guarantee [of freedom of expression] [is] to
prevent previous restraints upon publication," as prior restraints
are "the essence of censorship." Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 713 (1931); see also id. at 713-15
(describing our Nation's centuries-old history of repugnance toward
prior restraints). Accordingly, "[a]ny system of prior restraints of
expression comes to [the] Court bearing a heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); see also
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714
(1971) (per curiam).
In any case involving a prior restraint on protected expression,
such as that embodied in the Regulations, the government "carries a
heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a
restraint." Id. The First Amendment's ban on prior restraints
may be overridden only where the government conclusively establishes
that the regulation falls within the one recognized exception to the
ban on prior restraints applicable in cases involving national
security concerns. This exception has been construed very narrowly.
It is met only where "[publication] will surely result in direct,
immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people,"
id. at 730 (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., concurring), or
where there is "governmental allegation and proof that publication
must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an
event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at
sea," id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring); see
also Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th
Cir. 1988) ("Prior restraints are permissible only in the rarest of
circumstances, such as imminent threat to national security.")
(emphasis added).
This narrow exception to the prohibition on prior restraints
"refers to the fact that, as a matter of procedural safeguards and
burden of proof, prior restraints even within a recognized exception
to the rule against prior restraints will be extremely difficult to
justify." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
592 (1976) (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart, J., and Marshall, J.,
concurring). Even within the sole possible exception to the
prohibition against prior restraints, therefore, the government's
burden is "formidable," and indeed "almost insuperable." Id.
at 593-94. Thus, for example, despite the government's assertion that
the publication of a classified Defense Department study would
interfere with national security, produce the death of military
personnel, and prolong the Vietnam War, the Supreme Court refused to
uphold a prior restraint imposed on publication, holding that the
government failed to meet its "'heavy burden of showing justification
for the imposition of such a [prior] restraint.'" New York
Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (per curiam).
In the instant case, the government does not contend that the
publication or dissemination of the text at issue will cause "direct,
immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people,"
id. at 730 (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., concurring), or
that there is an "imminent threat to national security,"
Burch, 861 F.2d at 1154. Nor could it. The Regulations allow
the government to prohibit the dissemination of source code with
cryptographic content based on nothing more than a determination that
the prohibition "is consistent with U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests." 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(b). This sort of
discretionary, standardless pre-publication review of protected
expression fails to satisfy the standard set forth in New York
Times and poses the grave dangers of a censorship system that the
Supreme Court and this Circuit have repeatedly condemned. See,
e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951);
Desert Outdoor Advertising v. City of Moreno Valley,
103 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1996) ("A law subjecting the exercise of
First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without
narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing
authority, is unconstitutional.") (internal quotations omitted),
cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3281 (1997).
Because the Regulations embody a classic form of prior restraint
on protected expression in which undue discretion is vested in a
government licensor, see Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. 147;
Desert Outdoor Advertising, 103 F.3d 814, and that does not
comply with the standard of New York Times, the Regulations'
licensing scheme is unconstitutional.
B. The prior restraint embodied in the
Regulations is also unconstitutional because it fails to provide
necessary procedural safeguards.
The Regulations embody a prior restraint that should be found
unconstitutional for a second, independent reason: here, as in
FW/PBS, the statutory scheme lacks the fundamental procedural
safeguards that the Supreme Court has repeatedly identified as
essential to a government licensing scheme. See, e.g.,
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Teitel
Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968) (per curiam).
To pass constitutional muster, all prior restraints on protected
expression -- even content-neutral prior restraints -- must provide
at least two procedural safeguards: (1) there must be definite and
reasonable limitations on the time within which the licensor must
decide whether to issue the license; and (2) expeditious judicial
review of the licensing decision must be available. See
Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59; Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at
70; FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227-30. The government suggests that
content-neutral prior restraints, or prior restraints that are not
directed at preventing the public exchange of information or ideas,
need not comport with these procedural safeguards. See Brief
of Appellant at 21. But even assuming arguendo that the
Regulations were content-neutral, that would not save the Regulations
from scrutiny under the prior restraint doctrine. As the Fourth
Circuit sitting en banc explained in Baltimore
Boulevard,
[T]he [Supreme] Court has made clear that otherwise
valid content-neutral . . . restrictions that require governmental
permission prior to engaging in protected speech must be analyzed as
prior restraints and are unconstitutional if they do not limit the
discretion of the decision-maker and provide for the Freedman
procedural safeguards.
11126 Baltimore Boulevard v. Prince George's County,
Md., 58 F.3d 988, 995 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 567 (1995). The Supreme Court concluded in
FW/PBS that the above procedural safeguards must be provided
in any system of prior restraint, regardless of whether it
is content-neutral or content-based. Id.; see
also Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing, 486
U.S. 750, 764 (1988) ("[E]ven if the government may constitutionally
impose content-neutral prohibitions on a particular manner of speech,
it may not condition that speech on obtaining a license or permit
from a government official in that official's boundless
discretion.").
The Regulations in this case are therefore subject to and
deficient in light of the above prior restraint analysis, even
assuming arguendo that they are content-neutral. Similarly --
and contrary to the government's assertions -- regardless of whether
the Regulations were specifically intended or designed to
prevent the public exchange of information or ideas, regulations with
the effect of restraining expression prior to its publication
are subject to the prior restraint doctrine. For example, in
Lakewood, despite the government's contention that the
regulations on newsracks were designed to protect the health, safety
and welfare of citizens -- not to prevent the public exchange of
ideas or information -- the regulations were found subject to and
deficient under the prior restraint doctrine. See id.
at 770.
The Regulations fail to provide the required procedural safeguards
for prior restraints, first, because they fail to impose time limits
on the government's licensing determinations./ "A prior restraint on
speech that imposes no time limitations on the decision-making
process plainly fails to satisfy the first requirement set forth in
Freedman." Baltimore Boulevard, 58 F.3d at 997;
see also FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227. Although the
reasonableness of the time period of the licensor's decision-making
process may vary in different contexts depending on the type of
judgments involved in the licensing determination, an open-ended time
frame such as that permitted under the Regulations clearly lacks this
essential procedural safeguard. See United States v.
Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 374 (1971); Baltimore
Boulevard, 58 F.3d at 997; see also Teitel
Film, 390 U.S. at 141-142 (per curiam) (finding that 50-57 day
period for obtaining an administrative decision in film censorship
context did not amount to a "specified brief period" for purposes of
the Freedman analysis).
Second, the Regulations fail to provide for prompt judicial review
of the government's licensing decision. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized the importance of the availability of
expeditious judicial review of licensing determinations in the prior
restraint context. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59;
Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 368. In the case of
licensing decisions under the Regulations, the executive branch
apparently takes the position that judicial review is completely
unavailable./ Amici are aware of no case in which a federal
court has upheld a regulation imposing a prior restraint on protected
expression where judicial review of the licensor's decision was
unavailable. See Baltimore Boulevard, 58 F.3d at
1000-01 (collecting cases).
In sum, the Regulations impose a prior restraint on protected
expression that does not satisfy the requirements of New York
Times and vests undue discretion with the government licensing
official. Even assuming arguendo that the Regulations embodied
an otherwise valid, content-neutral licensing scheme, the scheme
would nonetheless be unconstitutional because it fails to provide
definite and reasonable limitations on the time within which the
government must issue its licensing determinations and fails to
provide for prompt judicial review of licensing determinations. Thus,
the Regulations constitute a system of unconstitutional prior
restraint of protected expression in violation of the First
Amendment.
IV. The Export Administration Regulations constitute an
unconstitutional content-based regulation of protected speech.
Even if this Court finds that the Regulations do not impose an
unconstitutional prior restraint, the Regulations should be struck
down because they embody a content-based restriction on expression
that is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest. Under the Regulations, the government seeks to restrict the
dissemination of certain text on the basis of its content because the
government considers such expression to be inimical to national
security and foreign policy interests. If the source code at issue
embodied word processing algorithms, for example, instead of
encryption algorithms, the Regulations would not restrict its
dissemination. The government expressly concedes that the Regulations
distinguish encryption software from all other software and impose
more onerous restrictions based solely on software's encryption
content. See Brief of Appellant at 12-13, 44. Thus, even if
not analyzed as a prior restraint, the Regulations' licensing scheme
is constitutionally suspect because it is aimed at the suppression of
a category of allegedly dangerous expression.
Because the Regulations restrict expression based on its content,
they are subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny. See,
e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). As the Supreme Court explained in
Mosley, a government regulation that delineates permissible
and impermissible expression in terms of its content or subject
matter is unconstitutional, absent a compelling governmental interest
and narrow tailoring of means to end. Id. at 95 ("[A]bove all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its . . . subject matter, or its
content."). The government does not contend that the Regulations can
withstand such strict scrutiny.
A. The government's proposed analyses for
finding the Regulations content-neutral are erroneous. '
The government offers several arguments to support its contention
that the Regulations are content-neutral and therefore subject to
reduced scrutiny. First, the government contends that regulations
cannot be considered content-based unless they are motivated by the
government's express disagreement with the message conveyed by the
regulated expression. See Brief of Appellant at 25. Second,
the government argues that regulations premised upon national
security or foreign policy concerns should not be considered
content-based. Id. at 25-26. Third, the government contends
that the Regulations are content-neutral because they restrict both
expression and non-expression (i.e., both cryptographic software and
hardware). Id. at 42. The flaws in each of these contentions
are apparent.
First, the government errs in contending that whether a regulation
is content-neutral turns on whether it was motivated by an illicit
governmental intent. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that
First Amendment analysis requires courts to peer into the subjective
minds of the legislators who enact the restrictions at issue. As the
Court explained in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue:
Illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of
a violation of the First Amendment. We have long recognized that even
regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict unduly
the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment.
460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983) (citations omitted). Second, throughout
this century the Supreme Court has recognized that government
censorship motivated by concerns for national security or foreign
policy can still constitute invalid content-based regulations.
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); see also Bullfrog
Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988)./ There
is no per se exception to the First Amendment for speech that
concerns national security or foreign policy. Third, the government's
argument that it can constitutionally restrict expression because it
also restricts non-expression cannot save the Regulations from
constitutional attack. Accepting this novel First Amendment rationale
would mean, for example, that localities could restrict a host of
items considered to be dangerous -- for example, guns and knives and
"dangerous" books -- and could then contend that these regulations
were content-neutral simply because non-expressive as well as
expressive items were regulated. It is surely no answer to a
complaint of a First Amendment violation that the subject regulations
concededly restrict expressive activity, but also prohibit other,
non-expressive activity.
B. The functionality or usefulness of the text
at issue does not withdraw it from First Amendment protection.
The government correctly notes that Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer provides for stringent First Amendment scrutiny of
regulations burdening items or activities that are "commonly
associated with expression." The government contends, however, that
the source code at issue is not commonly associated with expression
because of what the government contends are its unique functional
qualities. It contends that encryption software is regulated, whereas
books containing source code are not, because of the unique
functional qualities of software. This argument is also without
merit.
Although it is certainly true that it is easier to encrypt
communications if one has encryption source code stored on disk
rather than printed in a book, this difference is one of degree and
bears no constitutional significance. To convert source code printed
in a book to a computer readable format, the user must have some
minimal additional knowledge (how to type or scan the text into the
computer) and must press more keys on a computer to accomplish the
task. Once these steps are taken, the source code printed in the book
can be used to encrypt communications. But the usefulness or
"functionality" of speech is always a product of the existing
knowledge and facility of the reader. Thus, a person sent a copy of
the Pythagorean Theorem who understands the meaning of the word
"hypotenuse" and who has a calculator will find the theorem quite
functional, compared to a person without such tools or skills.
Similarly, exportation of Mao's Little Red Book in Chinese is less
"functional" as an instructional text to people in Latin America than
is the identical book translated into Spanish. In neither case would
variations in the "functionality" of the speech justify its
suppression in one case but not the other. Similarly, in the instant
case, the functionality of the text at issue stored on disk cannot
justify its suppression./
C. Even if the Regulations were not subject to
strict scrutiny, they are unconstitutional because they are not
narrowly tailored.
For the reasons set forth above, the government's argument that the
Regulations are content-neutral should fail. Even if, however, one
were to accept the government's position that the First Amendment
requires only that the Regulations must further an important
government interest, be unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and be narrowly tailored, the Regulations would still be
unconstitutional. Amici agree that national security is an
important governmental interest. Even accepting the government's
argument, however, the Regulations cannot be considered narrowly
tailored.
The government concedes that speech comparable to or even
virtually identical to the speech regulated in this case is available
overseas. See Brief of Appellant at 33. The government also
concedes that the exact speech in this case can be exported in book
form. Given these concessions, it is difficult to see the Regulations
as narrowly tailored to the purpose of preventing those overseas from
encrypting messages. Even if the Regulations were fully enforced,
those overseas and hostile to the United States could encrypt their
messages by using comparable software available overseas, by
downloading nearly identical software from one of many Internet
sites, or by converting the printed source code into electronic form.
Speech-restrictive regulations that fail to accomplish their stated
purpose to any significant degree cannot be found "narrowly tailored"
and must be held unconstitutional even under intermediate
constitutional scrutiny.
V. The Regulations unreasonably and impermissibly burden
private speech.
The source code at issue in this case not only constitutes expression
that merits First Amendment protection, as discussed above, but is
also critical to safeguard the right of private speech, which
implicates important First and Fourth Amendment values. Regulations
on cryptographic software such as those embodied in the Regulations
have the effect of controlling the result -- private speech -- by
controlling the tools necessary to achieve that result in the
electronic sphere. As the Supreme Court has long held, the government
may not target the tools of expression to restrain or burden the
underlying expression itself. See, e.g., Minneapolis
Star, 460 U.S. at 585. As discussed below, regulations on
cryptographic software chill private electronic communications,
impermissibly burden constitutionally protected speech, and interfere
with people's reasonable expectation of privacy in their electronic
communications.
A. Communications via the Internet, especially
private communications, are an increasingly important form of
expression.
The Internet has quickly become an unprecedented forum for
communication among individuals throughout the United States and
indeed the entire world. As the special 3-judge panel in ACLU
v. Reno explained,
It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet
has achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory
marketplace of mass speech that this country -- and indeed the world
-- has yet seen. [Because of the special characteristics of Internet
communications,] the Internet deserves the broadest possible
protection from government-imposed . . . regulation.
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D.Pa. 1996),
aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). The court explained further
that "[t]he World Wide Web exists fundamentally as a platform through
which people and organizations can communicate through shared
information." Id. at 837. Each day, millions of items of text,
messages, and other communications are exchanged among the
participants on the Internet, which serves as an unrivaled forum for
free expression and the exchange of ideas.
B. Private communications, including private
electronic communications, are protected by the convergence of First
and Fourth Amendment values.
Encryption capabilities are essential to the ability to communicate
privately in the information age. Without readily-available
encryption software, confidential or private electronic
communications are rendered vulnerable to public exposure and
interception. To require electronic communications and records to be
unencrypted is equivalent to requiring that all paper communications
be written on postcards instead of conveyed in sealed envelopes.
Regulations that impose a significant burden on the dissemination of
encryption software have a similar effect. If effective encryption is
difficult to obtain, the result will be that private messages and
records will be vulnerable to unwilling disclosure. That result is
inconsistent with the mandate of the ACLU v. Reno court
that "the Internet deserves the broadest possible protection" from
government regulation. Id. at 881.
Courts have also long recognized that the Fourth Amendment shields
private communications from unreasonable governmental interference or
surveillance. See, e.g., United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)
("Keith"); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967). In particular, the Supreme Court has held that "governmental
incursions into conversational privacy" via electronic means
"necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards."
Keith, 407 U.S. at 313. Throughout this century, the
importance of communications privacy has been recognized, regardless
of whether the medium of private communication is a sealed letter or
a telephonic or electronic message. See Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-75 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (fearing government's eventual use of "subtler and more
far-reaching means of invading privacy [furnished through] the
progress of science."). The Supreme Court has explained that when the
government seeks to impinge upon private communications in the name
of national security, the "convergence of First and Fourth Amendment
values" must guide the Court's interpretation of the reasonableness
of the government's interference. Keith, 407 U.S. at 313.
The Internet has become an increasingly important forum for
private communications. Individuals throughout the United States have
come to expect that their electronic communications, and often their
identities, will be shielded from public view. See,
e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 849
(recognizing importance of preserving privacy of identity of
participants in Internet communications); Shea v. Reno,
930 F. Supp. 916, 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); ACLU v.
Miller, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) (N.D. Ga. 1997) (finding
substantial likelihood that statute compelling identity of Internet
communicant was unconstitutional). Courts have explicitly recognized
that those who send private electronic communications enjoy a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of those
communications, such that government officials may not access such
communications without probable cause and a search warrant.
See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 45
M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
Without readily-available encryption software, however, electronic
communications can be easily intercepted, and communications intended
to be private may be rendered vulnerable to exposure. As the district
court in ACLU v. Reno recognized, electronic messages
sent over the Internet are not "`sealed' or secure, and can be
accessed or viewed on intermediate computers between the sender and
the recipient (unless the message is encrypted )." 929 F.
Supp. at 834 (emphasis added). Similarly, the district court in
American Library Association v. Pataki lamented the
insecurity of electronic communications via the Internet relative to
communications via U.S. mail, noting that "[w]hile first class
letters are sealed, e-mail communications are more easily
intercepted." American Library Association v. Pataki,
969 F. Supp. 160, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). That court went on to note
that "[c]oncerns about the relatively easy accessibility of e-mail
communications have led bar associations in some states to require
that lawyers encrypt sensitive e-mail messages in order to protect
client confidentiality." Id.
Cryptography has also become an increasingly vital tool for
political dissidents, human rights activists, and whistle-blowers in
the United States and throughout the world to facilitate private
electronic communications free from intrusion. See,
e.g., David Banisar, A Primer on Electronic Surveillance
for Human Rights Organizations, International Privacy Bulletin 3
(July 1993); Zimmermann Decl. ¶ 25 (ER 00196) (human rights
organizations rely upon the unfettered use of cryptography to protect
their communications, as do witnesses who report human rights abuses
in repressive regimes throughout the world).
The Regulations' restrictions on the dissemination of
cryptographic software, however, render it difficult for those
communicating via the Internet or other electronic means to achieve
genuine privacy. The Regulations substantially constrain private
communications between people in the United States and people located
in other countries -- whether U.S. citizens or foreign nationals.
This is a result of the critical importance of "interoperable"
software to the global Internet: Unless both parties to the
communication share encryption software that employs the same
cryptographic methods and standards, they cannot communicate
privately at all. The Regulations, and the restrictive licensing
policies they embody, effectively prevent most U.S. persons from
communicating privately with those in foreign countries.
The Regulations also have an indirect impact on the development
and availability of effective encryption software even within the
United States. If a strong and effective encryption system can be
sold only in the United States, or sold elsewhere only after a
lengthy and burdensome process of obtaining licensing approval for
every individual sale, its marketability is diminished. Producers
will not only forfeit world-wide sales altogether, but even U.S.
customers who want to communicate globally may not find such products
attractive. The result is that certain software producers have
declined to develop strong encryption features in mass-market
products, particularly word processing and spreadsheet software,
which integrate cryptographic capabilities. Some U.S. software
developers have elected to produce only software with relatively
ineffective encryption features that are not subject to the
Regulations' restrictions and can readily be sold abroad. As the
report of the National Research Council's Committee to Study
Cryptography concluded, "U.S. export controls have had a negative
impact on the cryptographic strength of many integrated products with
encryption capabilities available in the United States." NRC
Report, supra, § 4.3.1 (footnote omitted).
In sum, the Export Administration Regulations' pre-publication
restrictions on encryption software impermissibly and unreasonably
burden the development, availability, and use of encryption, which is
the sine qua non of private electronic communications.
Regulations that burden rights protected by the First Amendment are
unconstitutional, absent a compelling government interest. See
Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585. As no such compelling
government interest exists in this case, the Regulations should be
struck down.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the District Court
below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
____________________________
Ivan K. Fong
Dawn C. Nunziato
David W. Addis
COVINGTON & BURLING
1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
P.O. Box 7566
Washington, DC 20044
(202) 662-6000
David L. Sobel
Marc Rotenberg
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
INFORMATION CENTER
666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE
Washington, DC 20003
(202) 544-9240
Counsel for Amici Curiae
Date: November 7, 1997
FOOTNOTES
1 / The State Department belatedly notified
Bernstein, after this suit commenced, that the Snuffle source code
was an ITAR-controlled "defense article," that the related Snuffle
instructions were ITAR-controlled "technical data," but that the
Snuffle scientific paper was not subject to the ITAR. See Bernstein
Decl. & 41 (ER 00013).
2/ The Regulations were originally promulgated by
authority of the Export Administration Act ("EAA" or "Act"), 50
U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2420. The EAA has lapsed and has
not been reenacted by Congress. The provisions of both the EAA and
EAR are kept in force by executive orders exercising the President's
emergency powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act ("IEEPA"), see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706; 62 Fed.
Reg. 43,629 (August 15, 1997); 59 Fed. Reg. 43,437 (August 23,
1994).
3 / The exceptions from these expansive licensing
requirements are limited to certain forms of "publicly available"
technology that are embodied in books, periodicals, or recordings;
generally available at libraries or open conferences; submitted to
professional journals; part of academic instruction; or that result
from certain fundamental research. These exceptions, however, do not
extend to encryption source code in any electronic form, which
remains fully subject to the Regulations licensing requirements. See
15 C.F.R. § 734.3(b)(2), (3). Thus, while encryption source
code can be freely published and disseminated in book form, the
identical source code in electronic form is subject to
pre-publication licensing.
4 / The economic significance of cryptographic
technology has been recognized internationally. In a policy
declaration entitled "Towards a European Frame work for Digital
Signatures and Encryption," the European Commission recently observed
that "In order to make good use of the commercial opportunities
offered by electronic communication via open networks, a secure and
trustwor thy environment is . . . necessary," (visited October 23,
1997) <http://www.ispo .cec.be/eif/ policy/97503.html>
(hereinafter "European Encryption Declaration") (attached at Appendix
A). Likewise, the Organization for Economic Coopera tion and
Development ("OECD") has recognized that
[T]he failure to utilise cryptographic methods can
adversely affect the protection of privacy, intellectual property,
business and financial informa tion, public safety and national
security and the operation of electronic commerce because data and
communications may be inadequately protect ed from unauthorized
access, alteration, and improper use, and, therefore, users may not
trust information and communications systems, networks and
infrastructures.
OECD Cryptography Policy Guidelines (March 27, 1997)
<http://www.oecd.org /dsti/iccp/crypto_e.html> (attached at
Appendix A).
5 / As reported in the "European Encryption
Declaration," supra note 4, encryp tion technology firms are now
migrating overseas, with 440 non-U.S. firms compared to 400 U.S.
firms.
6 / See Paul Swamidass, Technology on the Factory
Floor III (forthcoming 1998).
7 / See Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence and the Senate Judiciary Committee on Terrorism,
Technology and Government Information, February 28, 1996.
8 / A segment of the actual source code at issue in
this case is set forth below:
SetupHash512();
for (i = 0; i < 64;i++)
x[i] = k[i] = h[i] = 0;
/* What matters is x[9...63], y, k[0...63],
h[0...63]. */
if (!fi)
exit(2);
9 / Copyright law also supports, by analogy, the
extension of the First Amend ment to encompass source code. The
copyright statute contemplates that scientists will use computer
programs as a vehicle for expressing their ideas, and the protection
of copyright law extends to the expression of ideas embodied in
computer programs. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 54 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667; Final Report of the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU")
(1976); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101, at 878 (1994) (granting
copyright protection to works "expressed in words, numbers, or other
verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as books, . . . tapes, disks, or cards, in
which they are embodied"); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1994); Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 2
(extending copyright protection to computer programs as literary
works); World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty,
Art. 4 (1996) (same); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (extending copyright
protection to source code as a "literary work"), cert. dismissed, 464
U.S. 1033 (1984). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explained that
the Copyright Act's protection of the expression of ideas embodies
the core values of the First Amendment. See Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
10/ The Regulations define specific
"publicly-available" criteria for information embodied in books,
periodicals, or recordings; generally available at libraries or open
conferences; submitted to professional journals; result from certain
funda mental research; or part of academic instruction. 15 C.F.R.
'' 734.3(b)(2), (3), 734.7, 734.8, 734.9.
11 / The purview of the First Amendment protec tion
of expression does not apply solely to communications among U.S.
citizens, nor does it stop at the Nation's borders. See Bullfrog
Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988).
12 / Although the Regulations provide that "license
applications will be resolved or referred to the President" within 90
days, that time limit may be tolled by a variety of circumstances or
government actions. See 15 C.F.R. § 750.4(a)(1). The regulations
also contemplate a cumbersome and lengthy inter-agency review
process. If the license application is denied at an initial stage,
the denial may then be appealed to other officials within the
Commerce Department, and the appeal procedures impose no deadline
other than "a reasonable time" for a final decision. 15 C.F.R. §
756.2(c)(2). Likewise, if the matter is referred to the President, as
the Regulations allow, no deadline is prescribed for the President's
decision.
13 / The Export Administration Act expressly
precludes judicial review. See 50 U.S.C. App. ' 2412(e). Reflecting
that rule, the Regulations flatly declare that "the decision of the
Under Secretary shall be final." 15 C.F.R. § 756.2(c). The Act
and the Regulations are both kept in force by an exercise of the
President's authority under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, which has no similar provision expressly precluding
judicial review. However, the Presi dent's executive order provides
that "[t]o the extent permitted by law," all of the provisions of the
Act and the Regulations -- presumably including the bar to judicial
review -- shall "continue in full force." E.O. 12924, 59 Fed. Reg.
43,437 (Aug. 23, 1994).
14 / International law binding upon the United States
also requires careful scrutiny of restrictions on speech justified in
the name of national security. See, e.g., International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ratified by U.S. 1992)
(permitting restriction of the right to freedom of expression in the
interest of national security only where "necessary.").
15 / It is not harmless to suppress the speech in
disk form while allowing it in print form. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the fact that one forum exists for speech does
not mean that such speech can be suppressed in other fora. See Reno
v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
16 / The private speech interests facilitated by
cryptography are recognized internationally, as well as in the United
States. Fifteen international human rights and civil liberties
organizations, including amici EPIC, ACLU, CPSR, HRW, and PI,
recently endorsed a "Resolution in Support of the Freedom to Use
Cryptography." The resolution notes that "the use of cryptography
impli cates human rights and matters of personal liberty that affect
individuals around the world," and that "the privacy of communication
is explicitly protected by Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and national law." See Resolution in Support of the
Freedom to Use Cryptography, (Sept. 25, 1996)
<http://www.gilc.org/gilc/ resolution.html> (attached at
Appendix A).
17/ By impinging upon individuals' efforts to
communicate privately, the Regulations also run afoul of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
specifically protects the rights of individuals worldwide "to receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers," through "writing," "print," or "any other media of
[their] choice."
