

body. The Main structure then descended into a heavily wooded area further damaging the structure. During recovery, the fabric was further cut into sections in order to remove it from the private wooded area for further analysis.

d. Systems.

(1) Warning System. T&C flight director data recording logs showed multiple warnings and cautions [REDACTED] (b)(5)

(2) Electrical System. Pre break: All electronics operated normally. Empennage failures and warnings were recorded in the Telemetry and Control (T&C) along with Tether tension and the mandate to re-terminate the tether. Post break: Emergency DC Blowers were reported engaged on the T&C console just before the final break of the tether. These blowers are operated by three emergency battery units design to operate when Power is lost in the aerostat. The final pictures of the aerostat show the blowers were still operating. The transponder did not activate because the FAA had instructed JLENS to turn them off. [REDACTED] (b)(5)

[REDACTED] (b)(5)

e. Power Plant. N/A

f. Transmission/Gearboxes and Drive Train. N/A

g. Laboratory Analysis. The fabric analysis was conducted by Natick Laboratory. See Tab 6b for the field report.

h. Crash Site Information. The aerostat parts were in two places. The first impact was at [REDACTED] (b)(6) at the edge of a field in the trees. The aerostat continued to move northwest down a stream feed hollow to a secondary hollow where the mooring lines and tether cause the aerostat to halt. No roads were available to the aerostats final resting point. All access to the aerostat was by foot, through difficult terrain, until the second day, when the land

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