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Before the

Federal Communications Commission Washington, D.C. 20554

# SECOND REPORT AND ORDER AND FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING

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Comment Date: March 30, 1998
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By the Commission: Commissioner Ness approving in part; dissenting in part and issuing a statement.

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#### I. INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. In passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act), Congress sought to establish a new "pro-competitive, deregulatory national policy framework" that would

replace the statutory and regulatory limitations on competition within and between markets.

Congress recognized, however, that the new competitive market forces and technology

ushered in by the 1996 Act had the potential to threaten consumer privacy interests.

Congress, therefore, enacted section 222 to prevent consumer privacy protections from being

inadvertently swept away along with the prior limits on competition. Section 222 establishes

a new statutory framework governing carrier use and disclosure of customer proprietary

network information (CPNI) and other customer information obtained by carriers in their

provision of telecommunications services.

2. Section 222 sets forth three categories of customer information to which different privacy protections and carrier obligations apply -- individually identifiable CPNI,

aggregate customer information, and subscriber list information. CPNI includes information

that is extremely personal to customers as well as commercially valuable to carriers, such as

to whom, where and when a customer places a call, as well as the types of service offerings  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right)$ 

to which the customer subscribes and the extent the service is used. Aggregate customer

and subscriber list information, unlike individually identifiable CPNI, involve customer

information that is not private or sensitive, but like CPNI, is nevertheless valuable to

competitors. Aggregate customer information is expressly defined as "collective data that

relates to a group or category of services or customers, from which individual customer

identities and characteristics have been removed." Subscriber list information, although

consisting of individually identifiable information, is defined in terms of public, not private,

information, including the "listed names, numbers, addresses, or classifications . . . that the  $\,$ 

carrier or an affiliate has published, caused to be published, or accepted for publication in

any directory format."

3. In contrast to other provisions of the 1996 Act that seek primarily to "[open]

all telecommunications markets to competition," and mandate competitive access to facilities

and services, the CPNI regulations in section 222 are largely consumer protection provisions

that establish restrictions on carrier use and disclosure of personal customer information.

With section 222, Congress expressly directs a balance of "both competitive and consumer

privacy interests with respect to CPNI." Congress' new balance, and privacy concern, are

evidenced by the comprehensive statutory design, which expressly recognizes the duty of all

carriers to protect customer information, and embodies the principle that customers must be

able to control information they view as sensitive and personal from use, disclosure, and

access by carriers. Where information is not sensitive, or where the customer so directs,

the statute permits the free flow or dissemination of information beyond the existing

customer-carrier relationship. Indeed, in the provisions governing use of aggregate customer

and subscriber list information, sections 222(c)(3) and 222(e) respectively, where privacy of

sensitive information is by definition not at stake, Congress expressly required carriers to

provide such information to third parties on nondiscriminatory terms and conditions. Thus,

although privacy and competitive concerns can be at odds, the balance struck by Congress

aligns these interests for the benefit of the consumer. This is so because, where customer

information is not sensitive, the customer's interest rests more in choosing service with

respect to a variety of competitors, thus necessitating competitive access to the information,

than in prohibiting the sharing of information.

4. In this Second Report and Order, we promulgate regulations to implement the

statutory obligations of section 222. We also review our existing regulatory framework

governing CPNI, and resolve CPNI issues raised in other proceedings that have been

deferred to this proceeding, including obligations in connection with sections 272 and 274 of

the 1996 Act. More specifically, for the reasons discussed herein, we modify our rules and  $\ensuremath{\text{0}}$ 

procedures regarding CPNI and implement section 222 as follows:

- (a) We permit carriers to use CPNI, without customer approval, to market offerings that are related to, but limited by, the customer's existing service relationship with their carrier.
- (b) Before carriers may use CPNI to market service outside the customer's existing service relationship, we require that carriers obtain express customer approval.

Such express approval may be written, oral, or electronic. In order to ensure that customers are informed of their statutory rights before granting approval,

we further require carriers to provide a one-time notification of customers' CPNI rights prior to any solicitation for approval.

(c) We eliminate the Computer III CPNI framework, as well as sections 22.903(f) and 64.702(d)(3) of our rules, in light of the comprehensive regulatory scheme

Congress established in section 222.

- (d) We reconcile section 222 with sections 272 and 274, and interpret the latter two provisions to impose no additional CPNI requirements on the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs).
- 5. Finally, in a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Further Notice) we seek

additional comment on three issues involving carrier duties and obligations established under

sections 222(a) and (b) of the 1996 Act. In particular, we seek further comment on (a) the

customer's right to restrict carrier use of CPNI for all marketing purposes; (b)

appropriate protections for carrier information and additional enforcement mechanisms we

may apply; and (c) the foreign storage of, and access to, domestic CPNI.

#### II. BACKGROUND

6. In response to various informal requests for guidance from the telecommunications industry regarding the obligation of carriers under new section 222, the

Commission released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on May 17, 1996. The Notice,

among other things, sought comment on: (1) the scope of the phrase "telecommunications

service," as it is used in section 222(c)(1), which permits carriers to use, disclose, or permit

access to individually identifiable CPNI without obtaining customer approval; (2) the

requirements for customer approval; and (3) whether the Commission's existing CPNI

requirements should be amended in light of section 222.

7. Prior to the 1996 Act, the Commission had established CPNI requirements applicable to the enhanced services operations of AT&T, the BOCs, and GTE, and the CPE

operations of AT&T and the BOCs, in the Computer II, Computer III, GTE ONA, and BOC CPE Relief proceedings. The Commission recognized in the Notice that it had adopted these CPNI requirements, together with other nonstructural safeguards, to protect

independent enhanced services providers and CPE suppliers from discrimination by AT&T,

the BOCs, and GTE. The Notice stated that the Commission's existing CPNI requirements

were intended to prohibit AT&T, the BOCs, and GTE from using CPNI obtained from their

provision of regulated services to gain a competitive advantage in the unregulated CPE and

enhanced services markets. The Notice further stated that the existing CPNI requirements

also were intended to protect legitimate customer expectations of confidentiality regarding

individually identifiable information. The Commission concluded in the Notice that existing

CPNI requirements would remain in effect, pending the outcome of this rulemaking, to the

extent that they do not conflict with section 222. On November 13, 1996, the Common

Carrier Bureau (Bureau) waived the annual CPNI notification requirement for multi-line

business customers that had been imposed on AT&T, the BOCs, and GTE under our pre-

existing CPNI framework, pending our action in this proceeding.

8. On August 7, 1996, the Commission released the First Report and Order in the CPNI proceeding. In the First Report and Order, the Commission affirmed its tentative

conclusion that, even if a carrier has received customer approval to use CPNI pursuant to

section 222(c)(1), such approval does not extend to the carrier's use of CPNI involving the

occurrence of calls received by alarm monitoring service providers, pursuant to the ban on

such use in section 275(d). Noting that section 222 sets forth limitations on the ability of

telecommunications carriers, their affiliates, and unaffiliated parties to obtain access to

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{CPNI}}\xspace,$  the Commission further concluded that it was not necessary to bar completely certain

of these entities from accessing CPNI simply because they market alarm monitoring

services. The Commission deferred deciding the issue of whether any restrictions on access

to CPNI were necessary to effectuate the prohibition contained in section 275(d).

9. On December 24, 1996, the Commission released the Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, which adopted rules and policies governing the BOCs' provision of certain

services through section 272 affiliates. In that order, the Commission concluded that the

nondiscrimination provisions of section 272(c)(1) govern the BOCs' use of CPNI and that the

BOCs must comply with the requirements of both sections 222 and 272(c)(1). The Commission deferred to this proceeding, however, all other issues concerning the interplay

between those provisions. On February 7, 1997, the Commission released the Electronic

Publishing Order, which adopted policies and rules governing, among other things, the

BOCs' provision of electronic publishing under section 274. In that order, the Commission

likewise deferred to this proceeding all CPNI-related issues involved in the BOCs' marketing

of electronic publishing services. In light of the Commission's determinations in the Non-  $\,$ 

Accounting Safeguards and Electronic Publishing orders, the Bureau issued a Public Notice

on February 20, 1997, seeking to supplement the record in this proceeding on specific issues

relating to the subjects previously noticed and their interplay with sections 272 and 274.

Finally, the Commission released the CMRS Safeguards Order on October 3, 1997, in which

it eliminated section 22.903 of the rules generally, but expressly retained subsection

22.903(f), regarding the BOCs' sharing of CPNI with cellular affiliates, pending the outcome

of this proceeding.

10. In this Second Report and Order, we address the scope and meaning of section

222, as well as the issues deferred to this proceeding. We will consider subsequently, in a

separate order, the meaning and scope of section 222(e) of the 1996 Act, relating to the

disclosure of subscriber list information by local exchange carriers. We note that LECs

became obligated to disclose subscriber list information to directory publishers on

nondiscriminatory rates, terms, and conditions, upon passage of the Act. Accordingly, the

LEC's duty exists presently, independent of any implementing rules we might promulgate in

the future, and a failure to discharge this duty may well, depending on the circumstances,

constitute both a violation of section 222(e) and an unreasonable practice in violation of section 201(b).

### III. COMMISSION AUTHORITY

## A. Background

11. Shortly after passage of the 1996 Act, various telecommunications carriers and

of their obligations under section 222. In particular, several associations representing a

majority of the local exchange carriers (LECs) asked, among other things, that the

Commission commence a rulemaking to resolve questions concerning the LECs' responsibilities under the new CPNI provisions of the 1996 Act. In addition, NYNEX filed

a petition for declaratory ruling seeking confirmation of its interpretation of one aspect of section 222.

12. The Commission tentatively concluded in the Notice that regulations interpreting and specifying in greater detail a carrier's obligations under section 222 would

be in the public interest, and sought comment on that tentative conclusion. The Commission also sought comment on the extent to which section 222 permits states to impose

CPNI requirements in addition to any adopted by the Commission, as well as on whether

such state CPNI regulation would enhance or impede valid federal interests with respect to

CPNI. The Commission further sought comment on whether the CPNI provisions of section 222 may, by themselves, give it jurisdiction over both the interstate and intrastate use

and protection of CPNI with respect to matters falling within the scope of that statutory provision.

13. Parties commenting in response to the Notice generally join the petitioning

carrier associations in urging the Commission to clarify the CPNI requirements established in

section 222. Some commenters further maintain that the Commission has authority to adopt

rules implementing section 222 that apply both to interstate and intrastate aspects of CPNI.

Other parties, disagreeing, contend that section 222 does not give the Commission

jurisdiction over interstate and intrastate use and protection of CPNI or that states should be

free to adopt various CPNI requirements, or both.

## B. Discussion

14. We confirm our tentative conclusion and find that our clarification of the

obligations imposed on carriers by section 222 would serve the public interest. As discussed

more fully herein, we are persuaded that Congress established a comprehensive new

framework in section 222, which balances principles of privacy and competition in

connection with the use and disclosure of CPNI and other customer information. Given the

conflicting interpretations of the statute proposed by the various parties, and drawing from

our knowledge and historical experience regulating CPNI use and protection, we conclude

that our clarification of this provision is necessary and consistent with what Congress

envisioned to ensure a uniform national CPNI policy. It is well-established that an agency

has the authority to adopt rules to administer congressionally mandated requirements.

Indeed, courts repeatedly have held that the Commission's general rulemaking authority is

"expansive" rather than limited. We agree with the petitioning carrier associations, and

essentially all other commenters, that our clarification of section 222 will serve to reduce confusion and controversy.

15. We further conclude that our authority to promulgate regulations implementing

section 222 extends to both the interstate and intrastate use and protection of CPNI and other

customer information in several important respects. Specifically, the Communications Act,

as enacted in 1934, established a dual system of state and federal regulation over

telecommunications. Section 2(a) extends jurisdiction for interstate matters to the

Commission and section 2(b) reserves intrastate matters to the states. Based on the  $\operatorname{Act's}$ 

grant of jurisdiction, the Commission has historically regulated the use and protection of

CPNI by AT&T, the BOCs, and GTE, through the rules established in the Computer III

proceedings. Sections 4(i), 201(b), and 303(r) of the Act authorize the Commission to

adopt any rules it deems necessary or appropriate to carry out its responsibilities under the

Act, so long as those rules are not otherwise inconsistent with the Act.

16. In Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, the Supreme Court held that, even where Congress has not provided the Commission with a direct grant of authority over

intrastate matters, the Commission may preempt state regulation where such regulation would

negate the Commission's exercise of its lawful authority because regulation of the interstate  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right)$ 

aspects of the matter cannot be severed from regulation of the intrastate aspects. The  $\operatorname{Court}$ 

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied this principle, generally referred to as the

"impossibility exception," in the specific context of a state CPNI regulation even prior to the

1996 Act. In California III, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Commission's preemption of

California regulations that required prior customer approval for access to CPNI, under the

impossibility exception. We conclude that, in connection with CPNI regulation, the

Commission may preempt state regulation of intrastate telecommunications matters where

such regulation would negate the Commission's exercise of its lawful authority because

regulation of the interstate aspects of the matter cannot be severed from regulation of the

intrastate aspects. As several parties observe, where a carrier's operations are regional or

national in scope, state CPNI regulations that are inconsistent from state to state may

interfere greatly with a carrier's ability to provide service in a cost-effective manner. In

addition, as MCI points out, even if a state written approval requirement were limited to the

use of CPNI for the marketing of intrastate services, for example, it would disrupt interstate

service marketing because it would be impractical to limit marketing to interstate services.

On this basis, we find inapplicable the limitation on federal regulation of purely intrastate

telecommunications matters in section 2(b) of the Act, as well as Congress' prohibition on

implied preemption in section 601(c) of the 1996 Act.

17. Several commenters interpret California III to support their view that state

rules would conflict with section 222 if they are more restrictive -- that is, permit less carrier

use and disclosure of  $\mbox{CPNI}$  -- than the Commission's implementing regulations. These

commenters rely on California III, where the court specifically upheld the Commission's

preemption of California's prior authorization rule in favor of the Commission's less

restrictive notice rule, reasoning that such state regulations would negate the Commission's

exercise of its lawful authority over interstate telecommunications services. In contrast.

other commenters contend that, consistent with California III, the Commission should

establish minimum federal standards under section  $222\ \text{for the use},\ \text{disclosure},\ \text{and}$ 

permission of access to CPNI, yet permit states to exceed those standards. These parties

reason that, although federal standards are needed to monitor the use of CPNI, state

regulators are best suited to deal with particular problems faced by consumers in their state,

and further argue that state requirements that provide additional privacy protections to

consumers would not conflict with the Commission's rules.

18. Because no specific state regulations are before us, we do not at this time

exercise our preemption authority. Rather, we agree with NYNEX that after states have had

an opportunity to react to the requirements we adopt in this order, we should then examine

any conflicting state rules on a case-by-case basis. State rules that likely would be

vulnerable to preemption would include those permitting greater carrier use of  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$  than

section 222 and our implementing regulations announced herein, as well as those state

regulations that sought to impose more limitations on carriers' use. This is so because state

regulation that would permit more information sharing generally would appear to conflict

with important privacy protections advanced by Congress through section 222, whereas state

rules that sought to impose more restrictive regulations would seem to conflict with

Congress' goal to promote competition through the use or dissemination of CPNI or other

customer information. In either regard, the balance would seemingly be upset and such

state regulation thus could negate the Commission's lawful authority over interstate

communication and stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the  $\operatorname{full}$ 

purposes and objectives of Congress. Other state rules, however, may not directly conflict

with Congress' balance or goals, for example, those specifying various information that must

be contained in the carrier's notice requirement, that are in addition to those specified in this order.

19. An alternative basis for concluding that our jurisdiction extends to the intrastate use and protection of CPNI stems additionally from section 222(f)(1)(B), which

expressly defines CPNI as including, among other things, "information contained in the bills

pertaining to telephone exchange service or telephone toll service received by a customer of a

carrier." Section 222(e) similarly provides that: "[n]otwithstanding subsections (b), (c),

and (d), a telecommunications carrier that provides telephone exchange service shall provide

subscriber list information gathered in its capacity as a provider of such service on a timely

and unbundled basis, under nondiscriminatory and reasonable rates, terms, and conditions  $\cdot$ .

.. " Insofar as telephone exchange service is virtually an exclusively intrastate service,

these references expressly also extend the scope of section 222 to intrastate matters. For this

reason as well we conclude that neither section 2(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 nor

section 601(c) of the 1996 Act precludes our regulation of the intrastate use and protection of

CPNI pursuant to section 222.

20. We thus conclude that section 222, and the Commission's authority thereunder, apply to regulation of intrastate and interstate use and protection of CPNI. We

find, therefore, that the rules we establish to implement section 222 are binding on the states,

and that the states may not impose requirements inconsistent with section 222 and our

implementing regulations.

- IV. CARRIER'S RIGHT TO USE CPNI WITHOUT CUSTOMER APPROVAL
  - A. Overview

21. Section 222(c)(1) and section 222(d) set forth the circumstances under which a

carrier may use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI without customer approval. Specifically,

section 222(c)(1) provides that a telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains CPNI by

virtue of its "provision of a telecommunications service shall only use, disclose, or permit

access to individually identifiable [CPNI] in its provision of (A) the telecommunications

service from which such information is derived, or (B) services necessary to, or used in, the

provision of such telecommunications service, including the publishing of directories."

Section 222(d) provides:

[n] othing in this section prohibits a telecommunications carrier from using,

disclosing, or permitting access to [CPNI] obtained from its customers, either

directly or indirectly through its agents -- (1) to initiate, render, bill, and

collect for telecommunications services; (2) to protect the rights or property of

the carrier, or to protect users of those services and other carriers from fraudulent, abusive, or unlawful use of, or subscription to, such services; or

- (3) to provide any inbound telemarketing, referral, or administrative services
- to the customer for the duration of the call, if such call was initiated by the  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{S}}$

customer and the customer approves of the use of such information to provide

such service.

22. Numerous parties comment on the proper interpretation of section 222(c)(1) because this provision governs, among other things, the scope of a carrier's right to use

CPNI for customer retention and marketing purposes, without having to seek some form of

customer approval. Most carriers acknowledge that they view CPNI as an important asset of  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right) +$ 

their business, and many state that they hope to use CPNI as an integral part of their future

marketing plans. Indeed, as competition grows and the number of firms competing for

consumer attention increases, CPNI becomes a powerful resource for identifying potential

customers and tailoring marketing strategies to maximize customer response. Accordingly,

a broad interpretation of the scope of section 222(c)(1) would afford carriers the opportunity

to use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI expansively. A narrow interpretation, conversely,

would restrict the use carriers can make of CPNI absent customer approval.

23. We conclude that the general framework established under section 222, considered as a whole, carves a limited exception in section 222(c)(1) for carrier use,

disclosure, and permission of access to sensitive customer information. Specifically,

sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B), as well as the narrow exceptions in section 222(d), represent

the only instances where customer approval for a carrier to use, disclose, or permit access to

personal customer information is not required. We believe that the language of section 222(c)(1)(A) and (B) reflects Congress' judgment that customer approval for carriers

to use, disclose, and permit access to CPNI can be inferred in the context of an existing

customer-carrier relationship. This is so because the customer is aware that its carrier has

access to CPNI, and, through subscription to the carrier's service, has implicitly approved

the carrier's use of CPNI within that existing relationship.

24. The language also suggests, however, that the carrier's right under section 222(c)(1)(A) and (B) is a limited one, in that the carrier "shall only" use, disclose, or

permit access to CPNI "in the provision of" the telecommunications service from which such

CPNI is derived or services necessary to, or used in, such telecommunications service.

Indeed, insofar as the customer consent in sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B) is inferred rather

than based on express customer direction, we conclude that Congress intended that implied

customer approval be restricted solely to what customers reasonably understand their

telecommunications service to include. This customer understanding, in turn, is manifested

in the complete service offering to which the customer subscribes from a carrier. We are

persuaded that customers expect that CPNI generated from their entire service will be used

by their carrier to market improved service within the parameters of the customer-carrier

relationship. Although most customers presently obtain their service from different carriers

in terms of traditional categories of offerings -- local, interexchange, and commercial mobile

radio services (CMRS) -- with the likely advent of integrated and bundled service packages,

the "total service approach" accommodates any future changes in customer subscriptions to integrated service.

25. For the reasons described below, we believe that the total service approach

best represents the scope of "the telecommunications service from which the CPNI is

derived." Under the total service approach, the customer's implied approval is limited to the

parameters of the customer's existing service, and is neither extended to permit CPNI use in

marketing all of a carrier's telecommunications services regardless of whether subscribed to

by the customer, nor narrowed to permit use only in providing a discrete service feature. In

this way, the total service approach appropriately furthers Congress' intent to balance privacy

and competitive concerns, and maximize customer control over carrier use of CPNI.

26. Also, as explained below, with respect to section 222(c)(1)(B), we further conclude that a carrier may use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI without customer

approval for the provision of inside wiring installation, maintenance, and repair services

because they are "services necessary to, or used in, the provision of such telecommunications

service" under section 222(c)(1)(B). In contrast, CPE and information services are not

"services necessary to, or used in, the provision of such telecommunications service" within

the meaning of section 222(c)(1)(B).

B. Scope of a Carrier's Right Pursuant to Section 222(c)(1)(A): the "Total

Service Approach"

## 1. Background

27. In the Notice, the Commission tentatively concluded that section 222(c)(1)(A)

should be interpreted as "distinguishing among telecommunications services based on

traditional service distinctions,  $\$  specifically, local, interexchange, and CMRS. Thus, for

example, a local exchange carrier could use local service CPNI to market local service

offerings, but could not use local service CPNI to target customers to market long distance

offerings or CMRS, absent customer approval. The Commission further tentatively concluded that short-haul toll should be treated as a local telecommunications service when

provided by a LEC, and as an interexchange telecommunications service when provided by

an interexchange carrier (IXC). The Commission sought comment on these and other  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right)$ 

possible distinctions among telecommunications services, the scope of the term "telecommunications service," and the costs and benefits of any proposed interpretation,

including the interpretation's impact on competitive and customer privacy interests. The

Commission also sought comment on the impact of changes in telecommunications technology and regulation and on whether and when technological and market developments

may require the Commission to revisit the issue of telecommunications service distinctions.

28. Commenters recognize that the language of section 222(c)(1)(A) is not clear.

and propose at least five different interpretations. First, several parties urge us to interpret

section 222(c)(1)(A) as limited to each discrete offering or feature of service subscribed to by

a customer. This proposal, which we refer to as the "discrete offering approach," assumes

that customers do not expect or understand, for example, that their local exchange carrier

would use local CPNI to market the carrier's call waiting feature to them, absent their

approval. Second, a number of parties urge us to adopt our tentative conclusion and define

the scope of "the telecommunications service from which such [CPNI] is derived" according

to the three traditional service distinctions -- local, interexchange, and CMRS. We refer to

this as the "three category approach." Under this approach, for example, a customer's local

exchange carrier would be able to use local service CPNI to market a call waiting feature to

them, as one of many offerings that make up local service, but would not be able to use

CPNI to market long distance or CMRS offerings, absent customer approval.

29. Third, a variation on the three category approach is what we refer to as the

"two category approach," where local and interexchange services constitute separate service

categories, but CMRS, like short-haul toll, "floats" between them. Under this approach,

for example, an IXC would be able to use CPNI obtained from its provision of long distance  $\,$ 

service to market CMRS, but would not be able to use long distance CPNI to  $\max$ 

service, without customer approval. Fourth, a number of parties urge us to interpret

section 222(c)(1)(A) as referring only to one broad telecommunications service that includes

all of a carrier's telecommunications service offerings. This approach, which we refer to

as the "single category approach," would permit carriers to use CPNI obtained from their

provision of any telecommunications service, including local or long distance service as well

as CMRS, to market any other telecommunications service offered by the carrier, regardless

of whether the customer subscribes to such service from that carrier.

30. Finally, several proponents of the various approaches further argue that we

should permit carriers to share CPNI among all offerings and/or service categories

subscribed to by the customer from the same carrier. We refer to this concept as the "total

service approach" because it allows carriers to use the customer's entire record, derived from

the complete service subscribed to from that carrier, for marketing purposes within the  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{E}}$ 

existing service relationship. Although parties supporting this concept advance various

alternative schemes, we view it as a separate interpretation of section 222(c)(1)(A) that is

defined by the customer's service subscription. Under the total service approach, for

and CMRS would be able to use CPNI derived from this entire service to market to that

customer all related offerings, but not to market long distance service to that customer,

because the customer's service excludes any long distance component. Thus, under the total

service approach, the carrier's permitted use of CPNI reflects the level of service subscribed

to by the customer from the carrier.

#### 2. Discussion

31. As discussed below, we conclude that the total service approach best protects

customer privacy interests, while furthering fair competition, and thereby best comports with

the statutory language, history, and structure of section 222.

- a. Statutory Language, History, and Structure
- 32. The statutory language makes clear that Congress did not intend for the implied customer approval to use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI under section 222(c)(1)(A) to extend to all of the categories of telecommunications services offered

by the carrier, as proposed by advocates of the single category approach. First, Congress'

repeated use of the singular "telecommunications service" must be given meaning. Section 222(c)(1) prohibits a carrier from using CPNI obtained from the provision of "a

telecommunications service" for any purpose other than to provide "the telecommunications

service from which such information is derived" or services necessary to, or used in,

provision of "such telecommunications service." We agree with many commenters that

this language plainly indicates that Congress both contemplated the possible existence of

more than one carrier service and made a deliberate decision that section 222(c)(1)(A) not

extend to all. Indeed, Congress' reference to plural "telecommunications services" in

sections 222(a) and 222(d)(1) demonstrates a clear distinction between the singular and plural

Congress has chosen different language in proximate subsections of the same statute," we are

"obligated to give that choice effect." Consistent with this, section 222(c)(1)'s explicit

restriction of a carrier's "use" of CPNI "in the provision of" service further evidences

Congress' intent that carriers' own use of CPNI be limited to the service provided to the

particular customer, and not be expanded to all the categories of telecommunications services

available from the carrier.

33. We therefore reject the single category approach as contrary to the statutory

language. In particular, we do not agree with several parties' claim that the general

definition of "telecommunications service" found in Title I of the Act, which focuses on the

offering of "telecommunications . . . regardless of the facilities used," indicates that  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{C}}$ 

Congress did not intend to differentiate among telecommunications technologies or services

in section 222(c)(1)(A). We likewise find U S WEST's reliance on the general plural

reference included in the definition of "telecommunications" misplaced. Rather, we agree

with the California Commission, CompTel, MCI, and TRA that the single category interpretation would render the specific limiting language in section 222(c)(1)(A)

meaningless. Approval would be necessary, if at all, only if a carrier wished to use CPNI

to market non-telecommunications services. Like Sprint, we conclude that, had Congress

intended such a result, the text could have been drafted much more simply by stating that

carriers may use CPNI, without customer approval, only for telecommunications-related

purposes, instead of the language of section 222(c)(1)(A), which expressly limits carrier use

to the "provision of the service from which [the CPNI] is derived."

34. We likewise reject parties' suggestions that we interpret section 222(c)(1)(A)

based on prior Commission decisions, including the McCaw orders, various Computer III

orders, as well as the Common Carrier Bureau's opinion in BankAmerica v. AT&T, which permitted the sharing of customer information among affiliated companies based on

the existing business relationship and the perceived benefits of integrated marketing. First,

with respect to prior Commission decisions, the 1996 Act, and section 222 in particular,

altered the regulatory landscape which served as the backdrop for those decisions. Congress

adopted a specific provision regarding CPNI that differs in fundamental respects from the  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{CPNI}}$ 

Commission's existing CPNI regime. While the Commission previously may have permitted

more sharing of information under the rubric of Computer III and within a pre-1996 Act

environment that limited carriers' market entry, we conclude that Congress drew a specific

and different balance in section 222. To the extent our prior decisions are relevant at all to

the interpretation of section 222(c)(1)(A), they suggest Congress deliberately chose not to

encourage the kind of information sharing that the Commission may have permitted in the

past, and which is now proposed by advocates of the single category approach. For these

reasons, we similarly reject parties' reliance on other statutes, particularly the Cable

Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act (1992 Cable Act) and the Telephone

Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), as well as the Commission's implementation of

those Acts. Neither of these statutes contains the specific and unique language of

section 222 which expressly limits a carrier's "use" of customer information. Again, to

the extent other provisions are probative, they indicate that Congress was clear when it

intended to exempt information sharing within the context of the existing business

relationship from general consumer protection provisions, but chose not to in section 222.

35. On the other hand, we also conclude, contrary to the suggestion of its proponents, that the discrete offering approach is not required by the language of

section 222(c)(1)(A). Although the statutory language makes clear that carriers' CPNI use

is limited in some respect, and thus fails to support the single category approach, it does not

dictate the most narrow possible interpretation (i.e., the discrete offering approach). Nor

does the statutory language, however, rule out a more general subscription-based understanding of the phrase "telecommunication service from which such [CPNI] is derived,"

consistent with the total service approach. As discussed infra, we believe as a policy matter

that the discrete category approach is not desirable because it is not required to protect either

customers' reasonable expectations of privacy or competitors' interests. Rather, we

believe that the best interpretation of section 222(c)(1) is the total service approach, which

affords carriers the right to use or disclose CPNI for, among other things, marketing related

offerings within customers' existing service for their benefit and convenience, but which

restricts carriers from using CPNI in connection with categories of service to which

customers do not subscribe. The total service approach permits CPNI to be used for

marketing purposes only to the extent that a carrier is marketing alternative versions, which

may include additional or related offerings, of the customer's existing subscribed service.

The carrier's use of CPNI in this way fairly falls within the language of "the provision of the

telecommunications service from which such information is derived" because it allows the

carrier to suggest more beneficial ways of providing the service to which the customer

presently subscribes.

36. Our rejection of the discrete category approach, and support for the total service approach, is also informed by our understanding of the relationship between

sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (d)(1). Specifically, the Texas Commission explains its discrete

offering interpretation of section 222(c)(1)(A) as limiting the carriers' CPNI use to the

"initiation, provisioning, billing, etc. of, or necessary to," the discrete feature of service

subscribed to by the customer. We believe this view essentially interprets the scope of

section 222(c)(1)(A) as being no broader than section 222(d)(1), which provides that carriers

may use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI to, among other things, "initiate" and "render"

telecommunications services. Although both sections 222(c)(1) and (d) establish exceptions

to the general CPNI use and sharing prohibitions, and overlap in certain respects, these  $\,$ 

provisions must be given independent effect. Had Congress intended to permit carriers to

use CPNI only for "rendering" service, as suggested under the discrete offering approach,

and as explicitly provided in section 222(d)(1), it would not have needed to create the

exception in section 222(c)(1)(A). In contrast, by interpreting section 222(c)(1)(A) as we do,

to permit some use of CPNI for marketing purposes, we give meaning to both statutory

provisions. Indeed, in contrast with the various parties' views concerning the scope of

section 222(c)(1)(A), commenters that addressed the meaning of section 222(d)(1) uniformly

suggest that it does not extend to a carrier's use of CPNI for marketing purposes.

37. The legislative history confirms our view that in section 222 Congress intended

neither to allow carriers unlimited use of CPNI for marketing purposes as they moved into

new service avenues opened through the 1996 Act, nor to restrict carrier use of CPNI for

marketing purposes altogether. Specifically, although the general purpose of the 1996 Act

was to expand markets available to both new and established carriers, the legislative history

makes clear that Congress specifically intended section 222 to ensure that customers retained

control over CPNI in the face of the powerful carrier incentives to use such CPNI to gain a

foothold in new markets. The Conference Report states that, through section 222, Congress

sought to "balance both competitive and consumer privacy interests with respect to  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI."}}$ 

Congress further admonishes that "[i]n new subsection 222(c) the use of CPNI by telecommunications carriers is limited, except as provided by law or with the approval of the

customer." Contrary to Congressional intent as expressed in the legislative history, the

single category approach asserts a broad carrier right, affording customers virtually no

control over intra-company use of their CPNI. This approach would undermine section 222's focus on balancing customer privacy interests, and likewise would potentially

harm competition. Carriers already in possession of CPNI could leverage their control of

CPNI in one market to perpetuate their dominance as they enter other service markets. In

these respects, therefore, the legislative history wholly fails to support the single category

approach. On the other hand, the legislative history makes no mention of any need or

intention to restrict the carrier's use of CPNI to market discrete offerings within the service

subscribed to by the customer. In this regard, therefore, the legislative history likewise does

not support the discrete offering approach.

38. Thus, contrary to U S WEST's suggestion, we do not believe that, because express service distinctions were eliminated during the Conference Agreement, Congress

intended to abandon them. Rather, Congress may well have deleted specific reference to

local and long distance services in section 222(c)(1)(A) because they were superfluous. The

repeated use of the singular "service" and the restrictive language "the telecommunications

service from which such [CPNI] is derived" in section 222(c)(1) serves to draw these same

service distinctions. Moreover, although service distinctions are not expressly referenced in

the language of section 222(c)(1)(A), they are retained in the statutory definition of CPNI,

which describes information contained in the bills pertaining to "telephone exchange service

or telephone toll service" In this definition, Congress also describes CPNI in terms of "a

telecommunications service subscribed to by any customer," which additionally suggests

that Congress understood the scope of section 222(c)(1) to be limited according to the total

service subscribed to by a customer.

39. Furthermore, in contrast with the single category approach, the limitations on

carriers' use or disclosure of CPNI to the total service subscribed to by the customer would

restrict carriers from using or disclosing CPNI without customer approval to target customers

for new service offerings opened only through the 1996  $\mbox{Act}$ , and accordingly would restrict

carriers' opportunity to leverage large stores of existing customer information to their

exclusive competitive advantage. Such CPNI limitations also further customer's privacy

goals as they restrict the use to which carriers can make of CPNI for purposes beyond the

parameters of the existing service relationship. As such, the total service approach protects

the privacy and competitive interests of customers, and thereby appropriately furthers the  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{L}}$ 

balance of these interests that Congress expressly directed, as explained in the Conference Agreement.

40. We also reject U S WEST's claims, in support of the two category approach, that Congress' failure to mention CMRS in the legislative history suggests that it did not

view CMRS as a separate service offering, but rather that CMRS is more appropriately

treated as a technology or functionality of both local and long distance telecommunications  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{E}}$ 

service. We do not find Congress' silence in connection with CMRS as dispositive, and  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) \left($ 

reject the notion that CMRS is not a separate service offering. Indeed, as the  $\operatorname{Commission}$ 

recently recognized in its Second Annual CMRS Competition Report, although CMRS offerings are increasingly becoming substitutes for each other in the public's perception,

and may someday directly compete with wireline service, "wireless services do not yet

approach the ubiquity of wireline telephone service." Moreover, we believe that the two

category approach would not protect sufficiently privacy and competitive concerns, and  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{concerns}}$ 

would thereby violate the statutory intent expressly set forth in the legislative history. As

Arch, Frontier, and AirTouch observe, allowing CMRS to "float" between the local and

interexchange categories may give incumbent carriers a competitive advantage.

41. We also disagree with MCI's argument in support of the two category approach that Congress solely intended for the new CPNI requirements set forth in

section 222 to protect against carriers using CPNI already in their possession to advantage

them as they moved into new service markets opened only through the 1996  $\operatorname{Act}$ . MCI

contends that, because wireline carriers could enter the CMRS market even before passage of

the 1996 Act, CMRS should be considered "as a type of service that can fit into either the

local or interexchange category and that should be treated the same as the predominant

category provided by the carrier in question." This argument is not supported by the

statutory language, and we reject it accordingly. Section 222 contains no exclusion, express

or implied, for CPNI related to services provided in markets previously open to competitors,

nor does the legislative history support this interpretation. Moreover, we further reject

MCI's suggestion that because entry of wireline carriers into the CMRS market was

previously permissible, no CPNI regulation is needed as a matter of policy. That argument

is belied by the fact that, even before the 1996 Act, the Commission's regulations afforded

considerable CPNI protection related to cellular service. Moreover, we believe that the  $\,$ 

statutory balance of privacy and competitive interests would be undermined if we were to

remove those restrictions that prevent carriers from using wireline CPNI without customer

approval to target new CMRS customers. Indeed, the elimination of such restrictions would

offer LECs, in particular, a substantial and unjustified competitive advantage because they

could use local wireline CPNI (available based on their historic monopoly status, but not

available to their CMRS competitors) to target local customers that they believe would

purchase their CMRS service.

42. Finally, we also reject the various arguments advanced by GTE, PacTel, USTA, and U S WEST that our adoption of an interpretation more limited than the single or  $\frac{1}{2}$ 

two category approaches raises Constitutional concern. In particular, they variously claim

that such restriction on intra-company sharing of CPNI would: constitute a taking without

just compensation; seriously impair carriers' ability to communicate valuable commercial

information to their customers in violation of the First Amendment; and violate Equal

Protection principles because CPNI rules would discriminate against certain telecommunications service providers to promote competition by another class of providers

(e.g., cable providers that can use CPNI with implied consent).

43. We reject the Constitutional takings arguments because, to the extent CPNI is

property, we agree that it is better understood as belonging to the customer, not the

carrier. Moreover, contrary to the contentions raised by some parties, even assuming

carriers have a property interest in CPNI, our interpretation of section 222(c)(1)(A) does not

"deny all economically beneficial" use of property, as it must, to establish a successful

claim. Under the total service approach, carriers can use CPNI for a variety of marketing

purposes which promote the interests of customers and carriers alike. In addition, with

customer approval, carriers are free to use CPNI to offer any combination of one-stop

shopping. Accordingly, the total service approach does not deny carriers all economically

beneficial use of CPNI; rather, carriers are free to market and discuss with their customers

whatever service offerings they want, in whatever combination. On this basis we also reject

U S WEST's claim that our interpretation may abridge the carrier's ability to  $\operatorname{communicate}$ 

with its customers, and thereby violate its First Amendment rights. Government restrictions

on commercial speech will be upheld where, as here, the government asserts a substantial

interest in support of the regulation, the regulation advances that interest, and the regulation  $\ensuremath{\mathcal{C}}$ 

is narrowly drawn. Section 222(c)(1)(A), and our total service approach, promote the

substantial governmental interests of protecting the privacy of consumers and promoting fair

competition. We thus conclude that these Constitutional claims are without merit.

44. We likewise reject parties' Equal Protection challenges based on section 222's

limitation to telecommunications carriers alone. In order to sustain an equal protection

challenge, parties must prove the law has no rational relation to any conceivable legitimate

legislative purpose. We conclude that Congress' decision to extend the  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$  limitations in

section 222 only to telecommunications carriers, and not, for example to cable operators,

does not support a Constitutional claim. The information telecommunications carriers obtain

from their customers, including who, where and when they call, is considerably more

sensitive and personal than the information cable operators obtain concerning their customers

(e.g., whether they have premium or basic service). Given the differences in the type of  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right) +\left$ 

information at issue, Congress' decision to mandate a higher level of privacy protection in

the context of section 222, applicable to telecommunications carriers, than in section  $551\ \text{of}$ 

the 1992 Cable Act applicable to cable operators, is plainly rational.

45. Non-Telecommunications Offerings. Several carriers argue that certain non-

telecommunications offerings, in addition to being covered by section 222(c)(1)(B), also

should be included within any service distinctions we adopt pursuant to section 222(c)(1)(A).

including inside wiring, customer premises equipment (CPE), and certain information

services. Based on the statutory language, however, we conclude that inside wiring, CPE,

and information services do not fall within the scope of section 222(c)(1)(A) because they are

not "telecommunications services." More specifically, section 222(c)(1)(A) refers

expressly to carrier use of CPNI in the provision of a "telecommunications service." In

contrast, the word "telecommunications" does not precede the word "services" in section 222(c)(1)(B)'s phrase "services necessary to, or used in." The varying use of the

terms "telecommunications service" in section 222(c)(1)(A) and "services" in section 222(c)(1)(B) suggests that the terms deliberately were chosen to signify different

meanings. Accordingly, we believe that Congress intended that carriers' use of CPNI for

providing telecommunications services be governed solely by section 222(c)(1)(A), whereas

the use of CPNI for providing non-telecommunications services is controlled by section 222(c)(1)(B).

46. Commission precedent has treated "information services" and "telecommunications services" as separate, non-overlapping categories, so that information

services do not constitute "telecommunications" within the meaning of the 1996 Act.

Accordingly, we conclude that carriers may not use CPNI derived from the provision of a

telecommunications service for the provision or marketing of information services pursuant to

section 222(c)(1)(A). We likewise conclude that inside wiring and CPE do not fall within

the definition of "telecommunications service," and thus do not fall within the scope of

section 222(c)(1)(A).

47. We recognize that the Commission has permitted CMRS providers to offer bundled service, including various "enhanced services" and CPE, prior to the 1996 Act. We

disagree with PacTel, however, that, consistent with section 222(c)(1)(A), CMRS providers

should be able to use CMRS-derived CPNI without customer approval to market these

offerings when they provide CMRS to a customer. The 1996 Act defines "mobile service"

in pertinent part as a "radio communication service carried on between mobile stations or

receivers and land stations, and by mobile stations communicating among themselves . . .

." "Radio communication service," in turn, is defined in terms of "the transmission by

radio of writings, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds, including all

instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (among other things, the receipt,

forwarding, and delivery of communications) incidental to such transmission." These

definitions do not include information services or CPE within the meaning of CMRS.

Accordingly, while nothing in section 222(c)(1) prohibits CMRS providers from continuing

to bundle various offerings consistent with other provisions of the  $1996\ \text{Act}$ , including

 ${\tt CMRS-specific}$  CPE and information services, they cannot use CPNI to market these related

offerings as part of the CMRS category of service without customer approval, because even

when they are bundled with a CMRS service, they do not constitute CMRS and are not

telecommunications services.

48. On the other hand, we also conclude that, to the extent that services formerly

described as adjunct-to-basic are offered by CMRS providers, these should be considered

either within the provision of CMRS under section 222(c)(1)(A), or as services necessary to,

or used in, CMRS under section 222(c)(1)(B). Thus, for example, a CMRS provider can

use CMRS CPNI to market a call forwarding feature to its existing customer because call  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{CMRS}}$ 

forwarding was classified as an adjunct-to-basic service, but not to market an information

service. In addition, we agree with the result advocated by WTR, and conclude that a  $\,$ 

reasonable interpretation of section 222(c)(1)(A) permits carriers to use, disclose, or permit

access to CPNI for the limited purpose of conducting research on the health effects of their

service. In particular, we believe that, integral to a carrier's provision of a telecommunications service is assuring that the telecommunications service is safe to use.

Insofar as customers expect that the telecommunications service to which they subscribe is

safe, use of CPNI to confirm as much would not violate their privacy concerns, but rather

would be fully consistent with notions of implied approval. The research proposed by WTR,

which uses CPNI disclosed by carriers relating to the time and duration of wireless telephone

usage to determine the health risks posed to users of hand-held portable wireless telephones,

comes within the provision of CMRS service and therefore the meaning of section 222(c)(1)(A).

49. Special Treatment for Certain Carriers. We conclude that Congress did not

intend to, and we should not at this time, distinguish among carriers for the purpose of

applying section 222(c)(1). Based on the statutory language, it is clear that section 222

applies to all carriers equally and, with few exceptions, does not distinguish among classes of

carriers. Accordingly, we reject the argument raised by several parties that we should

permit broader CPNI sharing for competitive LECs, but not for incumbent LECs, or that

we should limit the total service approach to entities without market power. As several

parties suggest, customers' privacy interests are deserving of protection, regardless of which

telecommunications carrier serves them, for customers' privacy expectations do not differ

based upon the size or identity of the carrier. Moreover, we disagree with the suggestions

of ICG, LDDS WorldCom, and Sprint that we should impose stricter restrictions on incumbent or dominant carriers, based on their greater potential for anti-competitive use or

disclosure of CPNI. We believe at this time that the regulations and safeguards implemented in this order fully address competitive concerns in connection with all carriers'

use, disclosure, or permission of access to CPNI.

50. We also decline to forbear from applying section 222(c)(1), or any of our associated rules, to small or competitive carriers, as SBT requests. First, SBT has not

explained adequately in its comments how it meets the three statutory criteria for

forbearance. Second, while SBT points out that competitive concerns may differ according

to carrier size, it does not persuade us that customers of small businesses have less

meaningful privacy interests in their CPNI. We thus disagree with SBT that the three

category approach gives large carriers flexibility to develop and meet customers' needs, but

may unnecessarily limit small business as competition grows. Even if, as SBT alleges, a

large carrier can base the design of a new offering on statistical customer data and market

widely, but a small business can best meet specialized subscriber needs if it offers CMRS,

local, and interexchange service tailored to the specific subscriber, the total service approach

allows tailored packages. We likewise disagree, therefore, with USTA that small carriers

could be competitively disadvantaged in any interpretation of section 222(c)(1)(A) other than

the single category approach. Rather, we are persuaded that the total service approach

provides all carriers, including small and mid-sized LECs, with flexibility in the marketing

of their telecommunications products and services. In fact, if  ${\tt SBT's}$  claims that  ${\tt small}$ 

businesses typically have closer personal relationships with their customers are accurate, then

small businesses likely would have less difficulty in obtaining customer approval to market

services outside of a customer's service existing service.

51. We also agree with a number of parties that there should be no restriction on

the sharing of CPNI among a carrier's various telecommunications-related entities that

provide different service offerings to the same customer. By its terms, section 222(c)(1)(A) generally limits "a telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains

[CPNI] by virtue of its provision of a telecommunications service" to use, disclose, or permit

access to CPNI only in "its provision of the telecommunications service from which such  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{S}}$ 

information is derived." This language does not limit the exception for use or disclosure

of CPNI to the corporate parent. Rather, we believe the language reasonably permits our

view that the CPNI limitations should relate to the nature of the service provided and not the

nature of the entity providing the service. In particular, under the total service approach, we

interpret the scope of section 222(c)(1)(A) to permit carriers to use or disclose CPNI based

on the customer's implied approval to market related offerings within the customer's existing

service relationship. To the extent a carrier chooses to (or must) arrange its corporate  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right)$ 

structure so that different affiliates provide different telecommunications service offerings,

and a customer subscribes to more than one offering from the carrier, the total service

approach permits the sharing of CPNI among the affiliated entities without customer

approval. In contrast, if a customer subscribes to less than all of the telecommunications

service offered by these affiliated entities, then CPNI sharing among the affiliates would be

restricted under the total service approach. In this circumstance, the restriction is not based

on the corporate structure, but rather on the scope of the service subscribed to by the customer.

 $\,$  52. For the reasons described herein, we believe that the sharing of CPNI  $\,$ 

permitted under the total service approach among affiliated telecommunications entities best

balances the goals of section 222 to safeguard customer privacy and promote fair competition. Under a contrary interpretation, carriers would have to change their corporate

structure in order to consolidate a customer's service record consistent with the total service

approach. If other business considerations counselled against such corporate restructuring,

the customer would ultimately suffer because it would not receive the advantages associated

with the information sharing permissible under the total service approach. Moreover, we

agree that CPNI distinctions based solely on corporate structure would be confusing and

inconvenient for customers. For all these reasons, we reject such an alternative interpretation.

## b. Statutory Principles of Customer Control and Convenience

53. In addition to finding that the total service approach is most consistent with the

statutory language and legislative history, we are persuaded that, as a policy matter, the total

service approach also best advances the principles of customer control and convenience

implicitly embodied in sections 222(c)(1) and (c)(2). These statutory principles, as discussed

below, in conjunction with our experience regulating carriers' CPNI use, guide our

interpretation of the scope of section 222(c)(1)(A). We agree with the observation of

numerous commenters that Congress intended that section 222(c) would protect customers'

reasonable expectations of privacy regarding personal and sensitive information, by giving

customers control over CPNI use, both by their current carrier and third parties. First, as

CPI observes, this principle of customer control is manifested in section 222(c)(2), which

provides: "A telecommunications carrier shall disclose customer proprietary network

information, upon affirmative written request by the customer, to any person designated by

the customer." In this provision, Congress requires that carriers must comply with the

express desire of the customer regarding disclosure of  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{CPNI}}$ , and in so doing establishes the

customer's right to direct who receives its CPNI and when it may be disclosed. Second,

section 222(c)(1) requires carriers to obtain customer "approval" when they seek to use,

disclose, or permit access to CPNI for purposes beyond those specified in sections 222(c)(1)(A) and 222(c)(1)(B). By requiring that carriers obtain approval, Congress

ensured that customers would be able to control any "secondary" uses to which carriers could

make of their CPNI, and thereby restrict the dissemination of their personal information.

Third, the principle of customer control also is reflected in sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B),

which permit carrier use of CPNI absent customer approval only in certain limited

circumstances. The restricted scope of the carrier's right to use CPNI under these provisions

-- only in the provision of the telecommunications service from which the CPNI is derived,

or services necessary to or used in that service -- evidences Congress' recognition that a

customer's subscription to service constitutes only a limited form of implied approval.

54. While sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B) embody the principle that customers wish

to maintain control over their sensitive information, those provisions also manifest the

principle that customers want convenient service, as some commenters have observed.

The notion of implied approval evidences Congress' understanding that customers desire their

service to be provided in a convenient manner, and are willing for carriers to use their CPNI

without their approval to provide them service (and, under section 222(c)(1)(B), services

necessary to, or used in, such service) within the parameters of the customer-carrier

relationship. Indeed, we agree with commenters that Congress recognized through sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B) that customers expect that carriers with which they maintain an

established relationship will use information derived through the course of that relationship to

improve the customer's existing service. Accordingly, as many commenters observe, what

the customer expects or understands is included in its telecommunications service represents

the scope and limit of its implied approval under section 222(c)(1)(A). As discussed

below, we conclude that the total service approach, based on the customer's entire service

subscription, best reflects these underlying principles of customer control and convenience.

55. Customers do not expect that carriers will need their approval to use CPNI for

offerings within the existing total service to which they subscribe. We believe it reasonable to

conclude that, where a customer subscribes to a diverse service offering  $\ensuremath{\text{--}}$  a mixture of

local, long distance, and  ${\tt CMRS}$  -- from the same carrier or its subsidiary or affiliated

companies, the customer views its telecommunications service as the total service offering

that it has purchased, and can be presumed to have given implied consent to its carrier to use

its CPNI for all aspects of that service. We find no reason to believe that customers would

expect or desire their carrier to maintain internal divisions among the different components of

their service, particularly where such CPNI use could improve the carrier's provision of the

customer's existing service. We agree with Sprint and MCI that customers choosing an

integrated product will expect their provider to have and use information regarding all parts

of the service provided by that company, and will be confused and annoyed if that carrier

does not and cannot provide complete customer service. For this reason, many of those

parties favoring either the two or three category approach, while not advocating the total

service approach explicitly, nevertheless support its principal tenet that, if customers'

subscriptions change, perhaps in response to new integrated carrier offerings, the scope of

section 222(c)(1)(A) must likewise change. The total service concept is supported by some

advocates of the discrete offering approach as well, who foresee customer movement toward  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{T}}$ 

a more comprehensive service offering.

56. We believe the total service approach maximizes both customer control and convenience. Customers retain control over the uses to which carriers can make of their

CPNI, for example, to market services outside the total service offering currently subscribed

to by the customer. This limitation, in turn, comports with our view that customers

reasonably expect that carriers will not use or disclose CPNI beyond the existing service

relationship. Once a carrier has successfully marketed a new offering to the customer,

however, that offering would become part of the "telecommunication service" subscribed to

by the customer, and the customers' entire service record would be available to the carrier to

improve the existing customer-carrier relationship. The customer's interest in receiving

service in a convenient manner is thereby also served. In these ways, the total service

approach serves the statutory principles of customer convenience and control, and best

reflects customers' understanding of their telecommunication service.

57. By contrast, neither the discrete offering approach nor the three category

approach serves the statutory principle of customer convenience or reasonably reflects

customers' expectations of what constitutes their telecommunications service. Prior to the

1996 Act, Commission policy permitted carriers to use CPNI to market related service  $\frac{1}{2}$ 

offerings. Given this environment, we conclude that customers expect and desire, for

example, that their local service carrier will make them aware of all local service

offerings. The discrete offering approach, on the other hand, would prevent a carrier,

absent customer approval, from improving the range and quality of service offerings

currently provided to the customer and tailoring service packages for a customer's existing

service needs. On this basis, we reject NYNEX's position that short-haul toll should be

included only within the local service category. Rather, we agree with commenters that,

insofar as both LECs and IXCs currently provide short-haul toll, it should be part of both

local and long-distance service. Also, permitting short-haul toll to "float" between the

local and the interexchange offerings should not confer upon any carrier a competitive

advantage, contrary to what NYNEX argues. In fact, the intraLATA equal access and

short-haul toll markets are competitive in several states. Moreover, LECs are not

disadvantaged because they can include their short-haul toll with their local service CPNI for

marketing purposes. We similarly reject a three category approach, for where a customer

subscribed to more than one carrier offering, the rigid categories would prevent a carrier.

absent customer approval, from using the customer's entire service record to offer alternative

improved versions of the existing service. Thus, although these approaches would afford

customers control, it would be at the expense of customer convenience and would not reflect

the customer's understanding of the total service relationship. We therefore reject these

approaches as contrary to the Congressional design of section 222, as well as to one of the

1996 Act's general goals of avoiding excessive regulation.

58. We also reject the discrete offering and three category approaches because we

share the concern expressed by many parties that such restrictive interpretations may be

difficult to implement as service distinctions, and corresponding customer subscriptions,

become blurred with market and technological advances. The three category approach

would require that we undertake a periodic review, beginning in the near future, to ascertain

whether changes in the competitive environment translated into changes in service

categories. In contrast, if customers embrace "one-stop shopping," through market-driven

integrated packages of service (e.g., bundled offering of local and long-distance services),

the flexibility of the total service approach would not require us to revisit or modify

categories to accommodate these changes. The categories would instead disappear naturally

as customers begin purchasing integrated packages, without need for Commission intervention. Although the total service approach would still require that we maintain

some service distinctions, unless and until customers subscribe to integrated products, it

facilitates any convergence of technologies and services in the marketplace. Carriers have

indicated, for example, that they are presently developing a hardwire cordless phone that can

become a wireless product when taken a certain distance from its base. Under the total

service approach, a carrier would be able to market related wireless and wireline offerings to  $% \left\{ 1\right\} =\left\{ 1\right\} =\left\{$ 

a customer that subscribed to this product, and not be forced somehow to separate wireline

CPNI from wireless. Finally, the total service approach is also sufficiently flexible to

accommodate future new service technologies that are beyond the three traditional categories,

as such offerings would not be artificially forced into a service category.

59. In supporting the total service approach, we are nevertheless cognizant of the

dangers, described by Cox, that incumbent LECs could use CPNI anticompetitively, for

example, to: (1) use calling patterns to target potential long distance customers; (2) cross-

sell to customers purchasing services necessary to use competitors' offerings (e.g., attempt to

sell voice mail service when a customer requests from the LEC the necessary underlying  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right) +\left($ 

service, call forwarding-variable); (3) market to customers who call particular telephone

numbers (e.g., prepare a list of customers who call the cable company to order pay-per-view

movies for use in marketing the LEC's own OVS or cable service); and (4) identify potential

customers for new services based on the volume of services already used (e.g.,  $\max$ ) tis

on-line service to all residential customers with a second line). We recognize that

requiring carriers to obtain express customer approval for use of CPNI to target customers

for new service offerings to which the customer does not subscribe protects against some, but

not all, of these abuses. Nevertheless, our rejection of the discrete offering and three

category approaches does not permit carriers to use CPNI anticompetitively within the

customer's existing service. That is, while we interpret section 222(c)(1)(A) to permit

carrier use of CPNI for marketing of related service offerings, using local service CPNI to

track, for example, all customers that call local service competitors, would not be a

permissible marketing use because such CPNI use would not constitute "its provision of" its

service. Such action would violate section 222(c)(1) and, depending on the circumstances,

may also constitute an unreasonable practice in violation of section 201(b). As the

Commission has found in the past, such anticompetitive use of CPNI violates the basic

principles of competition, and to the extent such practices rise to the level of anticompetitive

conduct, we can and will exercise our authority to prevent such discriminatory behavior.

In contrast, although carriers will benefit under the total service approach from being able to

consolidate the customer's entire service record, we do not believe that this use of CPNI is

anticompetitive or contrary to what Congress envisioned because such consolidation will not

result in the targeting of new customers, but merely will assist carriers in better servicing

their existing customers.

60. Customers do not expect that carriers will use CPNI to market offerings outside

the total service to which they subscribe. We have concluded above that the single category

approach is inconsistent with the language of section 222. We also believe that, as a policy

matter, it inadequately promotes the goals underlying section 222. Several commenters,

including the BOCs, AT&T, and GTE, argue that customers understand and desire for

carriers to use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI freely within the same corporate family,

regardless of whether the customer subscribes to the service offerings of the related

entities. As evidence, these parties offer a survey, commissioned by PacTel, which they

claim shows consumer support for such information sharing, as well as an earlier study by

CBT. In general, the survey results purport to show that a majority of the public believes

it is acceptable for businesses, particularly local telephone companies, to examine customer

records to offer customers additional services. PacTel claims that the Westin study also

indicates that the public is confident that local telephone companies will use personal

information responsibly, and will protect the confidentiality of such information.

61. We are persuaded, however, that the Westin study may not accurately reflect

customer attitudes, and fails to demonstrate that customers expect or desire carriers to use

CPNI to market all the categories of services available, regardless of the boundaries of the

existing service relationship. First, the Westin study does not identify the kind of telephone

information at issue. As Cox points out, the survey questions ask broadly whether it is

acceptable for a customer's local telephone company to look over "customer records" to

determine which customers would benefit from hearing about new services, without explaining the specific types of information that would be accessed. Much CPNI, however, consists of highly personal information, particularly relating to call destination,

including the numbers subscribers call and from which they receive calls, as well as when  $\frac{1}{2}$ 

and how frequently subscribers make their calls. This data can be translated into subscriber

profiles containing information about the identities and whereabouts of subscribers' friends

and relatives; which businesses subscribers patronize; when subscribers are likely to be home

and/or awake; product and service preferences; how frequently and cost-effectively

subscribers use their telecommunications services; and subscribers' social, medical, business,

client, sales, organizational, and political telephone contacts.

62. Insofar as the Westin study failed to reveal to the respondents the specific uses

of CPNI, we give little weight to the purported results as reflecting customer privacy

expectations. In addition, the wording and order of the questions in the survey  $\ensuremath{\text{may}}$  have

predisposed respondents to thinking that the information available would be nonsensitive. In

particular, question 10 refers to the examination of records by customer service representatives as "normal," and implies that the representative will be looking only at the

services the customer has before offering new services. Survey respondents may have

assumed that this was the information customer service representatives would be examining

in question 11. The survey did not clarify that customer service representatives would also

potentially examine sensitive CPNI, such as destination-related information. In addition,

respondents may have treated questions 10 and 11 as asking them whether they want to learn

about new services within the existing service relationship, and not as involving whether they

think their CPNI is sensitive information or whether they want it to be disseminated outside

that service relationship. Because certain CPNI, such as destination information, can be

regarded as highly personal, we conclude that some customers may not desire or expect

carriers to use such information for all categories of telecommunications service available,

but rather would wish to limit the dissemination of the information outside the service or

services to which they subscribed. Indeed, contrary to U S WEST's assertion that customers

do not suffer from "privacy angst," other sources suggest just the opposite. Within the last

several months, numerous published articles have chronicled customer concern over the loss  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right)$ 

of privacy in this "information age."

63. Moreover, we do not believe we can properly infer that a customer's decision

to purchase one type of service offering constitutes approval for a carrier to use CPNI to

market other service offerings to which the customer does not subscribe, and that may not

even have been previously available from that carrier. In the pre-1996 Act environment,

although customers could shop among long distance providers, CMRS providers, and information service providers (and among all these providers' respective discrete service

offerings), most customers, as a general matter, could not choose among carriers offering

"one-stop shopping" because such comprehensive service packages did not exist.

particularly true in connection with local service because incumbent LECs were regulated

monopolies and therefore customers had no choice, and could not even shop, among local

service providers. Accordingly, under these circumstances, it is highly unlikely that

customers would have expected a carrier to which they subscribed for one service to use

their CPNI for another service to which they did not subscribe - and which previously may

have been unavailable - from that carrier.

64. Second, even if the survey accurately shows that customers desire "one-stop

shopping," and would permit carriers to share information in order to offer improved

service, our interpretation of section 222(c)(1) does not foreclose carriers' ability to offer

integrated packages nor the beneficial marketing uses to which CPNI can be made. We

agree with commenters that it is desirable for carriers to provide integrated telecommunications service packages, and that the 1996 Act contemplates one-stop shopping, as past "product market" distinctions between local and long distance blur. We

are not persuaded, however, that the single category approach alone promotes these benefits.

We believe the total service approach also accommodates these interests. The total service

approach, for example, places no restriction on the offering of integrated service packages.

Moreover, the carrier can use CPNI to market other offerings within an existing category of

service, and when a customer subscribes to more than one, can share CPNI for marketing all

offerings within the customer's total existing service. In this way, the total service approach

allows a carrier to use a customer's account information to improve the quality of the service

to which the customer currently subscribes, without the fatal statutory, privacy, and

competitive flaws of the single category approach.

65. On this basis, we likewise reject arguments in support of the two category

approach that restrictions on using CPNI to market a carrier's wireline and wireless services

only would serve to perpetuate artificially a landline/CMRS distinction and thereby

discourage innovative, integrated services. BellSouth argues that such CPNI sharing is

crucial to effective joint marketing, and that treating CMRS as a separate service category  $\,$ 

for purposes of section 222 thus would thwart the joint marketing relief granted to carriers

through section 601(d) of the 1996 Act. As discussed in the CMRS Safeguards Order, we

disagree that the joint marketing relief granted by Congress in section 601(d) renders the

Commission without power to regulate the nature of the joint marketing. We believe the

CPNI restrictions set forth herein are a reasonable exercise of our authority consistent with

section 601. Under the total service approach, where a customer obtains CMRS and local or  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{CMRS}}$ 

long distance service from the same carrier, CPNI from the customer's entire service can be

fully able to communicate with their existing customers and solidify the customer-carrier

relationship. This is precisely the benefit for which Congress contemplated, and customers

expect, that CPNI would be used. Moreover, as CompTel points out, the principal "inefficiency" and bar to the offering of integrated service alleged under Computer II and

Computer III -- the inability of sales personnel to respond to customer inquiries regarding

other telecommunications service offerings -- is explicitly eliminated by section 222(d)(3).

Section 222(d)(3) provides that nothing in section 222 prohibits a carrier from using,

disclosing, or permitting access to CPNI  $"to\ provide\ any\ inbound\ telemarketing,\ referral,\ or$ 

administrative services to the customer for the duration of the call, if such call was initiated

by the customer and the customer approves of the use of such information to provide such service."

66. To be sure, under the total service approach carriers may not use CPNI

without prior customer approval to target customers they believe would be receptive to new

categories of service. While this limitation under the total service approach might make

incumbent carriers' marketing efforts less effective and potentially more expensive than the

single category approach, we disagree that this is a wholly undesirable outcome or contrary

to what Congress intended. The 1996 Act was meant to ensure, to the maximum extent

possible, that, as markets were opened to competition, carriers would win or retain

customers on the basis of their service quality and prices, not on the basis of a competitive

advantage conferred solely due to their incumbent status. We agree with several parties that

the single category approach, in contrast with the total service approach, would give

incumbent carriers an unwarranted competitive advantage in marketing new categories of

services. New entrants, but not incumbents, would be forced to incur the costs to obtain

approval for access to and use of CPNI, and may be placed at a competitive disadvantage

because not all customers will approve access. This environment, in turn, might discourage

new entrants, thus thwarting the 1996 Act's goals of encouraging competition and investment

in new technology as well as accelerating the rapid deployment of advanced telecommunications.

67. Finally, we reject the claim put forth by several proponents of the single

category approach that narrower interpretations of section 222(c)(1)(A) would result in

significant administrative burdens for carriers. On the contrary, we conclude that the total

service approach is the least onerous administratively. Under the total service approach,

unlike under the category and discrete offering approaches, a carrier will be able to use the

customer's entire customer record in the course of providing the customer service.

Moreover, given our decisions to permit oral, written, or electronic approval under

section 222(c)(1), and to impose use rather than access restrictions, the total service

approach addresses any concern that CPNI restrictions will disrupt the customer-carrier

dialogue, and the carriers' ability to provide full customer service.

- C. Scope of Carrier's Right Pursuant to Section 222(c)(1)(B)
  - 1. Background
- 68. Section 222(c)(1) of the Act provides that, "except as required by law or with

the approval of the customer, a telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains [CPNI]

by virtue of its provision of a telecommunications service shall only use, disclose, or permit

access to individually identifiable [CPNI] in its provision of (A) the telecommunications

service from which such information is derived, or (B) services necessary to, or used in, the

provision of such telecommunications service, including the publishing of directories." In

the Notice, the Commission stated that CPNI obtained from the provision of any telecommunications service may not be used to market CPE or information services without

prior customer authorization, and sought comment on which "services" should be deemed

"necessary to, or used in" the provision of such telecommunications service. The

Commission also sought comment on whether carriers, absent customer approval, may use

CPNI derived from the provision of one telecommunications service to perform installation,

maintenance, and repair for any telecommunications service, either under section 222(c)(1)(B) because they are "services necessary to, or used in, the provision of

such telecommunications service," or under section 222(d)(1) because the CPNI is used to

"initiate, render, bill and collect for telecommunications services."

69. Commenters focus on whether CPE, information services, or installation, maintenance, and repair services, should be deemed "services necessary to, or used in, the

provision of such telecommunications service."

# 2. Discussion

70. As a threshold matter, given the wide range of views on the interpretation of

section 222(c)(1)(B), we reject U S WEST's assertion that we simply craft rules repeating,

verbatim, the statutory language. We clarify, however, that we do not attempt here to

catalogue every service included within the scope of section 222(c)(1)(B), but rather address

the specific offerings that have been proposed in the record as falling within that section, in

particular, CPE, certain information services, and installation, maintenance, and repair

services. In so doing, we construe section 222(c)(1)(B), like section 222(c)(1)(A), to reflect

the understanding that, through subscription to service, a customer impliedly approves its

carrier's use of CPNI for purposes within the scope of the service relationship. As we

conclude in Part IV.B.2 supra, we believe that customers' implied approval in section 222(c)(1)(A) is limited to the total service subscribed to by the customer. We

likewise believe that section 222(c)(1)(B) most appropriately is interpreted as recognizing that

customers impliedly approve their carrier's use of CPNI in connection with certain non-

telecommunications services. This implied approval, however, is expressly limited to those

services "necessary to, or used in, the provision of such telecommunications service."

Through this limiting language, we believe carriers' CPNI use is confined only to certain

non-telecommunications services (i.e. those "services" either "necessary to" or "used in"), as

well as to those services that comprise the customer's total service offering (i.e. "such

[section 222(c)(1)(A)] telecommunications service").

71. CPE and Certain Information Services. Based on the statutory language we conclude that, contrary to the position advanced by several parties, a carrier may not use,

disclose, or permit access to CPNI, without customer approval, for the provision of CPE and

most information services because, as other commenters assert, they are not "services

necessary to, or used in, the provision of such telecommunications service" under

section 222(c)(1)(B). First, with respect to CPE, the exception in section 222(c)(1)(B) is

expressly limited to non-telecommunications "services." CPE is by definition customer

premises equipment, and as such historically has been categorized and referred to as

equipment. We give meaning to the statutory language, and find no basis to extend the  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{E}}$ 

exception in section 222(c)(1)(B) to include equipment, even if it may be "used in" the

provision of a telecommunications service. Accordingly, we conclude that the statutory

limitation to "services" excludes CPE from section 222(c)(1)(B), and carriers cannot use

CPNI derived from their provision of a telecommunications service for purposes in

connection with CPE.

72. Second, we conclude that, while the information services set forth in the record (e.g., call answering, voice mail or messaging, voice storage and retrieval

services, fax store and forward, and Internet access services) constitute non-telecommunications "services," they are not "necessary to, or used in" the carrier's provision

of telecommunications service. Rather, we agree with the observation of several

commenters that, although telecommunications service is "necessary to, or used in, the  $\,$ 

provision of "information services, information services generally are not "necessary to, or

used in, the provision of "any telecommunications service. As ITAA notes,

telecommunications service is defined under the Act in terms of "transmission," and

involves the establishment of a transparent communications path. The transmission of

information over that path is provided without the carrier's "use" of, or "need" for,

information services. In contrast, information services involve the "offering of a capability

for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making

available information via telecommunications." Indeed, the statute specifically excludes

from the definition of information service "any use of any such [information service]

capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the

management of a telecommunications service." Because information services generally,

and in particular those few identified in the record (i.e., call answering, voice mail or

messaging, voice storage and retrieval services, fax store and forward, and Internet access

services), are provided to consumers independently of their telecommunication service,

they neither are used by the carrier nor necessary to the provision of such carrier's service.

73. Contrary to NYNEX's argument, we conclude that Congress' designation of the publishing of directories as "necessary to, or used in" the provision of a telecommunications service does not require a broad reading of section 222(c)(1)(B) that

encompasses all information services. We are persuaded that section 222(c)(1)(B) covers

services like those formerly characterized as "adjunct-to-basic," in contrast to the information

services such as call answering, voice mail or messaging, voice storage and  $\operatorname{retrieval}$ 

services, fax store and forward, and Internet access services, that the parties identified in the

record. As noted supra, before the 1996 Act, the Commission recognized that certain

computer processing services, although included within the literal definition of enhanced

services, were nevertheless "clearly 'basic' in purpose and use" because they "facilitate use

of traditional telephone service." Examples of adjunct-to-basic services include speed

dialing, call forwarding, computer-provided directory assistance, call monitoring, caller ID,

call tracing, call blocking, call return, repeat dialing, call tracking, and certain centrex

features. With respect to these services, the Commission stated that such computer  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right)$ 

processing applications were "used in conjunction with 'voice' service" and "help

telephone companies provide or manage basic telephone services," as opposed to the

information conveyed through enhanced services. Although the Commission subsequently

recognized these adjunct-to-basic services as being telecommunications services in the Non-

Accounting Safeguards Order, their appropriate service classification remained unclear at the

time that Congress passed the 1996 Act. Accordingly, we believe the language in section 222(c)(1)(B), "services necessary to, or used in, the provision of such telecommunications service," reaches these adjunct-to-basic services, which are "used in" the

carrier's provision of its telecommunications service. On this basis, we agree with those

parties arguing that services such as call waiting, caller I.D., call forwarding,

SONET, and ISDN would fall within the language of section 222(c)(1)(B); therefore,

carriers need not obtain express approval from the customer to use  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$  to market those

services. We disagree, however, that other services, now classified as information services,

such as call answering, voice mail or messaging, voice storage and retrieval services, fax

store and forward, and Internet access services, would come within its meaning.

74. Our interpretation is supported by Congress' example of the publishing of directories. The publishing of directories, like those services formerly described as adjunct-

to-basic, can appropriately be viewed as necessary to and used in the provision of complete

and adequate telecommunication service. As the Commission reasoned, in connection with

finding directory assistance to be an adjunct-to-basic service: "[w]hen a customer uses

directory assistance, that customer accesses information stored in a telephone company data

base. . . [Such] service provides only that information about another subscriber's

telephone number which is necessary to allow use of the network to place a call to that other

subscriber." As with directory assistance services, if listings are not published, many calls

cannot, and will not, be made. In this way, the publishing of directories is likewise

necessary to facilitate call completion. This is the view taken by numerous state courts that

have explicitly found that the publishing of telephone listings is a necessary component of the

provision of basic telephone service. In contrast, most information services are not "used

in, or necessary to" the provision of the carrier's telecommunications service.

75. As a matter of statutory construction, we find that the language of section 222(c)(1)(B) is clear and unambiguous, and does not permit the interpretation that

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{CPE}}$  and most information services are "services necessary to, or used in, the provision of

such telecommunications service." But even if that language is ambiguous, we are

unpersuaded by parties' contrary arguments based on the legislative history and policy

considerations. Specifically, we disagree with U S WEST's claim that the absence in

section 222 of an express CPE and information services marketing prohibition, which was

contained in the House bill, indicates that Congress intended to allow CPNI use for  $\,$ 

marketing CPE and information services without customer approval. We do not believe

that this legislative history indicates Congress' intent one way or the other. Because any

change from prior versions is not explained in the Conference Report, we decline to

speculate about the possible reasons underlying the revisions to this provision. Moreover, as

ITAA and CompuServe argue, including information services within the scope of section 222(c)(1)(B) may give an unfair competitive advantage to incumbent carriers in

entering new service markets. Accordingly, restricting CPNI use in the CPE market is

consistent with Congress' express intent that, as part of the balance, we protect competitive  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) \left$ 

concerns regarding CPNI use.

76. We also reject suggestions that restrictions on CPNI sharing in the context of

CPE and information services would be contrary to customer expectations, as well as

detrimental to the goals of customer convenience and one-stop shopping. As ITAA notes, CPNI is not required for one-stop shopping. Our

interpretation of section 222(c)(1)(B) does not prohibit carriers from bundling services that

they are otherwise able to bundle under the 1996 Act, or from marketing integrated service

offerings. The restrictions merely would require the carrier to obtain customer approval

before using CPNI for such purposes.

77. Finally, we reject parties' contentions that we should permit carriers to use

CPNI in connection with CPE and information services because the Commission in the past

permitted more information sharing. PacTel argues that CMRS-related CPE and information services come within the meaning of section 222(c)(1)(B) because the Commission previously had not restricted CMRS carriers' use of CMRS CPNI to market

these offerings. While it is true that the Commission previously had allowed CMRS

carriers to use CMRS CPNI to market CMRS-related CPE and information services, Congress was well aware of the Commission's treatment of CMRS CPNI, and of our framework of nonstructural safeguards in connection with CPE and information services. In

its place, Congress enacted section 222 which extends to all telecommunications carriers and

thus all telecommunications services, and which contains no exception for CMRS-related

CPE and information services. Moreover, we note that the efficiencies gained through

permitting CPNI use for marketing enhanced services, described by the Commission in a pre-

1996 Act proceeding, were in the context of an inbound call. Section 222(d)(3) expressly

permits use of CPNI upon the approval of the customer in this inbound context, and

therefore, would not preclude the one-stop shopping envisioned by the Commission in that

order. Thus, while the Commission previously chose to balance considerations of privacy

and competition that permitted more sharing of information in these contexts, Congress

struck a different balance in section 222, which now controls. We also note, however,

that the record in this proceeding does not indicate whether, as a matter of policy, carriers

should be prohibited from marketing CPE under the total service approach. Section 64.702(e) of the Commission's rules specifies that CPE is separate and distinct from

the provision of common carrier communications services. It nevertheless may be appropriate in the future for us to examine whether the public interest would be better served

if carriers were able to use  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$  , within the framework of the total service approach, in

order to market CPE.

78. Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Service. We conclude that, pursuant to

section 222(c)(1)(B), a carrier may use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI, without

customer approval, in its provision of inside wiring installation, maintenance, and repair

services. We note at the outset that commenters responded quite generally to the Notice's

question on this issue, with several concluding, with little or no discussion, that "carriers

may use CPNI derived from the provision of one telecommunications service to perform

installation, maintenance, and repair for any telecommunications service" under section 222(c)(1)(B). Apart from the context of inside wiring, we are uncertain as to what

other installation, maintenance, and repair services parties contend that CPNI could be used.

Because commenters failed to specify their views further, we reject as unsupported and

unclear, the general claim that CPNI derived from the provision of "one telecommunications

service" may be used to provide installation, maintenance, and repair services for any  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{S}}$ 

telecommunications service. Nevertheless, the record supports permitting the provision of

inside wiring installation, maintenance, and repair services under section 222(c)(1)(B), and

we accordingly limit our discussion of installation, maintenance, and repair services to inside wiring-related services.

79. Specifically, we are persuaded that installation, maintenance, and repair of

inside wiring is a service both "necessary to" and "used in" a carrier's provision of wireline

telecommunications service. As such, carriers may use, without customer approval, CPNI

derived from wireline service for the provision of inside wiring installation, maintenance,

and repair services. As U S WEST points out, inside wiring has little purpose beyond

physically connecting the telephone transmission path. We also agree with  $\mbox{\it PacTel}$  that the

carrier's "provision" of a telecommunications service includes keeping the telecommunications service in working order through installation, maintenance, and repair

services. The Commission's decision in the Universal Service Order regarding intra-school

and intra-library connections supports our interpretation. In that order, the Commission

found that the installation and maintenance of internal connections constitute "additional

services" and thus are eligible for universal service support under section 254 of the 1996 Act.

80. We further believe that our conclusion is fully consistent with customer expectation, and thereby furthers the statutory principles of customer control and

convenience embodied in section 222. Although inside wiring installation, maintenance,

and repair services may be purchased separately from telephone services, they constitute  ${\tt non-}$ 

telecommunications services that carriers effectively need and use in order to provide

wireline telecommunications services. We believe such services represent core carrier

offerings that are both necessary to and used in the provision of existing service, which is

precisely the purpose for which both Congress intended, and we believe customers expect,

that CPNI be used. Because we conclude that such CPNI use by carriers is within customers' expectations, we do not believe that our interpretation of section 222(c)(1)(B)

jeopardizes privacy interests. Moreover, insofar as the Commission did not restrict LEC use

of CPNI to market inside wiring maintenance contracts prior to the 1996 Act, our interpretation of section 222(c)(1)(B) will not increase any existing competitive advantage.

- D. Scope of Carrier's Right Pursuant to Section 222(d)(1)
  - 1. Background

81. The Commission observed in the Notice that section 222(d)(1) enables carriers

to use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI "to initiate, render, bill, and collect for  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right) +\left($ 

telecommunications services." After generally acknowledging that section 222 restricts the

unapproved use of CPNI for any purpose other than those specified in section 222(c)(1) and

the exceptions listed in section 222(d), the Commission sought specific comment on whether

carriers, absent customer approval, may use CPNI derived from the provision of one

telecommunications service to perform installation, maintenance, and repair for any

telecommunications service to which a customer subscribes, either under section 222(d)(1)

because they are used "to initiate, render, bill, and collect for telecommunications services" or section 222(c)(1)(B).

### 2. Discussion

82. In the context of installation, maintenance, and repair of inside wiring, we

conclude that section 222(d)(1), as well as section 222(c)(1)(B), permit carrier use of CPNI

without customer approval for the provision of such services. We agree with virtually all

commenters that section 222(d)(1)'s permission for carriers to use CPNI "to initiate, render,

bill, and collect for telecommunications services" includes the actual installation,

maintenance, and repair of inside wiring.

83. Our conclusion is consistent with Equifax's concerns that we not interpret sections 222(d)(1) as well as 222(d)(2) in a manner that impedes carriers' access to

information for the purpose of billing, fraud prevention, and related services, as well as the

carriers' ability to provide the required information. We agree that section 222(d)(2)'s

protect users of those services and other carriers from fraudulent, abusive, or unlawful use

of, or subscription to, such services" includes the use and disclosure of CPNI by carriers

to prevent fraud. Sections 222(d)(1) and (2) establish that the carrier and public's interest in

accurate billing and collecting for telecommunications services and in preventing fraud and

abuse outweigh any privacy interests of those who might attempt to avoid payment of their

bills or perpetrate a fraud.

84. Contrary to the claims of AT&T and MCI, we further conclude, however,

that the term "initiate" in section 222(d)(1) does not require that CPNI be disclosed by

carriers when competing carriers have "won" the customer. We agree with  $\mathtt{GTE}$  that

section 222(d)(1) applies only to carriers already possessing the CPNI, within the context of

the existing service relationship, and not to carriers seeking access to CPNI. We note.

however, that section 222(c)(1) does not prohibit carriers from disclosing CPNI to competing

carriers, for example, upon customer "approval." Accordingly, although an incumbent

carrier is not required to disclose CPNI pursuant to section 222(d)(1) or section 222(c)(2)

absent an affirmative written request, local exchange carriers may need to disclose a

customer's service record upon the oral approval of the customer to a competing carrier prior  $\$ 

to its commencement of service as part of the LEC's obligations under sections 251(c)(3) and

(c)(4). In this way, section 222(c)(1) permits any sharing of customer records necessary

for the provisioning of service by a competitive carrier, and addresses the competitive

concerns raised by AT&T and MCI.

85. Furthermore, a carrier's failure to disclose CPNI to a competing carrier that

service, may well, depending upon the circumstances, constitute an unreasonable practice in

violation of section 201(b). We also do not believe, contrary to the position suggested by

AT&T, that section 222(d)(1) permits the former (or soon-to-be former) carrier to use the

 $\mbox{\former}$  of its former customer (i.e., a customer that has placed an order for service from a

competing provider) for "customer retention" purposes. Consequently, a local exchange

carrier is precluded from using or accessing CPNI derived from the provision of local

provider. The use of CPNI in this context is not statutorily permitted under section 222(d)(1), insofar as such use would be undertaken to market a service to which a

customer previously subscribed, rather than to "initiate" a service within the meaning of that

provision. Nor do we believe that the use of CPNI for customer retention purposes is

permissible under section 222(c)(1) because such use is not carried out "in [the] provision" of

service, but rather, for the purpose of retaining a customer that had already undertaken steps

to change its service provider. Customer approval for the use of CPNI in this situation thus

may not be appropriately inferred because such use is outside of the customer's existing

service relationship within the meaning of section 222(c)(1)(A).

# V. "APPROVAL" UNDER SECTION 222(c)(1)

#### A. Overview

86. Under sections 222(c)(1), (c)(2), and (d)(3), a carrier may (or must) use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI upon the customer's approval. In contrast to sections 222(c)(2) and (d)(3) of the Act, in which Congress made clear the form of customer

approval, section 222(c)(1) does not specify what kind of approval is required when it

permits a carrier upon "approval of the customer" to use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI

for purposes beyond the limited exceptions set forth in sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B).

Because the form of approval has bearing on carriers' use of CPNI as a marketing tool, we

received considerable comment concerning the proper interpretation of "approval" under

section 222(c)(1). In general, parties offer three separate views, ranging from a most

restrictive interpretation that would require approval to be in writing, to a permissive one,

where carriers merely would need to provide customers with a notice of their intent to use

CPNI, and a mechanism for customers to "opt-out" from this proposed use (notice and opt-out).

87. We conclude that the term "approval" in section 222(c)(1) is ambiguous because it could permit a variety of interpretations. We resolve that ambiguity by

implementing the statute in a manner that will best further consumer privacy interests and

competition, as well as the principle of customer control. We conclude that carriers must

obtain express written, oral, or electronic approval for CPNI uses beyond those set forth in

sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B). Further, in order to ensure that customers can provide

informed approval under section 222(c)(1), we require that carriers give customers explicit

notice of their CPNI rights prior to any solicitation for approval. By implementing the

approval requirements of section 222(c)(1) in this manner, we will minimize any unwanted or

unknowing disclosure of CPNI by customers, consistent with Congress' concern for consumer privacy interests. In addition, as explained below, we determine that this form of

approval will minimize the competitive advantages that might otherwise accrue unnecessarily

to incumbent carriers.

### B. Express Versus Notice and Opt-Out

#### 1. Background

88. The Commission sought comment in the Notice on which methods carriers may use to obtain customer approval consistent with section 222. The Commission recognized that, in the Computer III proceedings, prior to the 1996 Act, it established certain

authorization requirements applicable solely to the enhanced services operations of AT&T,

the BOCs, and GTE, and to the CPE operations of AT&T and the BOCs. Under these Computer III rules, for example, the BOCs, AT&T, and GTE are required to provide multi-

line business customers with written notification of their right to restrict CPNI use. Absent

customer direction to the contrary, we permit these carriers to use their respective CPNI for  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{CPNI}}$ 

marketing purposes as proposed in their notice. This notice and opt-out approach does not

extend, however, to business customers with twenty or more access lines. For these large

business customers, we require the BOCs and GTE to obtain affirmative written authorization  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{SOCS}}$ 

before using CPNI to market enhanced services. The Commission invited comment in the

Notice on whether these Computer III requirements should remain in view of section 222.

89. The Commission also sought comment in the Notice on a number of alternative

methods by which carriers may obtain customer approval under section 222(c)(1). The

Commission noted, for example, that carriers may choose a written method, in the form of a

letter or billing insert sent to the customer that contains a summary of the customer's  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$ 

rights and is accompanied by a postcard that the customer could sign and return to the carrier

to authorize CPNI use. The Commission sought comment on the privacy and competitive

implications, as well as the costs and benefits, of requiring carriers to obtain prior written

approval before they could use, disclose, or permit access to customer CPNI.

90. Alternatively, the Commission sought comment on whether section 222(c)(1) allows carriers to engage in outbound telemarketing to obtain oral customer approval for

CPNI use. The Commission observed that sections 222(c)(2) and (d)(3) give rise to

conflicting inferences as to whether approval can be oral. The Commission noted, for

example, that section 222(c)(2) requires telecommunications carriers to disclose CPNI "upon

affirmative written request by the customer, to any person designated by the customer, " and

that the absence of a similar written requirement in section 222(c)(1) suggests that oral

approval is permitted under that provision. On the other hand, section 222(d)(3) provides

that telecommunications carriers may use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI "to provide any

inbound telemarketing, referral, or administrative services to the customer for the duration of

the call, if such call was initiated by the customer and the customer approves of the use of

such information to provide such service." The Commission stated that section 222(d)(3)

could be interpreted to suggest that oral consent was not permissible for a broader purpose or

a longer duration, or, in the alternative, to allow a carrier to use CPNI to provide a customer

with information for the duration of an inbound call, even if the customer has otherwise

restricted the carrier's use of CPNI. The Commission sought comment on how section 222(c)(1) should be interpreted in light of these other provisions.

### 2. Discussion

91. As noted above, while section 222(c)(1) requires customer approval for carrier

use of CPNI outside the scope of sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B), it does not expressly state

the form of this approval. In order to implement this provision, we therefore must determine

what method of approval will best further both privacy and competitive interests, while

preserving the customer's ability to control dissemination of sensitive information. We

conclude, contrary to the position of a number of parties, that an express  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{approval}}$ 

mechanism is the best means to implement this provision because it will minimize any

unwanted or unknowing disclosure of CPNI. In addition, such a mechanism will limit the

potential for untoward competitive advantages by incumbent carriers. Our conclusion is

guided by the natural, common sense understanding of the term "approval," which we

believe generally connotes an informed and deliberate response. An express approval best

ensures such a knowing response. In contrast, under an opt-out approach, as even its

proponents admit, because customers may not read their CPNI notices, there is no assurance that any implied consent would be truly informed. We agree with the observations of MCI and Sprint that, insofar as customers may not actually consider CPNI

notices under a notice and opt-out approach, they may be unaware of the privacy protections

afforded by section 222, and may not understand that they must take affirmative steps to  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{S}}$ 

restrict access to sensitive information. We therefore find it difficult to construe a

customer's failure to respond to a notice as constituting an informed approval of its contents.

Accordingly, we adopt a mechanism of express approval because we find that it is the best

means at this time to achieve the goal of ensuring informed customer approval.

92. We are not persuaded by the statutory argument raised by the BOCs, AT&T, and GTE that Congress' requirement of an "affirmative written request" in section 222(c)(2)

means that Congress intended to permit notice and opt-out when it required only "approval"

in section 222(c)(1). While we agree that we should give meaning to Congress' use of two

different terms in sections 222(c)(1) and (c)(2), we believe that Congress' use of "approval"

in section 222(c)(1) can more reasonably be construed to permit oral, in addition to written

approval, rather than to require notice and opt-out. Our interpretation is consistent with the

suggestion by several parties that Congress intended to recognize the existing customer-

carrier relationship through permitting "approval" in section 222(c)(1), which governs the

existing carrier's use, disclosure, and permission of access to CPNI, as opposed to requiring

an "affirmative written request" as in section 222(c)(2), which governs disclosure to "any

party." We are not persuaded, however, that Congress intended for its encouragement of

the customer-carrier relationship to translate to support for notice and opt-out within the

meaning of section 222(c)(1). Rather, insofar as oral approval promotes customer and

carrier convenience, as discussed infra, we believe that Congress sought to facilitate the  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{C}}$ 

existing customer-carrier relationship by permitting "approval" that is oral, in addition to

written, in both sections 222(c)(1) and (d)(3), but not notice and opt-out as well. In addition,

we are not persuaded that use of the term "affirmative" in section 222(c)(2) suggests that the

absence of such term in section 222(c)(1) evinces Congressional support for an opt-out

method because a common sense interpretation of "approval" suggests a knowing acceptance,

which opt-out cannot ensure. We also reject the argument that Congress contemplated that

approval in section 222(c)(1) would be notice and opt-out based on an existing business

relationship. Because section 222(d)(3) explicitly excepts from the general CPNI

restrictions a carrier's use of CPNI to engage in "inbound telemarketing . . . [and other]

services" for the duration of the call if the customer that placed the call grants express (oral)

approval, we conclude that Congress could not have contemplated that the only form of

approval in the context of an existing business relationship would be notice and opt-out. The

exception in section 222(d)(3), which permits a form of express approval, is applicable only

in the context of an existing business relationship.

93. We likewise reject U S WEST's claim that the earliest versions of what became H.R. 1555 requires that we interpret "approval" to permit notice and optout. U S  $\,$ 

WEST argues that a change in language from "affirmative request," used in H.R. 3432

(introduced in 1993 during the first session of the 103rd Congress), to "approval" in the

subsequent bill H.R. 3626 (introduced in 1994 during the second session of the  $103 \mathrm{rd}$ 

Congress) signifies Congress' intent not to require affirmative approval in what later became

H.R. 1555 (introduced in 1995, during the 104th Congress), directly preceding section 222(c)(1) of the Act. Based on established principles of statutory interpretation, we

generally accord little weight to textual changes made to such early predecessor bills in the

preceding Congressional session, unless the reason for such changes are explained in relevant

legislative history. Even if we consider the earlier language, we are not persuaded that a

change from "affirmative request" to "approval" was intended to be substantive. It is equally

plausible (and we believe more likely) that the sponsors of these bills viewed the term

approval, as we do, to be synonymous with affirmative request, and made the change for

other stylistic reasons.

94. In contrast, we believe that, although the legislative history offers no specific

guidance on the meaning of "approval" in section 222(c)(1), the language in the Conference

Report, explaining that section 222 strives to "balance both competitive and consumer

privacy interests with regard to CPNI," strongly supports our conclusion that express

approval is the better reading of the statutory language. In contrast with notice and opt-out,

an express approval requirement best protects both privacy and competitive concerns. We

believe that imposing an express approval requirement provides superior protection for

privacy interests because, unlike under an opt-out approach, when customers must affirmatively act before their CPNI is used or disclosed, the confidentiality of CPNI is

preserved until the customer is actually informed of its statutory protections. This ensures

that customers' privacy rights are protected against unknowing and unintended  $\mathtt{CPNI}$ 

disclosure. We disagree with PacTel's contention that the use of CPNI does not pose the

same privacy risks as the use of medical and financial records, and therefore that the express

consent typically required for the use of such records is not warranted for CPNI.

Although PacTel observes that the content of phone calls is sensitive, it fails to recognize that

call destinations and other details about a call, which constitute  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$ , may be equally or

more sensitive. Indeed, PacTel's own survey, the Westin study, reported finding that a

majority (53 percent) of the public believes it is "very important" that telephone companies

adopt strong privacy policies, which is indicative of the public's concern that this information

may be abused, and should be considered sensitive. Thus, even assuming that an opt-out

approach can be appropriate for less sensitive customer information, such an approach would

not be appropriate for the disclosure of personal CPNI. We also note that section 222

establishes various categories of customer information and different privacy protections for

these categories. In particular, section 222 distinguishes among "CPNI" (e.g., sections 222(c)(1), 222(c)(2)), "aggregate information" (e.g., section 222(c)(3)), and

"subscriber list information" (e.g., section 222(e)). This suggests that Congress did not

intend to require that customer information be delineated into further categories. We thus

reject Cox's contention that the sensitivity of the CPNI should govern the form of express

approval required. The delineation of information categories in section 222 also

undermines NTIA's and other commenters' suggestion that CPNI is not understood as

personal or sensitive information, and that a notice and opt-out approach is therefore

appropriate. Section 222 accords the most protection to CPNI, by requiring customer

approval before it may be disseminated beyond the existing customer-carrier relationship.

95. In connection with competitive concerns, we agree, as several parties suggest, that notice and opt-out is likely to result in a greater percentage of implied

"approvals," and thus may place certain carriers at a competitive disadvantage relative to

incumbent carriers that possess most of the CPNI. Even if market forces provide carriers

with incentives not to abuse their customer's privacy rights, as some parties suggest, these

forces would not protect competitors' concerns that CPNI could be used successfully to

leverage former monopoly power into other markets. Moreover, because section 222 applies

to all telecommunications carriers, and thus all services offered by such carriers (not merely

CPE and enhanced services), we believe that there is greater incentive for carriers to use

CPNI under this new statutory scheme, and thus greater potential for abuse. In particular,

inasmuch as the 1996 Act sought to open new telecommunications markets to all carriers,

such as the long distance and local markets, we believe that carriers may have  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{greater}}$ 

incentive to use CPNI to gain a foothold in these new markets than they did

Computer III. This is particularly true for the long distance and local markets as entry into

these markets would be more lucrative than the CPE and enhanced services markets that

were the subject of Computer III. Furthermore, we believe that CPNI may be a more useful

marketing tool in the context of entry into these service areas, in contrast with the limited

context of CPE and enhanced services. Accordingly, we believe that an express approval

requirement most appropriately balances the competitive and privacy concerns at stake when

carriers seek to use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI for purposes beyond sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B).

96. We recognize, as several parties point out, that the Commission in the past

allowed a notice and opt-out mechanism for the use of CPNI to market enhanced services

and CPE under the Computer III CPNI framework. It is well-established, however, that an

administrative agency may depart from precedent so long as it provides a reasoned

justification. Consistent with this principle, for the reasons described herein, we find that

the enactment of section 222, and the framework and principles it embodies, justifies our

adoption of an express approval requirement. Unlike the Commission's preexisting policies

under Computer III, which largely were intended to address competitive concerns, section 222 of the Act explicitly directs a greater focus on protecting customer privacy and

control. This new focus embodied in section 222 evinces Congress' intent to strike a balance

between competitive and customer privacy interests different from that which existed prior to

the 1996 Act, and thus supports a more rigorous approval standard for carrier use of  ${\tt CPNI}$ 

than in the prior Commission Computer III framework.

97. Other policies the Commission adopted in the past that permitted non-express

approval are likewise distinguishable. For example, GTE cites prior decisions in the Billing

Name and Address (BNA) and Caller ID proceedings. Contrary to GTE's contentions,

we believe that the concerns associated with the disclosure of CPNI in section 222 are

qualitatively different from those at stake in the BNA and Caller ID proceedings. Unlike

BNA, which only includes information necessary to the billing process, CPNI includes

sensitive and personal information about whom a subscriber calls, the time of day the call is

made, and how often the subscriber calls a particular number, among other things.

Moreover, the Commission noted in the BNA Order that customers expect BNA to be used

for billing purposes only, and it limited carriers' use based on that expectation. This

reasoning is fully consistent with our interpretation in connection with CPNI announced

herein. CPNI and caller ID are similarly distinguishable. In the case of caller ID services,

the only information that can be transmitted through the network includes the caller's name

and the calling party number. We find that the transmission of this information is far less

sensitive than the disclosure of CPNI. Furthermore, consistent with our approach herein, the

Commission in the Caller ID proceedings restricted the use by businesses of information

regarding the identity of calling parties to marketing purposes within the existing customer relationship.

98. Finally, several parties, pointing to our implementation of the TCPA, argue

that we recognized in that order that solicitations to persons with whom the carrier has a

prior business relationship do not adversely affect customer privacy interests, and may even

be deemed to be invited based on that pre-existing relationship. While we crafted an

exception for established business relationships in implementing the TCPA, our action in that

proceeding is not inconsistent with the express approval requirement we adopt in this order.

In contrast to section 222, section 227 specifically excepts from the definition of "telephone

solicitation" a call or message "to any person with whom the caller has an established  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{S}}$ 

business relationship." Congress did not so except from the approval requirement of

section 222(c)(1) calls made to customers with whom a carrier has a pre-existing business

relationship. We likewise reject the arguments that Congress' express provision for a

notice and opt-out mechanism in section 551 of the Act somehow compels that result here

even though the language of section 222 contains no similar express reference to such a

mechanism. To the contrary, section 551 confirms that Congress knew how to draft a

notice and opt-out provision when it determined that such an approach was appropriate. For

all these reasons we reject commenters' arguments that notice and opt-out is in some manner  $\[$ 

required by the language of section 222, or other precedent.

99. Our express approval requirement also is justified by the principles of customer control and convenience that are embodied in section 222. These principles

contemplate that the customer, not the carrier, will decide whether and to what extent CPNI

is used. Consistent with these principles, we find that express approval, in contrast to a

notice and opt-out approach, best ensures that customers maintain control over carrier use of

sensitive CPNI, and that those that wish to limit the use and dissemination of their

information will know how, and be able to do so. A market trial conducted by  ${\tt U}$  S  ${\tt WEST}$ 

supports the view that, when asked, customers more often than not want to limit their

carrier's use of their CPNI for purposes beyond the existing service relationship. In its trial,

U S WEST attempted to obtain affirmative approval through various means, including

inbound and outbound telephone solicitations, as well as through direct mail. In seeking

approval from its local service customers, U S WEST generally explained that:

We're calling all of our customers to ask for their permission to continue to

share information about their telephone account services within the expanding

U S WEST family of product areas. This will allow us to keep on working cooperatively with other U S WEST product areas -- like wireless, long distance and the Internet -- to customize product packages to match your individual needs.

The study generally found that, of those customers even willing to listen to U S  ${\tt WEST's}$ 

request for approval (e.g., in the outbound telephone solicitation, those that did not hang up

or were otherwise not reached), the majority of customers contacted  $\operatorname{did}$  not approve the

carrier's use of their CPNI as proposed by U S WEST. This failure to obtain approval

from most customers resulted regardless of whether the solicitation for approval was

undertaken by telephone or by mail, or accompanied by financial incentives. For example,

the outbound telephone solicitation trial produced a weak response, with more residential

customers denying rather than granting approval for CPNI use. Similar results were

obtained in response to the direct mail campaign, even when financial inducements were provided.

100. U S WEST argues that these findings reflect consumers' aversion to marketing

generally, rather than any particular privacy concern regarding CPNI, and further show that

affirmative customer consent, whether written or oral, is too difficult and expensive to secure

to be practical. We believe, however, that an equally plausible interpretation of these

results is that they suggest that many customers value the privacy of their personal

information, and do not want it used or shared for purposes beyond the existing service

relationship. Moreover, even if U S WEST is correct, and customers do not grant approval simply because they do not want to be marketed to, this finding would not support

permitting notice and opt-out. Indeed, it would suggest, as MCI observes, that contrary to

U S WEST's claim, customers do not want to hear about "expanding service offerings," and

in particular do not want their CPNI used toward that end.

101. The findings of the Westin study do not persuade us differently. In general,

the survey results purport to show that a majority of the public believes it is acceptable for

businesses, particularly local telephone companies, to use customer records to offer

customers additional services when a notice and opt-out mechanism is employed. Contrary

to PacTel's assertions, however, we believe that these survey results fail to demonstrate that

customers expect or desire carriers to use CPNI to market to them service offerings beyond

the existing service relationship. As discussed supra, the lack of question specificity, and

even the ordering of the questions, make it problematic to rely on these findings. For

example, the Westin study does not identify the telephone information at issue, does not

illustrate the specific types of information that would be accessed, and does not explain that

use of the customer's information can reveal many of the customer's habits and actions.

The results of Westin's survey also would appear to conflict with the results of U S WEST's  $\$ 

affirmative approval trial, discussed above, which suggest that customers do not wish to be

marketed new services. Given the less theoretical nature of a market trial, U S  $\tt WEST's\ trial$ 

arguably was more likely to yield "true" results than PacTel's opinion survey. Moreover,

PacTel sought to use the CPNI. Accordingly, customers could very well have interpreted the

questions as consistent with the kind of information sharing permitted under the total service

approach. That is, customers' apparent support may have been for carrier use of CPNI for

the marketing of improved alternative versions of their existing service, not for the marketing

of all offerings available from the carrier. Because of this ambiguity, the Westin study does

not contradict our view that customers want to be given the opportunity to control their

carrier's use of their sensitive personal information for the marketing of additional offerings

outside of the customer's existing service relationship, which control is best secured through

an affirmative approval requirement.

102. We reject PacTel's and U S WEST's contention that customers do not expect carriers to seek affirmative approval for the use of information to market services to which

they do not subscribe, and that to do so would confuse them. To the contrary, based on

the results of U S WEST's affirmative approval market trial, as well as those of a similar

trial reported by Ameritech, we believe that, when customers wish to do so, they have no

problem understanding a carrier's solicitation for approval and granting consent for the use

of CPNI outside the scope of their total service offering.

103. By not mandating a particular form of express approval (i.e., oral, electronic,

or written), as discussed infra, we also believe Congress has furthered the principle of

customer convenience. We are not persuaded that we must permit notice and optout based

on arguments that an express approval requirement is unduly burdensome to customers, as

some parties suggest. The BOCs, AT&T, and GTE argue, for example, that only those

customers wishing to restrict carrier access to  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$  would have to respond to  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$  notices,

and therefore an opt-out approach would reduce the burden on the majority of customers.

USTA and SBC also note that permitting notice and opt-out would reduce the administrative

burden on carriers. Ameritech further argues that a notice and opt-out mechanism would

insulate customers who fail to respond to CPNI notices from repeated follow-up efforts,

while still allowing them to restrict carrier access to or use of CPNI. Contrary to these

arguments, we believe that an express approval requirement would not be significantly more  $\begin{tabular}{ll} \end{tabular}$ 

burdensome to customers than notice and opt-out. Under either an express or notice and opt-

out approach, the customer will be contacted because a notice must be provided. As  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{CPSR}}$ 

points out, the fact that section 222(c)(2) requires that customers provide an "affirmative

written request" for the disclosure of CPNI suggests Congress believed that even a written

approval requirement was not unduly burdensome to customers.

104. Although we agree that notice and opt-out would produce more customer approvals, we reject the argument that imposing an express approval requirement will

"effectively eliminate integrated marketing" and thwart the development of onestop

shopping. While section 222 precludes carriers from jointly marketing certain services

through the use of CPNI, nothing in section 222 prevents carriers from jointly marketing

services without relying on CPNI, as CPI and Cox point out. Moreover, while the use of

CPNI may facilitate the marketing of telecommunications services to which a customer does  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{CPNI}}$ 

not subscribe, such use is not necessary for carriers to engage in joint marketing. We thus

reject PacTel's contention that an express approval requirement would vitiate section 601(d)

of the 1996 Act, which allows carriers to market CMRS services jointly with other

telecommunications services, and section 272(g) of the Act, which permits BOC joint

marketing of telephone exchange service and in-region interLATA service, under certain

conditions. To the contrary, carriers are free to market jointly telecommunications

services without using CPNI to the extent such marketing is otherwise permissible under  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right) +\left($ 

other provisions. In addition, as TRA points out, a customer desiring an integrated

telecommunications service offering tailored to its needs simply may give approval to allow

its carrier to access CPNI for purposes outside of sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B). This is

true as to sophisticated business as well as residential customers. Indeed, the rules we

establish in this order permitting carriers flexibility to secure various forms of approval under

section 222(c)(1), in our view, facilitate the furnishing of integrated total service offerings

suited to the customer's needs. Moreover, as discussed supra, given that carriers may use

CPNI without prior customer approval to market any aspect of a customer's total service,

carriers currently retain considerable ability to market jointly telecommunications services.

105. We are not persuaded by U S WEST's contention that an express approval requirement would yield an insufficient number of approvals to justify the expense of

experience and knowledge of telemarketing generally, a 29% positive response rate on

outbound calling to a carrier's customer base is fairly successful." In addition, as  $\mbox{MCI}$ 

further observes, U S WEST's negative response rate reflects the difficulty of telemarketing

generally, not any inherent difficulty of obtaining affirmative approval specifically.

Therefore, we agree that, to the extent the large number of customers failing to give their

approval likewise would not want to receive subsequent telemarketing calls based on the use

of their CPNI, "U S WEST's own analysis shows that even with the 'opt-out' procedure it

advocates, it would not have much better luck telemarketing to those customers." Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that an express approval requirement would make

targeted marketing more difficult, we find that such a result would not be inconsistent with

customer expectations or desires. Given the new emphasis on customer privacy embodied in

section 222, we believe that Congress did not intend for countervailing considerations, such

as the promotion of one-stop shopping, to outweigh customers' interest in maintaining the

privacy of their sensitive information.

106. Finally, we reject U S WEST's argument that an express approval requirement

under section 222(c)(1) would impermissibly infringe upon a carrier's First Amendment

rights. U S WEST contends that CPNI is information owned by the carrier that forms the  $\,$ 

basis for informed speech between U S WEST and its customers or potential customers, and  $\,$ 

that any restrictions on such "inputs" beyond reasonable time, place and manner restrictions,

such as affirmative approval requirement for the use of CPNI, thus are unconstitutional.

U S WEST also maintains that the communication of CPNI between or among U S WEST corporate entities is a protected speech activity. We disagree that an express approval

requirement would impermissibly infringe upon a carrier's First Amendment rights. At the

outset, we think there is a substantial question as to whether CPNI restrictions even implicate

constitutionally protected "speech." Carriers remain free to communicate with present or

potential customers about the full range of services that they offer, and section 222 therefore

does not prevent a carrier from engaging in protected speech with customers regarding its

business or its products. What carriers cannot do is use confidential CPNI in a manner that

is not permitted by the statute. While section  $222\ \mathrm{may}$  constrain carriers' ability to more

easily "target" certain customers for marketing by limiting in some circumstances their

internal use of confidential customer information, we question whether that of itself

constitutes a restriction on protected "speech" within the purview of the First Amendment.

Nevertheless, to the extent that it were concluded that CPNI restrictions under section 222

did affect carrier communications with their customers or unrelated third parties in such a

way as to implicate the First Amendment, at most commercial speech would be at issue since

any limitations under section 222 relate solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its

audience. But any governmental restrictions on commercial speech will be upheld where,

as here, the government asserts a substantial interest in support of the regulation, the

regulation advances that interest, and the regulation is narrowly drawn. As the Supreme

Court has observed, it has never deemed it an abridgement of freedom of speech to make a

course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was initiated or conducted in part

through language; to the contrary, similar regulation of business activity has been held not to

violate the first Amendment.

107. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that protecting the privacy of consumers, and eliminating restraints on competition, are "substantial" government interests. An

express approval requirement directly advances the protection of customer privacy by vesting

control over the dissemination of CPNI with the customer, rather than the carrier, and by

limiting the ability of incumbent carriers to leverage their control over monopoly-derived

CPNI into emerging telecommunications markets. In addition, an express approval requirement is narrowly tailored to achieve these Congressional objectives. Contrary to U  ${\tt S}$ 

WEST's contention, we further conclude that an express approval requirement would not

violate the free speech rights of customers. To the extent a customer wishes to receive

information on offerings outside the scope of its total service offering, it simply may grant

approval under section 222(c)(1). As we previously noted, to the extent customers are

engaged in communications with their carrier regarding the servicing of their account, they

are more likely to grant approval. Finally, for the reasons discussed supra, we reject  ${\tt U}\ {\tt S}$ 

WEST's contention that an express approval requirement effectively would deprive carriers

of the use of their property, and thus would constitute a taking without just compensation.

## C. Written, Oral and/or Electronic Approval

# 1. Background

108. The Commission observed in the Notice that section 222 neither specifies the

procedures that a carrier must use to obtain customer approval, nor addresses whether

section 222(c)(1) approval must be written or oral.

#### 2. Discussion

109. While we believe that carriers should be required to obtain express approval

for uses of CPNI outside the scope of sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B), we conclude that

carriers should be permitted to obtain such approval through written, oral, or electronic

means, as several commenters contend. Allowing carriers to obtain customer approval

through any or all of these three approval methods comports with the language and design of

section 222, and is consistent with the principles of customer control and convenience that

are manifested in section 222. Moreover, this approach gives carriers flexibility without

sacrificing customer control over sensitive information. We thus agree with MCI that

carriers should be able to use the advanced technologies of their networks, including  $800\,$ 

numbers, 888 numbers, and e-mail, to obtain customer approval, in addition to using various

types of written approval, such as billing inserts, that are returned to the carrier.

110. We disagree with parties arguing that section 222 mandates written approval.

We find nothing in the language or design of section 222 that limits carriers to obtaining only

written approval, despite arguments advanced by some of these commenters. Indeed,

contrary to the claims made by AICC and CompTel, we believe that the requirement in

section 222(c)(2) that a carrier obtain a "written" request before disclosing CPNI to any

person, in contrast to the term "approval" in section 222(c)(1), suggests that Congress did

not intend to limit section 222(c)(1) to only written approval. Given that nothing in

section 222(c)(1) expressly limits approval to only written means, we conclude that carriers

should be given flexibility to secure approval through written, oral or electronic methods.

111. We also reject the contention that section 222(d)(3) of the Act supports a

written approval requirement. While section 222(d)(3) contemplates oral approval in

creating an exception for CPNI use during an inbound call, section 222(d)(3) also may be

interpreted simply to permit a carrier to use CPNI to provide a customer with information

for the duration of an inbound call, based on oral approval, even if the customer otherwise

has restricted the carrier's use of its CPNI, as Ameritech points out. This exception may

be significant, based on the results of U S WEST's approval solicitation trial. U S WEST  $\,$ 

found that, in the context of inbound calls, 72 percent of customers approved of the use of

CPNI for marketing purposes, as opposed to 29 percent in the outbound context. In a

similar trial, Ameritech reported that it achieved an even higher inbound response rate of

about 90 percent. We agree with U S WEST that, to the extent these findings are valid.

they suggest that when customers call their carrier, they are interested in the servicing of

their account, and thus are considerably more likely to approve the use of CPNI than when  $\ \ \,$ 

customers -- even these very same ones -- are "cold called" by the carrier. In this way, the

inbound telemarketing exception in section 222(d)(3) offers a meaningful, specific right,

different from the general "approval" exception in section 222(c)(1).

112. We do not believe that permitting outbound oral solicitations will have negative privacy consequences, as some commenters suggest. Because allowing carriers to

obtain oral approval does not divest the customer of control over CPNI, but affords the

additional benefits of customer convenience, we find that permitting such approval will

advance the goals of section 222. We recognize, however, as several parties suggest, that  $\ensuremath{\text{Supplies}}$ 

oral customer approval may be more difficult to verify than written approval, because

carriers typically would have no physical record that such approval had been given.

Nevertheless, we find that any verification problems can be adequately addressed through

measures other than an outright prohibition on oral approval under section 222(c)(1).

Accordingly, as discussed infra, we conclude that a carrier relying on oral customer approval

should be required to notify customers of their CPNI rights, and should bear the burden of

demonstrating that a customer has granted approval subsequent to such notification pursuant

to the rules we adopt in this order. Shifting the burden to such carriers, in addition to

establishing minimum notification requirements, as we do herein, also should address any

concerns that, if oral approval is permitted, customers will not consider their options due to

pressure from telemarketers, that substantially greater FCC and state commission resources

will be incurred, or that carriers will engage in "slamming" practices through telemarketing.

We believe the notification requirements we adopt will reduce the likelihood that carriers will

violate customer privacy by abusing oral approval mechanisms. In addition, as one party

suggests, certain mechanisms are currently available that make verbal approvals as readily

verifiable as written approvals.

113. We share the concern that oral approval mechanisms may be subject to greater

abuse than written approval mechanisms. To the extent our decision to permit oral

approval may result in carrier abuses, including, for example, the overselling of services, as

CPSR argues, we find that such a result does not warrant mandating written approval.

Assuming the term "oversell" is intended to refer to a situation in which a carrier frequently

telephones a customer to solicit section 222(c)(1) approval, we believe that carriers have an

incentive not to abuse outbound solicitation mechanisms as a tool for obtaining verbal

approval, since such abuse ultimately may result in the loss of the customer. Carriers that

make frequent outbound calls to obtain oral approval therefore do so at the risk of losing

their customer base.

114. On the other side of the balance, we are not convinced, despite arguments advanced by some parties, that permitting oral and electronic, in addition to written,

approval would raise significant competitive concerns. Proponents of written approval

generally maintain that any type of non-written approval will result in a greater percentage of

approvals, and thereby place small carriers at a competitive disadvantage relative to

incumbent carriers, which have the largest amount of, and most useful, CPNI. These

parties further contend that any rules we establish should ensure a "level playing field" for

new entrants. Accordingly, these parties argue, because third parties must obtain

affirmative written approval to gain access to CPNI pursuant to section 222(c)(2), all

carriers, including AT&T, the BOCs, and GTE, similarly should be required to secure  $\,$ 

written customer approval. Even if our decision to permit oral approval results in a

greater number of approvals, because all carriers must obtain such approval to use CPNI

outside the scope of section 222(c)(1), no particular class of carriers is placed at a

competitive disadvantage in connection with the CPNI use of their own customers. In

addition, we find no reason to impose a written approval requirement only on incumbent

carriers, while allowing carriers in competitive markets the option of obtaining written, oral

or electronic approval, as some parties suggest. Because oral approval constitutes a form

of express approval, we believe that permitting incumbent carriers to obtain such approval

for uses of CPNI outside the scope of section 222(c)(1) would not allow incumbent carriers

to leverage their dominant position in entering new markets.

# D. Duration, Frequency, and Scope of Approval

# 1. Background

- 115. The Commission sought comment in the Notice on whether requirements should be established regarding (1) how long a customer's approval should remain valid;
- (2) how often carriers may contact a customer in order to attempt to obtain approval,

regardless of whether the customer has restricted its CPNI; and (3) whether and to what

extent customers may approve of partial access to their CPNI, for example, limited to certain

uses or time periods. Commenters set forth differing views as to how long approval

should remain valid. Some parties argue, for example, that approval should remain valid

until the customer indicates otherwise, while others contend that approval should be renewed

periodically, or should be valid only for the duration of a transaction. Parties similarly argue

for differing limitations on how frequently a carrier may contact a customer to solicit

approval, ranging from one year from the date of solicitation, to no limitation at all.

# 2. Discussion

116. We conclude that approval obtained by a carrier for the use of  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$  outside

of section 222(c)(1), whether oral, written, or electronic, should remain in effect until the

customer revokes or limits such approval, as some parties suggest. We find that this

interpretation is consistent with the language and design of section 222. In particular, as

PacTel notes, the language of section 222(d)(3) stating that carriers may "provide inbound"

telemarketing, referral, or administrative services to the customer for the duration of the

call" suggests that Congress expressly limited the duration of approval where it wanted to so

specify, and thus the absence of similar language in section 222(c)(1) evidences that

Congress did not limit as a statutory matter the time period within which customer approval

remains valid. We also find that, so long as a customer is informed of its CPNI rights

prior to granting approval, permitting such approval to remain effective until it is revoked or

circumscribed does not infringe on a customer's privacy interests. We thus do not require

carriers to renew customer approval periodically, for example, annually or semiannually, or to presume that customer approval is valid only for the duration of the

transaction, if the customer has not otherwise specified the time period during which the

approval remains valid. Requiring customers who have provided section 222(c)(1) approval to renew such approval periodically would be inconsistent with the focus on

customer convenience in section 222, and would not provide any significant additional

privacy protections given the notification requirements we adopt in this Order.

117. We decline to establish at this time a restriction on the number of times

carrier may contact a customer to obtain approval for the use of CPNI outside of section 222(c)(1), despite arguments raised by some parties. As PacTel points out.

section 222 does not expressly establish a limit on how often a carrier may contact a

customer in order to obtain section 222(c)(1) approval. We also find that such a restriction

is unnecessary at present because carriers likely will not seek to jeopardize the good will of

their customers, through repeatedly attempting to obtain their approval, given the potential

that irritated customers would go elsewhere. In addition, as MCI points out, the rules we

adopted pursuant to the TCPA, including the requirement that telephone solicitors maintain

"do-not-call" lists, provide customers with a mechanism by which they may halt unwanted

telephone solicitations. To the extent our assumption that competitive marketplace forces

will regulate a carrier's actions proves to be incorrect, however, or carriers engage in

outbound solicitations to such an extent that intrudes upon customer privacy, we can

reevaluate this conclusion in the future.

118. Finally, we note that section 222(c)(1) is silent on the issue of whether a

customer may grant a carrier partial use or access to CPNI outside the scope of section 222(c)(1). We conclude that allowing a customer to grant partial use of CPNI is

consistent with one of the underlying principles of section 222 to ensure that customers

maintain control over CPNI. A customer could grant approval for partial use, for example,

by limiting the uses made of CPNI, the time period within which approval remains valid, and

the types of information that may be used. Moreover, we believe that section 222 affords

customers the right to authorize partial use of CPNI in the context of section 222(d)(3),

which allows a carrier to provide any inbound telemarketing, referral or administrative

services for the duration of the call to a customer based on oral approval. In this situation,

therefore, a carrier could obtain partial use by virtue of its ability to view customer records

for a limited duration, notwithstanding the customer's restriction of CPNI use.

# E. Verification of Approval

## 1. Background

119. In the Notice, the Commission proposed that, to the extent oral approval is

permitted under section 222(c)(1), carriers choosing to obtain oral approval should bear the

burden of proof associated with such a scheme in the event of a dispute. The Commission

stated that such carriers would be required to show through credible evidence that they have

obtained the required customer authorization prior to granting access to CPNI for purposes

that otherwise would be unlawful. Parties present differing views as to whether carriers

should bear the burden of demonstrating oral approval.

# 2. Discussion

120. We conclude that a carrier relying on oral approval under section 222(c)(1)

should bear the burden of demonstrating that such approval has been given in compliance

with the rules we adopt in this order, as a number of parties contend. In general, we find

that shifting the burden to such carriers will make it easier to verify oral approval. While

section 222 does not expressly require that carriers bear the burden of demonstrating oral

approval as PacTel points out, we find that shifting the burden in this manner is consistent

with the intent of section 222 to protect the confidentiality of sensitive customer information.

Shifting the burden is justified, given the potential for abuse of oral approval mechanisms

that could lead to unauthorized dissemination of CPNI. In addition, if we were to require

a complaining party to bear the burden of demonstrating that it had not granted oral

approval, carriers may not have an incentive to develop verification processes that are

adequate to protect customer privacy. We also conclude that shifting the burden to carriers

relying on oral approval strikes an appropriate balance in permitting a less rigorous

mechanism than written approval.

121. Because carriers must bear the burden of demonstrating that they have obtained oral approval under section 222(c)(1), we find it unnecessary to mandate specific

verification mechanisms at this time. We believe that carriers will have an incentive to

develop on their own processes to show that they have obtained approval in order to satisfy

this burden. We note, however, that while carriers may use any method of verification

that they see fit, certain methods may carry greater weight than others in determining

whether a carrier has satisfied its burden. In general, we agree with those commenters

arguing that a carrier relying on oral approval should be able to meet its burden by, for

example, audiotaping customer conversations, or by demonstrating that a  ${\it qualified}$ 

independent third party operating in a location physically separate from the carrier's

telemarketing representative has obtained customer approval under section 222(c)(1)

subsequent to adequate notification of its CPNI rights, and has confirmed the appropriate

verification data, e.g., the customer's date of birth or social security number. In contrast,

we would likely not consider the mere absence of any CPNI restriction in the customer's

database or other account record sufficient to verify that a customer has given express

approval in accordance with section 222(c)(1), despite SBC's suggestion. In addition,

because carriers are required under our rules to notify customers of their CPNI rights prior

to soliciting approval, we do not require them to send follow-up letters to customers

confirming approval, contrary to some parties' contentions.

122. Although we require carriers to certify that they are in compliance with our

CPNI requirements, such certifications, standing alone, would not be adequate to satisfy a

carrier's burden of demonstrating oral approval, despite AirTouch's contention. Allowing

carriers to satisfy their burden through electronic or written entries obtained outside of the

independent third party verification process, or merely by certifying that they are in

compliance with our rules, would undermine the intent of section 222 to protect the

confidentiality of sensitive customer information, since permitting carriers to do so could

potentially result in abuses that lead to the unauthorized use or dissemination of CPNI.

123. Finally, we require that carriers maintain records of notification and approval,

whether written, oral, or electronic, and be capable of producing them if the sufficiency of a

customer's notification and approval is challenged. Maintenance of such records will

facilitate the disposition of individual complaint proceedings. We thus require that carriers

maintain such records for a period of at least one year in order to ensure a sufficient

evidentiary record for CPNI compliance and verification purposes. In any event, carriers

generally will have an incentive to maintain such records for evidentiary purposes in the

event of a dispute with a customer or other "person" under section 222(c)(2). This is true

particularly in the case of oral approvals (including oral notification), which carriers bear the

burden of demonstrating have been given in accordance with our rules.

## F. Informed Approval Through Notification

## 1. Background

124. Section 222 of the Act does not expressly require that carriers notify customers

of the privacy protections afforded by section 222 if they wish to use CPNI for marketing

purposes beyond sections 222(c)(1)(A) and 222(c)(1)(B). The Commission tentatively

concluded in the Notice that carriers seeking approval for CPNI use within the meaning of

section 222(c)(1) should be required to notify customers of their right to restrict carrier use

of, or access to, CPNI. The Commission reasoned that customers must know that they

have the right to restrict carrier CPNI use, before they can waive that right.

125. Under the Computer III rules, AT&T, the BOCs, and GTE are required to notify their multi-line business customers annually of their right to restrict before using CPNI

to market enhanced services. In addition, the BOCs and GTE, but not AT&T, are required to notify their multi-line business customers annually before using CPNI to market

CPE. These carriers, however, are not subject to a general obligation to notify residential

or single-line business customers of their right to restrict carrier CPNI use prior to marketing

enhanced services or CPE. In November 1996 and in December 1997, the Common Carrier

Bureau and the Policy and Program Planning Division, respectively, waived these annual

notification requirements pending our action in this proceeding.

126. One party, BellSouth, contends that we need not require telecommunications carriers to notify customers of their CPNI rights. All other commenters generally agree

with our tentative conclusion that telecommunications carriers should be required to notify

customers because, absent a notification requirement, customers will be unaware of their

CPNI rights. A number of parties argue further, however, that carriers should be required

to provide this notification only if they wish to use, disclose or permit access to  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$ 

beyond the purposes specified in sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B).

#### 2. Discussion

127. Although section 222 does not expressly require notification of a customer's

CPNI rights, we conclude that telecommunications carriers should be required to notify

customers of their right to restrict carrier use of CPNI. We believe that notification of a

customer's CPNI rights is an element of informed "approval" within the meaning of

section 222(c)(1). Thus, because section 222(c)(1) by its terms requires express approval for

carrier uses of CPNI beyond the scope of the existing service relationship, carriers likewise

must provide notification for the use of CPNI beyond the scope of the existing service

relationship. Although section 222 does not specifically impose this obligation on carriers

as BellSouth points out, we believe that such a requirement is consistent with Congress'

intent to safeguard the confidentiality of sensitive information, and to vest control over such

information with the customer. We therefore require carriers to provide notification if they

wish to use, disclose or permit access to CPNI beyond the purposes specified in sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B); at this time, however, we make no decision on whether notice

is required for use of CPNI within the scope of sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B).

128. More specifically, we agree with the majority of commenters that customers must be made aware of their CPNI rights before they can be deemed to have "waived" those

rights. Requiring notification will not cause confusion to customers as BellSouth suggests,

but rather will ensure that customers either grant or deny approval in an informed fashion.

Moreover, we find that a notification requirement would provide customers maximum control

over carrier use of CPNI, and thus would further the objectives of section 222.

129. We reject BellSouth's contention that customers reasonably expect businesses

with whom they have a pre-existing relationship to use CPNI to offer new services, and that

therefore carrier use of CPNI for the development and marketing of services should be  $\,$ 

deemed to be permitted or invited, in the absence of specific notification to the customer.

As we conclude elsewhere in this order, we find that a customer's expectation, and implied

approval, for the use of CPNI for marketing purposes extends only to offerings within the

customer's total service relationship with the carrier. Consequently, specific notification of

the customer's CPNI rights, as a component of informed "approval" under section 222(c)(1),

is warranted for uses of CPNI outside the customer's total service offering.

# G. Form and Content of Notification

## 1. Background

130. The Commission sought comment in the Notice on whether it should allow notification to be given orally and simultaneously with a carrier's attempt to seek approval

for CPNI use, or whether it should instead require advance written notification. The

Commission further sought comment on what is the least burdensome method of notification

that would meet the objectives of the 1996 Act, and noted that, under Computer III, AT&T,

the BOCs and GTE are required to provide to multi-line business customers written  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{T}}$ 

notification of their CPNI rights. The Commission also sought comment on whether it

needed to specify the information that should be included in the customer notification, and, if

so, the disclosure requirements that it should adopt.

131. A number of commenters, advocating prior written notification, argue that such notification would help to ensure customer understanding and uniformity among

carriers. Other parties maintain that carriers should be permitted to give oral notification. Still other commenters generally contend that we should require written

notice for dominant telecommunications carriers, but permit oral notice for other carriers,

including small carriers or carriers in competitive markets. Several parties also maintain

that carriers should be given discretion to determine the content of notification. Other

commenters assert that we should specify minimum notification requirements, and propose

specific content requirements.

#### 2. Discussion

132. Form of Notification. We conclude that a carrier should be permitted to provide either written or oral notification, as a number of parties contend.

notification, for example, may take the form of a bill insert, an individual letter, or an

oral presentation that advises the customer of his or her right to restrict carrier access to

CPNI. We conclude that allowing carriers to provide notification through these means will

give them flexibility, while ensuring that customers are informed of their right to restrict

access to CPNI, consistent with the intent of section 222. In addition, as a number of

carriers suggest, allowing carriers to choose between oral and written notification is less

burdensome for carriers.

133. We are not persuaded by parties' assertions that oral notification is necessarily

less verifiable than written, will result in abuses, create greater disputes and confuse

customers, is too difficult to accomplish successfully, or could be used to dissuade

customers from releasing CPNI to a competitor. Any verification concerns that may arise

where carriers provide verbal notice of CPNI rights can be adequately addressed through

measures less restrictive than an outright prohibition on oral notification mechanisms. For

example, any verification problems concerning oral notice, like oral approval, may be

addressed by requiring carriers to bear the burden of demonstrating that such notice has been

given in the event of a dispute. We therefore conclude that a carrier providing verbal

notification of a customer's CPNI rights must carry the burden of showing that such notice

has been given, in compliance with the requirements we adopt in this order. Shifting the

burden to such carriers will ensure that customers are adequately informed of their  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$ 

rights. We further find that carriers may use any reasonable method for verifying oral

notification that adequately confirms that such notification has been given, including, but not

limited to, audiotaping customer conversations or using an independent third party

verification process. Likewise, any concerns regarding customer confusion or carrier abuse

are adequately addressed through the minimum content requirements for notification that we

adopt in this order.

134. We find no reason to impose different notification requirements on large and

small carriers, as some commenters suggest. As noted supra, although competitive

concerns may justify different regulatory treatment for certain carriers, concerns regarding

customer privacy are the same irrespective of the carrier's size or identity. Section 222's

requirements apply to all carriers.

- 135. Content of Notification. We agree with those commenters that suggest we establish minimum notification requirements. Prescribing minimum content requirements
- will reduce the potential for customer confusion and misunderstanding, as well as the
- potential for carrier abuses. While the minimum requirements we establish in this order
- do not provide precise guidance to carriers, we believe that prescribing such requirements is
- preferable to other approaches that parties have suggested. Developing general notice
- requirements strikes an appropriate balance between giving carriers flexibility to craft
- specific CPNI notices, and ensuring that customers are adequately informed of their CPNI rights.
- 136. Establishing notice requirements should not confuse customers or constrain a
- carrier's ability to make timely notice changes, as BellSouth suggests. To the contrary, we
- find that such requirements generally will reduce confusion by clarifying the customer's
- CPNI rights, thereby ensuring that any decision by a customer to grant or deny approval is
- fully informed. While it is possible that customers may experience some initial confusion,
- given that carriers were not required, in most cases, to provide notification of CPNI rights
- under our pre-existing requirements, the benefit to consumers of such notification, i.e.,
- heightened awareness of the right to restrict access to sensitive information, is consistent with
- the intent of section 222, and outweighs any countervailing disadvantages that may result
- from such notice, such as this initial customer confusion. In addition, because we establish
- only general notification requirements, carriers retain considerable flexibility to craft notices
- as they see fit, and thus should not be constrained from making last-minute changes to CPNI
- notices contrary to BellSouth's contention. Finally, we disagree with BellSouth that
- specifying minimum notification requirements will waste Commission resources. To the
- contrary, the failure to set forth such requirements would be far more administratively
- burdensome, given that any challenges to the adequacy of carrier notices would need to be
- addressed through individual complaint proceedings under sections 207 and 208 of the

Communications Act. We also reject as unduly burdensome CompTel's and ITAA's suggestion that carrier notices be subject to prior Commission review. For the reasons

discussed above, we also reject CPI's contention that only the largest incumbent LECs should

be required to use a Commission-prescribed form apprising the customer of its CPNI rights.

137. We decline to adopt PacTel's suggestion to establish a "safe harbor" specifying

the form of notice that would conclusively be presumed reasonable. The specific requirements for the form and content of notices that we establish in this Order provide

carriers with adequate guidance, while still preserving carrier flexibility to craft notices as

best suits their individual business plans. We explain these requirements in detail below.

138. At a minimum, customer notification, whether oral or written, must provide sufficient information to enable the customer to make an informed decision as to whether to

permit a carrier to use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI. If a carrier intends to share

CPNI with an affiliate (or non-affiliate) outside the scope of section 222(c)(1), the notice

must state that the customer has a right, and the carrier a duty, under federal law, to protect

the confidentiality of CPNI. In addition, the notice must specify the types of information

that constitute CPNI and the specific entities that will receive the CPNI, describe the

purposes for which the CPNI will be used, and inform the customer of his or her right to

disapprove those uses, and to deny or withdraw access to CPNI at any time. The notification also must advise customers of the precise steps they must take in order to grant

or deny access to CPNI, and must clearly state that a denial of approval will not affect the

provision of any services to which the customer subscribes. Any notification that does not

provide the customer the option of denying access, or implies that approval is necessary to

ensure the continuation of services to which the customer subscribes, or the proper servicing  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) +\left( 1$ 

of the customer's account, would violate our notification requirements.

139. We also require that any notification provided by a carrier for uses of  ${\tt CPNI}$ 

outside of section 222(c)(1) be reasonably comprehensible and non-misleading. In this

regard, a notification that uses, for example, legal or technical jargon could be deemed not to

be "reasonably comprehensible" under our requirements. If written notice is provided, the

notice must be clearly legible, use sufficiently large type, and be placed in an area so as to

be readily apparent to a customer. Finally, we require that, if any portion of a notification

is translated into another language, then all portions of the notification must be translated into

that language. We note that this requirement is similar to one we adopted in the context of

letters of agency for PIC changes.

140. We agree with CWI that a carrier should not be prohibited from stating in the

notice that the customer's approval to use CPNI may enhance the carrier's ability to offer

products and services tailored to the customer's needs. We also do not preclude a carrier

from addressing the rights of unaffiliated third parties to obtain access to the customer's

CPNI. Consequently, a carrier would not be prohibited from, for example, informing a

customer that it may direct the carrier to disclose CPNI to unaffiliated third parties upon

submission to the carrier of an affirmative written request, pursuant to section 222(c)(2) of

the Act. However, a carrier would be prohibited from including any statement attempting

to encourage a customer to freeze third party access to CPNI.

141. We also conclude that carriers must provide notification of a customer's  $\mathtt{CPNI}$ 

rights, whether oral or written, prior to any solicitation for approval. As stated above, a

customer must be fully informed of its right to restrict carrier access to sensitive information  ${\bf r}$ 

before it can waive that right. Any notification that is provided subsequent to a solicitation

for customer approval under section 222(c)(1) is inadequate to inform a customer of such

right. This conclusion is consistent with the underlying purpose of section 222 to safeguard

customer privacy and control over sensitive information. The notification may be in the

same conversation or document as the solicitation for approval, as long as the  $\operatorname{customer}$ 

would hear or read the notification prior to the solicitation for approval. Finally, we

conclude that the solicitation for approval to use CPNI, whether in the form of a signature

line, check-off box or other form, should be proximate to the written or oral notification,

rather than at the end of a long document that the customer might sign for other purposes, or

at the conclusion of a lengthy conversation with the customer, for example. Similarly, the

solicitation for approval, if written, should not be on a document separate from the

notification, even if such document is included within the same envelope or package. The

notice should state that any customer approval, or denial of approval, for the use of CPNI

outside of section 222(c)(1) is valid until the customer affirmatively revokes or limits such

approval or denial.

142. We conclude that carriers need only provide one-time notification to customers

of their CPNI rights, as suggested by some parties. Given the notification requirements we

adopt in this order, including the requirement that carriers inform customers that approval to

use CPNI under section 222(c)(1) is valid until revoked, we believe that customers granting

approval will have been fully informed of the scope and duration of a carrier's use of CPNI,

contrary to some parties' assertions. Although we imposed a periodic notice requirement

in Computer III, such a requirement was more appropriate in that context because the notice

and opt-out mechanism generally permitted in Computer III militated in favor of more

rigorous notification standards. That is, because carriers generally were not subject to an

express prior approval requirement for the use of CPNI under Computer III, but rather, were

permitted to share CPNI based only on notice and opt-out, the approval that was implied

under such an approach was based largely on a customer's notification of his or her CPNI

rights. In addition, as some parties suggest, requiring carriers to provide periodic

notification may be more intrusive to customer privacy than marketing contacts resulting

from section 222(c)(1) approval. For these reasons, we reject CWI's contention that an

annual notification requirement should be applied only to incumbent LECs, as well as  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right$ 

CPSR's assertion that oral notices should be repeated when a customer changes or adds services.

# VI. AGGREGATE CUSTOMER INFORMATION

#### A. Overview

143. To promote the interests of fair competition, section 222 also establishes important carrier obligations regarding aggregate customer information that expressly work in

tandem with the carrier requirements surrounding CPNI. Aggregate customer information is

defined separately from CPNI in section 222, and involves collective data "from which

individual customer identities and characteristics have been removed." On the one hand,

as the Commission has found in the past, disclosure of aggregate information by LECs, when

used to gain entry in new markets, is valuable and important to the LECs' competitors in

these new markets. On the other hand, because aggregate customer information does not

involve personally identifiable information, as contrasted with CPNI, customers' privacy

interests are not compromised by such disclosure. New section 222(c)(3) governing

aggregate customer information, accordingly, strikes a balance different from that governing

CPNI. It extends the Commission's requirement that aggregate customer information be

disclosed, which operated solely in the enhanced services and CPE markets and which

applied only to the BOCs and GTE, to the new statutory scheme applicable to all markets,

including long distance and CMRS, and to all LECs.

144. As we discuss below, because section 222(c)(3) offers an important competitive benefit, which is integral to the balance Congress drew regarding carrier use of

customer information and rationally distinguishes among carriers, we reject claims that

section 222(c)(3) in conjunction with section 222(c)(1) may constitute an unconstitutional

taking or an equal protection violation. Rather, as implemented in this order, section

222(c)(3) permits LECs to use aggregate customer information to improve their customers'

existing service, and when they choose to use it for purposes beyond their provision of

service in section 222(c)(1)(A), they must make it available to their competitors upon

request. We further conclude that section 222(c)(3)'s nondiscrimination obligation requires

that LECs honor standing requests for disclosure of aggregate customer information at the

same time and same price as when they disclose to, or use on behalf of, their affiliates.

### B. Background

145. Section 222(f)(2) defines aggregate customer information as: "collective data

that relates to a group or category of services or customers, from which individual customer

identities and characteristics have been removed." This definition is virtually identical to

the definition of "aggregate information" promulgated by the Commission prior to the 1996

Act. Section 222(c)(3), which governs carriers' use of aggregate customer information, provides:

A telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains customer proprietary network information by virtue of its provision of a telecommunications service

 $\ensuremath{\text{may}}$  use, disclose, or permit access to aggregate customer information other

than for the purposes described in paragraph [222(c)](1). A local exchange

carrier may use, disclose, or permit access to aggregate customer information

other than for purposes described in paragraph (1) only if it provides such

aggregate information to other carriers or persons on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions upon reasonable request therefor.

146. Although section 222(c)(3) concerning aggregate customer information differs

from section 222(c)(1) governing CPNI, the obligations in these provisions expressly

dovetail. Section 222(c)(3) provides that when carriers, other than LECs, aggregate their

individually identifiable customer information, they may use, disclose or permit access to

such aggregate customer information for purposes other than those permitted under section

222(c)(1). In this way, for carriers other than LECs, section 222(c)(3) operates to eliminate

the limitations in section 222(c)(1) on carrier use of customer information, when individually

identifiable characteristics and identities are removed. When LECs use, disclose, or permit

access to aggregate customer information for purposes beyond section 222(c)(1)(A) or (B),

they must provide such aggregate customer information on a nondiscriminatory basis to other

persons, including carriers, upon reasonable request.

147. As part of the Computer III rules established prior to the 1996 Act, the Commission requires the BOCs and GTE to provide aggregate customer information to

enhanced service providers when they share such information with their enhanced service

affiliates. The Commission also requires the BOCs to provide aggregate customer information to CPE suppliers when they share such information with their CPE affiliates.

In addition, the Commission presently requires the BOCs and GTE generally to notify

carriers when aggregate customer information is available, and the Commission has approved

a series of alternatives for compliance with such notification obligation. The Commission

excluded AT&T from the aggregate disclosure and notice requirements, reasoning that "if"

AT&T had to make aggregated CPNI available, there is a strong possibility that its network

service competitors would obtain this information and use it in their basic service marketing

efforts. The BOCs do not face the same potential competitive threat to their network service

operations from the aggregated CPNI requirement."

148. Commenters raise two issues in connection with section 222(c)(3)'s new

aggregate customer information requirements. First, U S WEST and USTA argue that, if we

adopt an interpretation of the scope of sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B) narrower than the single

category approach, as we do in this order, the disclosure obligation of LECs regarding

aggregate customer information under section 222(c)(3) would correspondingly be greater.

As such, they claim that the operation of these two provisions would constitute both an

unconstitutional taking and an Equal Protection violation because it would force LECs to

release commercially valuable information to third parties, while their competitors would

have no comparable obligation. Second, in the Notice, the Commission sought comment

on whether, in addition to the statutory requirements of section 222, the Commission should

also require all LECs to notify others of the availability of aggregate customer information  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{I}}$ 

prior to their using the information, as is required under the Computer III framework.

Several parties argue that we should not impose such a requirement because there is no

notice requirement under section 222(c)(3). Furthermore, they argue, notice of the

availability of LEC aggregate customer information would give competitors unfair notice of

LEC marketing plans. In contrast, ITAA disagrees, and further suggests that there may

be more efficient ways of giving notice than what we require under Computer III (e.g.,

publishing in trade publications or newsletters).

# C. Discussion

149. We reject the claim that our interpretation of sections 222(c)(1) and 222(c)(3)

would constitute an unlawful taking. As we discussed earlier, even assuming carriers have

a property interest in either CPNI or aggregate customer information, our interpretation of

sections 222(c)(1) and 222(c)(3) does not "deny all economically beneficial" use of property,

as it must, to establish a successful claim. First, under our interpretation of these

provisions, when CPNI is transformed into aggregate customer information, carriers, other

than LECs (and LECs with disclosure), are free to use the aggregate CPNI for whatever

purpose they like, including for example, to assist in product development and design, as

well as in tracking consumer buying trends, without customer approval. This means that a  $\hspace{1cm}$ 

long distance carrier, for example, may use collective data regarding customer usage

patterns, derived from its long distance service, to assist its CMRS affiliate; such collective

data may indicate, for instance, which regions are experiencing growth and thereby help

identify where to locate CMRS-related regional sales forces. Aggregate information may

also be useful to carriers to match certain types of consumers with service offerings that they

may find attractive. A long distance carrier, again for example, could aggregate its CPNI to

develop profiles of customers most likely to purchase CMRS service. Under our interpretation of section 222(c)(1)(A), for customers that are also the carrier's CMRS

customer, the carrier could use the profile to identify customers that may favor the new

CMRS offering. For existing long distance customers that do not also subscribe to the

carrier's CMRS, the carrier would have to obtain customer approval to use the customers'

CPNI to market CMRS service to them. With customer approval, however, by operation of

section 222(c)(3), the long distance carrier could compare the customer profile (derived from

aggregate customer information) with the customer's CPNI, to tailor its marketing strategy

for new CMRS service to that customer. In these ways, by permitting aggregate information

to be used in these ways, section 222(c)(3) affords important commercial benefits for carriers

and customer alike, without impacting customer privacy concerns.

150. Although LECs face certain obligations when they use aggregate customer information under section 222(c)(3), Congress did not require that LECs give aggregate

customer information to their competitors upon request in all circumstances. Rather, when

LECs use this aggregate information only to tailor their service offering to better suit the

needs of their existing customers -- that is, within the scope of sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B),

LECs do not need to disclose the aggregate information. Moreover, LECs are permitted to

use the aggregate information when targeting new service customers -- that is, for purposes

beyond the scope of section 222(c)(1)(A) and (B). When they do so, LECs simply must give

that information to others upon request. This means that, as in the example above,  ${\tt LECs}$ ,

like long distance carriers may use aggregate customer information for valuable business and

marketing purposes. Where LECs use or disclose the aggregate information for marketing

service to which the customer does not subscribe, however, LECs can still use the  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{LEC}}$ 

information, but must disclose the aggregate information to others upon request. Our

interpretation, therefore, does not deprive LECs of all economic benefit associated with their

customer information, and we accordingly find claims to the contrary to be without merit.

151. We also reject parties' Equal Protection challenge. In order to sustain an

equal protection challenge, parties challenging the law must prove that the law has no

rational relation to any conceivable legitimate legislative purpose. Making LEC aggregate

customer information available on nondiscriminatory terms, when used for purposes beyond

those in sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B), is reasonably related to the legitimate goal of

promoting open competition in telecommunications markets. Indeed, as CFA points out,

Congress sought a balance in the relationship between the carrier's permissible uses of  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$ 

in sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B), which need not be disclosed to competitors because

personal information is at stake, and section 222(c)(3)'s aggregate customer information,

which requires disclosure based on competitive interests. In singling out LECs in section

222(c)(3), Congress reasonably recognized that LECs, as former monopoly providers,

maintain a competitive advantage with regard to use of customer information. Specifically,

because of their former monopoly status, LECs enjoy the benefit of accumulated customer

information on all telephone subscribers within a certain geographic location, not merely

those that have "chosen" their service. Also, to the extent there is some correlation between

usage of local exchange and long distance service or CMRS, LECs theoretically "know" the

most profitable customers (i.e., heaviest users) of all IXCs and CMRS providers operating

within their region, as well. LECs obtained this information, as AT&T argues, not because

they provided exceptional service, but because customers had no choice but to subscribe to them.

152. Section 222 requires only that when LECs seek to target customers based on

aggregate customer information which create generalized "profiles" of groups of customers

likely to respond favorably to service offerings outside their existing service, they must also

make these group profiles available to their competitors. In this way, Congress sought to

rectify the LECs' advantage in scope and wealth of CPNI, while at the same time not

compromising customers' privacy interests. The aggregate rule rationally serves Congress'

goal of encouraging competitive markets, through availability of aggregate customer

information, while protecting CPNI from disclosure absent customer approval, and thus is

Constitutional.

153. Finally, regarding the LECs' notice obligations, the nondiscrimination requirement in section 222(c)(3) protects competitors from anticompetitive behavior by

requiring that LECs make aggregate customer information available "upon reasonable

request." We interpret these terms to permit a requirement that LECs honor standing

requests for disclosure of aggregate customer information at the same time and same price as

when disclosed to, or used on behalf of, their affiliates. We are persuaded that such standing

requests adequately address the competitive concerns formerly protected through our notice requirement.

#### VII. SECTION 222 AND OTHER ACT PROVISIONS

#### A. Overview

154. Section 222 by its terms extends to "all telecommunications carriers," including, therefore, the BOCs. Unlike other carriers, however, BOCs are subject to certain

structural separation and nondiscrimination requirements set forth in sections 272 through

276 of the Act. More specifically, section 272 provides: "[I]n its dealings with its [long

distance, interLATA information services, or manufacturing affiliates (section 272

affiliates)], a Bell operating company (1) may not discriminate between that company or

affiliate and any other entity in the provision or procurement of goods, services, facilities,

that "the term 'information' includes, but is not limited to, CPNI and network disclosure

information." Based on the further record developed in this proceeding, we revisit and

overrule the Commission's prior conclusion that the reference to "information" in section 272

includes CPNI. We agree with the BOCs that the specific balance between privacy and

competitive concerns struck in section 222, regarding all carriers' use and disclosure of

CPNI, sufficiently protects those concerns in relation to the BOCs' sharing of CPNI with

their statutory affiliates. We accordingly interpret section 272, as well as section 274, which

raises similar issues, to impose no additional CPNI requirements on the BOCs when they

share CPNI with their statutory affiliates.

#### B. Section 222 and Section 272

## 1. Background

155. As noted above, the Commission concluded in the Non-Accounting Safeguards

Order that the term "information" includes CPNI and that the BOCs must comply with the  $\,$ 

requirements of both sections 222 and 272(c)(1). The Commission declined to address

parties' other arguments regarding the interplay between section 272(c)(1) and section 222 to

avoid prejudging issues in this CPNI proceeding. The Commission also declined to address

parties' arguments regarding the interplay between section 222 and section 272(g), which

permits certain joint marketing between a BOC and its section 272 affiliate. The

Commission emphasized, however, that, if a BOC markets or sells the services of its

section 272 affiliate pursuant to section 272(g), it must comply with the statutory

requirements of section 222 and any rules promulgated thereunder.

156. On February 20, 1997, the Common Carrier Bureau released a public notice

seeking further comment to supplement the record in this proceeding on various issues

relating to the interplay between section 222 and other sections of the Act. The questions

raised concerning the interplay of sections 222 and 272 included, among other things: (i) the

meaning and scope of the nondiscrimination obligation in connection with "information" and

"services" in sections 272(c)(1) and 272(e)(2) as they relate to CPNI; (ii) the customer

approval requirements for BOCs sharing CPNI with their section 272 affiliates and

unaffiliated entities; and (iii) the application of section 272(g)(3), which exempts certain joint

marketing activity from the "nondiscrimination provisions of this subsection."

157. Several commenters argue that section 272 imposes separate and independent

requirements on the sharing by BOCs of CPNI with their section 272 affiliates that are

additional to the obligations established for all carriers under section 222. Commenters

further contend that section 272 obligates BOCs that solicit customer approval for sharing

CPNI with their 272 affiliates to solicit such approval on behalf of non-affiliated entities as

well. The BOCs, in contrast, argue that section 272 does not extend to their use,

disclosure, or permission of access to CPNI.

#### 2. Discussion

158. We recognize an apparent conflict between sections 222 and 272. Under the

total service approach, we have found that section 222 permits affiliated entities to share

 $\mathtt{CPNI}$  of the customers that already subscribe to service from those affiliates. Should  $\mathtt{CPNI}$ 

be deemed to be "information" or "services" that would trigger application of section 272,

however, then the BOCs would be unable to share CPNI with their affiliates to the extent

contemplated by section 222. The section 272(c)(1) requirement that "information" or

"services" be shared only on nondiscriminatory terms would, we believe, mean that BOCs

could share CPNI among their affiliates only pursuant to express approval. Thus,  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$ 

sharing under section 222(c)(1)(A) (based on implied approval under the total service

approach) would be precluded. Although we find that section 222 envisions a sharing of

customer CPNI among those related entities that provide service to the customer, such a  $\,$ 

sharing among BOC affiliates would be severely constrained or even negated by the  $\,$ 

application of the section 272 nondiscrimination requirements.

159. In addition, the application of section 272 to CPNI sharing would seem to

require that, when BOCs seek customer approval to share with their statutory affiliates (in

the context of either inbound or outbound marketing), they must simultaneously solicit

approval for CPNI sharing on behalf of all other carriers that ask them to do so. As

discussed below, we question whether procedures could be implemented to provide for truly

effective customer notice and opportunity for informed approval under such circumstances.

Further, such comprehensive multi-carrier solicitation would likely be so burdensome that, as

a practical matter, BOCs would be effectively precluded from seeking approval for affiliate

sharing by means of oral solicitation  $\mbox{--}$  a result not contemplated by section 222.

160. We find no express guidance from the statutory language as to how Congress

intended to reconcile these provisions. On the one hand, invoking the principle of statutory

construction that the "specific governs the general," the BOCs contend that section 222

specifically governs the use and protection of CPNI, whereas section 272 only refers to

"information" generally. Accordingly, they claim, section 222 should "trump" section 272. On the other hand, based on the same statutory principle, different parties

counter that section 272 specifically governs the BOCs' sharing of information with its

affiliate, whereas section 222 only generally relates to all carriers. From this perspective,

section 272 should control section 222. We find that either interpretation is plausible.

Because Congress did not make its intent clear, our resolution of the apparent conflict must

therefore be guided by the interpretation that, in our judgment, best furthers the policies of

these two provisions, and thereby, best reflects the statutory design. On this policy basis, we

believe that interpreting section 272 to impose no additional obligations on the BOCs when

they share CPNI with their statutory affiliates according to the requirements of section 222,

as implemented in this order, most reasonably reconciles the goals of these two provisions.

This is so because imposing section 272's nondiscrimination obligations when the BOCs

share CPNI with their section 272 affiliates would not further the principles of customer

convenience and control embodied in section 222, and could potentially undermine customers' privacy interests as well, while the anticompetitive advantages section 272 seeks

to remedy are sufficiently addressed through the mechanisms in section  $222\ \mathrm{that}$  seek to

balance the competitive concerns regarding LECs' use and protection of CPNI.

161. Should we interpret section 272 to apply when the BOCs' share CPNI with their statutory affiliates, BOCs may simply choose not to disclose their local service CPNI,

and thereby avoid their nondiscrimination obligations. This could occur even where the  ${\tt BOC}$ 

and its affiliate share the same customer (and therefore under the total service approach  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{S}}$ 

would be permitted to use or disclose CPNI absent customer approval under section 222(c)(1)(A), or where it has obtained express approval from its customers to do so.

This outcome, however, would not serve the various customer interests envisioned under

section 222. First, customers would be deprived of benefits associated with use and

disclosure of CPNI among affiliated entities, upon customer approval. For example,

customers would not be able to take advantage, if they chose, of tailored marketing, which is

currently possible under our implementation of sections 222(c)(1) and (d)(3). Second,

maintaining separate customer service records for local and long distance BOC offerings,

where both are subscribed to by the same BOC customer, would also not serve the

customer's interest in receiving service in a convenient manner. Indeed, if, as AT&T

suggests, the only way in which

BOCs could share information with statutory affiliates and not trigger section 272's

nondiscrimination requirements would be for BOCs to disclose CPNI to their section 272

affiliates upon written customer request secured by the BOC affiliate, customer convenience

goals would not be furthered.

162. The alternative, should BOCs nevertheless choose to share CPNI with their

section 272 affiliates, and we were to find section 272 applicable to CPNI, would likewise be

problematic. First, BOCs would not be able to disclose CPNI to non-affiliated entities for

the purpose of ensuring competitive access to CPNI consistent with section 222. Although

the statute permits the sharing among affiliated entities within the meaning of the exceptions

in sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B), the language does not support use or disclosure of CPNI

beyond the carrier's "provision of the telecommunication service from which such information is derived." Disclosure to other companies to maintain competitive neutrality

cannot reasonably be construed to constitute "the provision" of such service. Such a result

would defeat, rather than protect, customers' privacy expectations, and their control over

who can use, disclose, or permit access to such information, as set forth in section 222(c).

For the reasons described above, however, prohibition of such sharing would not serve the

customer convenience interests underlying section 222.

163. Second, the proposal that BOCs disclose CPNI to unaffiliated entities on the

same customer approval terms as they share with their section 272 affiliates, raises similar

concerns. Requiring that BOCs disclose CPNI to unrelated entities upon oral customer

approval when they share CPNI with their section 272 affiliates upon oral approval, would

not necessarily be inconsistent with the policies or language of section 222. We see no

principled basis, however, upon which not to impose other obligations required by

section 272. That is, if section 272's non-discrimination obligation applies to the form of

customer approval, we agree that it would also apply when BOCs solicit customer approval

to share with their statutory affiliates. We do not believe, however, that requiring BOCs

to solicit approval for unspecified "all other" entities would constitute either effective notice

or informed approval. We agree with SBC that customers cannot knowingly approve release

of CPNI unless and until they are made aware of the identity of the party which is to receive

the information. Alternatively, as a practical matter, it would be difficult for BOCs to

provide specific notice, and obtain informed approval, for each entity that so requests. To

do so would severely restrict the BOCs' ability effectively to market, particularly in the

inbound marketing context contemplated under section  $222(\mbox{d})(3)$ , and thereby would again

undermine the customer convenience policies of section 222.

164. Our interpretation is further based on the fact that, as a policy matter, the

three specific mechanisms in section 222 that address the competitive concerns implicated by

a BOC's use of CPNI render the application of section 272's nondiscrimination requirement

not essential. First, through section 222(c)(1), as implemented in this order, BOCs cannot

share CPNI with their section 272 affiliates unless they either obtain express customer

approval or, in the case of long distance, the customer is an existing subscriber to the

affiliate's long distance offering. Oral approval appropriately limits carrier's anti-

competitive use of CPNI. As we have explained above, CPNI sharing among affiliated

entities to whom the customer already subscribes is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects

since any such sharing does not allow carriers to target new customers, but merely assists

carriers in tailoring their service offering in a manner that may be more beneficial to existing customers.

165. Second, competitors are afforded access to customer CPNI through section 222(c)(2), which requires disclosure of CPNI to entities unaffiliated with BOCs upon

their obtaining a customer's affirmative written request." Through this provision, BOCs

cannot exclusively advantage their affiliates, and must provide competitors access when the

customer says so. Third, section 222(c)(3), which governs aggregate customer information,

directly addresses the particular competitive advantages obtained by LECs' store of customer

information. As discussed earlier, through this provision, Congress sought to rectify the

LECs' advantage in scope and wealth of CPNI, that derives from their historic and

continuing market power and not from their skill in competition, while at the same time not

compromising customers' privacy interests.

166. Further mitigating competitive concerns, beyond section 222, is the fact that,

BOCs, as incumbent local exchange carriers, may also be subject to obligations under

section 251 to disclose customer information as part of their interconnection obligations upon

the oral approval of customers. In addition, as we indicated earlier, section 201(b)

remains fully applicable where it is demonstrated that carrier behavior is unreasonable and anticompetitive.

167. Finally, we note that our conclusion is consistent with the regulatory symmetry

Congress intended for carrier marketing activities. Our interpretation requires that all

carriers, including BOCs, LECs, CLECs, and IXCs, obtain customer approval before using

CPNI to market offerings outside the customer's existing service relationship. In this way,

no carrier or group of carriers obtain a competitive advantage in marketing.

168. The fact that Congress requires BOCs to establish separate affiliates that must

operate independently from the BOC entity that offers local exchange service, does not, as

some parties contend, alter our conclusion. Rather, the separate affiliate requirement

serves other important purposes such as preventing anticompetitive cost-shifting that may  $\begin{tabular}{ll} \hline \end{tabular}$ 

arise when a BOC enters the interLATA services market in an in-region state in which the

local exchange market is not yet fully competitive. Moreover, in the Non-Accounting

Safeguards Order, the Commission held that the "operate independently" requirement in

section 272(b)(1) does not preclude the sharing of administrative and other services. In

addition, the exception in section 272(g)(2) further contemplates that BOCs can maintain

relationships with their long distance affiliates, when they jointly market the services of these

affiliates, that would not be subject to nondiscrimination principles. Accordingly,

suggestions that Congress intended to erect a kind of impermeable "Chinese wall" between

BOCs and their section 272 affiliates, for all purposes, are overstated. Rather, section 272 is

intended to ensure that BOCs do not give their affiliates a competitive advantage, and for the  $\,$ 

reasons described herein, section 222 fully and specifically balances these concerns in

relation to CPNI for LECs. In contrast, applying section 272 to the BOCs' sharing of CPNI

with their statutory affiliates would not permit the goals and principles of section 222 to be

realized fully as we believe Congress contemplated. We resolve this conflict between

sections 272 and 222, therefore, in favor of the interpretation that, as a policy matter, we

believe best furthers all of Congress' goals -- that section 222, and not section 272, governs

all carriers, including BOCs, use and protection of CPNI.

169. For all these reasons, we conclude that the most reasonable interpretation of

sections 222 and 272 is that section 272 imposes no additional CPNI requirements on BOCs'

sharing of CPNI with their section 272 affiliates. Accordingly, we overrule our prior

conclusion to the contrary in the Non-Accounting Safeguards Order.

#### C. Section 222 and Section 274

## 1. Background

170. The Commission confirmed that electronic publishing is an information service

in its Electronic Publishing Order, released on February 7, 1997. Section 222(c)(1), as

implemented in this proceeding, restricts carriers from using, disclosing, or permitting access

to CPNI, derived from the provision of a telecommunications service, for marketing

information services and other services unless they obtain express customer approval. This

means that customer approval is a prerequisite for any carrier s use or disclosure of CPNI

for electronic publishing purposes.

171. Section 274 permits BOCs to provide electronic publishing services only through a "separated affiliate" or "electronic publishing joint venture" that meets certain

separation, nondiscrimination, and joint marketing requirements. In the Electronic

Publishing Order, the Commission promulgated policies and rules governing the BOCs'

provision of electronic publishing under section 274. The Commission deferred to this

proceeding any decision on the extent that section 222 affects implementation of the joint

marketing provisions of section 274. The Commission also deferred to this proceeding the

following issues: (i) whether the term "basic telephone service information," as defined in

section 274(i)(3), includes CPNI; (ii) whether section 222 requires a BOC engaged in

permissible marketing activities under section 274(c)(2) to obtain customer approval before

using, disclosing, or permitting access to CPNI; and (iii) whether or to what extent

section 274(c)(2)(B) imposes any obligations on BOCs that use, disclose, or permit access to

CPNI pursuant to a "teaming" or "business arrangement" under that section.

- 172. In the Public Notice released by the Common Carrier Bureau on February 20,
- 1997, further comment was also sought regarding the interplay between sections 222 and
- 274, including on, among other things: (i) the meaning and application of the nondiscrimination obligations in sections 274(c)(2)(A) and 274(c)(2)(B); and (ii) customer
- approval requirements for BOCs sharing of CPNI with electronic publishing affiliates, joint
- ventures, and unaffiliated entities. In response to this notice, two commenters contend that
- section 274, like section 272, imposes additional requirements on the ability of BOCs to
- provide certain services and to share information with their electronic publishing affiliates or
- partners in particular contexts that go beyond the requirements of section 222. In contrast,
- although the BOCs acknowledge that some form of customer approval is required before
- CPNI can be used to market electronic publishing services, they argue that there is no
- statutory requirement related to the disclosure of CPNI in section 274(c)(2)(A).
- addition, the BOCs argue that they have no general obligation under either section 274(c)(2)(A) or 274(c)(2)(B) to solicit customers to obtain CPNI release for any
- entity, whether affiliated or unaffiliated.

# 2. Discussion

- 173. For the reasons discussed in connection with section 272, we are likewise persuaded here that we should interpret section 274 to impose no additional CPNI requirements regarding the BOCs' use of CPNI in connection with their provision of
- electronic publishing. We find that both privacy and competitive concerns regarding BOCs'
- use, disclosure, or permission of access to CPNI for electronic publishing purposes, are
- protected in section 222(c)(1) through the requirement that customers must give their
- approval for such use. Likewise, section 222(c)(2) ensures competitive access to CPNI by
- "any person," which therefore includes unaffiliated electronic publishers. Finally, pursuant
- to section 222(c)(3), competing electronic publishers would be entitled to obtain any
- aggregate customer information used by BOCs to market their, or an affiliated or related
- entity's, electronic publishing services. Thus, as in the case of section 272, where
- section 222 appropriately balances the potentially competing interests in the specific context
- of carriers' use and disclosure of CPNI, we conclude that we should not upset the balance by
- "superimposing" nondiscrimination standards in section 274.

#### VIII. COMMISSION'S EXISTING CPNI REGULATIONS

#### A. Overview

174. In the Computer III, GTE ONA, and BOC CPE Relief proceedings, the Commission established a framework of CPNI requirements applicable to the enhanced

services operations of AT&T, the BOCs, and GTE and the CPE operations of AT&T and the  $\,$ 

BOCs (Computer III CPNI framework). As we observed in the Notice, the Commission

adopted the Computer III CPNI framework, together with other nonstructural safeguards, to

protect independent enhanced services providers and CPE suppliers from discrimination by

AT&T, the BOCs, and GTE. The framework prohibited these carriers' use of CPNI to

gain an anticompetitive advantage in the unregulated CPE and enhanced services markets

while protecting legitimate customer expectations of confidentiality regarding individually

identifiable information. Alternatively, for those carriers that maintain structurally separate

affiliates in connection with their CPE and enhanced services operations, our Computer II

rule 64.702(d)(3) prohibits carriers from sharing CPNI with those affiliates unless it is made

publicly available. We likewise prohibit the BOCs from providing CPNI to their cellular

affiliates unless they make the CPNI publicly available on the same terms and conditions.

175. We conclude that the new CPNI scheme that we implement in this order, which is applicable to all telecommunications carriers, fully addresses and satisfies the

competitive concerns that our Computer III framework as well as our Computer II and  ${\tt BOC}$ 

CPNI cellular rules sought to address. Accordingly, we eliminate these existing CPNI

requirements in their entirety. Nevertheless, the record supports our specifying general

minimum safeguards, applicable to all carriers, to ensure compliance with section 222's

statutory scheme. Toward that end, we first require that all carriers conform their database  $\$ 

systems to restrict carrier use of CPNI as contemplated in section 222(c)(1) and section 222(d)(3), through file indicators that flag restricted use, in conjunction with

personnel training and supervisory review. Second, we impose recording requirements on

carriers that serve both to ensure that use restrictions are being followed and to afford a  $\,$ 

method of verification in the event they are not.

## B. Computer III CPNI Framework

#### 1. Background

176. The CPNI framework the Commission adopted prior to the 1996 Act, which applies only to the BOCs, AT&T, and GTE, and only in connection with their use of CPNI

to market CPE and enhanced services, involves five general components. The first concerns

customer notification. The current framework requires the BOCs, AT&T, and GTE to send

annual notices of CPNI rights regarding enhanced services to all their multiline business

customers. With respect to CPE, the BOCs must also send annual notices to  $\operatorname{multi-line}$ 

business customers, and AT&T must provide a one-time notice to its WATS and private line

customers. Each notice must be written, describe the carrier's CPNI obligations, the

 ${\tt customer's\ CPNI\ rights},$  and include a response form allowing the customer to restrict access

to CPNI. Second, the BOCs and GTE, but not AT&T, must obtain prior written authorization from business customers with 20 or more access lines before using CPNI to

market enhanced services. All BOC and AT&T customers with fewer lines have the right

to restrict access to their CPNI by carrier CPE personnel, and along with GTE customers.

enhanced services personnel as well. These carriers must also accommodate customer

requests for partial or temporary restrictions on access to their CPNI. Third, we require

the BOCs, AT&T, and GTE to make CPNI available to unaffiliated enhanced services providers and CPE suppliers at the customer's request on the same terms and conditions as  $\frac{1}{2}$ 

the CPNI is made available to their personnel. Fourth, the BOCs must provide unaffiliated

enhanced services and CPE providers any non-proprietary, aggregate CPNI that they share  $\,$ 

with their own personnel on the same terms and conditions. GTE is subject to the same

requirement for its enhanced services operations. AT&T, however, is not subject to any

Commission requirements with respect to aggregate CPNI. Finally, the BOCs, AT&T,

and GTE must use passwords to protect and block access to the accounts of customers that

exercise their right to restrict. We also mandate that the BOCs and GTE address their

compliance with our CPNI requirements in their ONA, CEI, and CPE relief plans.

 $\,$  177. The Commission acknowledged in the Notice that section 222 may address the

anticompetitive concerns that its existing CPNI requirements had sought to address, and the

Commission invited comment on which, if any, of its requirements may no longer be

necessary in view of section 222. The Commission tentatively concluded that it should not

extend its CPNI requirements to carriers that are not affiliated with AT&T, the BOCs, or

GTE. The Commission also recognized that, in certain respects, the Computer III CPNI

framework is more restrictive than the 1996 Act. The Commission decided that these

additional restrictions would remain in effect, pending the outcome of this rulemaking, to the

extent that they do not conflict with section 222. The Commission also asked parties to

address whether privacy, competitive concerns, or other considerations justified the retention  $\frac{1}{2}$ 

of our existing CPNI requirements, what the costs and benefits of retaining these  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$ 

requirements would be, and how changing our CPNI requirements might influence other

nonstructural safeguards adopted prior to the 1996  $\mbox{Act.}$  In the event the Commission

concluded that we should continue to subject the BOCs, AT&T, and GTE to CPNI requirements that are more restrictive than those applicable to other carriers, the Commission

sought comment on whether such differential treatment should be permanent or limited in

duration and, if limited, what sunset provisions should apply.

178. The Commission also tentatively concluded that AT&T's recent classification

as a non-dominant carrier for domestic services, and its plan to separate its equipment

business from its telecommunications service business, justified removal of our CPNI

requirements as to it. The Commission asked whether AT&T continues to possess a competitive advantage with respect to access to and use of customer CPNI, and whether

privacy concerns, competitive concerns, or any other considerations justify special regulatory

treatment of AT&T with regard to CPNI.

179. Several parties argue that our existing Computer III CPNI framework for the

BOCs and GTE is unnecessary and should be eliminated. AT&T and LDDS Worldcom argue that, in any event, the Commission's existing CPNI requirements should not continue

to apply to AT&T because it has been classified as nondominant. Other parties argue that

we should retain the Computer III CPNI requirements for the BOCs and GTE, and additionally for AT&T. Several of these commenters further contend that we should

extend some or all of the preexisting requirements to carriers other than AT&T, the  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{BOCs}}\,,$ 

and GTE.

#### 2. Discussion

180. We conclude that retaining the Computer III CPNI requirements, applicable

solely to the BOCs, AT&T and GTE, would produce no discernable competitive protection,

and would be confusing to both carriers and customers. The statutory scheme we implement in this order effectively replaces our Computer III CPNI framework in all material

respects. For example, like under the Computer III CPNI framework, our new scheme

establishes the extent that carriers, including AT&T, the BOCs, and GTE, must notify  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{N}}$ 

customers of their CPNI rights, obtain customer approval before using CPNI for marketing

purposes, and accommodate customer requests for partial or temporary restrictions on access

to CPNI. We also set forth under the new scheme the circumstances under which carriers,

CPNI available upon request.

181. The legislative history is silent on the issue of the Computer III requirements.

Some commenters argue that we should interpret Congress' silence as indicating its intention

that the Computer III CPNI requirements be retained. Other parties argue that the silence

indicates the intention that the existing framework be eliminated. Because Congress

offered no explanation on this point, we do not find the history helpful either way. Rather,

we find that the rules we implement in this order satisfy the concerns upon which the

Computer III framework is based, and therefore we replace them with the new scheme. We

note that, although we eliminate our Computer III approval and notification requirements, as

requested by several carriers, the rules we implement herein are actually more in line with

those endorsed by carriers urging us to retain our prior framework in which the BOCs,

AT&T, and GTE provide notification to their multi-line business customers, and need prior

authorization in the case of twenty or more lines.

182. We are persuaded that the competitive and privacy concerns upon which the

Computer III CPNI framework rests are fully addressed by our new CPNI scheme, and that,

continued retention of our Computer III CPNI framework would produce no additional

benefit. Indeed, in two important respects, the rules we promulgate herein implementing

section 222 afford information services providers and CPE suppliers greater protection from

carriers' anticompetitive CPNI use. First, the new scheme applies to all carriers, and in so

doing, extends the scope of protection consistent with section 222. We believe applying

our new CPNI rules to all carriers generally furthers the objective of section  $222\ \mathrm{of}$ 

safeguarding customer privacy.

183. Second, several of the new scheme's CPNI requirements operate to make carriers' anticompetitive use of CPNI more difficult. Unlike the Computer III CPNI

framework, which requires customer authorization only from businesses with over twenty

lines, we now require that all carriers obtain customer approval from all customers, including

small businesses and residential customers with any number of lines, before carriers can use

CPNI to market information services or CPE. Although the Computer III CPNI framework affords customers the right to restrict access to their CPNI records, whereas

under our new scheme the customer's right is to withhold approval, the result nevertheless is

the same -- the customer has the right to control whether a carrier uses, discloses, or permits

access to its CPNI. Indeed, in contrast with the Computer III CPNI framework, which

generally permits CPNI use unless and until the customer affirmatively acts to restrict, our

new scheme prohibits carriers from using CPNI unless and until they obtain customer

approval, and in this way offers customers greater control. Moreover, we conclude that

carriers must notify all customers of their CPNI rights under our new scheme, not merely  $\frac{1}{2}$ 

their multi-line business customers as is required under the Computer III CPNI framework.

This notice requirement, therefore, similarly affords greater competitive protections. Finally,

by its terms, section 222(c)(3) extends the obligation to provide non-discriminatory access to

aggregate customer information, when used for purposes outside of the provision of the

customer's total service offering, to all LECs, not just the BOCs and GTE. Thus, under

section 222(c)(3), information service providers and CPE suppliers are entitled to

competitively useful aggregate information from more carriers than they had been in the

past. In these ways, the new scheme is more protective of competitive and privacy

interests than currently exists under the Computer III CPNI framework. We thus find no

competitive or privacy justification at this time to retain our former framework.

184. Nor will the elimination of the Computer III CPNI framework weaken other

nonstructural safeguards. We agree with Ameritech, PacTel and GTE that the Commission's

other Computer III requirements are independent of CPNI regulation, and would continue to

prohibit discriminatory network access and protect against any alleged
"bottleneck"

leverage. Finally, we conclude that, insofar as we eliminate the Computer III

requirements, carriers' ONA and CEI plans no longer have to address CPNI.

- C. BOC Cellular CPNI Rule 22.903(f) and Computer II Rule 64.702(d)(3)
  - 1. Background
- 185. Under section 22.903(f) of the Commission's rules, BOCs may not provide CPNI to their cellular affiliates unless the information is made publicly available on the same

terms and conditions. The Commission invited comment in the CMRS Safeguards Notice

on whether rule 22.903(f) should be eliminated in light of section 222 of the Act. The

Commission expressly retained the rule in the CMRS Safeguards Order pending the resolution of CPNI issues in this proceeding.

- 186. Established in the context of the Computer II proceeding, and similar to rule
- 22.903(f), rule 64.702(d)(3) prohibits common carriers from sharing CPNI with their

structurally separate enhanced services and CPE affiliates unless the CPNI is made publicly

available. In the Notice in this proceeding, the Commission sought comment generally on

whether we should retain the current CPNI rules which were developed in a series of

Commission proceedings in connection with the BOCs, AT&T and GTE's provision of enhanced services and CPE, including, among others, Computer II.

- 187. Several commenters argue that continued retention of the BOC CPNI cellular
- rule 22.903(f) is important because CPNI derived from former monopoly local exchange

operations provides BOCs with an advantage in assisting their CMRS affiliates, and unless

this information is also made available to non-LEC-affiliated entities, competition is  ${\sf also}$ 

undermined. No commenter specifically supports continued retention of rule 64.702(d)(3),

although many commenters generally argue that all of our existing CPNI regulations, of

which rule 64.702(d)(3) is a part, should remain. In contrast, the BOCs and GTE argue

that we should eliminate rule 22.903(f), and all of the Commission's other pre-1996 Act

rules (e.g., Computer II and Computer III CPNI regulations) because section 222 and its

implementing regulations now govern a carrier's use of CPNI in the context of all

telecommunications services, including cellular and other CMRS offerings.

#### 2. Discussion

188. We conclude that we should eliminate both rules 22.903(f) and 64.702(d)(3).

We described supra that BOCs do not have additional obligations under sections 272 and 274

of the  $\mbox{Act}$  when they share local service CPNI with their statutory affiliates. For these

reasons, we likewise believe that the new scheme implemented in this order comprehensively

replaces these additional obligations. This new paradigm appropriately and sufficiently

protects customers' privacy interests as well as competitors' concerns when carriers,

including BOCs, share CPNI with their CMRS, information services and CPE affiliates.

Specifically, carriers are prohibited from using or disclosing CPNI derived from either their

local or long distance service to target customers that they wish to market CMRS offerings,

unless the customer approves, or unless the customer is also an existing CMRS customer

This new scheme protects against anticompetitive use of CPNI.

Replacing 22.903(f) with the new scheme also more appropriately extends the anticompetitive

mechanisms of section 222 to all LECs, not just BOCs, and in connection with all CMRS,

not just cellular service. Carriers are also not permitted to use CPNI in connection with

CPE and most information services absent customer approval. In contrast, retaining rule

22.903(f) would likely result either in BOCs electing not to share CPNI with their CMRS

affiliate, to avoid the requirement that they give the information to competitors, or in

disclosure on terms that may undermine customers' privacy and customer convenience goals.

These likewise would be the same options faced by carriers when they sought to share CPNI

with their CPE or information service affiliates should we retain rule 64.702(d)(3). Neither

result would further the policies of section 222.

- 189. We also reject parties' alternative argument, raised in connection with rule
- 22.903(f), that we exercise our general authority to require that LECs only disclose CPNI to

their CMRS providers upon the customer's written approval that has been gathered by the

affiliate, not the LEC. At this time, the record does not support the view that additional

requirements would be necessary. Such a written approval requirement imposes an additional burden on carriers and inconveniences the customer. Moreover, as discussed

below, we are persuaded that the safeguards we announce in this order protect carriers'

competitive concerns, as well as customers' interests, such that modification of our rule

would be both unnecessary and unwise.

### D. Safeguards Under Section 222

# 1. Background

190. To ensure compliance with our Computer III framework, we have considered a

variety of safeguards, consisting both of "access" and "use" restrictions. As a general

matter, access restrictions prohibit carrier personnel from physically accessing customer

records, and include personnel restrictions, such as separate marketing sales forces

authorized to access CPNI, as well as network password/I.D. restrictions. With use

restrictions, in contrast, employees are able to access customer records, but they are given

clear guidelines as to when CPNI use is, and is not, permitted. Use restrictions rely on

employee training and software "flags" which indicate, for example, whether customer

approval to use CPNI for marketing purposes has been secured.

191. The Commission tentatively concluded in the Notice that "all telecommunications carriers must establish effective safeguards to protect against

unauthorized access to CPNI by their employees or agents, or by unaffiliated third

parties." The Commission sought specific comment on whether the Computer III safeguards should continue to apply to the BOCs, AT&T, and GTE, whether they should

be extended to other carriers, as well as what other safeguards may be necessary. The

Commission also required that "AT&T, the BOCs and GTE must maintain any previously

approved mechanisms (i.e., computer password systems, filing mechanisms) to restrict

unauthorized internal access to CPNI." The Commission proposed waiting to specify

safeguards for telecommunications carriers not currently subject to the Computer III

requirements, but encouraged these carriers to consider applying the Computer III restrictions

to fulfill their obligation to develop effective safeguards. The Commission further noted,

however, that should the record indicate a need for safeguards applicable to all carriers, the

Commission would adopt them.

192. All of the commenters generally agree with our conclusion that carriers must

establish safeguards pursuant to section 222 to protect against unapproved use of CPNI.

Several carriers assert that they should be permitted to select the means or safeguards they

deem appropriate. Others propose that we adopt specific safeguards. In addition,

several of the commenters argue that our safeguards should distinguish among carriers and

that we should continue to apply the Computer III safeguards to the BOCs, AT&T, and GTE

alone. In contrast, other commenters claim we should eliminate all vestiges of Computer

III, including its safeguards, in light of the enactment of section 222.

#### 2. Discussion

193. We confirm our tentative conclusion that the Computer III safeguards, as they

currently operate, should not be applied to other carriers. Insofar as the statutory scheme we

implement in this order fully supplants our Computer III CPNI framework, we are further

persuaded that we should likewise not retain the CPNI safeguards designed to ensure

compliance within the Computer III framework. The record nevertheless supports the need

to specify safeguards to prevent unapproved use, disclosure, and access to customer CPNI by

carrier personnel and unaffiliated entities under the new scheme. We agree with commenters

expressing concern regarding carrier incentives to use CPNI for marketing purposes as well

as the potential for anticompetitive behavior. In light of these concerns, we reject

suggestions that we generally limit our CPNI requirement to, or impose different CPNI

requirements on, large or incumbent carriers. Although local exchange and other incumbent

carriers may have more potential for anticompetitive use of CPNI because of their large

customer base, we believe competitive concerns raised in the record are addressed generally

more effectively by applying our new CPNI scheme to all carriers. As several parties

observe, privacy is a concern which applies regardless of carrier size or market share.

Indeed, Congress intended for all carriers to safeguard customer information. Therefore,

we reject proposals that we generally should limit our new CPNI rules to, or impose

different CPNI requirements on, large or incumbent carriers.

194. We recognize, however, that our new CPNI scheme will impose some additional burdens on carriers, particularly carriers not previously subject to our Computer

III CPNI requirements. We believe, however, that these requirements are not unduly

burdensome. All carriers must expend some resources to protect certain information of their

customers. Indeed, section 222(a) specifically imposes a protection duty; "[e]very

telecommunications carrier has a duty to protect the confidentiality of proprietary information

of, and relating to, other telecommunications carries, equipment manufacturers, and

customers." In addition, for carriers that offer only one service, such as local exchange,

the CPNI requirements are minimal, and thus, not overly burdensome. Moreover, although we believe different rules are not generally necessary for small or rural carriers, we

note that such carriers may seek a waiver of our new CPNI rules if they can show that our

rules would be unduly burdensome, and propose alternative methods for safeguarding the

privacy of their customers, consistent with section 222.

195. Access Restrictions. We decline to require restrictions that would prohibit

carrier personnel from accessing CPNI of customers who have either failed, or expressly

declined, to give requisite approval for carrier use of CPNI for marketing purposes.

Although access restrictions offer considerable protection against carrier CPNI misuse, we

nevertheless agree with those parties that contend that such restrictions are inconsistent with

the statutory language and impractical and unnecessary under the statutory scheme. We

conclude that general access restrictions are not compatible with the exception set forth in

section 222(d)(3), which expressly permits carriers to use CPNI for marketing purposes when

customers so approve during inbound calls. Access restrictions preclude any dynamic

override capability that would permit marketing employees to access records upon receiving  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) \left($ 

customer approval. According to various commenters, in a password/I.D. system, personnel  $\,$ 

either have access to the entire customer service record or do not have access. Our  $\,$ 

existing password/I.D. restriction, applied to the new statutory scheme would mean that

carrier representatives would not be able to market additional services to a customer during  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{G}}$ 

an inbound call. Rather, the customer who had initiated the call would have to be

transferred to another carrier representative with password clearance to access the customer's

records for marketing purposes. This system inconveniences the customer as well as

burdens the carrier-customer dialogue, in conflict with the language and purpose of section 222(d)(3).

196. Conversely, we do not believe that the language in section 222(c)(1) requires

that we adopt access restrictions. Although section 222(c)(1)(A) prohibits carriers from

"[permitting] access to individually identifiable [CPNI]," we interpret this language to

obligate carriers to establish sufficient protections against external parties gaining access to

customer databases. We agree with Ameritech that the limitations on the access of  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$ 

apply solely to entities outside of the carrier's organization, whereas the use and disclosure

restrictions apply to the carrier. Because customer information is competitively valuable,

marketplace forces will ensure that carriers, as a part of normal operating procedures, will

protect against unaffiliated entities acquiring access to their customer information. Thus,

although we require carriers to establish procedures to protect against unauthorized access to

CPNI from unrelated entities, we decline at this time to establish specific restrictions.

197. Moreover, a mechanical access system is expensive to establish and to maintain. Because we find that section 222 applies to all telecommunications carriers, and

in contexts beyond CPE and enhanced services markets, any access restriction requirement

under section 222 would represent a considerable expansion of the existing Computer III

regulatory framework. We are not persuaded that the increased protection afforded through

access restrictions or separate marketing personnel would justify the additional expense of

such a system, which would be borne by all carriers, including those medium and small sized  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{sized}}$ 

carriers that have never before been subject to CPNI regulation. Such a requirement may

produce inefficiencies particularly for small carriers, and may thereby dampen competition

by increasing the costs of entry into telecommunications markets. We conclude that use

restrictions, as described below, can and will be effective when coupled with personnel

training. In addition, they promote customer convenience and permit carriers to operate

more efficiently with less regulatory interference.

198. Use Restrictions and Personnel Training. We specifically require that carriers

develop and implement software systems that "flag" customer service records in connection

with CPNI. Carriers have indicated that their systems could be modified relatively easily to

accommodate such CPNI "flags." The flag must be conspicuously displayed within a box  $\,$ 

or comment field within the first few lines of the first computer screen. The flag must

indicate whether the customer has approved the marketing use of his or her CPNI, and

reference the existing service subscription. In conjunction with such software systems, we

require that all employees with access to customer records be trained as to when they can

and cannot access the customer's CPNI. Carriers must also maintain internal procedures

to handle employees that misuse CPNI contrary to the carriers' stated policy.

requirements represent minimum guidelines that we believe most carriers can readily

implement and that are not overly burdensome.

199. Access Documentation. To encourage carrier compliance with our CPNI restrictions and to ensure a method of verification in the event of a subsequent dispute, we

require that carriers maintain an electronic audit mechanism that tracks access to customer

accounts. The system must be capable of recording whenever customer records are opened,

by whom, and for what purpose. We believe awareness of this "audit trail" will discourage

unauthorized, "casual" perusal of customer accounts, as well as afford a means of

documentation that would either support or refute claimed deliberate carrier CPNI violations.

Such access documentation will not be overly burdensome because many carriers maintain

such capabilities to track employee use of company resources for a variety of business

purposes unrelated to CPNI compliance, such as to document the volume of computer and

database use, as well as for personnel disciplinary matters. We further require that

carriers maintain such contact histories for a period of at least one year to ensure a sufficient

evidentiary record for CPNI compliance and verification purposes.

200. Supervisory Review for Outbound Marketing Campaigns. In addition to the electronic use restrictions, personnel training, and access documentation, we require carriers

to establish a supervisory review process that ensures compliance with CPNI restrictions

when conducting outbound marketing. Although supervisory review would neither be

convenient nor practical when customers initiate a service call (i.e., in the inbound marketing

context), we believe that such review is fully warranted in connection with outbound

marketing campaigns. There is both less likelihood that customers will detect CPNI

violations and greater incentive for sales employees to misuse CPNI when the dialogue with

the customer is initiated by the carrier. Indeed, a major focus of outbound sales

representatives is on the acquisition of new customers rather than on the retention of, and

service to, current customers. Accordingly, we require that sales personnel obtain

supervisory review of any proposed request to use CPNI for outbound marketing purposes.

Requiring prior supervisory review of marketing plans will safeguard against over-zealous

sales representatives, as well as afford a subsequent means of verifying  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$  compliance.

Moreover, insofar as marketing plans are presently developed, reviewed and maintained as a

matter of sound business practice, our requirement should not be burdensome to carriers. As

MCI explains, "event histories" (like contact histories) are routinely evaluated by carriers to

determine the success of marketing campaigns. We require carriers to maintain a record

of these event histories for at least one year from the date of the marketing campaign.

201. Corporate Certification. Finally, we agree with AirTouch that corporate certification is an appropriate and effective additional safeguard.

Accordingly, we require

each carrier to submit a certification signed by a current corporate officer, as an agent of the

corporation, attesting that he or she has personal knowledge that the carrier is in compliance

with our CPNI requirements on an annual basis. This certification must be made publicly

available, and be accompanied by a statement explaining how the carrier is implementing our

CPNI rules and safeguards.

202. Additional requirements. The Commission will enforce all rules announced in

this order upon their effective date. Because carriers may need time to conform their data

systems and operations to comply with the software flags and electronic audit mechanisms

required under this order, however, we will not seek enforcement of these specific safeguard

rules for a period of eight months from the date these rules become effective. After that

time, we authorize the Chief of the Common Carrier Bureau to undertake enforcement

actions when necessary and appropriate, and, to the extent that carrier behavior justifies

requirements beyond those outlined herein, to establish additional safeguards. This

delegation to the Common Carrier Bureau will facilitate the handling of CPNI compliance

issues in an expedited manner.

# IX. FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING

203. Implementation of Sections 222(a) and (b). The Commission in the Notice focused on issues relating to the implementation of sections 222(c)-(f). Based on various

responses from parties, we now seek further comment on three general issues that principally

involve carrier duties and obligations established under sections 222(a) and (b) of the Act.

Specifically, section 222(a) requires telecommunications carriers "to protect the

confidentiality of proprietary information of, and relating to, other telecommunication

carriers, equipment manufacturers, and customers, including telecommunication carriers

reselling telecommunications services provided by a telecommunications carrier." Section

222(b) provides that "a telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains proprietary

information from another carrier for purposes of providing any telecommunications service

shall use such information only for such purpose, and shall not use such information for its

own marketing efforts."

- A. Customer Right to Restrict Carrier Use of CPNI for Marketing Purposes
- 204. Section 222(c)(1) prohibits carriers from using, disclosing, or permitting

access to CPNI without customer approval for purposes other than those expressly provided

in sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B), and those in connection with the exceptions established in

sections 222(d)(1)-(3). Section 222, however, is silent on whether a customer has the right

to restrict a telecommunications carrier from using, disclosing, or permitting access to CPNI

within the circumstances defined by subsections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B). While the Notice

referred to customers' "rights to restrict access to their CPNI," it did so in the context of

when carriers must seek approval for CPNI use for purposes outside the scope of the

exceptions in sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B).

205. One view is that customers should be able to restrict carrier use of CPNI for

all marketing purposes, even within the customer's total service offering. This position may

be supported by the privacy protection in section 222(a), which imposes on every telecommunications carrier "a duty to protect the confidentiality of proprietary information

of, and relating to . . . customers . . . ,  $\mbox{\tt "}$  as well as by the principle of customer control

implicitly embodied in section 222(c). In addition, interpreting section 222 to permit

customers to restrict all marketing use of CPNI could be viewed as furthering the privacy-

competition balance struck in section 222, insofar as such a right would allow customers to

prevent carrier marketing practices that they found objectionable as their service relationship

with the carrier grew. Under this view, the only limitations on the customer's right to

restrict uses of CPNI within sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B) arguably would be those "required

by law" in accordance with section 222(c)(1), as well as those set forth in section 222(d).

We seek comment on this issue of whether customers have a right to restrict all marketing

uses of CPNI. Parties supporting a particular interpretation should state the statutory as well

as policy basis for their conclusion and should demonstrate why other conclusions are not justified.

## B. Protections for Carrier Information and Enforcement Mechanisms

206. We seek comment on what, if any, safeguards are needed to protect the confidentiality of carrier information, including that of resellers and information service

providers, that are in addition to those adopted in this accompanying order. We note that

Congress expressly protected carrier information in section 222(a), as well as in the specific

limitations on the use of that information in section 222(b). We believe that Congress'

goals of promoting competition and preserving customer privacy will be furthered by

protecting the competitively-sensitive information of other carriers, including resellers and

information service providers, from network providers that gain access to such information

through their provision of wholesale services. Therefore, we seek comment on what, if any,

additional regulations or safeguards are necessary to further this goal. These safeguards, for

example, may include personnel and mechanical access restrictions. Parties identifying

specific safeguards should comment explicitly on the costs and benefits of imposing such regulation.

207. We also seek comment on what, if any, further enforcement mechanisms we should adopt to ensure carrier compliance with our rules, or that may be necessary to

encourage appropriate carrier discharge of their duty under section 222(a) to protect the

confidentiality of customer information. We note, for example, that the  $\operatorname{Commission}$  in other

proceedings has sought to compensate carriers who have become victims of anticompetitive

behavior, as well as to streamline and update the formal complaint process in order to

promote the policies of the 1996 Act. Parties identifying specific enforcement mechanisms should comment explicitly on the costs and benefits of imposing such regulation.

## C. Foreign Storage of, and Access to, Domestic CPNI

208. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) asks the Commission to regulate the

foreign storage of, and foreign-based access to, CPNI of U.S. customers who subscribe to  $\,$ 

domestic telecommunications services (domestic CPNI). The FBI contends that vital law

enforcement, public safety, national security, business, and personal privacy reasons justify a

prohibition under section 222 on carriers storing domestic CPNI in foreign countries, for any

purpose, including billing and collection. The FBI further maintains that permitting direct

foreign access or foreign-storage of CPNI would seriously undermine important U.S.

governmental, business, and privacy-based protections afforded to CPNI under other

international and bilateral treaties. According to the FBI, the Commission has the

authority to prohibit such foreign storage or access based upon our jurisdiction conferred in

section 222. We seek comment on the FBI's proposal. In particular, we seek comment on

whether the duty in section 222(a) upon all telecommunications carriers to protect the

confidentiality of customers' CPNI, or any other provision, permits and/or requires us to  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right) \left($ 

prohibit the foreign storage or access to domestic CPNI.

209. As an exception to this administrative prohibition, the FBI suggests that

foreign storage or access to domestic CPNI may be permitted upon informed written

customer approval. When a U.S. domestic customer consents to having his or her CPNI

stored or accessed from a foreign country, the FBI further proposes, however, that we

require carriers to keep a copy of that customer's CPNI record within the U.S. for public

safety, law enforcement, and national security reasons, so that such information is available

promptly to law enforcement. We seek comment on whether requiring written customer

consent to store or access CPNI from a foreign country and maintaining duplicate  ${\tt CPNI}$ 

records in the U.S are necessary to protect customer confidentiality under section 222(a) or any other provision.

210. Finally, the FBI also requests that we require carriers to maintain copies of the

CPNI of all U.S.-based customers, regardless of whether they are U.S. domestic customers.

because of the need for prompt, secure, and confidential law enforcement, public safety, or

national security access to such information, pursuant to lawful authority. The FBI cites

the need of such information for investigations and as trial evidence. We seek comment on this proposal.

#### X. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

- A. Second Report and Order
- 1. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
- 211. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C.  $\,$  603, an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was incorporated in the Notice. The

Commission sought written public comment on the proposals in the Notice, including the

IRFA. The Commission's Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) in this Second

Report and Order conforms to the RFA, as amended by the Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996 (CWAAA), Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996).

- a. Need for and Objectives of the Proposed Rules
- 212. The Commission, in compliance with section 222 of the 1996 Act, promulgates rules in this order to reflect Congress' directive to balance the competitive and

customer privacy interests associated with the use and protection of customer proprietary

network information (CPNI), while fully considering the impact of these requirements on

small carriers. This order reflects the statutory principle that customers must have the

opportunity to protect the information they view as sensitive and personal from use and  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{L}}$ 

disclosure by carriers. As a general matter, we find that customer approval for carriers to

use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI is inferred from the existing customer-carrier

relationship; therefore, we conclude that such consent should be limited to the "total service

offering" to which the customer subscribes from a carrier. To preserve the customer's

control over the dissemination of sensitive information, we require an express approval

requirement for the use of CPNI beyond the total service offering to which the customer

subscribes from a carrier. While these rules permit customers to decide whether and to what

extent their CPNI is used, they also restrict carriers' anticompetitive use of CPNI.

- b. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by the Public Comments in Response to the IRFA
- 213. In the IRFA, the Commission generally stated that any rule changes that might

occur as a result of this proceeding could impact small business entities. Specifically, in the

IRFA, the Commission indicated there were no reporting, recordkeeping, or other compliance requirements. The IRFA solicited comment on alternatives to our proposed rules

that would minimize the impact on small entities consistent with the objectives of this

proceeding. In response we received no comments specifically directed to the IRFA. As

noted infra Part X.A.1.e of this FRFA, in making the determinations reflected in this order,

we have given consideration to those comments of the parties that addressed the impact of

our proposed rules on small entities.

- c. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which Rules Will Apply
- 214. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where feasible, an

estimate of the number of small entities that will be affected by our rules. The RFA

business," "small organization," and "small governmental jurisdiction." For the purposes

of this order, the RFA defines a "small business" to be the same as a "small business

concern" under the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632, unless the Commission has

developed one or more definitions that are appropriate to its activities. Under the Small

Business Act, a "small business concern" is one that: (1) is independently owned and

operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) meets any additional criteria

established by the Small Business Administration (SBA). The SBA has defined a small

business for Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories 4812 (Radiotelephone

Communications) and 4813 (Telephone Communications, Except Radiotelephone) to be small

entities when they have no more than 1,500 employees. We first discuss generally the

total number of small telephone companies falling within both of those SIC categories.

Then, we discuss the number of small businesses within the two subcategories, and attempt

to refine further those estimates to correspond with the categories of telephone companies

that are commonly used under our rules.

215. Although affected incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) may have no more than 1,500 employees, we do not believe that such entities should be considered small

entities within the meaning of the RFA because they either are dominant in their field of

operations or are not independently owned and operated, and are therefore by definition not

"small entities" or "small business concerns" under the RFA. Accordingly, our use of the

terms "small entities" and "small businesses" does not encompass small ILECs. Out of an

abundance of caution, however, for regulatory flexibility analysis purposes, we will

separately consider small ILECs within this analysis and use the term "small ILECs" to refer

to any ILECs that arguably might be defined by SBA as "small business concerns."

216. Total Number of Telephone Companies Affected. The United States Bureau of

the Census (the Census Bureau) reports that at the end of 1992, there were 3,497 firms

engaged in providing telephone services, as defined therein, for at least one year. This

number contains a variety of different categories of carriers, including local exchange

carriers, interexchange carriers, competitive access providers, cellular carriers, mobile

service carriers, operator service providers, pay telephone operators, PCS providers, covered

SMR providers, and resellers. It seems certain that some of those 3,497 telephone service

firms may not qualify as small entities because they are not "independently owned and

operated." For example, a PCS provider that is affiliated with an interexchange carrier

having more than 1,500 employees would not meet the definition of a small business. It

seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that fewer than 3,497 telephone service firms are

either small entities or small incumbent LECs that may be affected by this order.

217. Wireline Carriers and Service Providers. The SBA has developed a definition

of small entities for telephone communications companies other than radiotelephone

(wireless) companies. The Census Bureau reports there were 2,321 such telephone companies in operation for at least one year at the end of 1992. According to the SBA's

definition, a small business telephone company other than a radiotelephone company is one

employing fewer than 1,500 persons. All but 26 of the 2,321 non-radiotelephone companies listed by the Census Bureau were reported to have fewer than 1,000 employees.

Thus, even if all 26 of those companies had more than 1,500 employees, there would still be

2,295 non-radiotelephone companies that might qualify as small entities or small incumbent

LECs. Although it seems certain that some of these carriers are not independently owned

and operated, we are unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of

wireline carriers and service providers that would qualify as small business concerns under

the SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate that fewer than 2,295 small entity

telephone communications companies other than radiotelephone companies are small entities

or small ILECs that may be affected by this order.

- 218. Local Exchange Carriers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed
- a definition of small providers of local exchange services. The closest applicable definition
- under the SBA's rules is for telephone communications companies other than radiotelephone
- (wireless) companies. The most reliable source of information regarding the number of
- LECs nationwide of which we are aware appears to be the data that we collect annually in
- connection with the Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS). According to our most
- recent data, 1,371 companies reported that they were engaged in the provision of local
- exchange services. Although it seems certain that some of these carriers are not
- independently owned and operated, or have more than 1,500 employees, or are dominant we
- are unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of LECs that would
- qualify as small business concerns under the SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate
- that fewer than 1,371 small providers of local exchange service are small entities or small

ILECs that may be affected by this order.

- 219. Interexchange Carriers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a
- definition of small entities specifically applicable to providers of interexchange services
- (IXCs). The closest applicable definition under the SBA's rules is for telephone
- communications companies other than radiotelephone (wireless) companies. The most
- reliable source of information regarding the number of IXCs nationwide of which we are
- aware appears to be the data that we collect annually in connection with TRS. According to
- our most recent data, 143 companies reported that they were engaged in the provision of
- interexchange services. Although it seems certain that some of these carriers are not
- independently owned and operated, or have more than 1,500 employees, we are unable at
- this time to estimate with greater precision the number of IXCs that would qualify as small
- business concerns under the SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate that there are
- fewer than 143 small entity IXCs that may be affected by this order.

220. Competitive Access Providers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a definition of small entities specifically applicable to providers of competitive

access services (CAPs). The closest applicable definition under the SBA's rules is for

telephone communications companies other than radiotelephone (wireless) companies. The

most reliable source of information regarding the number of CAPs nationwide of which we

are aware appears to be the data that we collect annually in connection with the  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{TRS}}$  .

According to our most recent data, 109 companies reported that they were engaged in the

provision of competitive access services. Although it seems certain that some of these

carriers are not independently owned and operated, or have more than 1,500 employees, we

are unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of CAPs that would

qualify as small business concerns under the SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate

that there are fewer than 109 small entity CAPs that may be affected by this order.

221. Operator Service Providers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a definition of small entities specifically applicable to providers of operator

services. The closest applicable definition under the SBA's rules is for telephone

communications companies other than radiotelephone (wireless) companies. The most

reliable source of information regarding the number of operator service providers nationwide

of which we are aware appears to be the data that we collect annually in connection with the

TRS. According to our most recent data, 27 companies reported that they were engaged in

the provision of operator services. Although it seems certain that some of these companies

are not independently owned and operated, or have more than 1,500 employees, we are

unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of operator service

providers that would qualify as small business concerns under the SBA's definition.

Consequently, we estimate that there are fewer than 27 small entity operator service

providers that may be affected by this order.

222. Pay Telephone Operators. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a definition of small entities specifically applicable to pay telephone operators.

The closest applicable definition under the SBA's rules is for telephone communications

companies other than radiotelephone (wireless) companies. The most reliable source of

information regarding the number of pay telephone operators nationwide of which we are

aware appears to be the data that we collect annually in connection with the TRS. According

to our most recent data, 441 companies reported that they were engaged in the provision of

pay telephone services. Although it seems certain that some of these carriers are not

independently owned and operated, or have more than 1,500 employees, we are unable at

this time to estimate with greater precision the number of pay telephone operators that would

qualify as small business concerns under the SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate

that there are fewer than  $441\ \mathrm{small}$  entity pay telephone operators that may be affected by

this order.

223. Wireless Carriers. The SBA has developed a definition of small entities for

radiotelephone (wireless) companies. The Census Bureau reports that there were 1,176 such

companies in operation for at least one year at the end of 1992. According to the SBA's

definition, a small business radiotelephone company is one employing no more than 1,500

persons. The Census Bureau also reported that 1,164 of those radiotelephone companies

had fewer than 1,000 employees. Thus, even if all of the remaining 12 companies had more

than 1,500 employees, there would still be 1,164 radiotelephone companies that might qualify

as small entities if they are independently owned are operated. Although it seems certain

that some of these carriers are not independently owned and operated, we are unable at this

time to estimate with greater precision the number of radiotelephone carriers and service

providers that would qualify as small business concerns under the SBA's definition.

Consequently, we estimate that there are fewer than 1,164 small entity radiotelephone

companies that may be affected by this order.

224. Cellular Service Carriers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed

a definition of small entities specifically applicable to providers of cellular services. The  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{S}}$ 

closest applicable definition under the SBA's rules is for telephone communications

companies other than radiotelephone (wireless) companies. The most reliable source of

information regarding the number of cellular service carriers nationwide of which we are

aware appears to be the data that we collect annually in connection with the TRS. According

to our most recent data, 804 companies reported that they were engaged in the provision of

cellular services. Although it seems certain that some of these carriers are not

independently owned and operated, or have more than 1,500 employees, we are unable at

this time to estimate with greater precision the number of cellular service carriers that would

qualify as small business concerns under the SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate

that there are fewer than 804 small entity cellular service carriers that may be affected by this order.

225. Mobile Service Carriers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed

a definition of small entities specifically applicable to mobile service carriers, such as paging

companies. The closest applicable definition under the SBA's rules is for telephone

communications companies other than radiotelephone (wireless) companies. The most

reliable source of information regarding the number of mobile service carriers nationwide of

which we are aware appears to be the data that we collect annually in connection with the

TRS. According to our most recent data, 172 companies reported that they were engaged in

the provision of mobile services. Although it seems certain that some of these carriers are

not independently owned and operated, or have more than 1,500 employees, we are unable at

this time to estimate with greater precision the number of mobile service carriers that would

qualify under the SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate that there are fewer than  $172\,$ 

small entity mobile service carriers that may be affected by this order.

226. Broadband PCS Licensees. The broadband PCS spectrum is divided into  $\sin x$ 

frequency blocks designated A through F, and the Commission has held auctions for each

block. The Commission has defined small entity in the auctions for Blocks  ${\tt C}$  and  ${\tt F}$  as an

entity that has average gross  $\,$  revenues of less than \$40 million in the three previous calendar

years. For Block F, an additional classification for "very small business" was added and is

defined as an entity that, together with its affiliates, has average gross revenue of not more

than \$15 million for the preceding three calendar years. These regulations defining small

entity in the context of broadband PCS auctions have been approved by the SBA. No small

business within the SBA-approved definition bid successfully for licenses in Blocks A and B.

There were 90 winning bidders that qualified as small entities in the Block C auctions. A

total of 93 small and very small businesses won approximately 40 percent of the 1,479

licenses for Blocks D, E, and F. However, licenses for Blocks C through F have not been

awarded fully; therefore, there are few, if any, small businesses currently providing PCS

services. Based on this information, we conclude that the number of small broadband PCS

licensees will include the 90 winning bidders and the 93 qualifying bidders in the D, E, and

F Blocks, for a total of 183 small PCS providers as defined by the SBA and the Commission's auction rules.

227. Narrowband PCS Licensees. The Commission does not know how many narrowband PCS licenses will be granted or auctioned, as it has not yet determined the size

or number of such licenses. Two auctions of narrowband PCS licenses have been conducted for a total of 41 licenses, out of which 11 were obtained by small businesses

owned by members of minority groups and/or women. Small businesses were defined as

those with average gross revenues for the prior three fiscal years of \$40 million or less.

For purposes of this FRFA, the Commission is utilizing the SBA definition applicable to

radiotelephone companies, i.e., an entity employing no more than 1,500 persons. Not all

of the narrowband PCS licenses have yet been awarded. There is therefore no basis to

determine the number of licenses that will be awarded to small entities in future auctions.

Given the facts that nearly all radiotelephone companies have fewer than 1,000 or fewer

employees and that no reliable estimate of the number of prospective narrowband  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{PCS}}$ 

licensees can be made, we assume, for purposes of the evaluations and conclusions in this

FRFA, that all the remaining narrowband PCS licenses will be awarded to small entities.

228. SMR Licensees. Pursuant to 47 C.F.R. 90.814(b)(1), the Commission has

defined "small entity" in auctions for geographic area  $800\ \mathrm{MHz}$  and  $900\ \mathrm{MHz}$  SMR licenses

as a firm that had average annual gross revenues of less than \$15\$ million in the three

previous calendar years. This definition of a "small entity" in the context of  $800 \ \mathrm{MHz}$  and

 $900\ \mathrm{MHz}\ \mathrm{SMR}$  has been approved by the SBA. The rules adopted in this order may apply

to SMR providers in the  $800\ \mathrm{MHz}$  and  $900\ \mathrm{MHz}$  bands that either hold geographic area

licenses or have obtained extended implementation authorizations. We do not know how

many firms provide 800 MHz or 900 MHz geographic area SMR service pursuant to

extended implementation authorizations, nor how many of these providers have annual

revenues of less than \$15 million. We assume, for purposes of this  ${\tt FRFA}$ , that all of the

extended implementation authorizations may be held by small entities, which may be affected by this order.

229. The Commission recently held auctions for geographic area licenses in the 900

 $\mbox{MHz}$  SMR band. There were 60 winning bidders who qualified as small entities in the 900

MHz auction. Based on this information, we conclude that the number of geographic area

SMR licensees affected by the rule adopted in this order includes these 60 small entities. No

auctions have been held for  $800~\mathrm{MHz}$  geographic area SMR licenses. Thus, no small entities

currently hold these licenses. A total of 525 licenses will be awarded for the upper 200

channels in the  $800\ \mathrm{MHz}$  geographic area SMR auction. The Commission, however, has not

yet determined how many licenses will be awarded for the lower 230 channels in the 800

MHz geographic area SMR auction. Moreover, there is no basis on which to estimate how

many small entities will win these licenses. Given that nearly all radiotelephone companies

have fewer than 1,000 employees and that no reliable estimate of the number of prospective

 $800 \ \mathrm{MHz}$  licensees can be made, we assume, for purposes of this FRFA, that all of the

licenses may be awarded to small entities who, thus, may be affected by this order.

 $230.\,$  Resellers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a definition of

small entities specifically applicable to resellers. The closest applicable definition under the

SBA's rules is for all telephone communications companies. The most reliable source of

information regarding the number of resellers nationwide of which we are aware appears to

be the data that we collect annually in connection with the TRS. According to our most

recent data, 339 companies reported that they were engaged in the resale of telephone

services. Although it seems certain that some of these carriers are not independently

owned and operated, or have more than 1,500 employees, we are unable at this time to

estimate with greater precision the number of resellers that would qualify as  $\operatorname{small}$  business

concerns under the SBA's definition. Consequently, we estimate that there are fewer than

339 small entity resellers that may be affected by this order.

- d. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other Compliance Requirements
- $231.\$  In this Second Report and Order, if carriers choose to use CPNI to market

service offerings outside the customer's existing service, we obligate these carriers to (1)

obtain customer approval; (2) provide their customers a one-time notification of their CPNI

rights prior to any solicitation for approval; and (3) maintain records of customer notification

and approval, whether oral, written, or electronic.

232. We require carriers to develop and implement software systems that "flag"

customer service records in connection with CPNI. The flag must be conspicuously

displayed within a box or comment field within the first few lines of the first computer

screen, and the flag must indicate whether the customer has approved the  $\max$ 

his or her CPNI, and reference the existing service subscription. Also in connection with the

software systems, carriers must implement internal standards and procedures informing

employees when they are authorized to utilize CPNI. In addition, they must develop

standards and procedures to handle employees who misuse CPNI.

233. We further require that carriers maintain an electronic audit mechanism

tracks access to customer accounts and is capable of recording whenever customer records

are opened, by whom, and for what purpose. Carriers must maintain these "contact

histories" for a period of at least one year to ensure a sufficient evidentiary record for CPNI

compliance and verification purposes. Additionally, sales personnel must obtain supervisory

review of any proposed request to use CPNI for outbound marketing purposes, to ensure

compliance with CPNI restrictions when conducting such campaigns.

234. Finally, carriers must submit on an annual basis a certification signed by a

current corporate officer, as an agent of the corporation, attesting that he or she has personal

knowledge that the carrier has complied with the rules adopted in this order. The

certification must be made publicly available, and be accompanied by a statement explaining

how the carrier is implementing our CPNI rules and safeguards.

e. Significant Alternatives and Steps Taken by Agency to Minimize Significant Economic Impact on a Substantial Number of Small Entities Consistent with Stated Objectives

235. After consideration of possible alternatives, we have concluded that our rules

should apply equally to all carriers. Several parties in their comments address the impact of

possible changes in our CPNI rules on small entities. As a general matter, various small

entities express concern that, having never been required to comply with CPNI regulations in

the past, any regulation that extends to them will impose immediate costs. Specifically, SBT

argues that we should forbear from applying section 222(c)(1) to small businesses, and

thereby permit their use of CPNI for all marketing purposes, because small entities need

more flexibility to use CPNI to be competitive in the marketplace. SBT likewise opposes a

three category approach, claiming it gives large carriers flexibility to develop and meet

customers' needs, but may unnecessarily limit small business as competition grows. SBT

maintains that small carriers could be competitively disadvantaged by any interpretation of

section 222(c)(1)(A) other than the single category approach because a large carrier can base

the design of a new offering on statistical customer data and market widely, while a small

business can best meet specialized subscriber needs if it offers local, interexchange, and

CMRS tailored to the specific subscriber. ALLTEL and SBC agree with USTA that a multiple category definition of telecommunications service would specifically burden small companies.

- 236. As we discussed in this order, we decline to forbear from applying section
- 222(c)(1) to small carriers because we are unpersuaded that customers of small businesses

have less meaningful privacy interests in their CPNI. We believe that the total service

approach furthers the balance of privacy and competitive considerations for all carriers and

provides all carriers with flexibility in marketing their telecommunications products and

services. Indeed, if SBT is accurate in its claim that small businesses typically have closer

personal relationships with their customers, then small businesses likely would have less

difficulty in obtaining customer approval to market services outside of a customer's existing

service. Under the total service approach, carriers are able to use the customer's entire  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) \left( 1\right$ 

customer record in the course of providing the customer service, and no business is

prohibited from meeting customer needs by offering tailored packages of local, interexchange, and CMRS with customer approval. Moreover, to the extent carriers do not

choose to use CPNI for marketing purposes, or do not want to market new service

categories, they do not need to comply with our approval or notice requirements. Finally,

given our decisions to permit oral, written, or electronic approval under section 222(c)(1),

and impose use rather than access restrictions, the total service approach addresses any

concern that CPNI restrictions will disrupt the customer-carrier dialogue or the carriers'

ability to provide full customer service.

237. Some commenters urge the Commission to adopt notification rules which would require dominant carriers to give their customers written notification of their CPNI

rights, while smaller carriers or carriers in competitive markets would be permitted to give

oral notification to its customers. We find no reason to impose a written notification

requirement only on incumbent carriers. While competitive concerns may justify different

regulatory treatment for certain carriers, we believe all customers, despite the size or identity

of their carrier, have similar and important privacy concerns.

238. We also reject the suggestion by Arch, LDDS WorldCom, MCI, Sprint, and TCG that our rules in connection with CPNI safeguards be limited to large or incumbent

carriers, as they had been previously. Rather, we maintain that Congress intended for all

carriers to safeguard customer information, and that the safeguards we adopt today do not

impose a greater administrative burden on small carriers. We remain unconvinced that the  $\,$ 

burdens of section 222 are so great on small carriers that they cannot comply with reasonable

restrictions. Indeed, the mechanisms we require expressly factor commercial feasibility and

practice into an appropriate regulatory framework, and represent minimum general requirements. We also find that the use of an electronic audit mechanism to track access to

customer accounts is not overly burdensome because many carriers already maintain such

capabilities for a variety of business purposes unrelated to CPNI. Carriers have indicated

that such capabilities are important, for example, to track employee use of company

resources, including computers and databases, as well as for personnel disciplinary purposes.

The contact histories that we require carriers to maintain for a period of at least one year

also should not be burdensome to carriers because carriers routinely evaluate these contact

histories to determine the success of marketing campaigns. As we discuss in this order, we

believe the safeguards we adopt in this order will afford carriers the flexibility in conforming

their systems, operations, and procedures to assure compliance with our rules. Furthermore,

in an effort to reduce, for all carriers, the administrative burden of compliance with our

rules, we specifically decline to impose a password access restriction on carrier use of CPNI.

We also conclude that use restrictions are less burdensome to all carriers, including medium

and small sized carriers. We decline at this time to impose a requirement of separate

marketing personnel on the basis that such a rule may produce inefficiencies particularly for

small carriers, and thereby may dampen competition by increasing the costs of entry into

telecommunications markets.

## 2. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis

239. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking from which this order issues proposed changes to the Commission's information collection requirements. As required by the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, the Commission sought comment

from the public and from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on the proposed

changes. This Second Report and Order contains several new, proposed information

collections. We describe our proposed collections as follows:

240. In this order, if carriers choose to use CPNI to market service offerings

outside the customer's existing service, we obligate these carriers to obtain customer

approval and document such approval through software "flags" on customer service records

indicating whether the customer has approved or declined the marketing use of his or her

CPNI when solicited. These requirements constitute new "collections of information" within

the meaning of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501-3520. Implementation of this requirement is subject to approval by the Office of Management and

Budget as prescribed by the Paperwork Reduction Act.

241. Additionally, we require all telecommunications carriers that choose to solicit

customer approval to provide their customers a one-time notification of their CPNI rights

prior to any such solicitation. Pursuant to this one-time notification requirement, these

carriers must maintain a record of such notifications. This requirement constitutes a new

"collection of information" within the meaning of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44

U.S.C. 3501-3520. Implementation of this requirement is subject to approval by the

Office of Management and Budget as prescribed by the Paperwork Reduction Act.

242. All carriers must record whenever customer records are opened, by whom,

and for what purpose, and maintain these contact histories for a period of at least one year.

These requirements constitute new "collections of information" within the meaning of the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501-3520. Implementation of this

requirement is subject to approval by the Office of Management and Budget as prescribed by

the Paperwork Reduction Act.

243. Finally, we have adopted rules in this order requiring all telecommunications

carriers to submit on an annual basis a certification signed by a current corporate officer

attesting that he or she has personal knowledge that the carrier is in compliance with the

rules we promulgated in this order, and to create an accompanying statement explaining how

the carriers are implementing our rules and safeguards. Pursuant to this recordkeeping

requirement, all telecommunications carriers must maintain in a publicly available file the

compliance certificates and accompanying statements. This requirement constitutes a new

"collection of information" within the meaning of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44

U.S.C. 3501-3520. Implementation of all of these recordkeeping requirements are

subject to approval by the Office of Management and Budget as prescribed by the Paperwork  $\,$ 

Reduction Act.

### B. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

#### 1. Ex Parte Presentations

244. This matter shall be treated as a "permit-but-disclose" proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. 47 C.F.R. 1.1200 et seq. Persons

making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the substance of the presentations and not merely a

listing of the subjects discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the views

and arguments presented is generally required. See 47 C.F.R. 1.1206(b)(2), as revised.

Other rules pertaining to oral and written presentations are set forth in Section 1.1206(b) as well.

#### 2. Initial Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis

245. This Further Notice contains either a proposed or modified information collection. As part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, we invite the

general public and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to take this opportunity to

comment on the information collections contained in this Further Notice, as required by the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13. Public and agency comments are

due at the same time as other comments on this Further Notice; OMB comments are due 60

days from the date of publication of this Further Notice in the Federal Register. Comments

should address: (a) whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper

performance of the functions of the Commission, including whether the information shall

have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the Commission's burden estimates; (c) ways to

enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information collected; and (d) ways to

minimize the burden of the collection of information on the respondents, including the use of

automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

#### 3. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

246. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), as amended, the Commission has prepared this present Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the

expected significant economic impact on small entities by the policies and rules proposed in

this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Further Notice). Written public comments are

requested on this IRFA. Comments must be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be

filed by the deadlines for comments on the Further Notice. The Commission will send a

copy of the Further Notice, including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the

Small Business Administration. See 5 U.S.C. 603(a). In addition, the Further Notice and

IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal Register. See id.

### a. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules

247. The Commission is issuing the Further Notice to seek comment on whether customers may restrict a carrier's use of CPNI for all marketing purposes, even within

sections 222(c)(1)(A) and (B). The Commission also seeks comment on what, if any,

additional further safeguards may be needed to protect the confidentiality of carrier

information, including that of resellers and information service providers, and on what

further enforcement mechanisms, if any, should be adopted to ensure carrier compliance with

the rules adopted pursuant to the Second Report and Order. The Commission seeks comment

on whether the duty in section 222(a) upon all telecommunications carriers to protect the

confidentiality of customers' CPNI, or any other provision, permits or requires the

Commission to prohibit the foreign storage of, or access to domestic CPNI, as requested by  $\frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) \left($ 

the FBI based on their national security concerns.

- b. Legal basis
- 248. The Further Notice is adopted pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i), 222, and 303(r) of

the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 222, and 303(r).

- c. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which the Proposed Rules will Apply
- 249. Consistent with our conclusions in the present Second Report and Order, our

rules apply to all telecommunications carriers; therefore, any new rules or changes in our

rules adopted as a result of the Further Notice might impact small entities, as described in the

Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis supra. For a list of the small entities to which the

proposed rules would apply, see the Second Report and Order Final Regulatory Flexibility

Analysis supra Part X.A.1.c (Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to

Which the Proposed Rules will Apply). We hereby incorporate that description and estimate

into this IRFA. These entities include telephone companies, wireline carriers and service

providers, local exchange carriers, interexchange carriers, competitive access providers,

operator service providers, pay telephone operators, wireless carriers, cellular service

carriers, mobile service carriers, broadband PCS licensees, narrowband PCS licensees, SMR

licensees, and resellers. We discussed supra the number of small businesses falling within  $% \left( 1\right) =\left( 1\right) +\left( 1\right)$ 

both of the SIC categories, and attempted to refine further those estimates to correspond with

the categories of telephone companies that are commonly used under our rules.

- d. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements
- 250. Because we have not made any tentative conclusions or suggested proposed

rules, we are unable at this time to describe any projected reporting, recordkeeping, or other

compliance requirements. We have discussed generally in the Further Notice, supra Part IX,

however, the possibility that such proposals, if adopted, might entail additional obligations for carriers.

- e. Steps Taken to Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered
- 251. As noted supra, we seek comment on whether customers may restrict a carrier's use of CPNI for all marketing purpose, and on what, if any, additional safeguards

may be needed to protect the confidentiality of carrier information, as well as what further

enforcement mechanisms, if any, should be adopted to ensure carrier compliance with our

rules. In addition, we seek comment on whether the duty in section 222(a) upon all

telecommunications carriers to protect the confidentiality of customers' CPNI, or any other

provision, permits or requires the Commission to prohibit the foreign storage of, or access to

domestic CPNI. Consistent with our rules in the Second Report and Order, our intent is to

further the statutory principle that customers must have the opportunity to protect the

information they view as sensitive and personal from use and disclosure by carriers. Because

we have not proposed any rules, at this juncture, we are unable to forecast the economic

impact on small entities.

- f. Federal Rules that May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict with the Proposed Rules
- 252. None
- 4. Comment Filing Procedures
- 253. Pursuant to applicable procedures set forth in Sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the

Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments on or

before March 30, 1998, and reply comments on or before April 14, 1998. To file formally

in this proceeding, you must file an original and six copies of all comments, reply comments,

and supporting comments. If you want each Commissioner to receive a personal copy of

your comments, you must file an original and eleven copies. Comments and reply comments

should be sent to Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 1919  ${\rm M}$ 

Street, N.W., Room 222, Washington, D.C., 20554, with a copy to Janice Myles of the

Common Carrier Bureau, 1919 M Street, N.W., Room 544, Washington, D.C., 20554. Parties should also file one copy of any documents filed in this docket with the Commission's

copy contractor, International Transcription Services, Inc.,  $1231\ 20th\ Street$ , N.W.,

Washington, D.C., 20036. Comments and reply comments will be available for public

inspection during regular business hours in the FCC Reference Center, 1919  ${\tt M}$  Street,

N.W., Room 239, Washington, D.C., 20554.

254. Comments and reply comments must include a short and concise summary of the substantive arguments raised in the pleading. Comments and reply comments must also

comply with Section 1.49 and all other applicable sections of the Commission's Rules. We

also direct all interested parties to include the name of the filing party and the date of the

filing on each page of their comments and reply comments. All parties are encouraged to

utilize a table of contents, regardless of the length of their submission.

255. Parties are also asked to submit comments and reply comments on diskette.

Such diskette submissions would be in addition to and not a substitute for the formal filing

requirements addressed above. Parties submitting diskettes should submit them to Janice

Myles of the Common Carrier Bureau, 1919 M Street, N.W., Room 544, Washington, D.C., 20554. Such a submission should be on a 3.5 inch diskette formatted in an TRM

compatible form using MS DOS 5.0 and WordPerfect 5.1 software. The diskette should be

name, proceeding, type of pleading (comment or reply comments) and date of submission.

The diskette should be accompanied by a cover letter.

256. You may also file informal comments or an exact copy of your formal comments electronically via the Internet at <a href="http://dettifoss.fcc.gov:8080/cgibin/ws.exe/beta/ecfs/upload.hts">http://dettifoss.fcc.gov:8080/cgibin/ws.exe/beta/ecfs/upload.hts</a>. For information on filing comments via the Internet,

please see <ecfs@fcc.gov>. Only one copy of electronically-filed comments must be

submitted. You must put the docket number of this proceeding in the body of the text if you

are filing by Internet. You must note whether an electronic submission is an exact copy of

formal comments on the subject line. You also must include your full name and Postal

Service mailing address in your submission.

#### XI. ORDERING CLAUSES

- 257. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i), 222 and 303(r) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 222 and
- 303(r), a REPORT AND ORDER and FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING is hereby ADOPTED.
- 258. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to our own motion, paragraph 222 of In the Matter of Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Section 271 and 272

of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, CC Docket No. 96-149, First Report and

Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 21905 (1996), is hereby OVERRULED.

- 259. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission's Office of Public Affairs, Reference Operations Division, SHALL SEND a copy of this SECOND REPORT AND ORDER and FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING, including the associated Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis and Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to
- the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration, in accordance with
- paragraph 605(b) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq. (1981).
- 260. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Part 22 of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. Section 22.903(f) and Part 64 of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. Section
- 64.702(d)(3) are REMOVED as set forth in Appendix B hereto.
- 261. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Part 64 of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. Section 64 is AMENDED as set forth in Appendix B hereto, effective 30 days after

publication of the text thereof in the Federal Register, unless a notice is published in the

Federal Register stating otherwise. The information collections contained within become

effective 70 days after publication in the Federal Register, following OMB approval, unless a

notice is published in the Federal Register stating otherwise.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Magalie Roman Salas Secretary

# APPENDIX A -- LIST OF PARTIES SUBMITTING COMMENTS OR EX PARTES

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Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users Committee (Ad Hoc)
AGI Publishing (AGI)
AirTouch Communications, Inc. (AirTouch)
Alarm Industry Communications Committee (AICC)
ALLTEL Corporate Services, Inc. (ALLTEL)
American Public Communications Council (APCC)
America's Carrier Telecommunications Association (ACTA)
Ameritech Corp. (Ameritech)
Arch Communications Group, Inc. (Arch)
Association for Local Telecommunications Services (ALTS)
Association of Directory Publishers (ADP)
Association of Telemessaging Services International (ATSI)
AT&T Corp. (AT&T)
Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies (Bell Atlantic)
BellSouth Corporation (BellSouth)
Cable & Wireless, Inc. (CWI)
California Cable Television Association (CCTA)
California Public Utilities Commission (California Commission)
Cincinnati Bell Telephone (CBT)
Comcast Cellular Communications, Inc. (Comcast)
Competition Policy Institutte (CPI)
Competitive Telecommunications Association (CompTel)
Compuserve, Inc. (Compuserve)
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR)
Consolidated Communications, Inc. (Consolidated)
Consumer Federation of America (CFA)
Cox Enterprises, Inc. (Cox)
Direct Marketing Associates (DMA)
Directory Dividends
Equifax, Inc. (Equifax)
Excell Agent Services (Excell Agent)
Excel Telecommunications, Inc. (Excel)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Frontier Corporation (Frontier)
Anthony Genovesi, New York State Assemblyman
GTE Service Corporation (GTE)
Information Industry Association (IIA)
Information Technology Association of America (ITAA)
IntelCom Group (ICG)
Intermedia Communications, Inc. (Intermedia)
LDDS WorldCom Inc. (LDDS Worldcom)
MCI Telecommunications Corporation (MCI)
MFS Communications Company, Inc. (MFS)
MobileMedia Communications, Inc. (MobileMedia)
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC)
National Telecommunications and Information Association (NTIA)
National Telephone Cooperative Association and Organization for the Promotion
and
  Advancement of Small Telephone Companies (NTCA/OPASTCO)
New York Clearinghouse Association, Securities Industry Association, Bankers
  Clearinghouse, and Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users Committee (NYCA)
New York State Department of Public Service (New York Commission)
NYNEX Telephone Companies (NYNEX)
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Pacific Telesis Group (PacTel)
Paging Network (PageNet)
Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate (PaOCA)
SBC Communications, Inc. (SBC)
Small Business in Telecommunications, Inc. (SBT)
Southern New England Telephone Company (SNET)
Sprint Corporation (Sprint)
Sunshine Pages (Sunshine)
Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA)
Telecommunications Resellers Association (TRA)
Teleport Communications Group, Inc. (TCG)
Public Utility Commission of Texas (Texas Commission)
United States Telephone Association (USTA)
U S WEST, Inc. (U S WEST)
Virgin Islands Telephone Corporation (VITELCO)
Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (Washington Commission)
Wireless Technology Research, L.L.C. (WTR)
Yellow Pages Publishers Association (YPPA)
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For the reasons set out in the preamble, 47 CFR Parts 22 and 64 are amended as follows:

1. AUTHORITY: 47 U.S.C. 1-5, 7, 201-05, 222.

PART 22 -- PUBLIC MOBILE SERVICES

2. 22.903 [Remove].

PART 64 -- MISCELLANEOUS RULES RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS

The table of contents for Part 64 is revised to read as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

Subpart U -- Customer Proprietary Network Information

4. 64.702 [Amended]

64.702, remove paragraph (d)(3).

5. Subpart U is added to read as follows:

Subpart U -- Customer Proprietary Network Information

64.2001 Basis and purpose.

- (a) Basis. These rules are issued pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
- (b) Purpose. The purpose of these rules is to implement section 222 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 222.

64,2003 Definitions.

Terms used in this subpart have the following meanings:

- (a) Affiliate. An affiliate is an entity that directly or indirectly owns or controls, is owned or controlled by, or is under common ownership or control with, another
- entity.
- (b) Customer. A customer of a telecommunications carrier is a person or entity to which the telecommunications carrier is currently providing service.
- (c) Customer proprietary network information (CPNI). Customer proprietary network

information (CPNI) is (1) information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration,

type, destination, and amount of use of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any

customer of a telecommunications carrier, and that is made available to the carrier by the

customer solely by virtue of the customer-carrier relationship; and (2) information contained

in the bills pertaining to telephone exchange service or telephone toll service received by a

customer of a carrier. Customer proprietary network information does not include subscriber

list information.

- (d) Customer premises equipment (CPE). Customer premises equipment (CPE) is equipment employed on the premises of a person (other than a carrier) to originate, route, or terminate telecommunications.
- (e) Information service. Information service is the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or

operation of a

telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.

- (f) Local exchange carrier (LEC). A local exchange carrier (LEC) is any person that
- is engaged in the provision of telephone exchange service or exchange access. For purposes
- of this subpart, such term does not include a person insofar as such person is engaged in the  $\,$

provision of commercial mobile service under 47 U.S.C. 332(c).

- (g) Subscriber list information (SLI). Subscriber list information (SLI) is any
- information (1) identifying the listed names of subscribers of a carrier and such subscribers'

telephone numbers, addresses, or primary advertising classifications (as such classifications

are assigned at the time of the establishment of such service), or any combination of such

listed names, numbers, addresses, or classifications; and (2) that the carrier or an affiliate

has published, caused to be published, or accepted for publication in any directory format.

(h) Telecommunications carrier. A telecommunications carrier is any provider of telecommunications services, except that such term does not include aggregators

telecommunications services (as defined in 47 U.S.C. 226(a)(2)).

- 64.2005 Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information Without Customer Approval
- (a) Any telecommunications carrier may use, disclose, or permit access to  $\ensuremath{\mathtt{CPNI}}$  for

the purpose of providing or marketing service offerings among the categories of service (i.e.,

local, interexchange, and CMRS) already subscribed to by the customer from the same  $\$ 

carrier, without customer approval.

- (1) If a telecommunications carrier provides different categories of service, and a customer subscribes to more than one category of service offered by the carrier, the
- carrier is permitted to share CPNI among the carrier's affiliated entities that provide a

service offering to the customer.

(2) If a telecommunications carrier provides different categories of service, but a customer does not subscribe to more than one offering by the carrier, the carrier is not

permitted to share CPNI among the carrier's affiliated entities.

(b) A telecommunications carrier may not use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI to

market to a customer service offerings that are within a category of service to which the

customer does not already subscribe to from that carrier, unless the carrier has customer

approval to do so, except as described in paragraph (c) of this section.

(1) A telecommunications carrier may not use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI derived from its provision of local service, interexchange service, or CMRS, without

customer approval, for the provision of CPE and information services, including call

answering, voice mail or messaging, voice storage and retrieval services, fax store and

forward, and Internet access services. For example, a carrier may not use its local exchange

service CPNI to identify customers for the purpose of marketing to those customers related

CPE or voice mail service.

- (2) A telecommunications carrier may not use, disclose or permit access to CPNI to identify or track customers that call competing service providers. For example, a
- local exchange carrier may not use local service CPNI to track all customers that call local  $\,$

service competitors.

(3) A telecommunications carrier may not use, disclose or permit access to a former customer's CPNI to regain the business of the customer who has switched to another service provider.

- (c) A telecommunications carrier may use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI, without customer approval, as described in this subparagraph.
- (1) A telecommunications carrier may use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI, without customer approval, in its provision of inside wiring installation, maintenance, and repair services.
- (2) CMRS providers may use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI for the purpose of conducting research on the health effects of CMRS.
- (3) LECs and CMRS providers may use CPNI, without customer approval, to market services formerly known as adjunct-to-basic services, such as, but not limited to, speed dialing, computer-provided directory assistance, call monitoring, call tracing, call

blocking, call return, repeat dialing, call tracking, call waiting, caller I.D., call forwarding, and certain centrex features.

- 64.2007 Notice and Approval Required for Use of Customer Proprietary
  Network Information
- (a) A telecommunications carrier must obtain customer approval to use, disclose, or permit access to CPNI to market to a customer service to which the customer does not already subscribe to from that carrier.
- (b) A telecommunications carrier may obtain approval through written, oral or electronic methods.
- (c) A telecommunications carrier relying on oral approval must bear the burden of demonstrating that such approval has been given in compliance with the Commission's rules.
- (d) Approval obtained by a telecommunications carrier for the use of CPNI outside of the customer's total service relationship with the carrier must remain in effect until the customer revokes or limits such approval.
- (e) A telecommunications carrier must maintain records of notification and approval, whether oral, written or electronic, for at least one year.
- (f) Prior to any solicitation for customer approval, a telecommunications carrier must provide a one-time notification to the customer of the customer's right to restrict use of, disclosure of, and access to that customer's CPNI.
- (1) A telecommunications carrier may provide notification through oral or written methods.

- (2) Customer notification must provide sufficient information to enable the customer to make an informed decision as to whether to permit a carrier to use, disclose or permit access to, the customer's CPNI.
- (i) The notification must state that the customer has a right, and the carrier a duty, under federal law, to protect the confidentiality of CPNI.
- (ii) The notification must specify the types of information that constitute CPNI and the specific entities that will receive the CPNI, describe the purposes for which CPNI will be used, and inform the customer of his or her right to disapprove those
- (iii) The notification must advise the customer of the precise steps the customer must take in order to grant or deny access to CPNI, and must clearly state that a denial of approval will not affect the provision of any services to which the customer subscribes.
  - (iv) The notification must be comprehensible and not be misleading.

uses, and deny or withdraw access to CPNI at any time.

- (v) If written notification is provided, the notice must be clearly legible, use sufficiently large type, and be placed in an area so as to be readily apparent to a customer.
- (vi) If any portion of a notification is translated into another language, then all portions of the notification must be translated into that language.
- (vii) A carrier may state in the notification that the customer's approval to use CPNI may enhance the carrier's ability to offer products and services tailored to the customer's needs. A carrier also may state in the notification that it may be compelled to disclose CPNI to any person upon affirmative written request by the customer.
- (viii) A carrier may not include in the notification any statement attempting to encourage a customer to freeze third party access to CPNI.
- (ix) The notification must state that any approval, or denial of approval for the use of CPNI outside of the service to which the customer already subscribes to from that carrier is valid until the customer affirmatively revokes or limits such approval or denial.
- (3) A telecommunications carrier's solicitation for approval must be proximate to the notification of a customer's CPNI rights.
- (4) A telecommunications carrier's solicitation for approval, if written, must not be on a document separate from the notification, even if such document is included within the same envelope or package.

- 64.2009 Safeguards Required for Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information
- (a) Telecommunications carriers must develop and implement software that indicates within the first few lines of the first screen of a customer's service record the CPNI approval status and reference the customer's existing service subscription.
- (b) Telecommunications carriers must train their personnel as to when they are and are not authorized to use CPNI, and carriers must have a express disciplinary process in place.
- (c) Telecommunications carriers must maintain an electronic audit mechanism that tracks access to customer accounts, including when a customer's record is opened, by whom, and for what purpose. Carriers must maintain these contact histories for a minimum period of one year.
- (d) Telecommunications carriers must establish a supervisory review process regarding carrier compliance with the rules in this subpart for outbound marketing situations and maintain records of carrier compliance for a minimum period of one year. Specifically, sales personnel must obtain supervisory approval of any proposed outbound marketing request.
- (e) A telecommunications carrier must have a corporate officer, as an agent of the carrier, sign a compliance certificate on an annual basis that the officer has personal knowledge that the carrier is in compliance with the rules in this subpart. A statement explaining how the carrier is in compliance with the rules in this subpart must accompany the certificate.

# STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER SUSAN NESS DISSENTING IN PART

Re: Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and

Other Customer Information

I agree with most elements of this order but not with the decision to overturn a

portion of the Commission's prior ruling in the "Non-Accounting Safeguards" order. I

believe it is possible to implement Section 222 in a manner that is fully consistent with

Section 272. But the approach taken by the majority creates an unnecessary conflict between

the two sections and then resolves that conflict in a manner that undermines the structural

separation safeguards crafted by Congress.

Section 272 spells out in detail the relationship between a Bell operating company and

any structurally separate affiliate that is created to provide interLATA telecommunications

services and interLATA information services. The key rules can be summarized succinctly.

Under Section 272(a)(1)(A), the interLATA affiliate is required to be "separate of any

operating company entity . . . . " Under Section 272(b)(1)&(5), the affiliate is required to

"operate independently" of the operating company and to conduct all transactions with the  $\,$ 

operating company "on an arm's length basis . . . . " Under Section 272(c)(1), the operating

company "may not discriminate" in favor of the affiliate "in the provision or procurement of

goods, services, facilities, or information."

The sole exception to the nondiscrimination requirement is in Section 272(g)(2). It

specifies that the operating company may "market and sell" the interLATA services provided

by the interLATA affiliate. This exception addresses a single setting in which the

relationship between the operating company and the separate affiliate is free from the

nondiscrimination requirement of Section 272(c); it does not alter Section 272(a)&(b)'s

requirements for a separate entity which operates independently and on an  $\operatorname{arm}$ 's length

basis. Yet, despite the care Congress took to fashion a narrow exception to the general

principles of structural separation, the majority's decision today irretrievably blurs the lines

between the two entities.

Under today's decision, the Bell operating company and its interLATA affiliate are

treated as separate carriers for purposes of CPNI. Fine so far. But, if the operating

company successfully sells the interLATA services of its affiliate to a customer, or even if

the separate affiliate independently sells a customer on its long distance services, the order

treats both carriers as having collapsed into one. Both carriers will be deemed to have a

"total service relationship" with the customer that encompasses local and interLATA service.

Both may access the entire range of information available through the customer's account

records -- information about the destination of the customer's calls, their duration, and their

time of day. Both may use this information to devise any offer encompassing either or both services.

This approach does not square with the statutory scheme in which the Bell operating

company and its separate affiliate are deemed to be separate and independent entities. If

MCI, AT&T, or any one of a hundred other long distance companies successfully wins the  $\,$ 

interLATA business of a customer, it does not automatically acquire the right and the

opportunity to access the customer's local service information. Yet, under the approach

adopted by the majority today, if the structurally separated affiliate of a Bell operating

company wins the interLATA business of a customer, it does automatically acquire the right

and the opportunity to access the customer's local service information. I don't think this

discrepancy is what Congress intended.

Consider another example. Under Section 272(g)(1), the structurally separate affiliate

may market the local service offerings of its affiliated operating company, provided that

other entities may also do so. So, if a Bell operating company's structurally separated

affiliate successfully markets a local service offering of the operating company (say, in

selling the customer a second line), the majority's approach would say that the separate

affiliate now has the right automatically to access the operating company's entire record on

the customer for the purpose of marketing additional services. But if an unaffiliated entity,

exercising the same right to sell the same service on behalf of the same operating company,

successfully sells the operating company's local service, it does not acquire the same rights.

Again, the result is anomalous.

It bears emphasis that the issue here concerns solely the rights that the Bell operating

companies and their structurally separated affiliates will have without customer approval.

Under Section 222(c)(2), those customers who wish to empower any carrier to access any of

their private information may make arrangements to that effect. But, absent an affirmative  ${}^{\dagger}$ 

decision by the customer, I read Section 272 as precluding the kind of preferred relationship

between a Bell operating company and its structurally separated affiliate that is created by  $\frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) \left( \frac{1}{2} \right)$ 

today's decision.