## THE HIGH COURT - COURT 29

COMMERCIAL

# Case No. 2016/4809P <br> THE DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONER <br> PLAINTIFF <br> and <br> FACEBOOK IRELAND LTD. <br> AND DEFENDANTS <br> MAXIMILLIAN SCHREMS 

HEARING HEARD BEFORE BY MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO
ON FRIDAY, 24th FEBRUARY 2017 - DAY 11

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MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Good morning.
REGISTRAR: Matter at hearing, Data Protection
Commissioner -v- Facebook Ireland Ltd. and another.
MR. GALLAGHER: Prof. Swire, please.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Mr. Murray, you had indicated that you were going to have some issues in relation to Prof. Swire or are you not having some issues?
MR. MURRAY: Well, Judge, I would propose to revisit that later in the day with your leave because I think some of the facts are a little bit unclear, but I will revisit that later. Thank you, Judge.
MR. GALLAGHER: Judge, one thing I should say about 11:02 Prof. Swire. He has to go back to the States today, I think there's a reasonable chance he will finish, but some chance that he won't finish his evidence. He is committed to teaching for five hours on Tuesday, he's been here for a week, and he has to do that. He could, 11:02 if his evidence hasn't finished, deal with the matter by video conference on Tuesday morning, if that was satisfactory to the court, or else he could be back, he would fly back in on Wednesday. He would ideally prefer not to give his evidence on Wednesday, unless he 11:02 had to because of the jet lag, and he would make himself available on Thursday. I mean we would continue with the rest of the matter, it's not ideal, but he has accommodated everybody.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: No, no, I appreciate that and the parties have been very good.
MR. MURRAY: Judge, absolutely. I mean we fully understand. We have seen Prof. Swire, he has been here for, well it feels like ten days, $I$ am sure it's not that long. I am sure it feels longer for him.
THE WITNESS: It's lovely in Dublin.
MR. MURRAY: So, Judge, I will be as briefly as I can in the circumstances.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: It's not a case for cutting corners, this particular case.
MR. MURRAY: We11, no. But if I have not finished, Judge, I will take instructions as to whether we can do this by videolink, I am not sure Mr. McCullough -MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: There is also the issue about 11:03 the technicalities of which court will be available to us for videolink, as you know.
MR. MURRAY: Yes. I think this court actually --
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Is this one?
MR. GALLAGHER: I think this is one of the ones.
MR. MURRAY: Yes, I have certainly had it done in this court.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: You are more familiar than I,
I do know it has been a problem in the past.
MR. MURRAY: And if not, if for whatever reason
videolink is not the best way when we get to the end of today, we will certain7y accommodate Prof. Swire at any time that suits him.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: It's an evening flight I am
assuming, I mean we could work a bit later, but we'11 play that by year.
MR. MURRAY: Certainly, Judge, thank you.
MR. GALLAGHER: Is it tomorrow you are going?
WITNESS: My flight is first thing in the morning tomorrow.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Thank you. I mean I have to bear in mind the stamina of people as well.

MR. MURRAY: Of course, Judge, yes.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Not to be unreasonable.
MR. GALLAGHER: Thank you, Judge.

PROF. PETER SWIRE, CONTINUED TO BE DIRECTLY EXAMINED BY MR. GALLAGHER AS FOLLOWS:

1 Q. Prof. Swire, I think you were speaking to the, I'11 call it the joint expert report or identification of agreement or disagreements but I'11 call it report just for ease of reference. You had dealt with page 13, the effect of Section 702, as to whether it was less strict 11:04 or more strict, and I think on page 14 it deals with access to communications under Section 702. I think in substance you have dealt with those issues in terms of the targeting procedures that need to be followed and you have also explained the MCTs, so I think we can move from that to page 17.

You'11 see there there's a reference to PPD and feasibility and that the experts disagree about "the
significance of PPD's requirement that signals intelligence be as tailored as possible". Could you give your view to the court in relation to that and the significance, as you see it, of PPD-28?
A. Thank you. Good morning, Judge. So it is quite simply 11:05 there's a quotation here to the Presidential Policy Directive 28. We agree on the quotes: "Signals intelligence activities shall be as tailored as feasib7e."

That's an instruction from the President of the United States. I go on to observe that the language does not use the word 'necessity' or the word 'proportionality', but it is an example of safeguards that addresses those concerns. As tailored as feasible is, in my view, sort 11:05 of an ordinary English way of saying 'don't go beyond what you can, you are supposed to tailor it', and that is in my view is quite similar to my experience with the term 'proportionality' under European law.

Ms. Gorski said it was an extraordinarily broad and flexible standard. These are imprecise words in the English language, what feasible means, but I was giving my experience about what that would be taken in the United States.
2 Q. And the significance of non-compliance with PPD-28 or what is the consequence, I should say, of that, Professor?
A. So the word 'directive', is a directive from the

President of the United States. For military people, and some of the NSA people are uniform, that's an ordinary order from the Commander in Chief, so military line of authority. For civilian employees the President is part of the, he is the leader of the Executive Branch, has given an order to do a certain thing. If you violate it you are subject to the penalties that come as an employee who has violated a direct order which could lead to job termination or various kinds of consequences like that.

3 Q. On page 20, in relation to the US privacy régime, I think you take a different view with regard to the significance of the sectoral element, that it doesn't a11, protection doesn't all flow from one comprehensive source, and could you briefly address that or give the 11:07 court your view on that?
A. So I think here we talked yesterday about a company like Facebook would be subject to multiple kinds of litigation. There could be a private right of action for people whose records were revealed. There could be 11:07 government criminal prosecution if they broke the law. There could be Federal Trade Commission, in the form of action for deceptive trade practice. There could be actions by a state Attorney General or more than one for deceptive practices. This is an example of where Facebook would face multiple legal risks of enforcement if they were to violate their promise connected with returning records.

4 Q. Could I ask you then perhaps to turn to page 33 which
deals with the standing doctrine and at the same time perhaps direct you and the court to your report and chapter 7 of your report and page 38 of that report.
A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. The first matter I want to ask you about is Amnesty - $\mathbf{V}$ - 11:08 Clapper and could you explain to the court your assessment of its significance in terms of standing?
A. Right. So I went back and re-read Amnesty - v - Clapper this week as part of the preparation for testifying. when the case came out, as someone in the field I was very disappointed in the five to four ruling. I was on the side of the four justices who thought there should be standing. I re-read it this week and I was struck by a number of details in the majority opinion I hadn't focussed on so much before the enormous amount of work we have done for this case.

My view is that the majority makes a more detailed case for why there isn't standing than I had appreciated before. The first reason is, besides the facial challenge that's been mentioned, it was facial, not as applied.
6 Q. MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Not as?
A. Not as applied. I am sorry, in American legal, if I am challenging a statute in the United States as unconstitutional, it could be a facial challenge, it got passed yesterday, it's a facial challenge. or it could be the way the agency does it in practice, that's called an as applied challenge. There's a fairly
strong presumption that it's better to get the facts and do it as applied, but if it's important enough you challenge it up front under a facial challenge. I think there's something similar in Irish law, I've been told.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Thank you.
A. Okay. So the first thing is that, we spent all this time on targeting, well section 702 can only target non-us persons. The plaintiffs in the clapper case were all US persons. So, by statute, none of them were 11:09 targets of the surveillance. Then the speculation that a non-target would have his or her communications touched is more speculative because we know that they are outside the zone of those who are being targeted outside the lawful activities of the statute. So that's one thing I notice.

Another thing I noticed is the court spent quite a bit of time talking about other judicial review that existed if we didn't have this case going forward. It 11:10 specifically noted that companies like Yahoo or other service providers would be able to sue for constitutionality, and we have discussed how that kind of claim did happen in the FISA court.

Beyond that it talked about how the FISC, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, had full judicial review powers as a federal court and was doing it with all of the access to classified information that we
have discussed yesterday during my testimony.

So this raises a question in my mind about how much the point of a remedy here is to have an individual bring the claim, which is one sort of remedy, versus how much 11:11 the point of protection of fundamental rights comes from independent review by a judge for constitutionality. Because in this case the court was pointing to the fact that there was independent review of constitutionality by federal judges with appeal to the Supreme Court in that line, and in that context of having judicial review they didn't add this additional path of judicial review.

And then the last thing I noticed --
ms. JUSTICE COSTELLO: When you use judicial review, you mean judicial surveillance in the sense we have heard about the FISC court?
A. Judicial review in American law would be, there is a judge who is reviewing the constitutionality here.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Yes, it's a term of art for particular type of proceedings in this country, so I just wanted to clarify.
A. oh, okay.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: No, no.
A. Is that clear enough?

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: No, absolutely, thank you.
A. Okay. So we have federal judges checking for constitutionality and doing so with the factual details
that the FISC has as contrasted with the relative lack of details of knowledge as applied that the Supreme court would have had in that proceeding.

Then the last point I'd observe, my whole chapter on hostile actors has focussed me on why the government says we neither confirm nor deny when people try to ask questions about surveillance activities. well it turns out in Clapper, and this I hadn't noticed when I read it back when it came out a few years ago, the court goes on in some detail about how bad an idea it would be to allow standing for outside people to test whether they were under surveillance. And the court goes on to explain something along these lines, in my words, not their words: The court says well let's - I'm going to now give an example that's numerical that they didn't give, but I think it will just make the point.

Let's say there is ten plaintiffs, five of them turn out to be under surveillance, so they get standing; five of them don't turn out to be under surveillance so they don't get standing. Now you have created a mechanism through these court appeals to find out who is under surveillance. And that's exactly the Alice and Bob kind of examples that I give in my Chapter 8 on 11:13 hostile actors. It allows people on the outside to ping the court system to try to map out who is being surveilled by e-mail, by chat, for this kind of individual, for that kind of individual. And so the
court majority in Clapper goes through this in a way that I hadn't remembered as quite consistent with my chapter 8 analysis.

So for all those reasons I went into re-reading this the way I had felt when I originally read it, which of course that there should be standing, we need to have ways to challenge this, and I was struck by the details of the case, how the majority had a much stronger case than I had realised before we went through this analysis.
7 Q. I think you have also considered ACLU -V- Clapper; isn't that correct?
A. Right.

8 Q. And you might give the court your views on that?
A. Right. So I re-read and that's where standing was granted after the Supreme court case. And the facts there to my mind were quite different in important respects. when it comes to targets, it was known that they were not targets in the Amnesty case. But it is known, now that we have had the Snowden revelations and the verizon order, that tens or hundreds, a million Americans were targets under this telephone metadata programme, the Section 215 programme. So we have gone from speculative, whether anybody has a potential injury-in-fact to documented that millions and millions of people have injury-in-fact.

Also the nature of the surveillance programme, under

702 the Supreme Court said there's speculation about whether there was individual targeting. In the Second Circuit case the whole point of the 215 database is to connect the dots, to have the connections of this phone record with this phone record with the other person's phone record. And so the documentation of the verizon order talked about comprehensive nature. So we have millions and millions of targets and we know that everybody was in it because it is comprehensive and so the facts there are that people did have standing as opposed to the speculative, no targets situation in the previous case.

So factually that's quite a different: Are these individual affected by the surveillance? Answer clearly yes in the latter case; answer highly speculative in the earlier case.
9 Q. I think Section 215 that provided for that broad surveillance of the metadata, that was repealed by the Freedom Act; isn't that correct?
A. Yes. The review group recommended that it be repealed that I was on and then Congress repealed it in 2015.
10 Q. Yes. I think you have also considered the spokeo case, but, before dealing with the detail of the Spokeo case, I want to ask you did you have an involvement in relation to the FCRA and Congress' consideration of the FCRA and the issues relating to it?
A. Yes. So the Fair Credit Reporting Act is one of the areas as a privacy law expert I have worked in. It was
amended in 1996 and at the time $I$ wrote as a professor making observations about it. The last time it was amended was 2004, there was a big overhaul, and I testified in Congress on the Fair Credit Reporting Act at that time. And so I have a background in the 11:16 statute.
11 Q. Can you comment then on Spokeo in the light of the issues of which you are aware and the significance of that decision in terms of standing?
A. So I re-read Spokeo this week, it's been a fun week for 11:16 extra reading. So I have three observations. I'm sorry, I've been here all week.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: No, we are not getting many laughs.
A. Okay. The first thing is that my experience from having worked on that statute as being amended and from general knowledge is that there's quite a lot of errors in credit reports. The Federal Trade Commission did a report in 2013 that I looked at to confirm my recollection. In that report the Federal Trade
Commission found that about $5 \%$ of people's credit reports had material mistakes, mistakes that might have led to a change in their credit rating, and that about 20\% of the credit reports had some mistake when you looked into it in detail. Credit reports are highly detailed things so there's at least some mistake in about $20 \%$ of things. That matches my own understanding and that matches my understanding of why the standard in the statute at Spokeo is whether the company had
taken reasonable measures and whether it had wilfully failed to take those reasonable measures. In other words, it's not a strict liability statute. It's not a statute where the credit reporting agency makes a mistake and is liable. The credit reporting agency has 11:17 to take reasonable measures and it gets sues if it wilfully fails to do that. That's the first point.

The second point is that the kind of error here is a quite unusual mistake, it's that the person had a better report than the facts sustained. And in thinking about that I thought of the term of a bank error in your favour, right. So if I wanted to challenge a bank for sloppy accounting, it had given me extra money in my account and then I sued, 'I can't believe they put an extra $€ 100$ in there', that's an odd kind of case and complaint to make.

But that's essentially what the complaint is here, that the person was employed and had good credit. And so when you look at the traditional form of injury or mistake, that's not the one you are usually thinking about and it's not the one that was statute was primarily focussed on providing for. The statute was basically there to make sure, if there was a mistake and I couldn't get my mortgage loan, that it would be corrected.

Then the third observation is that the individual had a
different remedy under the statute. So the Fair Credit Reporting Act is, if I think there's a problem with my credit history with the company Spokeo, one of the main features of the Act is I can access my credit report, I get a free copy by right every year. If I look at the report and there's a mistake in it I have a right to seek amendment of it. The credit reporting agency is under a strict set of rules about how they have to amend it if there's a mistake.

And so in this case the question before the court was are we going to allow a class action for spokeo's activities. The fact was that the person got a good credit report and that the main way you fix that is you go to the company and say 'please correct my credit report'. But instead of asking for 'please correct my credit report', the person was asking for a class action against the company for attorneys' fees and damages.

So the claim was a peculiar claim given my experience in the statute. The court decided that it was not going to allow that peculiar kind of claim to go forward. And my understanding is it did remand it so that, if there was some particular showing of an individual harm, that the person would have a chance in subsequent proceedings below to do that. But as a type of injury it's a very odd injury under the statute.
12 Q. Now Prof. Richards says that that decision is of
significance and he says real significance in relation to standing in the context of the government surveillance that is the subject matter of these proceedings, could you tell the court what your opinion is on that?
A. Well, I agree with some things, many things Prof. Richards said and one of them is that standing is often indeterminate and very fact based. He said things along those lines and talked about 'well that's standing' when he explains it to his students or something of that nature. And so what I have described just now is my fact based analysis of these three cases having looked at them carefully this week.

My own reading of spokeo is that it makes a lot of sense in terms of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, there's no reference to national security surveillance in it. Myself as a lawyer, I would find it not to be very helpful in understanding national security, I would look at the clapper cases. It does make sense as a sort of odd case under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
13 Q. In that context how important is the statutory or how important are the statutory provisions, the statutory context in considering the question of standing?
A. Well, my reading of spokeo is that it's about, it really involves reading the statute, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and whether this is an injury-in-fact under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. So that's a
statutory question. It's done within the general context of the constitutional authority of course to on7y do cases in controversy, so there is always a constitutional dimension. Courts can only do what courts can do. But my own reading is that it's about 11:21 the nature of statutory remedies in a statutory structure.

14 Q. And does the Spokeo case alter the views which you expressed in your report on standing?
A. Does the Spokeo case alter it?

15 Q. Yes.
A. No, it doesn't.

16 Q. I now want to move to a separate matter, Professor, and that is the Ombudsman or Ombudsperson, excuse me. And you might find it of assistance to have Book 1 of the agreed European materials, Judge, which contains the annex of the Adequacy Decision and which describes the Ombudsperson and if the witness could be given that it might just assist.
A. Thank you. And I also discuss this at page 7-5 in my 11:22 own report.

17 Q. Yes.
A. Thank you.

18 Q. We need that and we also need, I think, the agreed expert report.
A. I'm sorry, so within the Privacy Shield materials, can you point me to what page or section?
19 Q. Yes, I can. It is Annex A and it's at page 73, 72 it begins and 73.
A. A11 right, okay.

20 Q. So you will see 207 'slash' the number?
A. Yes, I see 207 slash. And then 73 ?

21 Q. 73, yes.
A. Okay, I'm working towards it.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Is this the one that has "submitting requests" about a third of the way down?
A. So I am seeing 72 and then 73.

MR. GALLAGHER: Yes, Judge, 73, "submitting requests", exactly.
A. Okay, I have it there.

22 Q. It just begins on the left-hand side. Really what I want to ask you is, perhaps not by reference to the detail, but so that you have it there if you require it?
A. Mm hmm .

23 Q. But what in your view is the significance of this Ombudsperson régime and in particular what benefit or improvement does it effectuate to the pre-existing position?
A. So the Ombudsperson structure is, let's see how to say it. There was a, in the discussions of the Privacy Shield and after Safe Harbour, there's a concern about how would an individual in the EU get some sort of answer about assurance whether their rights are being protected in the national security surveillance. The procedure that came up is essentially that somebody in the EU administration, sorry in the EU structure of it, will make a request to the person in the State
department. And the request is that we have a particular European individual who has expressed concern about their rights.

Then the person in the State department is tasked with 11:24 going to find out about it. And they have to go see, do the investigation to see whether there is any violation of protections. If there is, they have to fix it or wait until it is fixed; and if there's not a problem then they come to the determination there's not 11:25 a problem.

Then there's a response back and the answer back is 'I'm the Ombudsperson, I've done the investigation' and either there was no problem or it has been fixed. So at the end of that statement, and that's a standard statement, no matter who asks that's the standard statement back; so at the end of that the European person will get an answer that is either there was never a problem or, if there was, it's now been rectified. And that's an answer back to the idea that maybe a person isn't getting a remedy and isn't getting protected under the US system.

This fits with the hostile actors discussion, the neither confirm nor deny discussion that is in my report. You can imagine a different system where there is ten requests, the first nine come in and the next day they say 'we have no records, don't worry about
it'. The tenth one comes in and, oh, it's a big complicated problem, there's some big investigation. At the end of the investigation taking some period of time the answer is 'now we have fixed it'. We11, that would provide a lot of information about how the first 11:26 nine were different from the last one. The people querying the national security system would have discovered something interesting about that tenth person.

Rather than have that done there is a standard answer and when the answers are done they are put in the federal register publically for everyone in the world to see, but it's done in a way where we have protected the right is the idea but we haven't released the national security secret. So that's what I take to be the key point is that there is a mechanism for upholding the right and there is a mechanism for protecting the national security secret.
24 Q. MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Just taking a logical
possibility that --
A. Yes.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: -- there is an infringement and it's not corrected.
A. Well then the United States government would not be able to say that in the Federal Register and then in the annual Privacy Shield review the Commission or whoever would come and say 'we have noticed that for these three there's been no statement, we submitted it
ten months ago and we have heard no answer back'. And the US government would say 'that's correct' and then the commission would be on notice that there was problem in relation with those three requests?
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: And then we are left where?
A. well then you are left with, you know the Commission would go through its Privacy shield process of negotiating, of being concerned, of negotiating country to country or EU to the United States about it. There would be then at that chance, and I don't know what the 11:27 procedures would be under EU law, perhaps some story to be told under EU law about a problem, it might be done through the Commissioner or through some other mechanism, I don't really know the answer.

But the point there is that the US government is officially certifying in public that such and such is the case. If it can't certify to that, a signal flag goes up that there is something there for the Commission and for the EU to worry about and that's what you get out of it. It's not a judge.

But one thing about it not being a judge is that, and this is something, reading Prof. Richards, he said 'well it's not a judicial proceeding'. We have talked about all this standing stuff. If it were a judicial proceeding we would have to go through all this elaborate discussion of who has standing or who doesn't and there might be standing problems if you insisted on
judicial procedure in the United States. But this way you don't even have a standing issue. The State department is not an Article III court, the State department is part of the US government and so they can go ahead and do things even if there is no standing and 11:28 so there's an answer to the lack of standing, it's what it is. You are trying to create various ways to accommodate two legal systems and people can come to the view they come to about it.

But it's a way for there, even in the absence of showing an injury of fact, it's a way to be able to get an answer from the system that a person's right is being protected.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Thank you.
26 Q. MR. GALLAGHER: Can I ask you then, with specific reference to that, to just look at the submitting request procedure on page 73 ?
A. Yes.

27 Q. The request is initially submitted to: "The supervisory authorities in the Member States competent for the oversight of national security and/or the processing of public data by public authorities."

And then the request is submitted by them to the Ombudsperson; isn't that correct?
A. Yes, it goes from the national supervisory authority to the EU centralised body. This EU centralised body or individual complaint handling body notifies the

Ombudsperson.
28 Q. Yes. And therefore the interaction in relation to the complaint is done through an official supervisory body that obviously has a status that an individual data subject wouldn't have; isn't that correct?
A. Well they have expertise in data protection, they are a supervisory authority. And they would, if there is some problem, the participation of the data protection supervisor would mean the Article 29 committee and the commission would learn about it very quickly.
29 Q. And if you would be kind enough to go to page 74 and item C?
A. Yes.

30 Q. You wil1 see that once a request has been completed sorry, (e), excuse my eyesight: "Once a request has been completed as described in section 3 of the memorandum the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson will provide, in a timely manner, an appropriate response."

And I think you, in reply to the judge, said 'well if they're not able to say that there's been no violation or that there's been a violation and remedied, then they are not in a position to give a response' and is that something that would be taken up then in the annual review of the operation of the Privacy Shield by 11:30 the Commission who could assess the significance of that or the extent to which that undermines the protections?
A. We11, I can't say what the Commission would do, but the

Commission would have notice of that.
31 Q. Yes.
A. And the Commission has its obligation to review regularly under the Schrems 1 decision so, yes.
32 Q. Now I want to move from that, if I may, to just some, 11:31 I have identified some materials, we needn't spend time on them, that are to be found in the books on US materials, Judge. And the first document that I want to refer to or the first documents are in book, my Book 3 but it's divide 50 and on.
A. So 50, you said?
A. Yes. Yes, I see that.

34 Q. In 50 you see "CIA intelligence activities procedures approved by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive 11:32 order 12333'?
A. Yes.

35 Q. And to identify 51: "Procedures. The Department of Defence manual procedures governing the conduct of DOD intelligence activities'?
A. Yes.

36 Q. Then in the next divide: "Procedures for the availability or dissemination of raw signals intelligence information by the National Security Agency", that's to other agencies, I think; isn't that 11:32 correct?
A. Yes.

37 Q. All of those were matters that you referred to in evidence yesterday but that's to where they are to be
found?
A. Yes, these appear to be the correct public versions of these documents.
38 Q. Then the report that you yourself was involved in is to be found in divide 55, the report and recommendations 11:32 of the President's review; isn't that correct?
A. Yes, this is a very wonderful document.

39 Q. And can I take you to Book 4 then and divide 57 first.
A. Yes.

40 Q. And you referred yesterday to recommendations being made by the PCLOB, that there were assessment reports in that. In fact there's a later assessment report than the one here, but this is an example of the assessment of the recommendations on whether or not they are being implemented, that was of January 29, 2015?
A. Correct.

41 Q. And can you recollect what the latest one is or do you remember?
A. I know there were two of them.

42 Q. Yes.
A. My guess is this is the 2015 and there later was a 2016.

43 Q. Yes, okay. And you referred yesterday, if you go to divide 59, to the rules of procedure of the FISC which you said were available and I think they are to be found in divide 59?
A. Yes.

44 Q. And then in divide 61 a report of the Director of the

Administrative Office of the US courts on activities of the FISC court for 2015?
A. Yes.

45 Q. Would you explain to the court what that is?
A. That's one of the newly required statistical reports. 11:34 So, for instance, on the third page of this document which is Tab 61, there's discussions about applications under different statutory authorities and how many orders were granted and how many orders were modified.
46 Q. Yes.
A. And also on the next page there's discussion on how often the amici have been named and who they are, how often they have been used in cases and who they are.
47 Q. Sorry, could I ask you to go back to Book 2 then of that, and I'11 do it by divide because I think they slightly differ, and if you go to divide 48.
A. 48 is in Book 2?

48 Q. In mine it's in Book 2 but it just might not be in yours, it's safer to go by divide I think.
A. I'm looking.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: In mine it's Book 3.
A. So I have Exhibit B "Minimisation Procedures".

49 Q. MR. GALLAGHER: Exactly.
A. okay.

50 Q. And you might just explain to the court what that is?
A. Yes. So the title says what it is. These are the minimisation procedures used by the NSA when they acquire information under Section 702. It talks about how they take the information and minimise it which is
significantly to reduce the amount of US persons' identified data in the file.
51 Q. And those were procedures that were once classified but are now made available; is that correct?
A. Correct.

52 Q. And then if you go to the next divide, 49?
A. Yes.

53 Q. You have "United States Signals Intelligence Directive, USSID SPOO18"?
A. Yes.

54 Q. And "Legal Compliance and us Persons Minimisation Procedures"?
A. Yes.

55 Q. And that's an example of NSA and Central Security Services, Signals Intelligence Directive, office of the 11:36 General Council and it says:
"It prescribes policies and procedures and it assigns responsibilities to ensure the missions and functions of the US are conducted in a manner that safeguards the 11:36 constitutional rights of US persons."

And those are the procedures that you also refer to, I think; is that correct?
A. Right, observed because I didn't say this in the report. USSID 18 is the way it is pronounced and referred to as a very, very famous document within the National Security Agency and related. It's the subject of annual training and a great deal of focus to make
sure that this particular document is followed and has been for a long time.
56 Q. Yesterday there was a reference you couldn't find and I was unable to assist you and it was in relation to the procedure for amicus curiae in the FISC court and 11:37 the basis on which they are appointed, and if you would be kind enough to get out your report at chapter 5 page 33, I think that may have been the reference that you were looking for, paragraph 155?
A. I'm looking. You are saying chapter 5-33 talks about 11:37 amicus?
57 Q. 53, excuse me. 5-53, I do apologise, 155.
A. Yes, okay.

58 Q. Is that of assistance to you?
A. I'm looking at it.

59 Q. Yes.
A. So paragraph 155 on page 553, it talks about how the statute, the USA FREEDOM ACt in 2015, created this panel of independent experts:
"Going forward the FISC must appoint an amicus in any matter in the court's judgment - spelled wrong, sorry presents a novel or significant interpretation of the 7aw."

I said 'significant' yesterday and the statutory term is 'novel' or 'significant interpretation of the law': "The duty to appoint an amicus applies in any FISC proceedings, including NSA applications for
surveillance authorisations."
60 Q. And 156 I think sets out the expertise for the amici; is that correct?
A. So this statute sets out criteria for selecting amici and the first criterion on the list is that there be expertise in privacy and civil liberties.

61 Q. Yes. And then in 157 the duty of the amici when appointed?
A. When the amici are appointed to a case, an amicus for a case, the job of that person is to: "Present legal arguments that advance the protection of individual privacy and civil 7iberties and they are security cleared to get access to classified information and they must also have access to the materials they need to litigate such as legal precedent, application, certification and the rest."

62 Q. Yes. And I think your report makes clear that those are all changes that were brought about by the USA FREEDOM Act; is that correct?
A. That's correct. There was inherent authority of the 11:39 FISC to appoint amici prior, but this regularised it and said that the court shall do that in specified circumstances.

63 Q. Two other matters. One, I think you are aware that the Venice Commission has commented on this hostile actor phenomenon that you spoke about, I'm sure the court know what the Venice Commission is, but maybe just for the record that you would explain what the Venice Commission does and then mention what they say about
the hostile actor phenomenon?
A. Yes. So the venice Commission is a creation of the Council of Europe. My understanding is that it's an organisation designed how to foster democracy and rule of law in our changing world. I reviewed the 2007 and 2015 versions of the venice Commission report. I sent to counsel a quote from the 2007 that I don't have in front of me, I don't know how best, I can try to do it from memory or?
64 Q. You can try and do it from memory, if you don't mind. 11:40
A. From memory, and I am sure that everyone will get copies of this eventually, but I was very struck, basically exactly the hostile actor point I make. I think they even used the words like 'of course there should not be anything done when you are providing these individual remedies that reveal the national security secrets or who is under surveillance'. There's a quote very close to the exact point that I have made in chapter 8 and I saw that after I wrote chapter 8 so $I$ drew it to counsel's attention when I saw that.
65 Q. I am afraid your errant counsel can't -- I've been assisted, thank you. The quote I think that you refer to is: "Plainly though legitimate targets of a security or intelligence agency should not be able to use a complaint system to find out the agency's work."

And it's the 2007, I think, version of the report; isn't that correct?
A. Right. When they say 'plainly though' I was struck by the sort of 'of course' nature, that you don't want to have a mechanism that's going to reveal to the actual targets of surveillance whether they are under surveillance.
66 Q. And the final matter, Professor, is the issue that arose yesterday. You gave evidence that you didn't think that any of your opinions had been changed following the interaction with the US government, did you have an opportunity overnight to get that investigated on your behalf and to see the results of that investigation?
A. So since we -- like this matter was drawn to me in court at the end of the proceedings yesterday. After court, with the people who staffed me on it, we have gone back and looked at every single one of the comments. My recollection was correct. None of my opinions, no 'my opinion is' or 'my view is', none of those were changed in any way. The first one on the list was what I described which is I had left out a particular exception to one surveillance authority and we put it in.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: This is the one about the embassies?
A. This is the one about the embassies. There were a number of others, all of them were in the level of technical and correction, to try to get the words precisely correct. None of them changed the import except to be more precise.

67 Q. MR. GALLAGHER: Professor, can you tell the court whether anybody has interfered in any way with your report or altered in any way any of the contents of your report.
A. If it's reference to the US government's role, I submitted it for declassification review, as I said yesterday. Nothing was changed for that reason. And then the lawyers who did the declassification review, who have to be knowledgeable in order to do it, offered comments to the law firm Gibson Dunn. Gibson Dunn then, without me being in contact with the government, relayed those comments which I have now, which I looked at. And then I made my independent judgment whether to take the comments once I looked at them and did the research on them. So there was no interference. There 11:43 was what I thought of as assistance by knowledgeable people to try to get it even more correct.
MR. GALLAGHER: Thank you very much, Professor. You might answer Mr. Murray.

PROF. PETER SWIRE, WAS CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR. MURRAY AS FOLLOWS:

MR. MURRAY: Good morning, Professor. THE WITNESS: Good morning.
Professor, your report discloses a large number of occasions on which you have testified before Congressional committees, the Belgian parliament?
A. The Belgian Privacy Authority which was asked by the

Article 29 working party to have a hearing after the Safe Harbour case.
69 Q. Yes. And what we would describe as regulatory authorities, I think you have testified before the FCC?
A. Federal Communications Commission, Federal Trade Commission, yes.
70 Q. I think you in fact testified before at least one of those in the course of the summer, in June?
A. So in June last year I testified in front of the us Senate Commerce Committee about the Federal Communications Commission. Previously in the year earlier, in April, I was at, what they called a workshop and I was under oath there, I believe, yes, for the FCC.
71 Q. Have you testified as an expert witness in a court of law before?
A. First time.

72 Q. This is your first time?
A. Yes.

73 Q. I see.
A. Well the first time I have testified orally. I twice before prepared expert reports.
74 Q. of course. where did you prepare those expert reports, what was the litigation in which you did that?
A. So the litigation -- I don't have the documents in hand.
75 Q. I understand.
A. One of them was a fair credit reporting case. This was done, I know it's before 2008, somewhere in the

2006/2007 range and I was asked to testify about procedures, about the details of how credit reports get fixed or don't get fixed.
76 Q. Mm hmm.
A. I gave my testimony and the plaintiff dropped the case. 11:45 And then, so we are 2017, so in 2015 there was a case brought about the privacy of bankruptcy records in the United States.

77 Q. Mm hmm.
A. And that was an issue I had worked on when I was in government to try to make sure that personal information wasn't released in the course of these bankruptcy case, records. Again I issued an expert report explaining how protections were in place for privacy and security, and subsequent to that the plaintiff dropped the case.
78 Q. I see. So you have a $100 \%$ record on plaintiffs dropping their cases when they see your reports?
A. Those are the two instances of experience $I$ have.

79 Q. I see. Were they in federal court?
A. Hmm, the more recent one was in federal court. The one in 2006 or 2007 I believe was in federal court, I think that's where the Fair Credit Reporting Act happens.

80 Q. All right. So just help us, I presume that the federal rules of civil procedures have a provision for expert testimony and how it is to be presented?
A. I try to follow all the rules. I'm not a litigator so I don't...

81 Q. I see.
A. But I follow whatever rules I am supposed to follow.

82 Q. Okay. But you don't recal1, when you prepared your earlier reports, whether you were guided by particular rules as to what you were supposed to do or say?
A. My hesitancy was the following: when I was in law school I studied the federal rules of procedure and there's things in that book called the federal rules of civil procedure.
83 Q. Mm hmm.
A. I don't remember for testifying whether the specific 11:47 rules were in that book called the federal rules of civil procedure or that there were other rules I was subject to.
84 Q. Fair enough. But there is rules?
A. There is rules, yes.

85 Q. Okay. And just to correct me if I'm wrong, let me outline the position here to see if it's the same here: As an expert you're allowed give opinion evidence?
A. That's my understanding.

86 Q. Exceptionally because nobody else is allowed to give opinion evidence, generally?
A. Correct.

87 Q. Okay. You are allowed give opinion evidence because you are an expert in a particular area or field?
A. Okay.

88 Q. And the court is entitled to hear and receive and act upon your expert evidence?
A. That's my understanding.

89 Q. okay. And I think you are also conscious of the fact
that it's very important in that connection that you are independent?
A. Correct.

90 Q. Because the court needs to know that you are independent before it can act on your opinion evidence, 11:48 you know all of that?
A. (Indicating)

91 Q. Okay. I think you will be not be surprised to hear that it's also important that the court knows and that it has disclosed to it anything that might reasonably be seen to affect your independence?
A. Yes.

92 Q. You know that?
A. Yes, go ahead.

93 Q. We11...
A. No -- so the rules on independence.

94 Q. Yes.
A. I have been taught are different in Ireland than they are in the United States.
95 Q. okay.
A. And so when I was reached out to about being engaged as an expert here, I was told that there are different rules on independence and I have sought the guidance of counsel about what I should do to do that.
of course, okay. Well, we're not concerned about the difference of the rules on independence save that you have to be independent and you obviously understand that and, second7y, you have to disclose anything that might leave open to reasonable doubt your independence
so that it's known?
A. As I said in this case I sought counsel for guidance about what I should disclose and how I should proceed.
97 Q. We11, you sought guidance from counse1. But, just to be clear, you know that, that you have to disclose anything that might reasonably affect your independence?
A. Hmm, I don't know whether those are the exact words in the standard in Ireland or in the United States, but I am trying to follow the rules and do what I am supposed to do.

98 Q. Al1 right. Well let's look at them another way, Professor. Do you think the judge, do you think the judge is entitled to know when the court receives your report whether there is anything about you or your professional experience or the report that might affect your independence?
A. I think I should give the judge the information she would need in order to determine my independence.
99 Q. okay. Now just so we understand what happened in relation to the disclosure that you made in the witness box yesterday. Approximately three, maybe four weeks before you submitted your report to the court, which was on 2nd November, you submitted a draft of part of what ultimately became the report to the Office of the 11:50 Director of National Intelligence?
A. Correct.

100 Q. Okay. And that's an agency of the United States government?
A. Correct.
Q. Is that part of the Department of Justice or the NSA?
A. No, it's neither of those.

102 Q. It's an independent entity?
A. It's an office that reports directly to the President. 11:50

103 Q. A11 right. And it was sitting on somebody's desk for three or four weeks because they didn't come back to you until 48 hours before your deadline; is that right?
A. Hmm, so pre-publication review we're asked to give enough time to the government so that they do all the other things they have to do in life, they have time to review it and come to a professional view and then give answers back if there is something that needs to be changed.

104 Q. Anyway they got back to you 48 hours or so before your deadline?
A. Correct. I first learned anything about the comments on November 3rd. I filed it on November 3rd.

105 Q. I see.
A. November 1st and November 3rd.

106 Q. Okay, fair enough. And this was mediated through Gibson Dunn?
A. Yes. So what we did was, to try to come up with something that would be as clearly independent and documented as we could.

107 Q. Okay.
A. So I didn't ever talk to the government, didn't know the lawyers who did the review. They gave it to counse1. Rather than having any direct contacts,
counse1 them read them to me.
108 Q. Okay. Gibson Dunn are Facebook's attorneys?
A. They are Facebook's attorneys.

109 Q. But the reason that the draft went to the Director of National Intelligence was nothing to do with Facebook, 11:52 it was due to your clearance and prior experience in having access to?
A. That's right.

110 Q. Okay. And the reason the Director of National Intelligence got back to you or back to Gibson Dunn with comments was similarly nothing to do with Facebook, it was to do with you because it was to you that they wished to pass on these comments, is that fair?
A. well, there is two things here. One is that there has 11:52 to be a declassification review, I am required by law to do that. The second is, when the lawyers did the declassification review, as expert lawyers they saw different imperfections in the report.
111 Q. Mm hmm.
A. A citation mistake or something small and then they passed those along as well as the message that there was nothing that violated declassification.
112 Q. I see. I understand, and that indeed was very helpful of them to spend their time correcting your errors. Is 11:53 that a service made generally available by the lawyers in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence?
A. My understanding is that it's common practice in declassification review, not only to make sure there is

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        no secrets being disclosed, but, if there is any
        errors, to point that out to the person writing --
    113 Q. I see.
    A. -- in the hopes that we don't have those errors
        propagated.
A. And one reason for that is that if somebody has been given access to classified information there can be a belief that there is authority associated with that, right because I learned all these things in a classified setting, and so there could be an inference, 1et's say there is some misstatement, that that's a sort of authorised misstatement or incorrect statement of the law.
115 Q. Yes. And that might in some way be pinned back to the 11:53 government because it might be thought by some misconceived listener that you, as someone who had had this who clearance or experience spoke for them?
A. I think that would be one concern.
116 Q. I see.
A. Also for the usefulness of the individual not making a mistake.
117 Q. Okay. So anyway they got back to Gibson Dunn, they got back in writing?
A. They sent written comments to Gibson Dunn.
118 Q. Did they track them on your draft or did they send a separate note or memorandum?
A. My recollection is they did a track changes in word -119 Q. Ah.
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A. -- to the document that we had sent them in October. Between October and November we had continued working on it, so the draft had evolved, but on the parts that they saw, the substance was very similar.
120 Q. Hmm, all right. They tracked the changes on the 11:54 version you had sent them. The version of the report had moved on because you were continuing to do your work obviously as your deadline arrived and these changes, what do you say, there were three, four changes tracked on the document?
A. No, there was a larger number.

121 Q. Oh, I am sorry, I misunderstood you. I thought there was a thing about an embassy and one or two other. How many changes?
A. So overnight we, with the people that have staffed me 11:55 on it went through the list.

122 Q. Yes.
A. I have seen the list, it wasn't numbered. The number was, I don't know how best, I don't know whether to go back and try to find the document or whatever, but the 11:55 number was more than 20 and less than 40.
123 Q. I see, between 20 and 40 changes suggested. But they were changes from the government to you mediated through Gibson Dunn, nothing to do with Facebook?
A. Nobody from Facebook to my knowledge ever saw the changes.
124 Q. Okay, fair enough. And did you adopt all of the suggested changes?
A. No.

125 Q. Okay. Can you remember which changes you did not adopt?
A. Hmm so -- I don't, I have my notes from the changes and I don't have them in front of me.
126 Q. okay.
A. I don't know how best to proceed because I don't... 127 Q. A11 right. We11, I can help you with that.
A. Because $I$ run the risk of saying something incorrect.

128 Q. Of course, and I don't want to put you in that position. One way to proceed is to give them to us so 11:56 that we can see them. Do you have a difficulty with that as the person who has a sole interest in this?
MR. GALLAGHER: I don't think that's a question for the witness. There is issues of privilege that arise in relation to that, Judge.
MR. MURRAY: Well very interesting ones indeed for a communication if a third party, the US government. If Mr . Gallagher is going to say there is a common interest between his client and the United States government, that's something that we can certainly consider.

But my understanding from what the witness has just said is that the reason he sent the report to the government was because of his relationship with it, his 11:57 prior relationship, I should say, in fairness and the reason the government sent it back was for the same reason. It was simply mediated through Gibson Dunn, nothing to do with Facebook.

Now, if Mr. Gallagher says, and I don't want to be unfair to Mr. Gallagher, it's not a straightforward question. If Mr. Gallagher says that there may be issues of privilege well so be it, but one just wonders how they could arise in communications to a third party 11:57 absent a common interest. But maybe, I don't want to be unfair to Prof. Swire, nor do I want to detain him. But certainly let's forget about, forget about Facebook for a moment, and Mr. Gallagher may have an issue around that; you personally, Prof. Swire, forgetting about Facebook, if Facebook said 'this is fine' would you personally have any difficulty with sharing those with us?
A. I would not personally have any difficulty.

129 Q. Okay, thank you. Now Mr. Gallagher did say yesterday 11:57 that the fact that the report had been submitted for vetting to the United States had been disclosed in the report, in your report?
A. He said that, yes.

130 Q. And is that true?
A. Yes, in the biographical chapter, Chapter 2 , it said that as with the review group, which was subject to declassification review, my statement in this proceeding is subject to declassification review.
131 Q. Okay. We11, I mean the biographical review, in fairness to you, is where you would expect to find a disclosure of this significance, so perhaps you can just point us to where we find it?
A. It's page 2-7 of my report, it's footnote 19.

132 Q. Oh, sorry, it's a footnote. Sorry, Mr. Gallagher did say that. So can we look at, that's 1 slash 27 in the first chapter, yes?
A. No, it's the second chapter, the biography chapter is chapter 2. It's paragraph 34.
133 Q. So it's chapter 2, it's 2/27; is that right?
A. It's page 2-7, it's paragraph 34.

134 Q. I don't appear to have a page 2-- 2-7. So paragraph 34 is where it is:
"When we completed our report of over 300 pages in late 2013 we met with President Obama to discuss the 46 recommendations. The five members were unanimous in the report and recommendations. To build trust we decided the whole report would be made public. The 11:59 government reviewed our report on7y to ensure there was no leak of classified information. We had complete editorial contro7."
where is the disclosure about this report, this report? 11:59
A. The footnote to that.

135 Q. Sorry, the footnote.
A. It says: "As with the review group report my submission to the court is reviewed by the US government to ensure that no classified information is 11:59 7eaked, but I retain complete editorial contro7."
136 Q. I'11 just let the stenographer change. We can talk about the location of your disclosure at a later point, Prof. Swire. But I don't see any reference there to
the fact that the uS Government got back to you with 20 to 40 comments, some of which you accepted in your report. Is that elsewhere?
A. That's not stated in the report.

137 Q. Why is that not disclosed to the court?
A. I tried to say what had happened and it didn't occur to me to list that. But I'm glad to say it. You know, I was trying to get accurate. We had somebody with knowledge providing -- for instance, one of the mistakes that I saw overnight when I reviewed it is
that I talked about the Confidential Information Procedures Act and the correct term is classified Information Procedure Act. And so we made that change in the report.
138 Q. Well now, Prof. Swire, you were glad to say it in the 12:01 witness box yesterday. Do you know that if we had not served a notice to cross-examine you, you would not be in the witness box and the court would not know that the US Government, which is a party with an obvious interest in these proceedings, had suggested changes to 12:01 your report which you had accepted? Did you know that, Prof. Swire?
A. Did I know that I would only be cross-examined if you served notice? Yes, I knew that.
139 Q. Yes. And it is only because you were in the witness box yesterday, which happened because we served a notice to cross-examine, that the disclosure was made that the United States Government had an input into your report.
A. That's correct.

140 Q. Yes. Well, can you please help us, Prof. Swire, as to how this state of affairs came about?
A. Well, I disclosed in the report that it was submitted to the government. I'm required to submit it to the 12:02 government. I understand my main task as being to assist the court in an accurate description of us law. As people who are researching on my team found things as we went along, I made corrections. In this case, there were corrections, such as the classified versus Confidential Information Procedure Act, that came as a result of the lawyers doing the declassification review saying 'Here's a mistake of this sort'.

As I said yesterday in my statement I confirmed overnight, no opinion of any sort in my report was changed based on the government submission, all of the sentences were the same. They were highly detailed clarifications, such as the terms about Section 702, certifications, directives, court orders, applications; those are technical terms where, in good faith, I'd try to write it as well as I can and sometimes when an expert sees it, they say 'Well, that's not quite right'.

Another example of a change was in describing the Judicial Redress Act. I said EU persons would have access to their data. And that's similar to the European term "personal data". The suggested edit from
the government was it should say "to their covered records", that's a more precise statutory term. So I struck the word "data" and put in the word "covered records".

Those are the sorts of changes that were made. In each case I received the comments and my team and I went back and looked at the specific words in the statute or wherever it was and made an independent decision, I made an independent decision 'Yes, we should call it 12:03 the correct term in the statute', 'Yes we should put in "covered records" instead of the vaguer word "data".'

One reason I remember that third authority in addition to law enforcement and national security about embassies is that that was, in my view, the most significant change. There was a sort of actual legal provision I hadn't been aware of. That was the big change in the report. And the number of changes, in my view, had to do with quite a detailed and lengthy report, as others have observed, and in the course of that, trying to get it right. And when I have information about how to make it more accurate, I considered my duty to the court was to make it more accurate.
Prof. Swire, you are a practicing attorney. You are in court giving evidence about the 7aw. Do you think that the court had a right to be told that your report had been changed following suggestions made by the United

States Government, a party with an acute interest in the outcome of this case?
A. When I wrote this, I thought I was giving a disclosure that indicated what had happened. I'm delighted to go into more detail about it. I was trying to get the stuff -- I was trying to get the report accurate. I didn't -- when I wrote the report - and this is a sign of me writing it on myself - I, for instance, had not at that point gone back to every contact with Facebook in other settings where there was any financial matter. 12:05 I'm glad to have done that. I would've done it earlier if I had known to do it.

And this was, in my case, not trying to hide from the court, this is I'm writing a story about us -- not a story, I'm writing a report about US law and here's my background and here's what we did. And so I provided more information. Once I saw the other witnesses' report, such as Prof. Richards mentioned the Future Privacy Forum, until he saw that, it hadn't occurred to 12:05 me to mention that I was active in the Future Privacy Forum - it was on my CV, but I hadn't thought to say that Facebook is one of the over 100 companies that supports the Future Privacy Forum. Once I saw it, I was glad to supplement the disclosure.
142 Q. Prof. Swire, I don't propose to interrupt you when you're answering any of my questions, I will let you answer them as you think fit, but I don't believe you had answered the question I asked you, which was: Do
you think the court had the right to be told by you that your report to the court contained changes that had been suggested by the United States Government, a party having an acute interest in these proceedings?
A. I don't have a view of what I should've known then. I 12:06 tried to give you an accurate report. And so I don't -- I'm not sure what to say beyond that. I've been trying to act in good faith and make the disclosures I ought to make.
143 Q. We11, let me help you with what to say beyond that; 'Yes, I do think I should've disclosed it'/'No, I don't think I should've disclosed it'. Try that for a suggestion.
A. I was not -- it had not occurred to me at the time I was writing. I was trying to make good disclosures. I 12:07 don't know the rules of Irish procedure, I was acting pursuant to whatever instructions I got from counsel to try -- not that they instructed me on this particular thing, but I was trying to understand what is one supposed to do for this thing I've never done before, which is an expert report for Ireland.

144 Q. We11, would you answer my question yes, you do or no, you don't?
A. I don't actually have a view. I don't know what's expected.

145 Q. You don't have a view? I see, okay. We11, one thing you might've done, given that you asked me the question, was you might've gone to Facebook's American or Irish lawyers and said 'The US Government, I
believe, are involved in this case in some way or other, they helped me rewrite my report. Should I disclose that to the court?' That would've been one thing. Did you ask that question of anyone?
A. I asked, I asked Gibson Dunn 'How should we proceed here? I want to make sure we're doing it in ways that will be considered acceptable.' And on the basis of that, they said 'You should have no contact with the us government, not receive the document from the us Government. We're going to have this procedure where 12:08 Gibson Dunn mediates it so that we can document that there was no improper contact with the US Government'. And subject to all that, we went through that procedure and I wrote my report.
146 Q. And Gibson Dunn didn't tell you you should disclose fact that the government have suggested changes?
A. No, they did not. If they had suggested it, I would've followed their suggestions as to procedure.
147 Q. I see. And Gibson Dunn, of course, are Facebook's us attorneys, is that right?
A. That's correct.

148 Q. But they do have an involvement in this case; they appear to have been the point of contact for the instruction of other witnesses as well.
A. As far as I know.

149 Q. Including witnesses in the UK.
A. I don't know that directly, but okay.

150 Q. Gibson Dunn, of course, themselves had obviously the draft of your report some three to four weeks before
you signed off on it; were the helpful lawyers there giving you any tips in terms of correcting errors, or was that level of assistance just furnished as a service by the US Government?
A. I'm trying to think about whether there was any corrections that they saw that they passed on to me. I'm not remembering any. I'm not remembering any.
151 Q. You don't remember any?
A. I'm not remembering any corrections that they passed on to me.

152 Q. You're not remembering any. I see. You told us that you were pleased, or glad - I can't remember the exact word, I'm sure we'11 find it on the transcript - to share with us the various situations in which Facebook had provided financial assistance to entities that you're connected with?
A. To projects I was associated with, yes.

153 Q. And you would've told us about that as well had you known, you said.
A. Yes.

154 Q. I see. I'm just going to hand up a document to you (Same Handed). These are the rules governing expert evidence in this court. No. 57, if you want to just take a look at it there:
"Every report of an expert delivered pursuant to these Rules or to any order or direction of the Court shall:
(a) contain a statement acknowledging the duty...
(b) disclose any financial or economic interest of the
expert, or of any person connected with the expert, in any business or economic activity of the party retaining that expert, including any sponsorship of or contribution to any research of the expert or of any University, institution or other body with which the expert was, is or will be connected."

Do you see that?
A. I see it.

155 Q. So you didn't comply with that, obviously?
A. I had not read the rule and I did not comply with it.

156 Q. Did it not occur to you as a practicing attorney in a jurisdiction where there are rules governing expert evidence that in this country there was a possibility we might have rules as well?
A. My practice was I knew that I didn't understand or have experience in the rules for Ireland for how such things proceed and I asked the people who had hired me 'what am I supposed to do here?' And I followed that.
157 Q. And who are the people who hired you?
A. Gibson Dunn.

158 Q. And how would they know what the Irish rules are?
A. Well, I was spending a lot of time doing research on the report and I was hoping that I would be properly instructed in the right format and in the right ways to 12:11 hand in everything for the report.
159 Q. Including, I see, research on Irish law.
A. We did research on Irish law as part of this.

160 Q. Now, "I" has moved to "we"?
A. Sorry. So within Alston \& Bird, I was in full control of the report.
161 Q. Mm hmm.
A. I had junior attorneys doing research on my behalf.

162 Q. Mm hmm.
A. The original reading on state secrets that refers to Irish law was done by one of those attorneys. I then asked for those to be provided to me and checked over the materials and checked over the initial draft of the readings and --

163 Q. I see.
A. -- did my edits.

164 Q. And is this attorney a qualified Irish lawyer?
A. The attorney is not an Irish lawyer.

165 Q. So let me just understand this - and I think it's in section eight of your report; you've a section in the report on Irish law, prepared by an unidentified attorney in your office, given to you and then reproduced in your report to this court. Have I missed any stage in the chain of production?
A. We11, given to me in draft. And then, as I do with my other research, $I$ look at it carefully, I read whatever I feel $I$ need to read in the footnotes or whatever to be sure that there's accurate statement there and then we get, I get a draft. And then there's a process afterwards we call site checking where a different attorney checks the footnotes to make sure that it accurately stands for --
166 Q. Okay, so 1987 Irish Reports, one, two, three, that sort
of check?
A. And for substance also.

167 Q. And --
A. So it's not on7y that the page number is correct, but that the document stands for the proposition in the text.

168 Q. okay, I understand. But you are the expert, you know your obligations. So you read the cases that are discussed in this?
A. I read some of the cases and not -- I didn't read all of every case. Because sometimes there's a particular section that's relevant. If you're reading a case on standing and then there's parts on the merits, you might read the part on standing -- I might read the part on standing and not read the part on merits that 12:13 are irrelevant to the standing issue.

169 Q. But you personally read Irish cases or parts of Irish cases, personal7y?
A. Yes.

170 Q. Did you? Name one.
A. So in the state secrets part there was, there's discussion of two different kinds of secrets. And my ability to -- this is material $I$ read months ago. But there were -- I could look at my report; is that...
171 Q. Well, I think as you will have gathered, I'm trying to 12:14 get you to tell me without looking at your report.
A. Right. I don't remember the names of cases from Ireland, as I don't from the other countries that I research.

doub7e-checked the materials to be able to make relatively summary statements about 'This doctrine exists under this country's law as well'.

I would not try to go into court and argue the cases of 12:16 whether this precedent or that precedent applies, but I believe within the realm of me being a professor who's written about many things that making constrained statements of 'Here are the general outlines under a different country's law' is something that I do and have done in many circumstances.
176 Q. And you were doing that as an expert in what?
A. In this case, I was talking about us law first; 'Here's how state secrets works in the United States'. And I was comparing it to European Union practice, which I've done in other settings, by giving pretty summary short statements of the clear existence of certain doctrines in different European countries.
177 Q. But the way this is done, Professor, is that the attorney in your office goes off and does the research, gives you a draft, perhaps copies of some of the cases or extracts from the cases?
A. Yes.

178 Q. And you put those into a report for the court. You have no notion of the legal context in which those decisions were made, no notion, let alone being an expert.
A. Well, I don't claim to be an expert in Irish law. What I do claim is a lot of experience in comparative law
and in EU law around these topics. And I thought it would be of service to the court when I make statements about how these concerns about state secrets and national security law in the United States exist that I put it in context for how, 'Here's the French law, here's the UK law' and I included Irish law.

179 Q. Because you did this for a number of jurisdictions, and presumably for all of them your report was prepared in the same way?
A. In essentially the same style.

180 Q. Yeah.
A. One lawyer would have the first responsibility to pull materials. I'd review the materials.
181 Q. Yeah. How many assistants did you have working on this case -- sorry, on your report?
A. So for this case there were - I'm just listing the names in my head at this stage. There were four attorneys doing primary research, there was one senior lawyer who was double-checking to make sure the process was going well and that everything was running smoothly, there were three attorneys who came in late in the process to check all the flip notes and make sure citations were correct.
182 Q. So how many is that altogether?
A. I think I said four plus three plus one, so that's eight.
Q. Did you have any other assistants?
A. There was secretarial support.

184 Q. And were all of these attorneys in your firm?
A. A11 of these attorneys are in my firm, yes. They were hired by my firm.
Q. Did you pay them or was their time billed to Facebook?
A. The billing was done as one bill from the law firm of Alston \& Bird. And all of the activities in Alston \& Bird were under my direction and I confirmed all the materials before they went into the report.
186 Q. All right. When were you instructed to write this report?
A. I believe it was in June. June 2016.

187 Q. Early June? Late June?
A. I don't have a recollection of the date.

188 Q. And it was, at least a substantial part of it was in near final form by early October?
A. Yes, so by early October, because of the declassification review, I prioritised getting any sections of the report that involved possibly classified materials done to give the US government time to have the time to do its review.
189 Q. Yeah. And in that time, or at least between your instruction - it might've been early June or it might've been 1ate June - we have a report of 146,750 words, yeah?
A. I haven't counted them, but thank you for doing it.

190 Q. Yeah. 351 pages?
A. Yes.

191 Q. 201 cases cited?
A. Yes.

192 Q. And 48 law review articles cited?
A. I'11 take your word for the numbers.

193 Q. Nine textbooks?
A. Yeah.

194 Q. 42 government reports and 114 newspaper articles?
A. okay.

195 Q. Were you doing anything else, Professor, between your instruction and the delivery of this magnum opus?
A. So I have two observations. One is that many parts of this report are either things or based on things I've written previously. So the Review Group report, the 2004 FISA article, the testimony of more than 40 pages from 2015 cover a very large fraction of the substantive points that are in this report. Those were also extensively footnoted. And that provided a large framework for the points that $I$ filled in after that.

196 Q. Were you doing anything else?
A. Yes, I was doing other things.

197 Q. Yeah. You were attending your Congressional or Regulatory Committees, you were doing your day job as a professor, your night job as an attorney - or is it the 12:21 other way around?
A. I consider this to be research that overlaps with my professor and law firm activities.
198 Q. Took some time off in August?
A. Yes, I did.

199 Q. Yeah. And did you read all of the cases that are referred to in the report?
A. I did not read all the cases in full that are referred to in the report.

200 Q. Did you read all of the cases in the report in part?
A. I... so there -- I think what would happen, so the process that $I$ would go through is did -- here's an example; there's a footnote for the fact that under ECPA there is a cause called Suzion - S-U-Z-L-O-N - I just remembered that $I$ hadn't been aware of. And so what we had was a statutory cite that said under the plain language, a non-US person can sue under ECPA. I didn't have a case support for that. So I said 'Go see if there's any case support for that'. And one of the 12:22 attorneys went and found the case. I looked at it, I looked at the syllabus of the case, which is the summary, and it clearly says this is it. And then I said 'okay, we have a cite for Suzlon for the fact that non-US persons can do this.

The belief that this would be correct was in part based on my direct checking of that sort, in part because we had expert attorneys working on the different initial research, in part because we had a partner named jim Harvey who was working with the associates to make sure the process was good and complete at every step and in part because we had citation checking by different lawyers after the fact to make sure that the citation was correct and that it supported the proposition in the case.

201 Q. Were you preparing an expert report, Professor or editing an anthology?
A. I believed I was providing an expert report on US law
relevant to the charge letter I was given to assist the court to understand us law.
202 Q. Large parts of it being written in first draft by all of these various assistants in your firm?
A. So my experience here in many other reports that I've written informed this. The process -- I have a full time legal researcher at Georgia Tech that's a lawyer. And with them, for instance, for them, for when I do law review articles now, having worked in the field for many years, the typical thing would be if you were the person, I would meet with you, we'd say we're going to write about this particular topic, non-US person rules for remedies, 'Here's some things I know, here's my outline, here's the three parts we have to do etc.' like that. 'On part two, I don't know as much about the background. Could you go deeper into part two and try to find research about that' and all that. And then 'Based on the outline we just did, can you come back to me with a draft?' They come back to me with a draft. I look at it and say 'okay, I get this and this, but I don't get this other part, so let's go deeper into that'. And then when $I$ had a decent draft, I would rewrite the whole thing in my words so that it became my tone, my consistent view of things, saying things that I was comfortable saying.

One of the reasons, in my experience, that this has worked as well is that I have a rule with my assistants of no adjectives. So for instance, in a lot of
writing, if it says 'It's a broad loophole'/'It's a narrow loophole', what I say is 'I want to have objective footnoteable things for each statement. So say for this law there are three exceptions, don't characterise them. Have the three exceptions, have the 12:24 footnote, have the footnote available on the web so anybody can check it'. So I didn't like footnotes unless it was available on the worldwide web. And then we can check and have confidence that there are three exceptions and that the sentence as stated is correct.

Now, I'11 just go for a minute more on why, I believe, in my experience, this has been accurate. Last year in January I published a report on a different topic about broadband internet privacy. And this was a report of 12:25 120 pages, another big document, it was on detailed materials. I submitted this eventually to the FCC in connection with the Rule 90 (Inaudible), but what I did at the time when we had a draft was I said 'This is tricky material. I'm going to put it up publicly on the internet and solicit public comments' and say 'I know that there's controversy about the issues here, I'm just trying to get the facts straight. If anybody has any comments, could you please send them in?' we posted that. Two groups did independent studies on the 12:25 same report. At the end of that, we changed -- I changed, but from my report where I was lead author, one sentence in the 120 page document; there was one sentence where I'd made it broader than I thought was
accurate based on the comments we'd received.

And that's similar, in my experience, to what happened in this case. So we have this long document, we had the experts' report. And yesterday when I began my commentary - my commentary, my testimony, whatever - we had two items where I felt that the original statement wasn't correct - this is after the experts with very different perspectives had worked over this stuff; one of them was about the transit authority under 12333 and 12:26 one of them was a sentence about the Fourth Amendment that I thought was too broad. And then when I found that out, I brought that to your attention. And those are, maybe we'11 find out more in cross-examination whether there are sentences I should amend, but after a 12:26 lot of experts spent a lot of time look at it, those were the two sentences they found that had inaccuracies.
203 Q. Well, thank you, Prof. Swire, that's a very helpful explanation of how you went about this. And you adopted the same methodology for this report, as you said, as you did in your experience in writing other reports, with your assistants?
A. So I did the same methodology and I asked the lawyers could we post this publicly to get the same kind of early scrutiny and make sure it's all accurate. And they told me that wasn't the way it was done for court here. But I made a request to have a public notice of what I wrote and an opportunity for the ACLU or anybody
else to criticise it so we could be as accurate as possible. And that's what I did the previous time, when I had that opportunity. I didn't have that opportunity here.
204 Q. Are you proposing to publish this report as a textbook 12:27 or a...
A. I've considered publishing it when we're done.

205 Q. Yeah.
A. It wouldn't be this report, it would be material based on this report in some form that would be of interest 12:27 maybe --
206 Q. Well, that, if you don't mind me saying so, Prof. Swire, is precisely how it reads. I want, just to try and assist the judge as we look at the legal questions of US law, I want to see can we define what exactly the points of agreement and disagreement are. I know obviously there's been the experts' meeting, but perhaps I'm going to ask you to help me refine some of these points a little. If you disagree with any proposition I advance, we will come back and look at it 12:28 later, but what I want to do for the court's assistance is to have as short as we can an identification of what's in issue and what isn't.
A. Okay.

207 Q. I want to do that to a large extent by reference to a ${ }^{12: 28}$ series of propositions. First of all, you very fairly, let me say, Professor, and properly explain in your report that you're not purporting to express any view of the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter or the
meaning of the word "adequacy" in the Directive or the meaning of the word "equivalence" as it's used in the European jurisprudence. You know those are matters of law for the judge to decide and it would be wrong of you as an expert to express a view on their meaning and 12:29 I understand you not to do so.
A. So what I have tried to do is bring my experience in EU data protection law over a lot of years to inform my discussion so that my background in us surveillance law would be understandable and put into context, at least for the European --
208 Q. Yes. And as I said, Professor, I will not interrupt any of your answers, but I just want you to indicate whether I'm right or wrong. And we can come back and discuss these later. But you're not expressing your view on the law? No.
A. I'm not expressing a legal conclusion of eU law.

209 Q. Okay, yeah. But you do, in fairness, have your own opinion that, looking at the remedies in the context of surveillance, that it's not appropriate to just look at 12:29 judicial remedies, that you have to look at other types of remedies and take a broader view, it's your view you have to take account of criminal prosecutions, of the possible role of regulatory bodies like the FTC and FCC, it's your view that you must take account of the press, Congressional oversight and the range of other matters that you very helpfully identified in your report, isn't that right?
A. So the word "must", just as a lawyer, has more than one
meaning. So --
210 Q. Fair enough.
A. And --

211 Q. It's your opinion that those are matters which one should take account, is that an unreasonable --
A. It's my opinion that in order to understand protections of fundamental rights, such as privacy, that this set of things you just described are relevant to that.
212 Q. Yes. And it's in that context that you express your own views as to, I don't want to use the word "adequacy" for obvious reasons, but your own views of the sufficiency of protection perhaps is a way of putting it in US law?
A. Yes.

213 Q. Okay. Now, Prof. V1adeck, in his report - and we'11 be 12:30 hearing from him next week as to whether this remains his position - but in his report he says that the prevailing assumption is that "non-citizens lacking substantial voluntary connections with the United States are not protected by the Fourth Amendment."
I'11 just read at that that to you again, in fairness --
A. No, I heard it, it's okay.

214 Q. So is that a statement with which you agree or disagree?
A. So I think that this is almost exactly what we put in writing in the part about the Fourth Amendment in the experts' report. So that was item no. 25 on page 19 of the joint experts' report. So if we look at -- shall I
wait a moment or should I go ahead?
215 Q. No, you go ahead.
A. Okay. So this is the scope of the application of the Fourth Amendment. And I believe you just quoted from the same quote that we have here: "Non-citizens lacking 12:32 substantial voluntary connections to the United States are not protected by the Fourth Amendment." And in the consensus language on the right-hand side, Prof. V7adeck says: "To the extent that Vladeck's earlier testimony stated that the Fourth Amendment applies in such circumstances, he amends the testimony to say the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue".
216 Q. Sorry, Professor, I know what's in that document, we had it yesterday. I'm asking you just to agree or disagree with the formula I read to you. "The prevailing" -- I'll read it to you again. You either agree or disagree with this.
A. Yes, I'm -- okay.

217 Q. "The prevailing assumption is that non-citizens lacking substantial voluntary connection with the United States 12:32 are not protected by the Fourth Amendment." Do you agree or disagree with that?
A. So --

218 Q. And if you disagree, we'11 come back and examine it in detail later. I just want to try and assist the court 12:32 in identifying what we agree or disagree on.
A. Right. And this is precisely the topic that, in the experts' group, we were trying to figure out where there's agreement or disagreement. And in that report,
the statement that we made was that we do not have clear Supreme Court guidance on that. I do know that there are cases before the Supreme Court this terma. And so "prevailing view"? I don't know that I ever came to an opinion previously on it. He stated it in his report and so there's prevailing... If we say more likely than not then I think the answer would be prevailing, yes.
219 Q. okay, so we'11 just bring some clarity on this. "The prevailing assumption is that non-citizens lacking substantial voluntary connections to the United States are not protected by the Fourth Amendment"; agree or disagree?
A. So on that, more likely than not, is that what most people think? I think the answer is yes.
220 Q. Yes, okay. Agree?
A. Agree.

221 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, do you agree that under the rules for Article III standing, it is not sufficient for a plaintiff --
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Sorry, do you mean the third amendment or Article III?
MR. MURRAY: Article III.
A. Article III is the role of the judges.

222 Q. MR. MURRAY: Article III standing, Judge, yes.
(To witness) Do you agree that under the rules for Article III standing, it is not sufficient for a plaintiff who seeks relief in federal court to establish an objectively reasonable likelihood that his
communications will be interfered with?
A. Em --

223 Q. We've discussed Clapper this morning and I'm going to come back to the detail of clapper. But that perhaps abstracted proposition of law --
A. Right.

224 Q. -- I invite you to agree or disagree with. Would you like me to read it again?
A. No. Can you tell me what the quote is from, just so I can have some context?

225 Q. Well, the quote is from the note I'm reading in front of me.
A. Ah. Well, so I'11 say this on standing: I wrote two pages in my report on standing. I'm an American law Professor who's been around standing and have taught to 12:35 it to my students. I have given you my detailed reading of three of the key cases. And I have not made a general study of all the Circuit or District Court cases of standing - and there's a tremendous amount of complexity and detail in that that I -- I have not read 12:35 a lot of the cases that have been mentioned in the court. So given that, I'm glad to give it a try, but I want to just qualify my level of expertise here to what it is. So please go ahead, sir.
226 Q. "I have given you my detailed reading of three of the 12:35 key cases. And I have not made a general study of all the Circuit or District Court cases of standing." Is that what you just said?
A. I agree with that. Yes, I think I said something like
that. And it's true.
227 Q. All right, okay. In fact I deduced from your evidence in response to Mr . Gallagher this morning that you read
Clapper during this week --
A. Again.

228 Q. -- and that you read it when it came out. I got the impression, and please correct me if I'm wrong, that you did not read it before you wrote your report.
A. I don't know if I read the whole thing. I certainly went back to it and looked at it, but I can't say I read every word of it again the way I read every word of it again this time.
229 Q. So you didn't read it carefully?
A. I don't currently -- I cannot say that $I$ read it al1 the way through as part of this report. It's a long case.

230 Q. No, you didn't read it carefully?
A. I can't say that I didn't. I did a lot of work on this case, as you've said, and I don't want to say I did something I didn't do.
231 Q. Okay. We11, we'11 1ook and see what you say about it later. It's not sufficient for a plaintiff who seeks relief in federal court to establish an objectively reasonable likelihood that his communications will be interfered with; agree or disagree?
A. So I think that that goes to the first of the three prongs, if I'm understanding correctly, and you'd have to satisfy the other prongs. But I'm not sure that's the particular issue you're pointing to.

232
Q. It's a negative; it is not sufficient for a plaintiff who seeks the relief in federal court to establish an objectively reasonable likelihood that his communications will be interfered with.
A. So - and this is my effort to respond the best I can to 12:37 your thing - there would have to be some sign of redressability, I believe. So if there has to be redressability then what you've stated would not be sufficient.
233 Q. Okay. We11, just imagine I establish the other prongs 12:37 but I do not establish an objectively reasonable likelihood that my communication will be interfered with; have I got standing?
A. You now have or have not established --

234 Q. Have I got standing? 12:37
A. So if you have -- I'm sorry, there's a lot of "nots" in here. I'm trying to do the best I can, Sir.
235 Q. Okay. We11, I see, Professor. The phrase that I'm giving to you is one from Clapper, it is the plaintiff's case in Clapper as recorded in the report 12:38 which you read about this week and in respect of which you're giving evidence as an expert in US law. If I come to court and say 'Judge, I have an objectively reasonable likelihood that my communications will be acquired under Section 1881(a)', am I going to be told on that ground alone that $I$ do not have standing?
A. I believe the answer is no.

236 Q. I will not be told that? The court will say 'oh' --
A. Can I try to say it -- you know, I'm trying to answer
your question, I'm trying to -- so if I, as a plaintiff, establish an objectively reasonable belief that my communications have been interfered with --
237 Q. Likelihood. Reasonable, objectively reasonable likelihood.
A. okay. So if $I$, as a plaintiff, establish an objectively reasonable likelihood my communications have been - is the word "interfered with"?
238 Q. That my communications will be interfered with.
A. And "will be" is, you know, not 20 years in the future, 12:39 but imminent enough?
239 Q. Yes.
A. Then my understanding is that sounds like the injury-in-fact, yes.
240 Q. Does it? Okay. So disagree. Now, do you agree that 12:39 there is no provision in us law in the surveillance context, the national security context with which we're concerned, whereby persons whose data has been accessed by the government must be advised of that fact?
A. There's no general notice requirement.

241 Q. Thank you. So we agree on that. Do you agree that because there is no general notice requirement, many people who have been surveilled will never know of that fact?
A. I agree.

242 Q. And do you agree that people who do not know that they have been surveilled will have difficulty establishing standing under Article III?
A. Under most scenarios we can think of, yes. Right.
Q. Absolutely.
A. And that's not a warrant in US law, that's a FISA order.

246 Q. Mm hmm.
A. Then under Section 702 , we've talked in great detail, there's a certification for the year and then there's a 12:41 directive in an individual case. So there's no warrant.
247 Q. There's no warrant. And people, EU citizens' information can be accessed without any such prior warrant being granted under Section 702? It's obvious, 12:41 not a matter of dispute --
A. There's no such, there's no warrant under either of those things.
248 Q. Yeah. Just so that we again --
A. Right.

249 Q. -- have what we agree on together. I think you accept -- we11, excuse me, do you accept that to establish standing you must prove an injury which is concrete and particular?
A. Particularised, yes, I think.

250 Q. Do you agree that you cannot satisfy the requirements of Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation?
A. There was language to that effect in Spokeo. And I don't know whether that would be true in all settings, 12:42 but in the Spokeo case there was language to that effect.

251 Q. Okay, fair enough. would you agree with this proposition: The mere fact that a statute has been violated does not in itself mean that there's a concrete and particularised injury?
A. Do I agree that that's a statement of US law?

252 Q. Yes.
A. I agree with it.

253 Q. Do you agree that that may be the case, even though the 12:42 statute confers a cause of action for breach of the provision?
A. So again this is similar to language in Spokeo. We could argue about the word "breach". The main point is that there might be certain kinds of violations that would not be enough to trigger a private right of action.

254 Q. okay. And would you agree that in deciding whether an injury is concrete and particular, the question of
whether the law has traditionally provided a remedy for that injury is relevant?
A. There's certainly Supreme Court statements to that effect. Different justices have different views about how much the history of that harm is relevant.
255 Q. But you as an expert, giving expert evidence as to what us law provides, would you agree that in deciding whether an injury is concrete and particular, the question of whether the law has traditionally provided a remedy for that injury is relevant?
A. I agree it has been found relevant by some justices of the Supreme court.
256 Q. Ah, well now, hold on. We're trying, Professor - and there may be a misunderstanding here; I'm not asking you what justices of the supreme Court has found, have found, and in fact the court doesn't require you to tell them, because we can read the judgments ourselves. My understanding is that you're here as an expert in us law to proffer your opinion as an expert on what the United States law is. Correct?
A. Yes.

257 Q. Okay. So you've a view as to what the law of the United States is in your area of expertise?
A. Yes.

258 Q. Okay. So I'm asking you - and this applies to all of the questions I've asked you - that your opinion as an expert, is it your opinion as an expert that in deciding whether an injury is concrete and particular, the question of whether the law has traditionally
provided a remedy for that injury is relevant, yes or no?
A. Judge, can I explain my view here? There's been quite a bit of debate in the Supreme Court between different parts of the court about how much weight to put on the fact that there was this kind of injury, let's say, in the 1790s when the Constitution was --
259 Q. MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: when you say "different parts", you mean different judges?
A. Different justices. So in the -- there's a case called 12:44 Jones which has to do with surveillance in public, it's a Fourth Amendment Supreme Court case. It ended up being a nine to nothing decision. Five of the justices emphasised how similar the injury was to trespass as understood back in the 1790s. Four of the justices said 'That's really not the question at all. We have different kinds of harms under the different kinds of technology today. And so finding a specific hook in a traditional common law injury is not a key factor in our decision'. And so that's the five majority, four in concurrence.

And that's why when there's language about finding a particular harm sort of going back to English common law, there's been quite a bit of debate between the justices about how much weight to give to that.
260 Q. MR. MURRAY: Okay. And Jones is a case about whether you need - correct me if I'm wrong --
A. A warrant, yes.

261 Q. -- a warrant to put a tracker on somebody's car, is that right?
A. That's right.

262 Q. Yeah. And the majority decided that this was an analogue to a common law interference with property?
A. Trespass on property, yes.

263 Q. But in your opinion, if I arrive in your office and say 'I want you to tell me what the law of this, the federal law on this issue is' and I know that the first thing you'11 say is, because it's what we all say, 'Well, it depends' and 'It could go either way' -MR. GALLAGHER: Mr. Murray can speak for himself on that.
MR. MURRAY: I won't disclose --
A. Yes, the one handed lawyer does not exist, yes. Right, 12:46 okay.

MR. MURRAY: -- I won't disclose how many of Mr. Gallagher's opinions I've read in the last 20 years, 15 years.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: They're subject to privilege, I 12:46 suspect.

MR. GALLAGHER: Exactly. I'11 have a complaint to the Bar Council.
264 Q. MR. MURRAY: And the comment I made is not divorced from their standard template. (To witness) But after you've said 'It depends' and 'I don't know' and 'It could go either way', if you've an aggressive client with a large chequebook who says 'I want you to tell me the answer to this question in your opinion, I won't
sue you if you are wrong, I just want you to tell me your professional opinion'. Now, will you please apply that test to this question: In deciding whether an injury is concrete or particular, the question of whether the law has traditionally provided a remedy for 12:47 that injury is relevant; agree or disagree?
A. And what I would say to that client is that predicting the votes of the Supreme Court, I believe it is relevant. I think that's an incorrect view of the Constitution.

265 Q. I see, okay. So we'11 split our predictive function from our academic function. But given that you're being paid to predict what will happen in my case, the answer is yes?
A. Correct.

266 Q. Okay, thank you. And can we apply that test, the one you've just articulated, you've articulated it well and very clearly, can we apply that test to all the questions I'm going to ask you today about your opinion of US law, Professor, please?
A. So just to clarify what you're asking, you're asking me to make a predictive statement --
267 Q. Exactly.
A. -- and not a statement of what I think the law should be --

268 Q. Correct.
A. -- and where it will go over time or something like that?
269 Q. Absolutely. I want you to predict what the law of the

United States is and how a court is likely to decide it, in your opinion.
A. okay.

270 Q. Now, this is obvious again, I don't think it's the subject of dispute, but just so we are absolutely clear 12:48 and the court has these matters together, you're not giving evidence about European law, but you know a bit about it?
A. Correct.

271 Q. Clearly.
A. Yeah.

272 Q. And you understand that under the law of the European Union, there's a right, a Charter right to data privacy, a right to the protection of personal data and you know that European Union law starts from the premise of a right not to have your data accessed, used, disclosed, retained, a right of fair processing and so forth?
A. Yes.

273 Q. You agree with that?
A. Yes.

274 Q. And it's not to say, and I'm not putting it in these terms for the purposes of this principle, but we'11 come back to it, it's not to say, to comment on it one way or the other, but American law is different in structure in this regard?
A. Yes.

275 Q. There's no right to data privacy so described or in the same way in the United States Constitution, but there
are rights, express or implied, under the United States Constitution which, in certain circumstances, provide protection for data privacy, is that a --
A. I agree with that.

276
Q. Yeah. And some of those rights may be derived from the 12:49 Fourth Amendment insofar as search and seizure requires probable cause and the like and some of them may be derived from the First Amendment insofar as some invasions of data privacy might also have a chilling effect on speech, is that...
A. I agree with that.

277 Q. Okay. And then that is supplemented in American law by a range - I'm not going to use the word "fragmented" but a range of different statutory provisions which provide privacy or data privacy protection in certain circumstances?
A. I agree.

278 Q. Now, you've read and obvious7y very carefully considered the first report of Mr. Serwin?
A. I've read it, yes.

279 Q. Yeah. Does that answer mean that you haven't careful7y considered it?
A. I'm not always good at memorising everything, but I'11 do my best to -- if I've read it more than once? Yes.
280 Q. okay. Well, it's not a memory test and I'm not going 12:50 to play games with you in terms of what he said or didn't say, $I$ just want to establish that prior to writing your report, you considered Mr. Serwin's first report - he prepared two?
A. I received it after, at some point during the preparation of my report, yes.

281
Q. Okay. So you had it?
A. I had it before I submitted my report to the court.

282 Q. okay. And you read it?
A. Yes.

283 Q. Okay. And you considered it?
A. Yes.

284 Q. And I'm sure you read it carefully?
A. Yes.

285 Q. So you read and carefully considered it prior to your report?
A. Okay.

286 Q. Okay. Did you read the decision in Spokeo before you furnished your report?
A. I believe I read press accounts about it, but hadn't read the full text.
287 Q. Ah.
A. "Press" meaning I have my inbox with current privacy news items and so I would read the one-paragraph summary sometimes of things.
288 Q. Okay. Well, it's a decision of the United States Supreme Court handed down on 18th May. Right?
A. I don't have the date, but it sounds right.

289 Q. We11, the United States Supreme Court presumably every day of the week?
A. No, Sir, it does not.

290 Q. No. So this is a significant enough event. Mr. Serwin
was aware of it the day it happened and indeed thought it sufficiently important to issue a new report to take account of it. You hadn't even read it?
A. I can't tell you under oath that I didn't read it. I will say - and this is relevant to what I cover and what I don't cover - that I'm not, I don't get the daily reports of all the Supreme Court cases. In my study of what I work on, a lot of it is not about Supreme Court case law or Circuit Court case law, a lot of it's on other issues, including technology and legal issues that come from the administrative side. So I do not read any -- I do not read a substantial number of Supreme Court cases every year.
291 Q. All right. So it's quite possible you hadn't read it before the time -- before you delivered your report, you don't know?
A. As I said, I believe that I read a summary of it at least, but I don't know if I read more than that.
292 Q. But this is a case concerned with remedies in the American federal legal system for data breach, in which ${ }^{12: 53}$ it's found there's no Article III standing. And you're writing a report about data remedies in us law in which you've a section about standing. why didn't you get a copy of the decision to read what the United States supreme court had said on the topic?
A. I felt that my assistance to the court was providing the materials that $I$ provided here in detail. I did two pages on standing because $I$ found out in the course of the materials that that was something others were
talking about. But in order to explain the safeguards of personal information as $I$ understand it in the American system, I went into great detail and did a lot of reading on many other topics.
293 Q. Well, it's very funny you say that, Prof. Swire, because one of the mysteries of your report is that you do not disclose in it what it is you were asked to address by Facebook.
A. Yes.

294 Q
So can you tell us now please what is it Facebook asked 12:54 you to address in your expert report?
A. So I reviewed the charge letter within the last week or so, to go back to it, that we had right at the start and the way I --
295 Q. I'm sorry, you used a phrase there which I'm certainly not familiar, the "charge letter".
A. Oh, I'm sorry. I was charged to do a certain thing, I was instructed to give a report on a certain scope. That's what I intended to convey by that.
296 Q. Yeah.
A. The way that I explained it to the people working with me is my job is to explain US surveillance law to a European Union legal audience. And so in my experience it's been very confusing and difficult for many people in the United States and the EU to understand this complicated system of FISA and the rest, and so I tried to put out in a systematic way 'Here's how there's protections around personal information that come up in the national security investigations, here's what the
different safeguards are, here's what the different problems are'. And that's what I tried to explain in my report.
well, are you saying that in your charge letter Gibson Dunn said 'Dear Prof. Swire, could you please explain US surveillance law to a European legal audience?' Is that what you were asked to do?
A. That's a paraphrase that catches a fairly close approximation. I think -- again, so I'11 try to say my best recollection of the words in the letter. But it 12:55 was an along the lines of the following: 'Tell us what the constitutional statutory administrative practical public disclosure and other safeguards are that apply to information that's collected in the course of national security investigations'.

And what I do remember was that it went beyond constitutional and sort of legal case to being the things such as the documents that Mr. Gallagher was asking me later today - what is the agency policy on signals intelligence and what are the 12333 -- you know, what are all the different administrative procedure and agency protections? Because in my experience, those are extremely important to the actual structure of how the data is handled and the safeguards 12:56 are extremely important to coming to some view about how carefully the data is handled. were you asked to express your view as to the remedies available to us -- to EU citizens whose data was
accessed by the government in the United States?
A. To the best of my recollection, that was part of it also.

299 Q. Sorry, that was part of it?
A. That was part of it also.

300 Q. Well, that's not part of what you just read out there. So can you please help us and tell us with some particularity what it is you were asked to do?
A. I've explained to the best of my recollection -- I explained to you the basic mental idea I had that explained what I was trying to do; how was the data safeguarded for eu citizens. And that includes after the fact there may be remedies. But it includes, as the data goes through the data cycle, what are the different protections as it happens.
301 Q. Were you expressly asked to address remedies?
A. To the best of my recollection, the word remedies was in there.

302 Q. Remedies. Okay. And standing is a fairly important part of remedies, is it not?
A. I don't remember if the word "standing" was in the letter.
303 Q. Were you given a copy of the DPC decision?
A. Yes.

304 Q. Did you read it?
A. Yes.

305 Q. And you will have seen from it that standing features prominently in the DPC reasoning, isn't that right?
A. That's correct.

306 Q. Okay. So standing was an important part of what you had been asked to address, correct?
A. Well, so it was - we've just gone through it - it was important in the DPC's opinion, I agree with that --
307 Q. Yeah.
A. I believe that - and this is similar, for instance, to the similar material $I$ put out in my testimony to the Belgian authority a year ago - that explaining how the system works and how different that is from some of the statements about the US system in the previous round of litigation was a useful thing I could do in this report so the court would have the benefit of having that background.
308 Q. I understand. Remedies and standing were part of what you knew you had to address in your report?
A. That's correct.

309 Q. Okay. And you have a section on standing.
A. Yes, I do.

310 Q. You knew that standing featured prominently in the DPC decision.
A. Yes.

311 Q. It was, therefore, going to be important to the court in the context of these proceedings?
A. I -- okay.

312 Q. You agree?
A. So I don't have a view in Irish law of exactly how much the court is going to do exactly the issues and only the issues in the DPC's draft opinion. I don't have an answer on that.

8



MR. MURRAY: It's just one o'clock, Judge.
two o'clock.
MR. MURRAY: Thank you, Judge.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Very good. We'11 take it up at
相



THE HEARING CONTINUED AFTER LUNCH AS FOLLOWS:

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Good afternoon.
REGISTRAR: In the matter of Data Protection
Commissioner -v- Facebook Ireland Ltd. and another.
14:02

CONTINUATION OF CROSS-EXAMINATION OF PROF. SWIRE BY
MR. MURRAY

MR. GALLAGHER: Sorry, Prof. Swire, please.
14:02
MR. MURRAY: Good afternoon, Professor.
WITNESS: Good afternoon.
313 Q. I'm going to move on.
A. Could I raise one thing for clarity from this morning where I said something incorrectly and I would like to 14:02 correct it.
314 Q. Please do.
A. Okay. Your Honour, during the break I went back to look at the listed changes and the number was different than what I said this morning, so I don't want to be on 14:02 the record as saying an incorrect number.

Doing the complete list of the proposed changes and actual changes made, the actual number of changes made was 70 approximately. Some examples are there was a
link not working in a footnote, something written as February 17th for a date and it was February 20th, a case name was spelled incorrectly. There is a whole series of small things, but $I$ said a smaller number
this morning and I didn't want that to be...
315 Q. Okay. well thank you, Professor, we appreciate that. so 70 changes and hopefully Facebook will agree to provide us with that and your evidence that these are mere technical changes can hopefully be confirmed in that.

Now, professor, I'm going to move on to the Fourth Amendment and could I ask you please to look at your report.
A. Yes.

316 Q. Page 1-7, paragraph 20.
A. Yes.

317 Q. And I want to read this paragraph to you, please:
"For protection against government access to persona1 data, the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution which prohibits unreasonable searches of person, houses, papers and effects plays a particularly important role."

And clearly that's correct: "Foreign intelligence searches on a US person or on a non-US person who is in the uS remains subject to the fourth Amendment because such searches must meet the overal1 Fourth Amendment test that they be reasonable."

And can I just ask you to stop there. Is it your evidence that a non-US person who has not established
any connection with the us by residence for a period but is merely there temporarily, is it your evidence that a non-us person in that situation can invoke the Fourth Amendment before the United States courts?
A. So I'll state what I think you just said and I'll give 14:04 my and if it's incorrect we'11 -- so if you or someone in this country were to go to the United States and a search were done on you while you were in the United States, my evidence is that the Fourth Amendment would apply.
318 Q. It wou7d app7y?
A. Correct.

319 Q. Yes. And is there any legal authority which so states?
A. Hmm, I am confident that is the law in practice. I don't have the case name in my head for establishing 14:05 that.
320 Q. But you believe that there is a decision of the federal courts that so holds?
A. I am confident there are decisions that so hold, yes.

321 Q. Well, if we look at footnote 17 you cite a case called In Re Sealed case, is that a case which so holds?
A. I would need to look at it to confirm. But this is part of my limitations as a human being, I don't remember every case, but if it's there that means that we have checked that it is there, and I have checked that it is there, so that would be such a case.

322 Q. Well maybe the best way if you just tell us what that case was about?
A. Ah. So for -- should I go, is it in the folders and we
323 Q. No, I'm asking you to tell us what the case is about, Professor?
A. And the answer is that I don't know from the title In Re Sealed case what the case is about.

324 Q. Well, I'm sorry. We're now talking about the Fourth Amendment which is the bedrock of constitutional protection in this area. We're talking about a statement that you have made in your report to the court and a legal authority which you have cited in support of that statement and I am asking you to tell us what the case is about and you don't know and I have asked you to tell us some case that establishes the proposition and until I referred you to the footnote you didn't know either, is that a fair summary of where 14:06 we are?
A. Yes.

325 Q. Thank you. Now 1et's move on: "These constitutiona7 protections apply to searches conducted in the US, including on data transferred to the us."

Can I ask you to stop there?
A. Yes.

326 Q. Is that right or wrong?
A. That's incorrect based on the amendment that we talked about earlier today.

327 Q. Well now it's not incorrect based on the amendment --
A. Sorry.

328 Q. -- we talked about earlier today?
A. No.

329 Q. It's incorrect?
A. It's not my view, I believe that sentence is incorrect.

330 Q. okay. So could you explain to us how it came about that a error of such an important kind in this case made its way into your report please?
A. So this is an instance where I have worked on Fourth Amendment, $I$ have focussed on how it operates in a variety of settings. I have known that the practice for the courts and for the agencies has been that if somebody is in the United States that at that point when the search happens, if you're at the hote1 in New York City that there is a search. That's things that a professor with experience in the area I was confident of.

It turns out I had not focussed on the specific instance where the search happens in the United States but the individual is not in the United States. And it was in the course of reading Prof. Vladeck's work after 14:08 I did this that $I$ became aware that there's particular debate about that instance and I had not focussed on that instance here.

331 Q. But it turns out, Professor, to use your language, that you had not focussed on an issue that is central to this case, an $E U$ citizen in the $E U$ whose data is in the US, what else is this case about except that situation?
A. So that's a -- so I think, what I would say is that there is the Verdugo case, which I have read and which
is cited here and in the other people's things, which is on facts that are different from a data search in the United States. What I have said is that we do not have an authoritative case that I'm aware of, or that Prof. Vladeck is aware of, that has held specifically about this question of searches done in the united States where the individual has not established any connection to the United States.

And so it's a particular area of the law where there's no Supreme Court case, and where I hadn't directed my attention to, I had not directed my attention to the level I have now that we have done this work.
332 Q. But, Professor, how did it happen that you didn't direct your attention to the position of an EU citizen whose data is in the United States and was seized, how did it happen that you didn't direct your attention to that question?
A. Hmm, I think what happened here is I thought that the, without having done the particular research to find out 14:09 that there hadn't been such a case, I was under the view that I knew that a search done in the United States triggered Fourth Amendment and I had not seen law review article or debate or whatever that said 'but it's different if the search is done in the United States and the person is not physically in the united States', I just hadn't seen that.
333 Q. How could you make these statements in your report to the court without going and checking the law which is
your area of expertise?
A. Well, there's no case on point. That's the statement that Prof. V7adeck and I each said at the end. We don't have a case that talks directly to it --
334 Q. Well, excuse me.
A. -- and so researching the negative is extremely difficult.
335 Q. Excuse me please, Professor. What the agreed statement says is you don't have a United States Supreme court case, is that not what the agreement statement says? It doesn't say you don't have a case?
A. That's correct.

336 Q. Yes. So you're wrong there again? Did you look to see if there -- well maybe you'11 help us because we don't know: when lawyers in the United States try to ascertain the position under a matter of federal constitutional law, presumably you start off looking to see if there's a Supreme Court decision which is apposite and binding?
A. That is certainly something you could start with.

337 Q. That's where you begin?
A. Yes.

338 Q. And if there's none you move and look and see if there's decisions in the circuits; is that right?
A. Other things you would do is look for treatise, authorities, law review articles, secondary sources where somebody has done a study of it, yes.
339 Q. All right. So if you are going to make a proposition to the court which you know is central to the issues
with which the court is concerned here, viz us legal remedies for EU persons whose data is in the us, if you are going to make such a statement do you not go and research all of the available cases to see and commentaries to see if there is anything that supports the proposition you include in your report?
A. I did a lot of research for this case. I had people assisting me who did a lot of research for this case. I tried very hard to be accurate in many different specific places in this case. In this area I focussed 14:12 on Section 702, the statutory things, the many other things in the report. I did not do as much research in this area as I now wish I had.
340 Q. But you didn't research this point at all and you cite it as authority for the first part of your proposition, 14:12 a case about which you are unable to tell the court anything? But you weren't just making this as an aside, can I ask you to look at footnote 18 please:
"In some European writing about US law, there has been 14:13 confusion about the effect of the uS Supreme Court cases defining the scope of the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment such as United States -v-
Verdugo-Urquidez. As discussed in more detail in chapters 3 and 4, the Fourth Amendment applies to searches performed in the us, including for data transferred from the EU."
A. Right. So I don't agree with that statement.

341 Q. No, either. We11, you see, Professor, I don't know
that it's quite this easy, that you simply tell us you don't agree with that statement. This is a report prepared by you for the court, solemnly attested by you on oath in affidavit, you are now telling us that a statement of law that you make you equivocally and categorically was wrong and that you did not research the point prior to making it?
A. I was wrong on this point.

342 Q. When did you discover you were wrong?
A. No later than when the experts meeting happened, I don't remember before then.
343 Q. So it's possible you found out before then?
A. It's possible. You asked my question, I'm trying to remember. I know that it came up in the experts meeting. I was looking at Prof. V7adeck, Ms. Gorski, 14:14 my own statements there. And in the course of looking at that I came to the view that there was more complexity there that I had not known about.
344 Q. Well, how did you find out you were wrong?
A. Hmm, so what I do recollect is in that meeting, and I don't know how much we are supposed to talk about what happened in the meeting.
345 Q. No, I don't want to know what happened in the meeting?
A. Right.

346 Q. If you're telling us now, which is not what you told me 14:15 the first time I asked you, that you found out at the meeting, fine, but if you're telling us if you find out before the meeting, I'm asking you to tell us how you found out, what was it that alerted you to your error?
A. So in reviewing, after I submitted my testimony I saw Prof. Vladeck's testimony for the first time. Professor Gorski's testimony was supplied to me very late before $I$ sent it and $I$ read it but quickly and didn't, I was so busy trying to finish my own document 14:15 that in the short amount of time I didn't do the sort of thorough vetting of her report that one would do typically. So between --
347 Q. MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Sorry which report do you mean there, Ms. Gorski's?
A. Yes. And so it had been submitted, I was rushing to finish by November 3rd, I looked at it and said I have to finish writing my thing, that's roughly what happened.

And so I don't, I can't tell exactly when in re-reading her report and reading Prof. Vladeck's report and/or in the meeting with the experts but along the way of that I became aware that other experts had made statements that I learned from so when the expert meeting happened 14:16 $I$ was very clear I wanted to change my statement on this point and I did change my statement.

348 Q. How did you change your statement?
A. We11, I took this to be, I took the experts report to be 'I'm now clarifying what Swire believes on this point'.
349 Q. Did you write this paragraph in your statement?
A. I did write the paragraph in the statement. The summary, yes, absolutely.
Q. Did you write, did you read the decision In Re Sealed case to which you refer?
A. Hmm -- oh, that's 2002, yes, I read that case. Now I know what case it is. It was the first declassified case, it was the DC circuit case by Judge Silverman about the wall coming down between the FISA foreign surveillance and the criminal investigation. I have written about it in my 2004 article, now that I see what it is, yes.
351 Q. And does that case, Professor, say that foreign intelligence searches, searches on a us person or a non-US person in the US are subject to the Fourth Amendment?
A. So now I have refreshed my recollection, the In Re Sealed case was not a good hint, 2002 was a very good 14:17 hint. So this was the first case where the FISA Appeals Court gave an opinion. So that was an important thing. It's the first published opinion by a Court of Appeals on FISA, and I write about that in detail in my 2004 article on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

So that was the first authoritative statement at the Court of Appeals level of how FISA operates and how the Fourth Amendment operates. And so it was on that basis 14:18 that I thought this was authoritative because it was in the Court of Appeals in the FISA context and so I was citing to the best authority we have for this important statement.

352 Q. Does it address that issue?
A. To the best of my recollection it does.

353 Q. It does.
A. That's the best of my recollection from a 2002 case, yes.

MR. GALLAGHER: I think the witness should be entitled to refer to the case.
MR. MURRAY: Oh, certainly.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Well in due course. But he is entitled to conduct his cross-examination.

354 Q. MR. MURRAY: I just want to ask one other question. Thank you, Professor. So can I ask you to go forward please to page 3-4 and look at footnote 13. "In my experience'?
A. Could I just finish reading it because it's a long footnote, is that okay?
355 Q. We11, I was going to read it out.
A. Okay, that's fine. Please go ahead.

356 Q. "In my experience, there has been some confusion about the way the Fourth Amendment applies to non-US persons. 14:19 Briefly, the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures which takes place within the US (such as on data transferred to the US), and to searches against US persons (US citizens as well as permanent residents) that take place outside of the US. For foreign
intelligence collected in the US, such as personal data transferred from the EU by a company, the Fourth Amendment continues to app7y, because all searches must meet the overal 1 Fourth Amendment test that they be
reasonab7e."

And you then cite a Re Sealed case.
A. Yes, sir.

357 Q. So the sealed case now seems to be cited, maybe I am misreading it, for the proposition that data that's transferred from the EU to the uS is subject to the Fourth Amendment, does it so state?
A. So here's, reading that sentence, I think it's correct if you stop, there's the comma and then it says "all searches must meet the overall fourth Amendment test that they be reasonab7e". That is an accurate cite to the In Re sealed case. If it's a search, that's the legal term that means the Fourth Amendment attaches and if it's a search then that case establishes, it's not a 14:20 search warrant criminal case, it's a 'be reasonable' foreign intelligence search. So if it's a search then the Fourth Amendment applies.

The mistake in my view at this point now comes before the comma, which is that I believed when I wrote this sentence that the word "search" applied to government access in the United States for data that came from outside the United States. I no longer make that claim.

358 Q. Because there is no authority whatsoever in law for it?
A. I'm not aware of any authority in law for that.

359 Q. Now would you like to see the sealed case, Professor?
A. I think --

360 Q. We have a copy of it for you.
A. Yes, okay.

361 Q. If there is any particular aspect of that, in fairness to you, given that you are familiar with it, that you would like to draw our attention to please do so.
A. No, I think I have explained the reason for me citing to the case which is all searches must meet a reasonableness test and I have explained that I made a mistake about what counts as a search. So if the data comes in from outside the United States it's not a search and that's the mistake $I$ made.

362 Q. Now what you said this morning - sorry, excuse me what you said yesterday was that: "If anyone in the room goes to the United States you get Fourth Amendment protection"?
A. That's the point about being physically in the United States.
363 Q. Yes. So what's the legal authority for that?
A. Hmm, so this is where my ability to cite every case is not as wonderful as I wish it were. But I believe you would see that in Verdugo, though Verdugo is not a factual situation where's the search was done inside the United States.
364 Q. Al1 right. So it's the Supreme Court decision in Verdugo that establishes that non-US citizens and non - 14:22 sorry, excuse me. It is Verdugo, are you saying that Verdugo establishes that a person who is neither a US citizen nor a permanent resident of the US, and you understand what I mean by that phrase?
A. Yes, I do.

365 Q. A person with a close connection, that such a person can rely upon the Fourth Amendment, does Verdugo establish that?
A. I believe that to be US law and I do not know if that's 14:22 the best authority for that proposition.

366 Q. Oh, I see, sorry.
A. It's my recollection but I...

367 Q. Okay. We11 maybe then we will take a look at Verdugo which is, $I$ think, in Book 2 of the authorities and hopefully someone can furnish the professor with it.
A. (SAME HANDED TO THE WITNESS) it's in this one, Book 2? This is small Book 3.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Do you recal1 which tab it is, Mr. Murray?

MR. MURRAY: It's Tab 41, Ms. Hyland says, Judge.
A. Okay.

368 Q. okay. I'm going to perhaps explain my understanding of this case to you. You are familiar with the facts, Professor? Professor?
A. Yes, this is the search in Mexico is the key fact here.

369 Q. Correct. And I'm going to suggest to you that the reasoning of the courts, simply as I understand it, was that the Fourth Amendment in its terms was directed to a class of persons who had become part of the national 14:23 community or developed a sufficient connection with the United States to be considered part of that community, is that?
A. I am sorry, I was reading and I didn't hear, could you
say it again? Apologies.
370 Q. Yes, of course. It's my understanding that what this case decides is that the Fourth Amendment in its terms was directed to a class of persons who had become part of the national community or had developed a sufficient 14:24 connection with the United States to be considered part of that community?
A. Okay.

371 Q. Is that an incorrect understanding of the case?
A. I'm glad to go with that at this point.

372 Q. Well, no, I am sorry. I'm not interested -- excuse me?
A. As far as I -- I am sorry, I didn't mean to be difficult.

373 Q. No, no. I just suggested --
A. In its terms the people -- yes.

374 Q. Well let's look then at page 265, please. And we see, maybe about a third of the page up, while the textual --
A. You said 265, I am turning to it, yes.

375 Q. 265, about a third of the page up, after quoting from 14:24 Article 121: "while this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive it suggests that 'the peop7e' protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers were are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community."

And then if you go to the next page, the very last sentence: "The available historical data show, therefore, that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their own government; it was never suggested that the provision was intended to the restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside the territory."

And I don't think there is any issue --
A. Right.

376 Q. -- in what we're talking about at the moment about that, although we'11 come back to it in another context later.

Then if you go page 271, and it's midway down this page that I want you to look at, Professor. After citing a number of cases what the opinion of the court says is:
"These cases, however, establish on7y that aliens
receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country."

And then Plyler is quoted: "The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment 'are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction'."
"The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time. Once an alien lawfully enters and resides he becomes invested."

And then: "Respondent is an alien who has had no previous significant voluntary connection with the United States, so these cases avail him not."

Is there a misinterpretation of the decision, is there a --
A. I've been reading -- I apologise. I'm trying to read and listen at the same time and I'm doing a bad job.
377 Q. Yes.
A. Where do you want me to direct my attention please.

378 Q. Well, Professor, I am terribly sorry about this, but it 14:26 appears almost as if you are reading this for the first time. This is a case that has featured in the discussion in court for the last week, do you know what the various parts of the judgment say?
A. I have read it. I have not reread it this week.

379 Q. When have you last read it?
A. I don't know for sure, at some point in preparation for this case. But I don't know.
380 Q. Had you read it before you prepared your report?
A. I believe so. I at least read summaries and discussions of it and I don't remember if I read the whole thing.
381 Q. I was putting it to you, Professor, that the passage that I had quoted on page 271 ?
A. Yes.

382 Q. Starting after Yick wo -v- Hopkins?
A. Mm hmm .

383 Q. Suggested that only aliens within the state, within the territory who had developed a substantial connection could avail of the provision?
A. Right. And then on the next page, when they are talking about INS -v- Lopez-Mendoza, a majority of justices assumed that the Fourth Amendment applied to illegal aliens in the United States.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Is that a separate judgment, is that Justice Stevens' judgment?
MR. MURRAY: It's not, I made the same mistake. They put his name in capital letters when they are talking about him.
A. No, this is in the majority opinion.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Thank you very much. No, it is just it looks, in our reporting style, I am just asking.
A. It looks like that, right. So there was a previous decision in INS -v- Lopez-Mendoza, this is in the middle of 272.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Thank you.
A. And in that case a majority of justices assumed the Fourth Amendment applied to illegal aliens. The court 14:28 says we cannot fault the Court of Appeals for placing reliance on that case and then they talk about where it applies and where it doesn't apply.
384 Q. MR. MURRAY: Okay, Professor. Do you want to say
anything else about the Verdugo case before I move on?
A. No.

385 Q. Okay. Professor, I want to talk to you now about the decision in Spokeo. You have read this case now?
A. Recently, yes.

386 Q. It didn't feature in your report because you hadn't read it?
A. It didn't feature in my report, that's right.

387 Q. It did feature in Mr. Serwin's report?
A. Yes.

388 Q. But even that being the case you still didn't read it?
A. Correct.

389 Q. And can you give us an explanation for that?
A. I think my explanation is I worked hard, I wrote a lot of things and I read a lot of things and I didn't read everything.

390 Q. All right, Professor. I had understood from your evidence this morning, and please correct me if I'm wrong, that you appear to be relating the Spokeo case very much to the legislation which was in issue, do you 14:29 believe it applies outside the scope of that legislation?
A. Well, I'd say just as a general matter of, while you're reading a Supreme court opinion, that facts and the holding are in the position of the particular facts in 14:30 the legislation there and then lawyers look to that as precedent for other cases, that's the standard way I think to say it.
391 Q. Do you think the decision has any role in cases in
which it is alleged that there have been breaches of legislation conferring privacy or data privacy rights?
A. Is that the question?

392 Q. Yes.
A. So what I said this morning, which I'11 answer your question, is that in my experience standing cases are best understood in a particular factual setting, a judge looks at the concrete situation and comes to the view the judge comes to. In this case it was a particular statute and the court came to the view it came to. It would be natural in the next statutory case for lawyers to look at that and the two parties would then argue about how relevant, how similar or distinct the situation were. But, yes, other statutory claims, I believe the lawyers would look to that and if 14:31 it would help their case they would cite to Spokeo for support.
393 Q. Yes. I think all people in court, or at least in the front part of it, understand the process that you have just described, Professor?
A. Okay, yes.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: I hope you're not excluding me, Mr. Murray.
MR. MURRAY: I did say in the front part of the court, Judge.
MR. GALLAGHER: It was ambiguous certainly, Judge.
394 Q. MR. MURRAY: We understand how this process operates but thank you for the explanation. What I'm more interested is your professional or your expert opinion
as to whether the Spokeo rationale applies to cases involving statutes which confer rights of privacy or data protection?
A. Hmm, I am just trying to understand the words and give a good answer here. So the rationale would be that there needs to be the proper concrete and particularised finding under the statute of injury-in-fact, I think that's roughly a statement of that. And to that extent in the next statutory case I believe it would be appropriate to look to see if there's the correct concrete and particularised.
395 Q. All right. Well, how do you think this relates to claims where a person say that their data rights, as they would be described in Europe, their rights under a statutory code, having their data not used in a particular way, not accessed in particular circumstances, does Spokeo operate to prevent them from claiming?
A. So two things I said about Spokeo today is that it wasn't the kind of harm the statute was supposed to address, at least not the typical harm, and that there was a full remedy under the statute. So if there was a next privacy claim where the privacy statute was not supposed to protect against that kind of harm and there was full redress in another way, then I don't think, then I think you would get a similar outcome, if it's not the same redress or if there's the kind of harm the statute is trying to protect against, then I think the plaintiff would have a strong claim for being covered
by the statute.
396 Q. I see. well could we perhaps just test that against a number of propositions just so the court can understand how this case relates to standing in the cases with which the court is concerned. I think you' 11 accept, or would you accept, that prior to Spokeo the rule was that a plaintiff could satisfy Article III standing by alleging a statutory violation, do you think that's a correct statement of the law?
A. I believe it would be but with the qualifications that there might be some de minimis or not really what's violated by the statute kind of violations that wouldn't lead to the action.
397 Q. Would you agree with this statement: what Spokeo holds is that a plaintiff can't just do that, he has to come 14:34 in and show real harm, would you agree with that statement or disagree with it?
A. I remember the words, particularised and concrete. If real was one of the words the court also used, which it might have, then I'd agree that that's what the court said.

398 Q. So if you have a piece of allocation that confers data privacy rights of whatever kind, a plaintiff who comes to court and says 'my privacy has been violated' without more, could not bring a claim because of
Spokeo? Now, I'm not putting words in your mouth, I just want to understand exactly what you are saying; he couldn't bring a claim without more, he would have to prove real harm?
A. I think -- so, yes, those are words that are correct. If the privacy statute is there to make sure there's not disclosure when there shouldn't be, then the disclosure in my view would be the harm, or if the government is not supposed to look at the e-mail then the looking at the e-mail is the harm.

400 Q. Hmm.
A. And so it's sort of upside down from the usual situation where the statute is there to try to protect something, the person says 'I'm not being protected by that', and that's when you get to win.
401 Q. Mm hmm.
A. But if the statute is trying to protect something in a certain way and it's something different from that, then the court may find that's not what the statute protects.
402 Q. It's all just a bit unclear, isn't it?
A. I believe standing cases are often unclear.

403 Q. Right.
A. And we have had multiple experts testify to that.

404 Q. The Spokeo case appears to make it, to introduce even a
greater lack of clarity, do you agree?
A. It's a recent case that introduces new words that hadn't been as heavily emphasised as before.
405 Q. But the problem, as you know from sitting here, is that in privacy cases the Spokeo case on one view suggests it's not enough to say 'you accessed my data', it's not enough to say 'you used my data', you have to prove harm to have Article III standing and the mere invasion, the mere retention and gathering of data isn't a concrete injury, do you think those arguments are stateable or as I think the American phrase used during the week was colourable by another witness?
A. Right. I believe those would be colourable arguments and I believe the other side would be able to say with quite a bit of force that when the kind of protection the statute is there to protect against, that is going to work.
406 Q. Hmm.
A. When it's not the kind of protection the statute is intended for, then that's outside the scope.
407 Q. But you have defendants in data cases all around the United States applying to strike out claims on the basis that Spokeo bars them, there seem to have been a large number of such cases and many of the courts have acceded to those applications?
A. And this is where my focus on where I do study and my focus on where I don't study comes in. I have not gone and read the many cases that he refers to, I believe that's the case, but $I$ haven't read those cases.

408 Q. Okay. We11 were you aware that Facebook is being sued in a class action suit in the northern district of California by plaintiffs who allege breach of a state statute called the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, have you heard of that suit?
$14: 38$
A. No.

409 Q. Okay. Do you have familiarity with these statutes which I think are in a number of states?
A. I am somewhat familiar with the Illinois biometric statute.

410 Q. You are?
A. Yes.

411 Q. okay. And this is, biometric information is unique?
A. Fingerprints, eye scans, these kind of things.

412 Q. Yes, exactly. The statute provides certain procedures 14:38 which must be followed before someone who has or collects this data uses it in particular ways or stores it, isn't that it in very general terms?
A. That is correct, general, yes.

413 Q. It imposes a statutory obligation to provide certain 14:38 information to a person before you obtain the biometric information, you have to tell them it will be stored?
A. I think there is a notice, there is some notice requirement.
414 Q. Exactly, okay. And the complaint in the case is that 14:38 Facebook was applying facial recognition software to their photos and analysing it. The case I think was in the newspapers, but maybe you have never heard of it?
A. I understand how there could be such a case. I don't
remember reading accounts of such a case.
415 Q. So you were not aware therefore that after Spokeo came out Facebook went to the judge in the northern district and asked him to strike out the case on the grounds the plaintiffs had no article III standing because of Spokeo?
A. I was not aware.

416 Q. Okay. We11, we have a transcript of the argument in that case, I'm going to ask you to look at it. (SAME handed to the court) (SAMe handed to the witness)
A. Thank you.

417 Q. And I should say, Professor, obviously I'm sure Facebook has a defence to this case, I'm not suggesting otherwise. My interest in it is not that and not even whether the submissions they make are right. What I'm concerned that the judge understand in practical terms is how Spokeo is being used in cases of data breach.

So if you go to page 4 and I think Ms. Goldman is counsel for Facebook: "Prior to spokeo the rule in the 14:40 Ninth Circuit was that a plaintiff could satisfy Article III standing by alleging a statutory violation. He said if these statutory rights are violated, therefore I have standing and what Spokeo holds is that a plaintiff cannot just do that, he has to come in and show real world harm."

What's the real world harm if, in breach of the national surveillance laws, we're considering data is
handled in a way that's consistent with that?
A. Are you asking about the facial recognition and biometrics?

418 Q. No, I'm talking now about, I'm trying to use that phrase "real world harm" in the context with which you are concerned, what's the real world harm?
A. So I was reading this and trying to make sense out of it because it's new material to me. I was wondering if I could just briefly make a comment on this and then respond?

419 Q. of course.
A. I teach about, you know I am aware of biometric statutes and have written about concerns about fingerprint databases not being protected well and such. And so in a fingerprint or other facial recognition setting, if I were on the side of the plaintiff $I$ would say, and my biometrics had gone into this database, once they are there they might be breached and that risk of breach put me at risk of not being able to use my fingerprints again because they have been compromised. And so just myself I would have sympathy in that case for saying that that's a harm that comes from improper collection of biometrics. So that's why I -- I was just trying to understand the biometric case.

420 Q. No, absolutely. Wel1 maybe let's help you if I ask you to go to the next page.
A. But do you want me to go to national security?

421 Q. I want you to look at the next page and then perhaps we
will come back?
A. Yes.

422 Q. Because there counsel gives examples: "Did you lose money? Did the defendant embarrass you in a way that will support a lawsuit in federal court? was your personal information exposed to the public in a way that humiliated you? What is your actual harm?"
A. Yes.

423 Q. Now similar arguments could be made, I think you'11 accept, if there were a breach of the national, of the 14:42 national security surveillance statutes --
A. Yes, I do agree.

424 Q. -- with which we are concerned?
A. That kind of risk of breach of sensitive behaviour is a reason for concern and it's a reason to have these privacy protections, I agree with that.
425 Q. Yes. But if a plaintiff is to sue for a breach of these statutes, it would appear that defendants are not shy about raising these Article III standing points, they will come and they will say 'well hold on, so what 14:42 if we held on to your information for a year longer than we should have, so what if we processed it in a way that the statute doesn't permit, so what if we passed it from the NSA to the FBI when we shouldn't have done so, so what if we obtained it other than in 14:43 compliance with the FISA order, what's your real harm? Did you, was your personal information exposed to the public? No. Were you humiliated? No. What's your actual harm?' The argument is there to be made in
exactly the same way?
A. Right. And my view in the biometric case, not having the facts, but my view is that for a fingerprint to be breached would clearly be a harm.
Q. okay.
A. So then if there is some risk of breach at some point, if the risk becomes important enough. And, similarly, if there's a breach of intelligence information that shouldn't happen, that would be a reason to say harm, and we had things like ACLU -V-Clapper that says that 14:43 phone records were there, and at some point there's enough risk of that breach that there would be harm.
427 Q. But what's the harm for someone whose data was taken, should have been destroyed and in breach of the statute wasn't, what's their harm?
A. So I would say that the harm could include that they were, their information, perhaps embarrassing, but their information was being held by the NSA and they were under surveillance by the NSA and that's been revealed.
428 Q. The information is on a server in the NSA or it's in somebody's filing cabinet and it's there for a year longer than it should have been, what's the harm?
A. And similar to the fingerprint being in a database, one concern is the risk of breach. We have seen many breaches and that's at least one concern and that's then a place to fight over, that the risk there is significant enough that -- yes.
429 Q. Then you have to have the right, rather like the cases
which we saw with Prof. Richards, there is a risk of identity theft for instance in some of the fair trade or fair?
A. Fair credit.

430 Q. Fair credit report cases?
A. Yes.

431 Q. And that's not held to be sufficient in some of the circuits, a risk of identity theft. So what I am asking you, Professor, please in order to assist the court is what is the harm, within the formulation that we see counsel for Facebook agitating here, what's the harm in these data?
A. In the biometric situation?

432 Q. No, in the surveillance legislation with which we are concerned. Just take this one example, my information 14:45 has been retained for a year more than it should have been under the relevant regulations or legislation?
A. Well so I have a couple of observations. One is, my testimony goes on at length about the fact that if it's found in the oversight proceedings that it was kept too 14:45 long, the FISA court says purge those records and that's the practice. So we have administrative controls overseen by a court to say, if you break the rules, then we're going to make you purge the information. That's one kind of thing that happens under the law.
433 Q. I may have framed the question badly so please forgive me ?
A. Yes.

434 Q. I'm asking you this question: If I am an EU citizen whose information has been seized under these provisions and it has been retained for longer than it should have been?
A. Mm hmm .
$14: 46$
435 Q. And I want to sue, and I'm told by my lawyers Spokeo says you have to prove harm, am I not going to be barred by Spokeo because I have not suffered the type of harm which appears to be envisaged in these types of arguments?
A. And this goes to how closely a Fair Credit Reporting Act case with all the things we have talked about would turn out to be a precedent that would apply in a national security setting. No, as lawyers they are quite different factual settings.
A. Then, you know, one person would say it's the same thing, the other person would say it's different and the lawyers would -- but I do think that a much closer analogy would be ACLU -v- Clapper, the Second Circuit
Clapper, where you could be asking what's the harm of having all these people's phone records in the database and the answer there was that there was standing.
437 Q. But there was standing because there had been a seizure of which those plaintiffs were entitled to complain under the Fourth Amendment, Professor, and European citizens, we agree, cannot?
A. Well okay. The fact that there's a particular legal basis for it is different from whether there is the
right kind of harm in standing. The point I was making about ACLU -v- Clapper is the right kind of harm and standing, not what the particular legal claim is based on.
438 Q. If we just go down the page, Ms. Goldman: "In the wake 14:47 of Spokeo courts all around the country have been dismissing claims holding that bare statutory violation is no longer enough."

Does that sound right in your experience?
A. Well, that's -- as I said I haven't been reading all these district court cases, that's not where I focussed my energy.
439 Q. You don't know, okay. You don't know.
A. I don't know.

440 Q. Have you been reading the circuit court cases?
A. On standing, not particularly so.

441 Q. No. Then the next page, page 6 line 7: "It's not enough to say the defendants scanned the photo of me as a template on its database, you have to show that as a result of that you are identified in some embarrassing situation, lost your job or you tried to sell your biometric information, you were unable to do so because Facebook cornered the market and added value. You have to show real world injury."

Do you see that?
A. Yes.

442 Q. And then go over the page, page 7.
A. After the judge says she is sceptical, that Spokeo is a big change in the law.
443 Q. Oh, no, the judge is sceptical. Go over the page.
A. Yeah.

444 Q. "We71, we would not say - said Ms. Goldman - that the 14:48 cases all hold that invasions of privacy are sufficient after spokeo."

And then she quotes some other cases, the Northern District of Illinois in McCollough -v- Smarte Carte, that a bare BIPA violation does not satisfy Article III. She said - that's the judge:
"I understand you have these statutory rights, but there's a difference between a statutory right and an injury flowing from the violation of that right and it's not enough to say it's just an invasion of privacy in the air, you have to show how your privacy was violated and how you were harmed."

Do those sort of statements reflect United States law after Spokeo in your opinion?
A. As I say I haven't read all the cases. They reflect what defence counsel says when they are trying to stop a case. I don't have a view of how often that argument 14:49 wins or loses.

445 Q. I see, but I wasn't asking you that. I was asking you the statement: "You have to show more than just an invasion of privacy in the air, you have to show how
your privacy was violated and how you were harmed."

I'm asking you is that a correct statement of the law of the United States Article III standing in your opinion?
A. So in my opinion that would not be a statement that comes from my own reading of spokeo.
446 Q. I see. You can see that it's an argument certainly that was sufficiently cogent for counsel to advance before a court, it's a colourable argument, they believed?
A. I believe it's an colourable argument.

447 Q. okay.
A. I would say it's an overreading of the way I explained Spokeo.
448 Q. Very good, okay. Thank you. You did actually consider, as you said this morning, the question of standing in your report and your consideration begins at page 7-38 and it's not very long?
A. Mm hmm .

449 Q. You refer to Clapper and you note that the DPC had referred to it -- I am terribly sorry, Professor, we are at paragraph 87 page 738.
A. I'm there.

450 Q. So your consideration of standing I think runs, it's 14:50 about two pages in total; is that right?
A. That's about right.

451 Q. Yes. So: "The Data Protection Commissioner has filed an affidavit which states the standing admissibility
requirement of the US federal courts operate as a constraint on all forms of relief in the us. This statement refers to the discussion of the us supreme Court case Clapper in the DPC's Draft Decision. In Clapper, Amnesty International and other plaintiffs brought a constitutional challenge to Section 702 the day after it entered into force."

I think there was some suggestions in the course of, confusion yesterday or the day before, it wasn't the day before, they said it was the day after:
"The supreme Court dismissed the challenge because it found the plaintiffs did not show an injury that granted them standing to sue."

Now can I just stop there. So you were fully aware and fully understood that the DPC decision, which I presume you knew was central to these proceedings, did you?
A. Yes, I read the DPC decision.

452 Q. No.
A. And, yes, so when -- it was the referral that led to this court, so yes.
453 Q. Yes. You knew the DPC had referred to and relied upon Clapper, but you don't appear to have gone and read it 14:52 carefully and analysed it before preparing this report?
A. well, I made my statements here about standing. I had read it. The statement that you just read I'm entirely comfortable is an accurate description of the case.

454 Q. No, no, I understand that, I am asking you about something slightly different. You did not go and read the case carefully the way you have done before giving your evidence now when you were preparing this part of your report?
A. That's the best of my recollection, yes.

455 Q. Yes. In fact you didn't go and read the case again at all; isn't that right?
A. That I don't know, I don't remember that.

456 Q. You don't know?
A. Right.

457 Q. So can we just stop, Professor, and see where we are on this. Mr. Serwin referred to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Spokeo, a very recent decision in his report and you didn't read that?
A. Correct.

458 Q. You have a consideration in your report of the Fourth Amendment which you accept to be incorrect, which you accept you did not research, and involving a proposition which is unsupported by any authority; isn't that correct?
A. Hmm I think that's an accurate statement of what we went through, yes.
459 Q. Yes. And we now see another decision of the United States Supreme Court relied upon by the Data Protection 14:53 Commissioner is given, to say the most cursory attention by you in the course of your researches for this case -- sorry, in your researches for your report; isn't that right?
A. I think cursory is not an accurate statement of what is reflected here which talks about there was this holding in Clapper and then here are subsequent cases that are cited in footnote 292, a case cited in footnote 293 and it says that this has not been a per se ban when there have been more facts, the courts have indeed found standing post Clapper.
460 Q. Did you read all of those cases?
A. I certainly read in them a11 and whether I read every word I don't know.
461 Q. You certainly read, what?
A. I am sorry.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: In them all.
A. If there's a 50 page opinion and there's a section that's relevant to my task, I might read that section and not read other sections. That's what $I$ mean to say.
462 Q. MR. MURRAY: Do your assistants, when they write up their research, they give you sheets of paper with parts of the judgment, is that the way it works?
A. So they would attach the case typically as a file along with the draft, that would be a very common way it would happen.
463 Q. So they'd write the draft, they'd attach the case?
A. After I have given them direction and said here is what 14:54 we need to do.

464 Q. I see.
A. Then it may come back as a research memorandum which I then engage with and try to figure out well what
should we make of this topic and turn it into testimony or it may be that it's a specific paragraph or whatever where I say give a draft of it.
465 Q. It would be a mistake, you say in the next sentence, to read more -- sorry, next paragraph: "To read more into 14:55 Clapper. In one sense, I agree with the quotation from the DPC, in the sense that a plaintiff does have to establish standing to sue in order to get relief from a us court," hardly a remarkable concession?
A. Yes.

466 Q. "The case should not, however, be read to create a per se ban on cases involving us foreign intelligence or counterterrorism programmes."
who said anywhere that the case involved a per se ban on cases involving foreign intelligence or counterterrorism programmes?
A. I don't quote anybody or cite anybody there. I'm trying to explain what a case stands for and doesn't stand for and I then go on to explain how that proceeds.
467 Q. "Two lower courts, for instance, have found that individuals had standing in the foreign intelligence realm to challenge Section 215 telephone metadata programme. Another court found, in a counterterrorism 14:56 setting, that an individual had standing to challenge suspected placement on the terrorist watch list. The facts and law of the individual case will determine whether an individual has standing to sue."
A. Yes.

468 Q. And then you refer to the concern the Supreme Court articulated about, is it a "vector of attack" is the phrase that you use?
A. That's one phrase I use, yes.

469 Q. That's one of the phrases you use?
Q. In fact, just while we are on it, you do use some phrases, the "vector of attack" and that's a reference to people who exercise their right to go to court, is it, a vector of attack?
A. I teach cyber security and it's a term -- one of the different ways that you can attack a computer system and so you come in through this port or you come in through this other way and that's referred to as a vector of attack and I make the comparison to cyber security attacks.
471 Q. Yes. No, I think you describe bringing proceedings as a vector of attack, yes, in the "golden era of surveil7ance", another one of your phrases?
A. Yes, where I have expressed concerns about too much surveillance power, yes. "Golden age", for what it's worth.

472 Q. "Golden age". So then you refer to that and then you say: "It hasn't prevented individuals from bringing lawsuits against companies that commit privacy violations, even in the absence of out-of-pocket damages."

And you refer to some cases in that. And then you say, at paragraph 91, something interesting, you say: "In addition, the doctrine of standing addressed in clapper pertains on7y to the US federal courts, and thus at most impacts judicial remedies."
A. Yes.

473 Q. You appear to view judicial remedies as a relatively small part of this whole fabric, is that a fair comment?
A. I agree with paragraph 91. What I have said yesterday in connection with the automobile example is, when you are trying to protect safety in a car you want to make sure the engineering is good and then you want to have good remedies after the fact. And I said when you are trying to do information systems and protect privacy, you want to make sure the engineering is good and then make sure there is remedies after the fact. And so then I point to the other things that lead to having good engineering is the way I describe it.
474 Q. I see.
A. So...

475 Q. Which, although you didn't have the time to research your consideration of the Fourth Amendment, you had the time to address it at some length in the course of your report?
A. The Fourth Amendment?

476 Q. No, the other examples, the multiple ways, the PCLOB, the free press administrative agencies?
A. Yes.

477 Q. These all receive lengthy consideration in your report?
A. They do.

478 Q. They do. Can I ask you to look at the decision in Clapper, please, that's the United States Supreme Court decision.
A. Yes. Do you have a reference to a binder number?

479 Q. I don't.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: I think it's Tab 16.
A. 1-6 or 6-0?

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: 1-6.
A. Thank you. Yes.

480 Q. MR. MURRAY: So can we look at what this case decided, Professor.
A. Yes.

481 Q. And can I ask you first of all to turn please to page 1146.
A. I'm there.

482 Q. So if you look at the last paragraph on the left-hand side of the page?
A. I'm just seeing "on the day when" instead of "the day after". I don't know if that's what you are going to lead me to, but go ahead.
483 Q. No. "After both parties", the last paragraph:
"Moved for summary judgment, the district court held the respondents do not have standing. On appeal, however, a panel of the Second Circuit reversed. The panel agreed with respondent's argument that they have standing due to the 'objective7y reasonab7e like7ihood'
that their communications will be intercepted at some time."

Do you remember I asked you about that phrase this morning, you asked me where I got it from?
A. okay.

484 Q. Yes. That's where it came from. That was the basis on which the second circuit decided that these plaintiffs had standing, but you didn't know that? Did you?
A. Hmm, I did not remember those exact words in a way where I could put my finger on them.
485 Q. Okay. But you see I asked you about this and you answered, eventually, when I said to you, "if I as a plaintiff establish an objectively reasonable likelihood my communications have been", is the word interfered with?
A. Intercepted, I think.

486 Q. Will be interfered with, I said. I didn't use the word "intercepted", I said interfered with?
A. Ah.

487 Q. And you said: "wel1 it will be, you know, not twenty years in the future but imminent enough, yes. Then my understanding - you said - is that sounds like the injury-in-fact, yes."

That seems the Second Circuit's formulation of standing except they held that there was standing, did they not?
A. Right. And I believe a fair reading of the case is that the five justices in the majority did not find an
objectively reasonable, what is the word, likelihood.
488 Q. Oh, I see.
A. So they used words like "speculative" etc. So they have different views of the facts.

489 Q. Oh, I see. So as you read the judgment the united States Supreme Court maintained the test the Second Circuit had applied but simply found it hadn't been satisfied; is that right?
A. I'm not saying it exactly maintained or didn't. I'm saying that I don't believe a fair reading of the majority is that they thought there was an objectively reasonable likelihood, where they go on about there's no targets involved and it might have been other programmes and all the rest.

I believe a fair reading is their assessment is not fit with objectively reasonable likelihood and so whether they would have taken the doctrinal words from the Second Circuit or not I don't have a view on, but I do have a view that they didn't find an objectively reasonable likelihood.

490 Q. I see. So am I to understand therefore that it's your evidence that the test for standing after clapper is that applied by the Second Circuit?
A. In a case that's overruled I don't think you would I'm making a statement about the court's view of the facts and reading that opinion with the facial challenge and speculation and it might not be this
programme.
491 Q. I see.
A. I don't see a basis for them, I don't think the five justices majority is consistent with the finding of objectively reasonable likelihood.

492 Q. No, I do want you to adopt a clear position on this please, Professor: Is it or is it not your evidence that the Second Circuit test "that a person will have standing due to the objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications will be intercepted at some time in the future", that that is still the test app1ied?
A. Hmm, you asked me earlier to say predicting in court versus my own view.

493 Q. Yes.
A. So my own view is that objectively reasonable likelihood would and should establish standing and then I have also said that standing is done in the particular factual setting, would establish injury-in-fact sufficient for the other prongs of standing. And I have said that in the factual analysis the majority has here, my view is they didn't think that applied.

494 Q. I see. would and should?
A. Yes.

495 Q. It would and it should?
A. Should is my view of how the law should be interpreted.

496 Q. I understand what the two words mean.
A. And would is, if the judge got to the point where the
judge thought there was an objectively reasonable likelihood.
497 Q. okay.
A. I believe there's quite a high probability, my prediction as a lawyer, if the judge came to that view 15:04 my view is that the judge --
498 Q. I see.
A. -- quite likely would say that's enough to meet the injury-in-fact.
499 Q. We11 can I ask you now to turn to page 1147, heading $3(a)$ on the right-hand side of the page?
A. Mm hmm .

500 Q. And could I ask you to read out please what's underneath that?
A. "Respondents assert that they can establish injury in 15:04 fact that is fairly traceable to the statute because there is an objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications will be intercepted. This argument fails."

That's a combined statement of fact and law. Ah. And so now they go through the doctrinal part about "threatened injury must certain7y" --
501 Q. We11, no, I think we'11 read it all out, Professor, please.
A. Okay: "As an initial matter, the Second Circuit's 'objectively reasonab7e likelihood' standard is inconsistent with our requirement that 'threatened injury must be certain7y impending to constitute injury
in fact'."
502 Q. Oh, well that sounds slightly inconsistent with what you think would and should be the test?
A. May I read the next sentence?

503 Q. Of course you can.
A. So the next sentence after the citation say:
"Furthermore, respondents' argument rests on their high7y specu7ative fears" and then they go through a series of speculations.

504 Q. I know that.
A. And so what -- one reason I'm not a litigator is I'm not great at remembering exactly these tests in every case, and so I probably should make that admission. As a professor I study these things and I try to come to my understanding of them. What we had here was my statement that if the court objectively believed, reached that objectively reasonable, then $I$ believe the finding would come out that way. And I said the majority think [sic] here was very speculative and I think on page 1148 the court clearly thought it was very speculative.

Now exactly what words attach to it, it looks like I was incorrect. When it gets to the point of did the majority find objectively reasonable likelihood, my reading was correct and it was speculative and the court thought it was speculative.

505 Q. 'I'm not great at exactly remembering these tests', did I hear that right?
A. You did.
Q. I see.
A. I don't teach standing, I have taught standing but I don't work in the area of standing where the incredible intricacy of the words has overwhelmed my ability to keep them all straight.

507 Q. 'I'm not great at exactly remembering these tests in 1aw'?
A. Yes.

508 Q. I see. I'11 just let the stenographer change. You do refer throughout your report on occasion to the European Convention on Human Rights.
A. Yes.

509 Q. Article 8.
A. Yes.

510 Q. And I think you understand that Article 8 has and the Convention has some relevance under the Charter?
A. I'm sorry, Article 8 of the Convention --

511 Q. Of the Convention has some relevance to the Charter.
A. -- has some relevance to --

512 Q. And maybe you don't know - and you're not an expert in the EU law - so I'm asking you and if you don't know, so be it and I'11 --
A. No, I did go and read through the history of adoption of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter where they say in the history of the creation of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter that they come directly from Article 8 of the Convention.

513 Q. okay. And indeed you express the view at one or two
points - I'11 get you the citations if necessary; disagree with me if I'm wrong - you do suggest that the us surveillance regime could be justified under Article 8. Do you recall making...
A. Right, so yes, I used the language of Article 8 to talk 15:08 about what's necessary in a democratic society, yes.
514 Q. Have you ever seen commentaries to the effect that US surveillance law may fall below the standard fixed by Article 8?
A. Yes.

515 Q. You have?
A. There's many -- I'm sorry, this fell down. I was just closing this book. So I do know from just having been working with European Union law that there's been many criticisms of the us legal regime.

516 Q. Okay. But have you read commentaries suggesting that that may be the case, that the uS standard may fall below Article 8?
A. I'm not -- a citation is not coming to mind, but it wouldn't surprise me at all to see such things.
517 Q. All right. Do you disclose any of them in your report?
A. I don't remember citing to something like that.

518 Q. Okay. You do, however, look, not so much at the Convention, but at the law of the individual states in the EU.
A. Yes.

519 Q. Yeah. And you know, you understand there's a dispute as to whether the test is a European test or whether it's a test by reference to the individual member

States. That's a matter the judge will have to decide, not a matter for you. But you do look at the individual Member States in the context of the claim?
A. Yes.

520 Q. Okay. And you refer in that regard to Prof. Brown's report.
A. Yes.

521 Q. And there's a quotation that you have throughout your report, in fact we've counted it, 12 times. Do you know which quotation that is?
A. It probably has the word "benchmark" in it.

522 Q. Well, close. It's "baseline".
A. "Baseline", sorry.

523 Q. okay, fair enough. So what's the quote?
A. I have the key word, but --

524 Q. Ah, we11, no, just look to paragraph 1.1. Sorry, I'm not trying to get you. It's not a memory test.
A. I'm, sorry where am I looking?

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: where are we in the report?
525 Q. MR. MURRAY: We're at paragraph 1.1 of Prof. Swire's report. (To Witness) So you see it there: "The US now serves as a baseline for foreign intelligence standard'.
A. Yes, I see it at 1.1.

526 Q. A11 right. Do you want to just take a look at the report?
A. Look at Prof. Brown's report?

527 Q. Yeah. We'11...
A. So...

528
Q. Book five, tab 66.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Is that the European or the American authorities?

MR. MURRAY: US, Judge.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: US. 66.
529 Q. MR. MURRAY: If you go to page three. Do you see there at the end of the page?
A. Yes.

530 Q. "In the absence of clear and specific rules in other countries, ironically the US now serves as a baseline for foreign surveillance standards, although the European Convention on Human Rights, which requires the protection of the rights of all those within the states party to the jurisdiction sets a higher general standard than the US Government's interpretation of its 15:12 internationa7 human rights law ob7igations as app7ying on7y within its territory."

Do you see that?
A. Yes.

531 Q. And I think there's an authoritative -- you regard Prof. Brown as an authority in this field?
A. I do, yes.

532 Q. You take what he says seriously on these matters?
A. Yes.

533 Q. Yeah, okay. Then if you go forward to paragraph 3.4 on page 16 , he's a list --
A. His page 16 ?

534 Q. Yes.
A. Okay.

535 Q. He's a list of what's required under the Convention. You've read this many times, Professor - I think this report features almost as a chapter in your book, or in your report, chapter six. So he lists what it is the European Court of Human Rights requires for data protection. One of the matters at page 17 - do you see over there, the second tab:
"Persons who have been subjected to surveillance should 15:13 be informed of this as soon as this is possible without endangering national security or criminal investigations so they can exercise their right to an effective remedy at least ex post facto."

Do you see that?
A. Yes.

536 Q. That's not the position in the United States.
A. It's also not the practice in the countries in Europe based on my research.

537 Q. Oh, I think that's the point that Prof. Brown is making. But he's identifying what is required under the Convention - which is relevant, as we know, to the Charter.
A. Yes.

538 Q. Okay. Is there a reason you didn't refer to those aspects of Prof. Brown's report which you have quoted many times and referred to at great length throughout your report?
A. Well, as I state - and I'm going to talk for just a second and then -- so as I stated in the chapter, I was looking for some reasonably objective, well accepted way to measure US practices when measured with the practices of other countries. The methodology for Prof. Brown is he looked to four sources for basically tick-lists of what it would take to count as effective protection and surveillance. And then based on those four sources, he and his group set forth 11 criteria for what a good system would look like. And then in chapter six we took each criterion --
539 Q. MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: This is back to your book?
A. Chapter six of my report.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Your report, yes.
A. Because for an American Professor to say anything about 15:14 European law is subject to all the criticisms. And I was trying to think how might you or anyone else come to some view in an area where there's so much contested and the facts are unclear. And so the approach that I came to was: Let's take this very good report from someone who's trying to show what good protections look like and take the 11 criteria and then for each one say what is the US law, what reforms, if any, have happened since 2013 - because we've had a lot of reforms - and then what is the most neutral objective statement of European legal practice to compare to that?

And that way, rather than taking some global statement of "Swire thinks this or that" you could say for
criterion one, two, three through 11, here's the US, here's the EU. And it wasn't me saying words, it was having block quotes from the LIBE Committee, block quotes from the, you know, Fundamental Rights Agency report, things like that from European authorities, so that I wasn't saying it, and comparing it to statements of the US law and the Review Group recommended in the reforms. And I thought that would be the best system I could find where you or anyone could come to some view of the matter. So that's why I relied on Prof. Brown's 15:15 report.
540 Q. MR. MURRAY: And that's fully understood and understandable, Professor. That wasn't quite the question I was asking you.
A. okay.

541 Q. I was just wondering how come you referred to Prof. Brown's report at some length without recording what he observes about the requirements of the European Convention?
A. Well, I think what I did was to refer to the report very clearly so everyone could see it. I footnote throughout my report very, very comprehensively. And then drew my attention to these conclusions about when you're comparing EU practice with the US practice, how strikingly strong the US practice is compared to the practices in the Member States. That's a different view than many Europeans, in my experience, start with. And so I was trying to show information that would let any reader, including the judge, come to some view on
that.
542 Q. Now, Professor, did anyone tell you that part of your obligation, as an expert, to the court is to present an unvarnished account of your sources - not just the bits that favour the case you're making, but if you come across material which is adverse, to reveal that also?
A. My approach was to write clearly, was unvarnished, my directions to the people working for me was to take out all the adjectives so we can be as objective as possible. And then there are times when there are certain statements that capture important points and I cited to those.
543 Q. I see. Now, you produced a report, you refer to it many times, your working -- tab 64 of that book. Your 2004 report.
A. Yes.

544 Q. Just some things about that very quickly please.
A. Yes.

MR. GALLAGHER: I think it's an article rather than a report.
545 Q. MR. MURRAY: Thank you, yes, it is. (To Witness) Just if you go to page 28 first.
A. Is that 1328 you mean?

546 Q. No. Well, I hope you've the same version of this as I do. But the pagination at the bottom should be...
A. So that's a different version than $I$ have. But if we go to section headings, I could probably find it.

547 Q. This is "The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law", Peter Swire.
A. Yes.

548 Q. I'm terribly --
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: It's just the page starts at 1306. If we add 28 we'11 probably get it.
A. No, so I think I can clear this up. The version that's 15:18 in the court booklet is a page, photographs of the pages as published. At an earlier stage on SSRN, which is the Social Science Research Network, I hadn't succeeded in getting the final version up and I've corrected that. So...

549 Q. MR. MURRAY: This is one source in the -- you refer to in your report with which you are extremely familiar, I think?
A. I certainly --

550 Q. So I might just read out some --
A. Yes, please. Okay.

551 Q. Because I'm sure --
A. Okay.

552 Q. "Targets of FISA" -- this is page 28 of the version I have, just above footnote 111 -- just after footnote 111.
A. 111. That will help me. Could I just turn to footnote 111? Yes, please.

553 Q. "Targets of FISA surveil7ance almost never learn that they have been subject to a wire tap or other observation." Is that a...
A. Now I've found it. Yes.

554 Q. And that remains the case?
A. We11, with the Snowden leaks, many people learned a lot
of things, including 215. But --
555 Q. Okay. Certainly legally that remains the case?
A. Yes.

556 Q. And at what I have marked as page 98 --
A. The footnotes work very well, if that were possible?

557 Q. What I have at page 98, which contains footnote 336, you made, at paragraph five, the recommendation:
"Consider Providing Notice of FISA Surveillance Significantly After the Fact For domestic wiretaps, the Fourth Amendment generally requires prompt notice to the target after the wiretap is concluded. For national classified information, even top-secret information, there are declassification procedures with presumptions of release... Yet for FISA, anomalous7y, the surveillance remains secret permanent7y.

Serious consideration should be given to changing the permanent nature of secrecy for at least some FISA surveillance. Procedures can be created that are similar to declassification procedures. For instance, especially in cases that have resulted in criminal prosecution, there might be a presumption of release to the target or the pub7ic five years after the surveil7ance concludes."

Then you continue in relation to the presumption of release. What's the position in relation to that
concern today?
A. So what was I saying then or what I believe to be the case now?
558 Q. No, what is the case now?
A. So one change has been made in that direction. In the 15:21 Review Group report we recommended terms somewhat similar to this. And that has happened for what's called national security letters, which is one type of -- and so the previous practice had been not to declassify those, to keep those in classified things. 15:21 And President Obama issued an order a couple of years ago that changed the presumption. So for NSLs national security letters - these are phone records, credit card records that the FBI can get - for these records now, the presumption is that they're released after three years, unless a very senior official makes a specific finding in that case not to release them. So the presumption has moved from secrecy in perpetuity to a transparency about those for national security 1etters.
559 Q. But that's the only change made in relation to that concern that you expressed?
A. There's been many other kinds of declassification, but there hasn't been a more general change to notice, correct.

560 Q. Of the kind that you recommend?
A. That's correct.

561 Q. Okay. Come back to page 82 , where you' 11 see in fact a discussion of the NSLs. I'm terribly sorry, 315 --
A. Thank you.

562 Q. 315 is the footnote.
A. Yes, I'm there.

563 Q. "NSLs are more worrisome from a civil liberties perspective because of the lack of judicial supervision 15:22 that exists with a Section 215 order".
A. Yes.

564 Q. "Oversight is appropriate for NSLs and Section 215 orders together to determine what factual settings are fitted to each too1. At a minimum, there should be a reporting on the use of NSLs and Section 215, as has been suggested already in Congress.

In terms of other possible reforms, probing questions are appropriate to determine whether and in what circumstances NSLs and section 215 orders are necessary at al7. If the decision to keep some form of NSLs and section 215 is made, however, then there are various reforms that would cabin some of the most disturbing aspects."

And then you talk about the particular issue of library records.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: I'm sorry, Mr. Murray, under which heading this? My footnotes don't seem to be helping me.
A. There was a period where I was talking about footnotes --

MR. GALLAGHER: It's 1338, Judge, ant it's...

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: 1338?
MR. GALLAGHER: It's the second paragraph on the fourth 1ine. 1338 -- 1358. Sorry, my eyesight has gone.
1358, sorry. And it's the second paragraph, Judge, and the fourth line: "NSLs are more worrisome".

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Thank you. Thank you very much.
565 Q. MR. MURRAY: And I'm sorry, Judge. (To Witness) These letters are still used very widely?
A. Yes.

566 Q. And what oversight is now -- what judicial supervision now exists?
A. So there have been substantial changes in oversight of NSLs, national security letters. I testified in Congress on this in, roughly, 2006 or 2007, was very critical of the national security letter regime. When they re-authorised the PATRIOT Act at that time in 2006, the Congress ordered the Inspector General in the Department of Justice to do comprehensive studies of the national security letters. The studies were done, they were made pub1ic, they were very critical of the FBI practices in 2006 or 2007. As a result of that, in 2007 or 2008 the Department of Justice issued comprehensive new guidelines for how to make sure the NSLs were done properly and the Inspector General was tasked with repeatingly going back to make sure that these were being followed.

And so from a period where, in my view, they were often being done lawlessly without following the rules, we
went to a world in which there were public and detailed guidelines for how they should be issued and where the Inspector General, who's this independent watchdog within the agency, has continuing oversight responsibility. Now, that has not been judicial oversight.

567 Q. Exact7y.
A. But it is a major regularisation of how it's being done. And in my view, it went a long way towards curing the worst abuses at least. But it's an area that I've continued to have concerns about. Our Review Group asked for further changes in the area --

568 Q. Yes.
A. -- the President did not agree with those suggested changes.
569 Q. And Executive Order 12333, am I correct in thinking that the on7y safeguards in relation to Executive Order 12333 are in PPD-28?
A. Let's see. So the Executive Order itself sets forth the authorities for doing surveillance. It says itself, before PPD-28, that if you do surveillance outside of those authorities, you're violating -you're against what 12333 itself allows. So 12333 says 'You're allowed to do this' and 'You're not supposed to do it outside of this'. So that's a statement from the 15:26 President in an Executive order.

PPD-28 has a series of -- Presidential Policy Directive 28 has a series of safeguards built in. Each agency
also has its procedures for 12333, and some of those are in the record. So for instance, the CIA had not updated its safeguards and procedures for quite some time. And one of the documents that Mr. Gallagher asked us to look at is what the CIA guidelines now say. 15:26 So there's been administrative updating and attention to how to perform 12333 surveillance.
570 Q. I'm going to come to PPD-28 in just one moment. But insofar as you refer to some internal control in 12333, is that justiciable?
A. Is it justiciable?

571 Q. Yeah.
A. I'm not aware of a way in which it would be justiciable.
572 Q. okay. Because --
A. And in fact Executive orders, by their terms, generally say that this does not create a cause of action.
573 Q. Exactly. As does PPD-28.
A. Yeah. That's standard language in presidential directives.
MR. MURRAY: Prof. Swire, thank you. If you can just answer any questions from my colleagues.
A. Thank you.

PROF. SWIRE WAS CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR. MCCULLOUGH AS FOLLOWS:

574 Q. MR. MCCULLOUGH: Prof. Swire, would it be fair to say that you have expressed strong views on the adequacy of

US data protection laws as against European data protection laws?
A. I have expressed clear views - you could call them strong views - about the comparison between the two, yes.
575 Q. Yes. In favour of uS protection laws?
A. In the national security surveillance area in particular.
576 Q. For instance, if we look at 2.5 or $2-5$ of your report.
A. I'm working there, yes.

577 Q. Paragraph 21.
A. I'm there, yes.

578 Q. We see that you have, on a couple of occasions, participated as a private citizen, I think...
A. Yes.

579 Q. ... independent person in various discussions, isn't that correct?
A. Yes.

580 Q. One of those is in relation to a meeting in Belgium, I think, isn't that right?
A. Is that the meeting where Mr. Schrems and I were both on the same panel?
581 Q. No, that's at paragraph 22. At paragraph 21 --
A. Yes.

582 Q. -- you attended a meeting of the Belgian privacy authority, or I suppose a discussion, a pane1 discussion hosted by the Belgian privacy authority, isn't that correct?
A. I called in through video - it was in Europe and I was
in the United States. But yes.
583 Q. I see. And you yourself decided to make a paper for that purpose and then presented that paper in a journal to which you contribute, is that correct?
A. I was invited by the Belgian privacy authority to testify. They asked me to do that. And when I did it, I submitted it to the authority, I put it on the website for anyone to see. Later there was someone asked if they could put it as a chapter in a book and I said 'Here it is' and 'You can use it'.

584 Q. A11 right. And then at paragraph 22 we see that, presumably again as a private citizen, you came to Europe in January and participated in a panel discussion with Mr. Schrems, isn't that correct?
A. That's correct.

585 Q. A11 right. And you've also given testimony to the US Congress about these matters, $I$ think, isn't that correct?
A. Various of the matters, yes.

586 Q. I'11 just show you, if I may, an extract of what you said on that occasion (Same Handed).
A. Okay. Yes, Sir?

587 Q. And we'11 find your testimony in this, I think...
A. It looks like it might start on page 20 of 29.

588 Q. Thank you. I have it in a slightly different version 15:30 to you. And we see that you gave evidence there about the effects of the Safe Harbour decision, I think, isn't that correct?
A. This was a 2011 testimony if I'm not mistaken. So this
was about -- the Safe Harbour was then in effect.
589 Q. Safe Harbour was then in place, yes.
A. Yes.

590 Q. So if we look down through your testimony, you see:
"The focus of my time today though is going to be on jobs"?
A. Yes, I see that.

591 Q. "Jobs in US businesses the effects on those. My point here is that support for baseline privacy principles is good business and good policy for the US. If we adopt 15:31 a 'don't care about privacy' attitude, that creates major risks for American jobs, American exports and American businesses. Other countries could then decide the US is a noncompliance zone, they can ban transfers of data to the US. Foreign competitors can then use the US for lack of privacy protections as an excuse for protectionism and then insist all the information processing happens in their countries and not here in the US, where right now we have such an important technologica1 edge."

And do you see that as an aim on the part of European competitors of the US to create some form of protectionist advantage?
A. So, Judge, I believe -- I was testifying to the US -the US Congress and saying we should do what's good for US jobs - it's a pretty standard way to try to get them to believe in something. My view is that in Europe
there are many people with very sincere beliefs about privacy protection and the importance of fundamental rights. My belief is that there are also some businesses in the European Union who would be glad to have a competitive edge against the United States. And 15:32 so there's a possibility of raising protectionist arguments, along with sincere beliefs that it's important to protect privacy.
592 Q. Al1 right. And do you feel, as you appear to feel here, that that's part of what lies behind European espousal of data protection law and protection?
A. As I just said, for some people the business advantage is a reason to support strong enforcement of European rules, for many people it's a sincere belief that they think it should be protected.
593 Q. All right. You continue in the second last paragraph of your testimony:
"So we are stuck in a world where they have national jurisdiction and national legislation. I think the question then is how do we engage, how do we find a way for the US to best have our self-regulatory, our good privacy principle but our non-intrusive approaches, but also explain to the rest of the world how to stop this protectionism?"

And that's again a reference to that portion of the -of those in the EU who espouse privacy rights and their motivation by protectionism?
A. Yes. Judge, this is in testimony before the Energy and Commerce Committee. These are the members of Congress whose jurisdiction is about how do we help US commerce. In that setting, I was making an argument about how it would help us commerce if we had better privacy protection.
594 Q. Yes. And does that make any difference to the question I'm asking you?
A. So I'm trying to be responsive. So I think we should have baseline legislation if possible. And your question is -- it was something about protectionism, I'm just trying to...
595 Q. Sure.
A. Oh, we should be able to explain to the rest of the world that the United States has a good enough system - 15:34 because it would have a good enough system - that then people who wanted to have a competitive edge would no longer have that good argument.
596 Q. A11 right. But that is what you fee1, as I understand it. But part of what lies behind the views of at least 15:34 some of those in the European Union who support data privacy is an indirect motive of supporting their trade as against US trade?
A. Yeah, in my experience, some European businesses would like to have the benefits of less effective competition 15:34 by US competitors.

597 Q. I think you've also, you also wrote articles just around the time of the Safe Harbour decision, just immediately before and after it, isn't that correct?
A. Yes.

598 Q. And in those articles you were commenting upon the inadequacy of the views of the Advocate General, I think, isn't that correct?
A. One of the pieces made that point, yes.

599 Q. I'11 just give you two of those articles if I may (Same Handed)? One is the...
A. Yes?

600 Q. The first is 5th October.
A. Yes.

601 Q. 2015. "Don't Strike Down The Safe Harbour Based on Inaccurate Views About US Intelligence Law".
A. Yes.

602 Q. You say:
"Important legal decisions should be based on an accurate understanding of the 7aw and facts. Unfortunate7y, that is not the case for the Advocate General's recent opinion finding the Safe Harbour agreement between the US and the EU un7awfu7. As the 15:35 US mission to the EU has also noted, the opinion suffers from particular inaccuracies concerning the law and practice of US foreign intelligence 7aw, notab7y the PRISM programme. It relies on these incorrect facts about PRISM to reach its conclusion, removing the 15:35 factual basis for its overall finding."

And that was a form of advocacy piece, I think, is that right?
A. This was me as a private citizen expressing my views about the Advocate General's opinion. I was advocating for an accurate understanding of the law and facts. That's what the headline says, it's what the first sentence says. The particular concern was about the Washington Post article that had said there was direct access into companies' servers and that the Advocate General's opinion relied on that as apparently a very important part of its factual predicate. And I had a different view of the facts on that based on my knowledge and experience and I thought it was important to point that out.
603 Q. Would it be fair to describe you as an advocate in favour of the Safe Harbour provision and against the Safe Harbour decision by the Court of Justice?

15:36
A. Am I an advocate for it? I helped to negotiate the safe Harbour, it grew out of my view that it was important to have a lawful basis for transfers between the United States and Europe.

The specific point of this article, which is very consistent with my testimony here, is that it's important for decisions in Europe about the US to be based on an accurate view of what the US actually does. And when the key factual finding is mass surveillance without limit in 702 - and my testimony here has been about the multiple overlying safeguards and targeted nature of 702 - that's such a big factual difference that I'm concerned that there could be incorrect
decisions or unfair decisions based on that. And so, I mean, I'd say I'm an advocate for accuracy here. That's what I would say.
604 Q. All right. And an advocate then against, as you see it, the incorrectness of the schrems 1 decision?
A. This article of october 5 th was before the schrems decision came out.
605 Q. Correct, mm hmm.
A. It was a criticism of the Advocate General's opinion because in particular of this factual mistake.
606 Q. Then you wrote an article immediately after the Schrems 1 decision criticising that result, isn't that correct? That's the second article in front of you.
A. I'm reviewing this article, just one second.

607 Q. It came out on the following day, 6th october.
A. This is, the version I have -- oh, sorry, the opinion came out on 6th October. My article came out on October 13th.
608 Q. Your first article is on 5th.
A. Correct.

609 Q. The Court of Justice decision is on 6th. And your second article is on 13th.
A. Yes.

610 Q. And just look at one part of it, for instance. Perhaps we could --
A. And so the main point at the beginning of this article is how to solve the unsolvable. It emphasises the role of independent data protection authorities here and suggests that model contract clauses, among other
things, provide a promising way forward in the wake of the decision.
611 Q. Can we just look at what I think is the theme of this article at the foot of the second page, page two of seven?
A. Yes.

612 Q. "The us must take European law and practice serious7y. It will do little good to fulminate about why the ECJ is wrong. The Schrems decision is now the law. At the same time, the EU should not be able to insist on US practices that are stricter than what the US expects of its own organisation".
ms. JUSTICE COSTELLO: I think that should be "eu".
MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes.
A. Yes, that's what it says. And I agree with it.

613 Q. MR. McCULLOUGH: Yes. And much of the rest of the article analyses eU practices and forms the view that they're worse or certainly no better than uS practices, isn't that right?
A. I'm re-reading this as you hand it to me. (Pause to Read) And I'm just re-reading it right now.

614 Q. Sure.
A. So "To date", it says, for instance, on page five, "there has been" - near the bottom - "there has been no such investigation of how US and EU surveillance practices compare".
615 Q. Yes?
A. "Nor did the court discuss the multiple changes to us law and the administrative process in the wake of the

Snowden revelations."

So my Belgian testimony talked about 24 reforms that had not been considered in the october decision of the European Court. So I'm saying 'Let's look at what the actual current law in practice is' and saying that if we do the comparison, it will come out, I believe. And I continue to believe quite differently than...
616 Q. Sure.
A. ... at least some had assumed.

617 Q. And this is a strongly held view of yours as I understand it, that there is a proper comparison to be done between US law on the one hand and law in the EU Member States on the other hand?
A. I believe in -- I do believe that if we're going to talk about equivalence or essential equivalence that that implies some comparison and so $I$ believe it should be a carefully done and factually based comparison.
618 Q. So the answer to that question, I think, was yes, you --
A. Yes.

619 Q. All right. And whether that's a relevant comparison or not, of course, is a matter for the judge. But it's certainly a view --
A. Yes.

620 Q. -- that you hold strongly and have advocated strongly for quite some time?
A. Well, I'd say advocated in the sense that that's the conclusion I've come to. I've tried to give very
careful footnotes and reasons for explaining why I believe that.
621 Q. There's just a few issues in your report I want to explore, Professor, if I may. At 3-23...
A. Yes.

622 Q. Sorry, before I go there. In your report you talk about a relatively limited number of targets, isn't that correct?
A. Yes.

623 Q. And I think you quote a figure of 94,368 targets in 2015?
A. That's a one year total from one of the government transparency reports.
624 Q. Yeah. And I think the reason that you make that point is in order to demonstrate, as you believe, that it's a, relatively speaking, small number, isn't that right?
A. Yes.

625 Q. And you've seen the comments on that in the joint experts' report.
A. Yes.

626 Q. Which I just have to find. If you look at page 16.
A. Yes.

627 Q. We've seen your comment that there's 94,368 targets in one year under the Section 702 programmes. And then you've seen Ms. Gorski's comments on the left-hand side.
A. Yes.

628 Q. And I think you agree that the targets that are identified by the NSA under the 702 programmes
invariably communicate with individuals who aren't targeted --
A. Yes.

629 Q. -- is that correct?
A. Yes.

630 Q. And you agree that the government likely surveys several selectors or accounts for each of those targets and that each account may communicate with many other individuals?
A. Well, so there's... I'm not sure I agree with the footnote 47 sentence you just read. So we have information on targets from the government report.
631 Q. Mm hmm?
A. And we also have information from the company transparency reports --

632 Q. Yes.
A. -- of the number of accounts that are reached.

633 Q. Yes.
A. And the statement that there would be multiple selectors or accounts for each target, I think, I don't 15:43 understand the basis for a clear assertion of that. Because there are also -- well, anyway, so I think "7ike7y surveil several per person" I think overstates the number.
634 Q. All right. Certainly likely not to be restricted to 15:44 just one in every case, isn't that right?
A. Well, if we have -- I don't think that we have any evidence about, for a target, what the typical number of selectors is. I'm not aware of such a number
anywhere in the record that I've seen published.
635 Q. Well we probably don't know, isn't that right?
A. I don't, sitting here, know the answer to that.

636 Q. If you look at page 14 of the joint experts' report, there's a number of statements that you do agree with on the right-hand side at item 14: "The experts agree targeted individuals often communicate with individuals who are not targets." That's correct, isn't it?
A. Yes.

637 Q. "The experts agree the government interprets Section 702 to authorise the acquisition of communications to, from and about targets".
A. Yes.

638 Q. So it's not just to and from, it's whatever they can find that relates -- that is about a target, isn't that 15:44 right?
A. No, that's not my understanding of "about". "About" authority under Section 702 is explained in detail in the PCLOB report. And the main thing to know there is that if the government is trying to find all the communications to or from somebody, it might appear in the header part of an e-mail address, what's called the envelope, or in some instances technologically it might appear below the line in what's considered the content part of the e-mail or other communication. And PCLOB said to the NSA 'Can you come up with a better way to make sure you're doing as little "about" as possible?' And the NSA said back, roughly speaking, 'we're doing the best we can on this, but sometimes you have to go
below the line and look at the "about" in order to find all the ones to or from somebody'.

So "about" could be an extremely broad thing which, anything about a particular person, but we know that saying it's about a particular person, such as Peter Swire, is forbidden under the rules - that's in the PCLOB report - and we know that the reason for "about", according to the PCLOB report, is in order to figure out whether it's to or from somebody.
639 Q. And we know that the government -- the experts also agreed the government acquires multi communications transactions, isn't that correct?
A. Yes, we've talked about that, yeah.

640 Q. All right. And just explain to the judge what they are.
A. This is where there's a series of e-mails that are forwarded from one person to another, the multi communications transactions or MCTs. And these are the ones that were found to be not strictly enough done in 15:46 the Upstream programme initially, the judge found it to be unconstitutional. The NSA came back with a set of tightened up procedures and the judge found it was constitutional.
641 Q. MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Is this the one with the different name? No, not the different name.
A. This is Upstream.

MR. MCCULLOUGH: MCTs.
A. Upstream is MCTs, yeah.

642 Q. MR. McCULLOUGH: Are stil1 use indeed Upstream, isn't that correct?
A. It's correct that MCTs are still used in Upstream under the new procedures, yes.
643 Q. Yeah. I just want to show you a document that we've created, so you won't find it in any of the books.
A. Yes.

644 Q. And I will explain what it is (Same Handed). This is a document based on the transparency reports to which you just referred.
A. Yes.

645 Q. And it gives the numbers that each of the companies have given...
A. Yes.

646 Q. ... for the targets against which they're asked to 15:47 search in each year. A11 right?
A. Yes.

647 Q. And you can see that the total for the years that we're looking at, 2013 to 2015, is just short of half a miliion.
A. If you add up -- well, these may be continuing, so I don't know if they're a half a million different. So if it was there for the first half of 2013 and it continued in effect for the second half, that might be the same person. I can't tell, but that's what I would 15:47 believe is quite possibly the case. But if you add up those periods and you're willing to have that double counting then you get to half a million, yes.
648 Q. Assuming that's what it is. And we can assume that
each person or each account - because an account, I think, is an e-mail or a telephone number, isn't that correct?
A. My understanding of the reports - I looked at the Google and Facebook reports, for example - my understanding is that was the number of customer accounts that were being accessed.
649 Q. A11 right. And we can assume that each of those accounts will necessarily communicate with a number of other people, can't we?
A. Yes.

650 Q. So if it's a Facebook account, that Facebook account wi11 communicate with Facebook friends, isn't that right?
A. Yes.

651 Q. If it's a Google mailbox, the mailbox may communicate with a very large number of people, isn't that right?
A. Yes.

652 Q. And of necessity, the government will have to look through all of the material relating to them also, isn't that right?
A. The government will have collected those under the law. There's a separate question when they collect things of which pieces are looked at for analysis purposes. But it would be in the database.
653 Q. Yeah. These are in fact numbers that are newly tasked for each half year, the numbers we have here.
A. I don't know the length of an order and what newly -I'm not sure. But okay.

654 Q. A11 right.
A. Yeah.

655 Q. And so the number that you give in fact multiplies out to a very large number of people whose data is necessarily inspected by the NSA, isn't that correct?
A. We11, "very large" is one of those number -- things. But what I would say is that the government has given us an annual number, such as 2014 at 90 something thousand, 2015 at 90 something thousand. And so this, I don't know if this is Section 702 or for all purposes, the numbers you've sent here, but in a year the US government has said 90,000 targets, roughly speaking, and in a year, even if you add up these together, you get numbers like 130,000/150,000. So those are the kinds of numbers of who's targeted.

656 Q. Mm hmm.
A. And then the question is how many other people have at least one communication with them? And that would be a bigger number, yes.
657 Q. It would be a larger number --
A. Correct.

658 Q. -- because you have to multiply the number in each target, in each account as the case may be, by the number of people with whom it communicated, isn't that correct?
A. Yes, and subtract double counting and all that.

659 Q. And subtract double counting. Al1 right. And you're right to say, of course, that we shouldn't use "very large" numbers - you've a prejudice against adjectives, I understand.
A. I do.

660 Q. But it's a much larger number than the figure that you gave?
A. Yes, it's much larger than the number of targets, yes. 15:50

661 Q. Yes, exactly. All right. Can I just ask you one thing in that context, it's something that you were mentioning; in the Upstream surveillance programme, as I understand it, internet traffic is scanned at congested points, isn't that correct?
A. By "congested" you mean some place where a lot of communications come to one place?

662 Q. Yes.
A. That's my understanding.

663 Q. Al1 right. And selectors are applied at that point in order to identify to, from and about, isn't that correct?
A. Yes.

664 Q. And in order to identify multi communication transactions?
A. So the MCTs are identified as part of that process, yes.

665 Q. All right. And that necessarily involves scanning the entire of the traffic that goes through that point, isn't that correct, in order to identify those that fall within the category in which the NSA is interested?
A. So it implies that there's a lot of collection there. whether it's $100 \%$ or not would depend on technical
features that I don't think we know.
666 Q. All right. Well, I suppose the central point is this, that the data of everybody that passes through the congestion point has to be searched, isn't that right?
A. Has to be -- so the filter would apply to both targets and non-targets.
667 Q. Yeah.
A. And so for wherever the filters are operating, it would be both targets and non-targets where there would be that initial filtering that happens. Then the ones that pass through the filters would go into the saved area for the NSA.
668 Q. All right. I just want to see if we can agree about that. They are all available to be searched in the first instance in order to identify the ones that you want to keep, is that a fair description of what occurs?
A. Right, so can I, just briefly? There have been big debates with good faith in more than one direction, in my view, on how to describe this. So I'11 try to describe it in a way that $I$ hope counsel will agree on.

So one way to think about it is you've got a great big pipe with lots and lots coming through and there is some operation that's done out of that great big pipe to get a smaller amount. At the end of that smaller amount you'll have the to, from and about selectors. The PCLOB report says there's two stages - is it us or not and does it match the selector? But there's some
process where the big pipe gets searched and then the first time, any time anybody --
669 Q. MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Sorry, does that mean everything in the big pipe?
A. Well, it might be that they can see $100 \%$, it might be they can see $70 \%$. Just whatever the filter's attached to, right? If there's two pipes, they might get this pipe and not that pipe. But wherever the filtering's happening. It's a big pipe, it's a lot of communications. The output of that is the subset that ${ }_{15: 53}$ matches 702 Upstream.

There's been a debate - and I'11 roughly summarise; some people say it's collected at the big pipe level, so you have to count it as a search of everybody in the 15:53 big pipe. Some people say no human being or analyst or computer programme doing anything for foreign intelligence purposes sees it until it gets to this subset. And so collection would be then the things that come out that are to, from and non-us.

I don't want to make some conclusion about which is collection or not. I believe there's agreement that there's the big pipe and that the NSA touches the big pipe for purposes of doing the filtering - or at least that's my view and it's what they say in all the court proceedings - and I think there's agreement that the actual analysis of what does it mean, is there foreign intelligence purpose etc. happens on the subset.

So that's my effort to try to explain the big pipe and the smaller subset that actually gets then subject to the sort of analysis of the national security agency.
670 Q. MR. MCCULLOUGH: Al1 right. Just one other point then, 15:54 Prof. Swire; this issue about direct access to the pipe, or direct access to the communications that pass through that are searched -- sorry, that pass through the internet that are searched. It has been said that there's direct access to that on the part of the NSA.
A. So here -- because the term "direct access" was in the original washington post story and it named specifically internet companies such as microsoft, Facebook, Apple, Google. It was in a programme -- it was in an article that described "the PRISM programme". 15:55 The PRISM programme is the 702 - you have an annual certification, then you have a directive to the company and specific selectors go to Facebook. What we've just been describing is the other programme under 702, that's the upstream programme.

So in terms of direct, my own view would be direct access to the internet backbone under upstream is a fair reading. My view is that direct access under PRISM to Facebook and the other internet companies is not an accurate reading. And the washington Post article said the PRISM programme had direct access.
671 Q. All right. And I suppose that brings us back then to one of the issues that was addressed in the report in
which you said that we don't actually know the precise technological means by which the government secures the information that it requires, isn't that right?
A. I'm sorry, can you --

672 Q. All right, if we look at page seven of the joint experts' report. They're now talking about PRISM.
A. Yes.

673 Q. You'11 see the agreed position:
"Under Section 702, the government serves directives on 15:56 us providers and providers are compelled to give communications sent to or from identified selectors to the government. The precise technological means by which the government permits selectors to providers and providers send data to the government, to the best of the experts' knowledge, has not been made public".
A. Yes.

674 Q. All right. And does that mean that we just don't know precisely how information is transmitted from the providers to the government under PRISM?
A. So here's what I intended when I agreed to that sentence; in Ms. Gorski's testimony there's discussion about we don't know whether it's sent by paper or by what other mechanism between, for instance, Facebook and the government, and what I was referring to to Facebook, the directive goes to Facebook's lawyers. But I don't know what combination of fax or e-mail or whatever is used to send the government's request from
the government to Facebook's lawyers.

And similarly, when Facebook sends it back, I don't know if it's on a CD Rom or by e-mail, I don't know the precise mechanism. What I do know and believe is that there is a request -- sorry, it's sent to the lawyers for Facebook, as other government requests are, and then Facebook returns it to the government, as other requests are, once the lawyers have said it's okay to produce. So I don't know fax, CD Rom, tape drive, the 15:58 mechanism of sending it back - that's what we were agreeing to there. what I do know is in PRISM that it's the legal production through the lawyers that we're familiar with in many other settings when there's a request for production.
675 Q. Equally, what we don't know, Prof. Swire, is whether it operates along the following lines: That the operators in the NSA or the FBI or whoever it is simply have to feed in the selectors once they've been agreed by the lawyers for Facebook and then the information comes straight back via a live connection. We don't know whether that's so or not.
A. I don't believe that's consistent with what the PCLOB report says. So that's not my own understanding of how it operates and I don't believe it's consistent with what the PCLOB report says when it gives details and says it's done the way other documents are produced.
676 Q. Can I just show you some of these slides of which we've heard a good deal?
A. Ah, the ones that were in the Washington Post, referred to in the Washington Post article?
677 Q. I think so, yeah (Same Handed). These, I think, come ultimately from the NSA, isn't that correct?
A. I am looking at them. I believe these were the slides 15:59 that the Washington Post original PRISM article referred to.

678 Q. Yes. And these, I think, come from the NSA?
A. I think that as far as $I$ know, that reporting is correct.

679 Q. All right. And you'11 see that on the first page it has the two 702 programmes of which we know, Upstream and PRISM?
A. Yes.

680 Q. Upstream: "Collection of communications on fibre cables 15:59 and infrastructure as data flow is passed." And then PRISM: "Collection directly from the servers of these US service providers".
A. Yes.

681 Q. Then over the page it gives a more detailed description. There are various types of material to which access can be gained. So there's stored communications, chat, RTNEDC - which stands for realtime notification of an e-mail event such as log-in or sent message, RTNIM - realtime notification of a chat, log-in or log-out event. And then other methods, other forms of information. And some of these appear to provide for realtime communication, do you see that?
A. I see the slide.

682 Q. A11 right. And does that not help you in your view as to what actually happens here, that material comes in realtime from the providers to the NSA?
A. So the Director of National Intelligence, the PCLOB report and other official statements of the US Government has said these are incorrect. That's consistent with my view under oath.
683 Q. We11, they may have done. But they come from the NSA, isn't that correct?
A. So I'm not challenging the accuracy of these slides, I'm chal1 -- sorry, the accuracy of that these came from the NSA. I am saying that these slides are incorrect to my knowledge.
684 Q. You're saying that various government officials have said they're incorrect?
A. Yes, and that my own information and belief based on the work I've done in this area is that they're incorrect.

685 Q. We11, is this something now that is based on your security clearance?
A. The conclusion that I'm giving is the same conclusion that the PCLOB report gave, it's the same conclusion that the US Government has given to the Commission in its proceedings and it's my belief that that is the case.

686 Q. Sure. But I asked you is that based upon some form of classified information that you have that you're not going to tell us about?
A. It is, yeah, it's based on my having been briefed and

I'm giving the conclusion that's been publicly released.
And in fact, you can't tell us anything about classified information, isn't that correct? I can't explore that with you, because you won't give me proper 16:02 answers, isn't that right?
A. We11, I don't know about proper answers. I'm bound by my obligations not to reveal classified information. The statement I'm giving here is the same statement that has been given by the uS Government officially to Europe, it's the same statement that is made in the PCLOB report and it's the same statement that the companies have specifically stated repeatedly. And I'm stating it also.
688 Q. All right. Well, we'11 just look at one more of the slides from the NSA if we may, the PRISM tasking process. Again this is referring specifically to PRISM. It's a couple of pages on.
A. What page please? Page four?

689 Q. Page four, yeah. And this seems to describe the process from tasking downwards. And we heard about tasking yesterday, isn't that right?
A. We did talk about it, yes.

690 Q. Yeah. And down the bottom of the page you' 11 see after the various tasking work has been carried out there's a 16:02 description of the providers Google and Yahoo...
A. Yes.

691 Q. ... giving the information to an FBI data intercept technology unit. What's that?
A. I don't know what, if anything, has been said publicly about that.
692 Q. Right. And is that the means by which the information is collected by the FBI?
A. I'm reading the slide as you are and... This is, Judge, this is an area where $I$ have to say what's true and I also can't say anything that's classified. And so $I$ will try not to say anything that will be inconsistent with those obligations.
693 Q. Professor, I don't want to know anything that I can't explore with you. So if you can't say anything otherwise than what you know based upon information that you can't give me, well, then I'm afraid I don't want to know it.
A. Right, you're asking me questions. Whenever $I$ have something that I'm confident is true and that $I$ can say publicly, I'11 say it.
694 Q. Yeah, if you know anything about -- well, first tell me do you know anything about this FBI collection unit?
A. I think I'm going to say the same thing; I don't have anything that $I$ know is true and that I can say about it.

695 Q. A11 right. So one other thing then about this, a document you handed in yesterday.
A. Yes.

696 Q. A document from the ODNI, do you have that?
A. Is that the targeting procedures?

697 Q. It's the assessment of oversight and compliance with targeting procedures.
A. I've seen it. I think somebody... (Same Handed). And which date is this? Yes?

698 Q. This is a document to which you referred yesterday.
A. It's one of the -- oh, this is targeting procedures, yes, it is.

699 Q. So just to put this in context, the certifications are produced by the NSA, isn't that correct?
A. The certifications are given to the court by the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General.
700 Q. I'm sorry, by the Attorney General. And the certifications for 1881(a), Section 702, they don't show probable cause for individual targets, rather they describe the system?
A. That's right, they show the targeting minimisation procedures that we described yesterday.

701 Q. And we've heard that there's a single authorisation for a very large number of targets in a single year under 702, isn't that right?
A. So we've agreed there's a certification once a year and 16:05 the number of targets is 90,000 or whatever it is.

702 Q. A11 right. And then this document, or documents like this, are produced in the course of the year that follows, I think, is that correct?
A. I believe -- well, there's oversight and compliance ones which are every six months - and three of those were recently posted. I believe this assessment of oversight and compliance with targeting was a one time study requested --

703 Q. A one time study. I see, all right.
A. Yes.

704 Q. A11 right. And we know that under 1881(a) that the basic rule so far as a non-US person are concerned is there must be a reasonable belief that the person is outside the US, isn't that correct?
A. Yes.

705 Q. And the collection must be for -- a significant purpose of the collection must be to obtain foreign intelligence?
A. Yes.

706 Q. And you showed this document yesterday, I think, in order to demonstrate the targeted nature of this. I just wanted to bring you to one part of it again.
A. Yes.

707 Q. It's on page six. It's a description of what the NSA analysts must fill in.
A. Yes.

708 Q. It's in the second part of the first paragraph.
A. Yes.

709 Q. "Specifically, NSA analysts must include the following information in a relevant part in the tasking sheet: The specific selector being tasked; citations to the specific document communications that led the agency to determine the user of that facility is reasonab7y assessed to be located outside the US; a description of those cited documents or communications; a statement regarding the assessed non-US person's status of the user; and a statement identifying the foreign power or
foreign territory about which the NSA expects to acquire foreign intelligence information".
A. Yes.

710 Q. From the point of view of a non-US person - that's an EU citizen, say residing in this country - I suppose number one is obvious, that's just a description of an e-mail or a telephone number, isn't that right?
A. Yes.

711 Q. Two to four aren't really of any benefit to the EU citizen, isn't that correct? They're directed to ensuring that the person is in fact outside the US, they're designed to protect US persons?
A. Could I answer that in the following way, Judge: So my view is that eU persons, the rest of the world, and us persons benefit from the care and attention to each selector that's required here. So an analyst has to go through these hoops or jump over these obstacles for each selector that's tasked. And then they have to get their boss to sign off on them. And so the care and attention of documentation for each one means that the analyst, in practice, will want to have a good reason to go through that. And so that rather than just signing off on an extra thousand or ten thousand, for every selector they have to go through this paperwork documentation. And my view is that is an important limit on mass and indiscriminate surveillance, because it puts a hurdle in the way of any analyst who wants to just go fishing around.
712 Q. Well, just look at the question I asked you.
A. Yes. So I believe it does provide benefit to EU citizens, because the method that has to be gone through for each selector is burdensome enough that it is done for a reason to do their job rather than to just look around among non-us persons.

713 Q. Prof. Swire, we can surely agree with this: Items two to four that have to be filled in in this sheet or computer form, whatever it is, they are designed to protect us persons, isn't that correct?
A. Well, that are located outside the United States. It has to do with different surveillance rules for inside the United States. But yes.
714 Q. They are not intended to be of any benefit to the EU citizen who is sitting in Dublin or Berlin?
A. Except in this indirect way that I've just described.

715 Q. Yeah, except that it makes somebody, if you like, think about the fact that he is there, isn't that correct?
A. Well, I think I've tried to answer that, that there's a system there, the system imposes bureaucratic rigour on the process to a certain extent and that is to the benefit of EU persons.
716 Q. All right, it's a matter for the judge ultimately. And then five is a statement identifying the foreign power or foreign territory about which the NSA expects to acquire foreign intelligence information. And that means they simply have to identify the foreign power or foreign territory, isn't that correct?
A. Yes, I believe so.

MR. MCCULLOUGH: Al1 right, thank you.

MR. GALLAGHER: Sorry, Judge, I'11 be very short, if that's --
Ms. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Yes, yes. Well, you're happy to complete it today? I just want to know whether...
MR. GALLAGHER: I'm happy to complete it today to let 16:10

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: The Professor might need a break.
A. I'm delighted to continue, if you'd like to.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: very good.
MR. GALLAGHER: Thank you very much for offering, Judge. I won't be long.

RE-EXAMINATION OF PROF. SWIRE BY MR. GALLAGHER

717 Q. MR. GALLAGHER: Just in relation to those tasked selectors, if you take the first one that you're looking at there, the specific selector being -- sorry, the targeting procedures, I should say; the specific selector being tasked.
A. Yes.

718 Q. Is that of assistance to EU citizens, that they're required to identify specific selectors and confine themselves to the selectors then so identified?
A. My view has been that each selector has to go through this process. So a busy analyst trying to get through their job and do a good job at it has to decide whether it's worth it to add each additional e-mail or each additional phone call or each additional Facebook
handle. And my view is that that is a significant deterrent to fishing expeditions.
719 Q. And the second one, citations to the specific documents or communications that led the agency to determine the user of that facility is reasonably assessed to be located outside the US, is that relevant?
A. It's relevant in the following way. If you have an e-mail address, that doesn't show your location inside or outside of the us in many cases. Sometimes it might - we could have the country code at the end. But if it's a G-mail address, you need a lot more to figure out whether it's in the EU or the US.
720 Q. I think the PCLOB report said that these -- the requirement that the person be a non-us person has an incidental benefit in terms of foreign citizens, isn't -- or foreign -- non-US citizens, isn't that correct?
A. The PCLOB report said that. And it's consistent with my view.
721 Q. Just, I'm going to take, if I may, the questions put by Mr. McCullough and just ask you a few questions on them, because those were the last matters that you dealt with. And in relation to the direct access issue on which you can't reveal classified information but you stated your conclusion on oath, have you read the affidavits filed on behalf of Facebook in this and the affidavit of Ms. Andrea Scheley, who deals with that matter in paragraph ten?
A. Is that the one that talks about the LERT, the L-E-R-T?

722 Q. Yes.
A. Yes, I read that.

723 Q. Yeah. Can I just ask you to look at that? That's in book four.
A. What tab?

724 Q. And it's tab 23. And if I can direct you to paragraph 16:12 ten.
A. Paragraph ten?

725 Q. Yes.
A. Yes.

726 Q. Ms. Scheley says: "Facebook does not provide direct
access to its systems to any government or government agency." Is that consistent with your understanding of the position?
A. Yes, I'm reading paragraph ten. It's consistent with my understanding or what $I$ intended to say earlier. So 16:13 in particular the last sentence says: "This information, and only this information, is sent to the requesting government entity, and subsequent requests and disclosures must follow the same process".
727 Q. I then just want you to address another point raised by 16:13 Mr . McCullough and that relates to your criticisms of the Advocate General's opinion in Schrems. And I think you indicated that there were mistakes in the Advocate General's understanding of the position in relation to the surveillance, is that correct?
A. That's correct.

728 Q. And could you just identify the main errors that were included in the Advocate General's opinion?
A. I'd emphasise two things. One is this PRISM story that
we've talked about, the difference between direct access to servers or the sort of mass access - and the word "mass" was emphasised by the Advocate General and the contrast with selectors tasked one at a time that we've been talking about. The second is that by the fall of 2015 the Review Group had done its report, the President had issued his set of reports in 2014, the US Congress had passed the USA Freedom Act, and these reforms were not reflected in the Advocate General's opinion.

So to the extent that a dictate has been that the Commission's decision and the court's decision should be based on current actions, not old and out of date actions, there had been very substantial changes in us law and practice that were publicly available and those were not reflected in the Advocate General's report.
729 Q. And on the basis of your knowledge and your description to this court of how the system operates, how significant were those mistakes on the part of the Advocate General?
A. We11, they were significant. For instance, the entire 215 programme, collection of all that phone call meta-data for vast fractions of phone calls had been cancelled by then. It's quite a material change. And secondly, for 702, PRISM, the difference between mass and undifferentiated on the one hand and targeted selectors is an entirely different kind of programme. using the word "mass" for targeted surveillance is a
very fundamental mistake.
730 Q. I think you identified 24 reforms you said that weren't considered by the Advocate General?
A. That's right. In my testimony in 2015 to the Belgian authority after the Schrems case, I listed 24 - you could count them differently and say there are 20 or 26 or whatever. But there were many different changes in law and practice that had not been considered.
731 Q. And I don't want to go through all of those reforms. But in general terms, how significant were those reforms, be they 20 or 24 ?
A. I believe they were very significant. When USA Freedom passed, I wrote an article calling it the biggest pro-privacy reform since FISA in 1978. And to not notice the biggest statute in 50 years, to me is a big deal.

732 Q. And how significant is PPD-28 itself?
A. PPD-28, to me, is significant in its, in the thrust of it to apply privacy civil liberties protections, not just to US persons but to non-US persons. It is not a statute, it could be changed in the future by a future President. But I consider it significant.
733 Q. MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: We11, how easy is that to do?
A. It would --

734 Q. MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: I mean, does it 1iterally just...
A. Can you just do it tomorrow?

735 Q. MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: ... just write it in tomorrow? Does he have to go through a process or...
A. No -- well, if the President doesn't do a careful process and vet it then a President can get into trouble and have courts strike him down - what's happened with the immigration ban. For PPD-28, my assumption is that we would find out publicly that it was cancelled. So then the EU Commission and the courts would be on notice at that point that this thing had changed.
736 Q.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: But as a matter of power --
A. As a matter of power, he could sign it tomorrow.

737 Q. MR. GALLAGHER: I think you indicated the concerns that US business might have if there were any change of that nature?
A. I know the US business would be very concerned at that point. The US business who does trans -- and also European business that does transatlantic business, if there were to be a disruption of the sort that we've discussed is possible, that would be of substantial concern to those businesses, yes.
738 Q. I think you've seen Prof. Meltzer's report in terms of the scale of the disruption, is that correct?
A. I have.

739 Q. Mr. McCullough put a document to you (INDICATING) that doesn't in any way on its face give us information with regard to whether, for example, in 2013 quarters one and two, three and four, that the users targeted are actually different, but it seeks to add up the numbers for the first and second quarter and the third and fourth quarter to give an aggregate number for the
year, is that correct?
A. On its face, the document doesn't say that. You could go back to the individual reports and see what it says and that would give you an answer.
740 Q. And he then aggregates the numbers for the three years total. Does it give any information with regard to the numbers of users that are customers of these entities, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Yahoo, Google?
A. The chart does not give those numbers. My report gives information when we talk about Google and Facebook of what the numbers are.

741 Q. And does it give any information as to whether the user targeted in Facebook in the first quarter of 2013 is different from the user targeted in Apple or in Microsoft or Yahoo or Google?
A. The document does not. And so if there's a selector and you're doing both to and from then I would think there's quite a strong chance that it might be from G-mail if it's a Google customer, but there might be a selector to Apple customers or to Facebook customers.
This has been put to you as an indication of the number of users over this period, different users. Is it possible to draw any conclusion as to whether that represents different users or the extent of the overlap of the users encompassed or captured by those figures?
MR. MCCULLOUGH: That is, of course, a leading question, Judge. I mean, all the questions on this line have been.
A. Would you like me to answer, Judge, or not?

MR. MCCULLOUGH: We11, now it's been asked, you better. MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Well, I think it's been asked, we'11 get the answer. Mr. Gallagher wins that one. Yes, answer it please.
A. Ah, okay. I thought you were saying no, so I sat back and relaxed.

743 Q. MR. GALLAGHER: I think I was being told no with the question, so I'11 improve it the next time. But maybe you'd answer that?
A. I received the document. I don't know the basis for deciding whether it's the same users or different users.

744 Q. Then going back perhaps, in reverse order, to some of the points raised by Mr. Murray. He referred you to Prof. Brown's report, which I think was at divide 66 but we don't need to get it out - and the list of principles that were included in pages 16 and 17 and suggested that you didn't draw attention to those in your report. And can I just ask you to look at the section of your report, $I$ think it's chapter six --
A. It is.

745 Q. -- that deals with that?
A. Yes.

746 Q. And I think you explained what you had done in chapter six, identifying the various principles and putting before the court a picture, or a full picture of the extent to which those principles were complied with, is that correct?
A. Yes, we went through the list that the Prof. Brown
group defined and we went step by step through them, giving quotations about them.
747 Q. And in fact, in paragraph three on page 6-1 you say: "This chapter app7ies the 11 categories of safeguards derived by the oxford team from these four sources".
A. Yes.

748 Q. And those are the 11 safeguards that are mentioned in pages 16 and 17 , isn't that correct?
A. I believe so. I think it's the same list of 11 that we're talking about, yes.
749 Q. Now, can I just then ask you, Mr. Murray referred you to the golden era of surveillance and you corrected him and said the golden age of surveillance. In what context were you referring to that?
A. I've written articles on encryption, it's an area I've 16:22 spent quite a lot of time on. And the FBI in particular has said that law enforcement is going dark; the idea is there's all these encrypted communications, the FBI is being blinded by encryption, they can't see anything. In a long article on encryption and in a shorter article that was called "Golden Age of Surveillance versus" -- "Going Dark versus the Golden Age of Surveillance", I've said this is actually an era where surveillance agencies have great advantages compared to previously. It's been a concern, it's part 16:23 of why we need to have good encryption. I don't know how much to go through the whole thing.
750 Q. No, that's --
A. Okay. But among other things, when Apple CEO Tim Cook
was talking about the big fight on encryption between Apple and the FBI, he, in his Time Magazine article, quoted "The Golden Age of Surveillance" as an example of part of why he thought it was important to have effective encryption safeguards.
751 Q. Can I ask you to have a look at Spokeo, on which you were examined, and divide 35? And there's just a passage on page ten that I want to draw your attention to.
A. Okay, I've got book three. Passage, number 35 ?

752 Q. 35, yeah.
A. Getting there.

753 Q. And page ten.
A. Yes, Spokeo, yes.

754 Q. And you see the passage, the second paragraph: "This 16:24 does not mean, however, the risk real harm cannot satisfy the requirement of correctness"?
A. I'm sorry, what page are you on please?

755 Q. Ten. And its the first full paragraph: "This does not mean, however, that the risk of real harm cannot satisfy the requirement of concreteness." Do you see that?
A. Yes, I see it.

756 Q. And Clapper -v-Amnesty. "For example, the law has long permitted recovery by certain tort victims even if 16:24 their harms may be difficult to prove or measure", states the restatement. And: "Just as the common law permitted suit in such instances, the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury-in-fact".
A. Yes.

757 Q. "In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified".
A. Can I -- so as an observation for that, I've said that a big goal of the credit report is to take care of you if you've had a mistake that hurts your credit. That's what I see as the major thrust of harm that Congress was worried about. If instead you get a bonus and have 16:25 a better credit history, that has not struck me as the kind of harm that Congress was most looking at. And here, where Congress has decided that there's a kind of harm to protect - like a privacy invasion - this language is consistent with that interpretation; if it's going to hurt your credit history you should be protected, if you're getting a bonus and getting help on credit history that's not what the statute was designed to do.
758 Q. And it goes on and says: "Confirming that a group of voters' 'inability to obtain information' that Congress had decided to make public is a sufficient injury in fact to satisfy Article III)."

And it goes on: " (Holding that two advocacy organisations' failure to obtain information subject to disclosure under the Federal Advisory Committee Act 'constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue')."

Is that passage relevant to the conclusions which your report contained in relation to standing and your understanding of that doctrine?
A. Well, I'd say in a holding that goes in the direction of limiting standing, at least in the view of some of the statements we've heard, this is authority pointing in the other direction, showing the relatively easier ability to establish standing and the majority is stating that, you might look at it as a limitation on the breadth of what it's saying here.
759 Q. Can I ask you then to look at the case that Mr. Murray handed in, the Facebook Biometric case?
A. Yes.

760 Q. And he referred you to Ms. Goldman's arguments on page 16:26 four.
A. This was a handout separately I think.

761 Q. It looks like this (INDICATING), it was handed in to you separately.
A. Yes, I'm getting it. Got it. I have it in my hands, 16:27 yes.

762 Q. And he asked you to look at page four.
A. Yes.

763 Q. And he drew your attention to Ms. Goldman's arguments, beginning on line 16.
A. Yes.

764 Q. And over the page he drew your attention to Ms. Goldman's argument on line 17, do you see that?
A. Yes.

765 Q. Where she said: "In the wake of Spokeo." He didn't draw your attention to, $I$ think, the judge's intervention in line seven for some reason.
A. We11, I was guessing you were going to point me to line 11: "Spokeo impresses me for its utter lack of nove7ty".
766 Q. Yes. We11, I was going to get to that, but I was just taking it in stages. I think the section begins in line seven.
A. Yes. And so --

767 Q. And it says:
"I am not sure I am prepared to say that the Ninth Circuit categorically said as to any statutory injury was enough. I think that goes too far. But leaving that aside, I mean, Spokeo impressed me for its utter 7ack of nove7ty."

Does that judicial expression of the Spokeo case, how does that relate to your view of the Spokeo case?
A. Well, I've been -- I've tried to be careful to say what I know about standing and what I don't know about standing and that $I$ haven't looked at all the different cases, especially in the lower courts. So it's the judge expressing scepticism about how big and we've gone through quite a bit, I'm not sure I have anything to add.
768 Q. And he didn't draw your attention, I think, to the next
page, beginning on line 14 , and perhaps more specifically on line 18.
"But in any event, let me ask you this" - this is the court speaking - "so I denied summary judgement and applied Illinois law because $I$ found that there was a fundamental right of privacy in Il7inois and that BEPA was attempting to protect that. So I mean, the one thing the Spokeo cases all have in common, which isn't much because they're all very specific to the facts, you know, they're addressing, but the one thing they all have in common is that when they tried to come up with an illustration of an injury that passes under Spokeo, they all say 'invasion of privacy' and that's what I found in the summary judgment order".
A. I'm not sure $I$ have much to add at this point.

769 Q. Sorry?
A. I'm not sure I have much to add. Maybe I am getting tired, but I'm not quite seeing what --
770 Q. Okay. Well, we'11 leave that bit then and pass from that. Earlier you were referred to -- you were asked about the Serwin report. Can you remember when you received the Serwin report?
A. Em --

771 Q. Or how long prior to your finalising of your own report?
A. I don't have a definite memory of when I received it. It was earlier than when I received the Gorski report, to my recollection, but exactly when different
documents arrived with me, I'm afraid I don't have a clear recollection.
772 Q. Well, it was furnished to Facebook's lawyers on 28th October.
A. You're talking about the second report or the first report?
773 Q. The first report.
A. Ah, okay.

774 Q. And I just want to clarify the --
A. Ah, well, then I'm incorrect. And that was right near the end. Because my report was filed on November 3rd.
775 Q. Yes. Can I ask you to -- or can I refer you to the -Mr. Murray was asking you about, and not giving you the case, the In Re Sealed decision and asking you what it held. And you couldn't recollect what it held and then you subsequently said that the date, 2002, actually assisted you and enabled you to remember.
A. Yes.

776 Q. This title, "In Re Sealed", is that a title that's commonly used for this type of case or...
A. That was not -- I mean, that would be a standard way the national security cases are often stated. And so it's like saying "In Re Redacted" case. "In Re Sealed" case - it provides almost no clue. As I stated before, when I saw that it was the 2002 appellate opinion, which was a very notable opinion, then I recalled it and can talk about it a great length.
777 Q. You indicated to the court that your practice when you publish an article is to put it -- or maybe it's
before, I may have got this wrong, but your practices with articles, learned articles that you author is to publicise them on the web and invite comments and corrections?
A. I did that in a very public way on the broadband report 16:32 last year. Also, American legal practice for law review articles is to use something called SSRN, the Social Science Research Network. And it's very common at an intermediate stage to put the article up there while it's still being edited by the law review editors 16:32 and it's common to receive comments at that point and corrections or add changes or whatever it is. And so for my law review articles and for the report that I referred to, I put it up there for people to see. It's known to be in process. I welcome comments and try to 16:32 make it better if I get comments.
778 Q. And when you get the comments, I take it you consider them and see whether any changes are required?
A. Yes.

779 Q. And I think you indicated that you were desirous of doing that in this instance, but were told that that wasn't an appropriate way in which to deal with evidence, isn't that correct?
A. I specifically asked Gibson Dunn if I could do that here so we could have maximum accuracy and they told me 16:33 that's not the appropriate thing in this case.
780 Q. Could you tell the court whether there is any analogy between that process and how you consider comments from third parties and corrections and what you did in
relation to the comments by the US Government that you've referred to?
A. Well, I'll make a general comment and a specific comment. So the general comment is I worked in government under what we call notice and comment rule-making. So for HIPAA - HIPAA is the medical privacy rule for the United States - in 1999 I was the white House coordinator for the HIPAA privacy rule. We put it out publicly for comment. We received 53,000 comments. Our obligation was to create a record that answered those comments. And so I was the white House lead and there was a health and human services lead. we coordinated a process for 14 agencies and 70 people to respond to 54,000 comments. We put out a document of over a thousand pages into the public when we did our final rule. So that's a thorough notice - read the comments, respond to them, come up with your final draft process - that I oversaw in that setting. And that rule was upheld by the courts later.

I think based on that experience, I'm prone to try to put out to the world 'Here's my understanding' and do it with, I don't know, some humility or understanding that I might be mistaken. And then when we do the work, sometimes we have changes. I try to have a rigorous process to minimise those changes and when I -- we had the experts' meeting and then I came to you to testify, I'm sorry, I was wrong on the Fourth Amendment, I hadn't done that part right, it was one of
the things I brought to you, and also on 12333.

So now, in terms of the government, I would've welcomed public comments on my draft before we came to court. The government had an obligation to read my comments in 16:35 detail with expert people before I could publish it, because of declassification review. The government sent in and had the kinds of comments we've talked about, from typographical errors to 'Here's this small exception you missed' and things like that. None of my 16:35 opinions changed. But as part of my practice to try to get it as accurate as possible, I considered each one, with the people working with me, we checked each one of the proposed comments. And where I came to the view that it was better to change it than not, I made the changes. Because I took my view to be as accurate as possible this is how US law operates. So wherever I could get an accuracy improvement, that was my goal and those are the changes that I accepted.
781 Q. You indicated that you had given instructions, it's 16:35 your practice to give instructions to your assistants and I think Mr. Murray aggregated the number of people who corrected the footnotes with the people who provided substantive help --
A. "Corrected" would be double-checking with the notes, yes, right.

782 Q. I think you said your standing order was for them not to use adjectives in what they placed before you. And I think you may have explained that, but would you just
clarify why you have that process or procedure so that there's no misunderstanding?
A. I think this also comes from my government experience. If you're writing a medical privacy rule that applies to the whole country, you want to be able to defend every sentence as accurate. So characterisations of 'an insightful this' or 'a badly drafted that', just take those out. 'The rule has the following three provisions', 'it has the following two exceptions', footnote it, publicly show what the footnote is. And that way, if you have critics, people who are in the government - it might be Congress criticising what the White House says - they'11 look at the sentence and they'11 say 'That sentence is correct, I have nothing to shoot at'.

And so that experience of writing in that tough setting against people who are pushing to try to find any flaws has led me to a practice of trying to be as objective in my statements as I can be.
MR. GALLAGHER: Thank you, Professor.
MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: Thank you very much. We're very grateful for your long time staying here.
A. Thank you.

MS. JUSTICE COSTELLO: So Tuesday at eleven o'clock.
MR. GALLAGHER: Thank you, Judge. Thank you for sitting late.

THE HEARING WAS THEN ADJOURNED UNTIL TUESDAY, 28TH

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