IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER,

Plaintiff,

VS.

1:17-cv-1320

PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON ELECTION INTEGRITY; MICHAEL PENCE,
in his official capacity as Chair of
the Presidential Advisory Commission
on Election Integrity; KRIS KOBACH,
in his official capacity as Vice
Chair of the Presidential Advisory
Commission on Election Integrity;
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES; OFFICE OF THE
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
BEFORE THE HONORABLE COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

JULY 7, 2017

Court Reporter:
Richard D. Ehrlich, RMR, CRR
Official Court Reporter
United States District Court
333 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 354-3269

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THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone.

All right. Go ahead and call.

THE CLERK: Civil Case 17-1320, Electronic

Privacy Information Center vs. Presidential

Advisory Commission On Election Integrity, et
al.

Counsel, would you please come forward and identify yourself for the record?

MR. ROTENBERG: Your Honor, good afternoon.

My name is Marc Rotenberg. I am counsel for the

Electronic Privacy Information Center. With me

is Alan Butler, also counsel for EPIC.

THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon.

MS. SHAPIRO: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

I'm Elizabeth Shapiro from the Department of

Justice, and with me at counsel's table is

Joseph Borson and Carol Federighi, also from the

Department of Justice.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

All right. I reviewed the motion for the temporary restraining order, the opposition, or reply, a sur-reply, and a very recently sur sur-reply that I just received.

So I have to say that the last document

I've received I've looked at very quickly but

have not been able to look at everything, but I did look at some of the exhibits, et cetera.

So, obviously, I will need to take a look at that a little bit more. I've also reviewed the pertinent case law.

I'm going to start by stating my overview of what I consider a framework in very summary forms what I would consider in informing my decision when I make it. I will tell you I'm not making it from the bench today. I do need some information, and that's part of the reason for the hearing.

So I'm going to start with the standing arguments as I understand them in looking at the case law. I'm going to start with informational standing or injury and the general principles that you start by looking at the statute that's at issue that requires a disclosure of information. It would appear from the cases that there would be no informational standing if the statute has a prerequisite to the disclosure of the information. That has not yet happened. There would be no informational injury because the Government has not yet been obligated to disclose the information; however, if you

consider the E-Government Act, which is the statute at issue in this case, it requires that there be a Privacy Impact Assessment and disclosure of that assessment before the, in this case, the election data is collected. So it would appear that it could apply in this particular case.

The Commission moved forward in collecting the electronic -- the election data, rather, where the statute requires an impact statement regarding the collection, and it requires also a disclosure of that impact statement before the collection of the data.

So I think this case fits more into that category when you look at the E-Government Act itself which requires all of this before you start collecting.

So we're talking about -- in this there's been no impact statement done or disclosed prior to collecting the data at issue, which the E-Government Act requires, and the injury here would be the nondisclosure of the impact statement prior to collecting the election data.

In terms of organizational standing, there are at least two theories at issue. One is that

the -- which the plaintiff argues that their members are injured or will be injured if the privacy impact statement is not done. It's not clear to me what harm there would be to the individual members, what they would suffer where the Commission is collecting, according to them, only publicly available information and would only publish in an anonymous form. So I need more information relating to the membership and harm.

Looking at another theory, which is in the PETA case, which is a DC circuit case, the DC circuit recognized a somewhat unique concept of organizational standing; namely, that an organization has standing if it can show, quote, "A concrete and demonstrable injury to its activities mindful that under our precedent a mere setback to abstract social interest is not sufficient."

This would mean that EPIC has standing if it can show that its public interest activities -- I'm assuming educating the public regarding privacy -- will be injured by the defendants' failing to abide by the E-Government Act.

So the injury here, it's argued, would be its public interest activities, educating the public, or whatever, and they would not have the information from the Privacy Impact Assessment prior to the collection of the electronic data.

So the failure would be to provide EPIC important information that they argue vital to its public interest activities. I need more information about this one as well.

So those are, in very summary forms, what I see as the arguments and the framework on which to make a decision on obviously the initial decision which is going to be standing.

Now, I have a series of questions that I'd like to ask, and at the end of all of the questions, I'll give you an opportunity to respond to my overview, to my two views of the informational injury and the organizational.

So I'm going to start with the plaintiff.

So why don't you come on up and let me ask a couple of questions here.

So I'm going to start with the members.

What concrete harms will EPIC members suffer if their publicly available voter information is collected and publicized by defendants in an

anonymous form?

MR. ROTENBERG: Okay. Thank you, Your
Honor. Let me begin by saying that EPIC will
take the position that, as a matter of law, none
of the information sought by the Commission is,
in fact, publicly available to the Commission.
I will explain that I believe it is one of the
questions you set out in your hearing for today.

The information that is sought from the EPIC members is information that is currently protected under state privacy law. Those state privacy laws limit the collection and use of state voter record information to particular parties and for particular purposes. In our view, the Commission falls outside the bounds of almost all of those exceptions found in the state privacy law for the release of the information that the Commission seeks. That's the basis upon which we say that there is nothing as a matter of law that's publicly available to the Commission given the request in the June 28th letter.

THE COURT: Well, it seemed to me -- and I only got to look at the chart very quickly as one of the exhibits, but it looked as if a

number of states were providing some; a number of states were indicating that they couldn't under their state statutes. There may be some federal statutes relating to Social Security.

The Commission has argued that it's only publicly available that they're seeking, and if a state has statutes that would not allow it to produce it, then they are not expecting to get the information.

MR. ROTENBERG: Right. We understand that, Your Honor, and we've attached by way of example the response from the Secretary of State of the State of Georgia, which was similar to the responses from many of the states in which the state secretary says simply much of the information that is sought by the Commission we could not release.

But then you see the state secretary goes on to suggest that there are additional conditions prior to the disclosure. So, for example, the method that has been proposed by the Commission to receive the voter data from the State of Georgia, even that could be permissibly disclosed by the State, the State would not accept, and the State said we would

have to find a different technique, one that is password encrypted and authenticated to permit the release of the personal data; moreover, the State of Georgia also said to the Commission there are fees associated when requests are made

for the release of state voter data.

The June 28th letter that was sent to the 50 state secretaries provided no indication that the Commission was prepared to pay any of the fees associated with a release of the data it was seeking.

So you see, there are three different ways to understand how it is that when the Commission approaches the State and asks for so-called publicly available information, the state secretary properly responds under the terms of this letter, "There's, in fact, nothing we can provide to you."

THE COURT: So your idea would be that if they had done an impact -- Privacy Impact
Assessment, they would've figured this all out?

MR. ROTENBERG: Well, Your Honor, that's the second category of our objection to the Commission's request. Not only do we believe that the states could not release the

information to the Commission, we further believe that the Commission could not receive 3 the information from the states, and this has to do with the obligations that fall on the 5 Commission by virtue of being within the Executive Office of the President and subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act and the E-Government Act to undertake certain steps before it could request any type of personal data. It was expected to undertake the Privacy Impact Assessment, which may very well have revealed that the method of transmission proposed in this instance was simply inadequate. So you see, in requesting the so-called

publicly available information, the Commission actually committed two flaws. In the first instance, it did not comply with the requests of the 50 states.

In the second instance, it did not fulfill its own obligations to safeguard the information it was intending to collect.

THE COURT: Okay. But let's get -- that one gets a little bit more to the merits it seems to me.

MR. ROTENBERG: Yes.

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THE COURT: Let me get back to sort of the standing question. I appreciate the information.

What concrete harms -- I'm talking about
this is -- the EPIC members would suffer if -assuming that there is any publicly available
voter information that can actually be
collected. I believe that they've indicated -I mean, if they're not publicly available,
they're not going to receive it, and you've
indicated that -- I don't know whether anybody
has actually sent anything or whether any of the
states can say that they can send it. They're
meeting all of the requirements. Do you know?

MR. ROTENBERG: Well, let me say based on the declaration of Mr. Kobach on July $5^{\rm th}$, two days ago, the Commission had not received any data from any of the states.

So, at this moment, we're relying on that declaration as to the current status regarding the transfer of the data that's being sought.

But to your question, Your Honor, let's understand two different types of information that the State is seeking. So by the terms of the letter, they ask, for example, for the last

four digits of the Social Security number.

Members of EPIC's voter information may well contain the Social Security number. It is often used in the state administration of election systems to avoid duplication and reduce the risk of fraud, but it is not the case that information is generally made available to the public. If it were made available to the public, the last four digits of the Social Security number have been identified by the Department of Justice and consumer protection agencies as contributing to the commission of identity theft and financial fraud because those last four digits are the default passwords for many commercial services such as cell phone or online banking.

So you see, the Commission has asked the states to turn over particular personal information the states would not routinely make available concerning EPIC members that if it were made public could lead to identity theft.

THE COURT: But that assumes -- I think they've indicated, however, that publicly available -- they've left it to the states to figure out, or whatever statutes. So if there's

a federal statute or some other way that they should not be giving out Social Security numbers, or the last four digits of Social Security numbers, the expectation would be that the states would not provide it.

MR. ROTENBERG: I understand your point,
Your Honor, but I would add also, I frankly find
it striking that a commission on election
integrity would make such a broad request to the
states for such detailed personal information
and then put it back on the states to determine
which information the states may lawfully
release.

Let me take a simple category. Home addresses. So there is agreement, for example, in the report of the National Conference of State Legislatures, the 2016 report which we've appended to our filing, that surveys the privacy laws of all 50 states. And it says, 29 states, as a general matter, will give out home address -- name and address, I should say precisely, name and address information.

And you could well say, "Well, that appears to be publicly available information. Why can't they just, you know, send back the name and

address information?"

And then you read more closely, and you see that, in fact, even though that information may be made available, many people in the states also have the right to restrict the disclosure of name and address information.

Texas, in fact, restricts the disclosure of the name and address information from the judiciary.

So none of these categories lend themselves to an easy release of state data.

THE COURT: Well, it sounds as if there's not going to be any basis for them to get anything. So your request to hold it back, if they're not going to give it, doesn't seem to work.

I'm still trying to get in terms -- what are the EPIC -- let me ask it this way: Who do you consider the EPIC members? Their advisory board. What does the advisory board do? I mean, the members that you're talking about, the ones you attached were advisory board members and also voters. So what are the rights and responsibilities of EPIC's advisory board members?

MR. ROTENBERG: Okay. So we have approximately 100 members of our advisory board. They are leading experts in law, technology, and public policy that contribute to the support of the organization. They participate in the work of the organization. They help select award recipients for the organization.

THE COURT: Do they pay any kind of dues?

MR. ROTENBERG: There is no formal dues

requirement, but most of the members do

contribute in some manner to the work of the

organization. And in this particular matter, 30

of our 100 members signed a statement to the

National Association of Secretaries of State

asking state officials not to release the voter

data to the Commission.

So we are, in effect, also representing their interest when we appear before --

THE COURT: Who is their interest?

MR. ROTENBERG: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Who is their interest?

MR. ROTENBERG: Those members of our advisory board who are actively participating and expressing their opposition to the data collection.

THE COURT: Okay. Do they control the activities of the organization?

MR. ROTENBERG: They do not directly control the activities of the organization.

There is a separate board of directors, but it is not uncommon for an organization such as EPIC to have this structure, and the members of the advisory board actively participate in the program activities and the direction and selection of matters that the organization pursues.

THE COURT: So exactly what -- the board of directors runs the organization?

MR. ROTENBERG: Yes, that's correct.

THE COURT: And the advisory board advises on what matters to get involved with?

MR. ROTENBERG: Yes, Your Honor, and actively participates in those activities and provides financial support.

THE COURT: But it's a voluntary financial support?

MR. ROTENBERG: That's correct. But they could not -- to be clear on this point, they could not be a member of the advisory board unless they formally accepted that

responsibility, and they may choose to withdraw their participation as an advisory board member as well.

THE COURT: Accepted what responsibility?

MR. ROTENBERG: Participating in the work of the organization.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROTENBERG: Contributing to its activities.

THE COURT: And the contribution you're talking about is contributing in terms of if you decide to take on a particular task such as this one, this particular case, that they would contribute to providing information, pursuing it? Is that what you're saying?

MR. ROTENBERG: Financial support including personal donations are routinely made by members of the advisory board, their time and their expertise.

THE COURT: All right. So what informational harms will EPIC suffer if the defendants don't comply with the E-Government Act, which requires disclosure of this Privacy Impact Assessment to be done and then disclosed before the collection of the data?

Again, I'm talking about EPIC in the context of either membership or otherwise.

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MR. ROTENBERG: Right. Well, apart from the individual harm to our members, also as an organization that was specifically established to focus public attention on emerging privacy issues, and has been involved in the voter privacy matter for almost 20 years, this particular controversy directly impacts our mission. This is not a speculative type of This is a circumstance where we arrangement. have for many years sought to advance an interest in voter privacy here in the United The actions by the Commission have States. required us to undertake a number of activities to work with citizen organizations, to discuss with media outlets the impact of the Commission's activity upon the public. an educational function which we would not be doing at this point to the extent that we are but for the Commission's request to gather state voter record information.

THE COURT: So as you've described it, I take it that's what you would consider your public interest activities?

MR. ROTENBERG: Well, yes. I mean, there is, in fact, also related litigation. We are seeking under the Open Government Act to obtain information about the Commission's activity. That is also activity undertaken, a cost to the organization, and in response to the Commission's act.

THE COURT: All right. And in terms of educating the public regarding data privacy or other activities, do you use routinely information from the Government?

MR. ROTENBERG: Yes, we do, and I should point out also central to our educational activity is the maintenance of one of the most popular websites in the world on privacy issues, which is simply EPIC.org. So for the last week, as a consequence of the Commission's act, we put aside the other work on our website and focused solely on providing public information related to this current controversy.

So there are two pages of EPIC.org with extensive information about the Commission as well as this litigation.

THE COURT: You started off the discussion by indicating all of the difficulties and

barriers there would be to provide -- having the states provide the voter registration data to the Commission based on various statutes, regulations, or whatever. I take it you're really getting to the merits that this is not publicly available for the most part? Is that the point of this --

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MR. ROTENBERG: Correct, Your Honor. we thought it was important to state that at the outset. We understood in the questions that you had posed to the parties for today's hearing, and certainly Mr. Kobach in his letter to the state secretaries, uses this phrase, "publicly available." He places a great deal of weight on it. But, in fact, we could not find the phrase in any of the state voter privacy laws that we looked at. The states talk about public records in some instances, or they talk about exemptions which permit the release of voter record information. But we thought it was very important to make clear that this phrase is actually not a phrase that helps us understand the permissible circumstances under which the data may be released.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I have some

questions for the defendant. I'll get back to you.

MR. ROTENBERG: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: So my first question is:
What's the authority, if any, relied on by the
Commission to systematically collect this voter
registration information?

I didn't see anything in the materials establishing or anything else that talked about it.

MS. SHAPIRO: Well, I think the main authority is the executive order which sets out the mission of the Commission and the charter based on the executive order. And in order to carry out the work that is defined in those documents, the Commission needs to collect and analyze information so that it can best advise the president in the report that it's charged with creating.

THE COURT: But you would agree that there's nothing in the executive order that suggests that you -- that this data should be collected?

MS. SHAPIRO: There's nothing specific about that, but I don't believe that authority

would be required because it's not a demand for information. It's a request, and the Commission is not empowered to enforce that. It doesn't have the ability to say you must do it. So it's simply a request to the states and nothing more than that.

THE COURT: Do you want to respond to the issue in terms of what he brought up initially relating to the fact that, as it appears that most states, if not all of them, have restrictions, and that there's really nothing that's totally publicly available about the request?

MS. SHAPIRO: So I think if I'm understanding correctly, I think what EPIC is saying is that they don't have standing because the way I understand what they're saying is that the states are not going to provide the information because the information is protected under state law, in which case there won't be information going to the Commission. So there can't possibly be any injury because if the information is not going to the Commission, there's no injury. There's no Article III standing.

THE COURT: Are you talking about in the context of the EPIC injury to EPIC members? Is that what you're talking about?

MS. SHAPIRO: EPIC members.

I also wanted to address the alleged organizational injury because I think that they fail standing on numerous levels. Not only do the members not have standing because their states are not providing the information, but, organizationally, everything that EPIC just discussed now relates to its advocacy mission. And I think the cases are quite clear that simply choosing where to allocate resources when advocating --

THE COURT: But that's only one piece of what he talked about. I mean, if you look at the PETA case, it certainly is -- the argument would be its public interest activities, which in this case is educating the public is that by not having the information relating to the assessment, the impact assessment, they're not in a position to put that information out.

So, I mean -- leaving aside allocating different things. The questions I asked really related to what was the role of the members in

order to make a decision as to whether, you know, the first theory of organizational standing based on membership as opposed to the PETA case, which I think is premised on activities, not on membership.

MS. SHAPIRO: Correct. Though the PETA case identified a concrete injury to the organization, a perceptible injury they called it, because they were not -- in that case, there was agency -- some agency inaction that prevented the organization from filing complaints with the agency. So there was a perceptible injury to the organization.

Here you have an organization whose mission is advocacy. They may be very, very interested in privacy, and they may be expert --

THE COURT: Advocacy but also in terms of informing the public, if I understood. The educational aspect would be informing the public of this information, and they're not getting it.

MS. SHAPIRO: Correct, but the information doesn't exist, and I guess that goes to the informational standing because I believe that the cases require that the information actually be in existence in order to --

THE COURT: You have to look at the statute first. And if you look at the statute, the E-Government Act requires that before the collection of the data take place, that you would've done this impact statement, which is different than the cases that have indicated where the statute requires. What I said is that the prerequisite to the disclosure hadn't happened in the other case, which I think is -- I can't remember which case it is.

MS. SHAPIRO: It was Friends of Animals, I think.

THE COURT: Yeah, in terms of that one, which is not what we're talking about.

E-Government Act doesn't require -- it requires it up front before you would've collected data.

MS. SHAPIRO: Yes. But I think, then, it's a question of the Commission not being subject to the E-Government. So it has no requirement to create that --

THE COURT: That's why we're getting back to some of these standing things.

MS. SHAPIRO: Right.

THE COURT: So let's get back to some of

the other questions that I had.

So your view of it is it's implicit in the executive order that they can collect whatever they think is important for their mission?

MS. SHAPIRO: Right. And I would refer back to the Mayer case, which was the Reagan Task Force on Deregulation that was addressed in Mayer v. Bush, a similar kind of commission chaired by the vice president also gathering information in order to make recommendations.

It's not uncommon to think that in the ordinary task of preparing a report and studying an issue, that you would need information.

THE COURT: Okay. I just was curious as to whether there was something I had missed.

What services have or will be provided by GSA to the Commission? Because I notice that the executive order says that, "GSA shall provide the Commission with administrative services, funds, facilities, staff, equipment, other support services as be necessary."

So have they -- is the Commission fully operational? Have they set up an office? Where is it located? Are you using any GSA services?

MS. SHAPIRO: So the Commission is in its

infancy. There has not yet been a meeting. GSA is tasked with specific limited administrative support, like arranging travel for the members, maybe assistance with booking meeting locations. Mostly logistical. That's what's envisioned at this stage.

THE COURT: Okay. Is that what you're expecting it to do in the future?

MS. SHAPIRO: Yes. Of course, the Commission is not really up and running, you know, to any great extent.

THE COURT: Where is it located at this point? Does it have an office?

MS. SHAPIRO: Well, I don't know that it has dedicated office space. I believe it's the Office of the Vice President, since the vice president is the chair of the Committee.

THE COURT: All right. What has been or will be the involvement of Commissioner Christy McCormick and/or the Election Assistance Commission in the decision-making process of the Commission since she heads the Election Assistance Commission?

MS. SHAPIRO: She's a member of the Commission but not there as part of her EAC

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role. It's completely distinct from that.

She's there as just a member of the Commission due to her expertise, and she would participate in the decision-making and the deliberations to the extent she's present at the meetings.

THE COURT: So there's not going to be any role or any information provided or any role by Election Assistance Commission? Is that what you're saying?

MS. SHAPIRO: Well, she would not be there as part of -- in her capacity -- in that capacity as --

THE COURT: Well, that's not quite what I asked.

MS. SHAPIRO: Okay.

THE COURT: What I asked is -- she's maybe not as the head assigned to it like the state secretary of a particular state, but my question is whether the Election Assistance Commission is going to provide assistance to the Commission?

So you have her -- I mean, there's cases that talk about dual role of being in sort of a private in the government.

MS. SHAPIRO: Right. I'm not aware that they would be providing any assistance. I can double-check that for the Court, but my understanding is that they would not be providing assistance, and she is on the board simply as a member of the Commission.

THE COURT: All right. The executive order talks about other federal agencies will, quote, "Cooperate with the Commission."

Any other federal agencies currently cooperating with the Commission?

MS. SHAPIRO: No. Right now there are no other federal members of the Commission. I don't know of any other federal agencies working with the Commission.

THE COURT: So let me move into the website in terms of which -- it appears to be an Army website?

MS. SHAPIRO: Yes.

THE COURT: So that's not going to be -that doesn't involve a federal agency?

MS. SHAPIRO: Well, it's a site that exists to transfer large data sites, but that is more of an IT tool. It's not -- it doesn't involve their -- the military is not engaged in the work of the Commission in any substantive way.

THE COURT: Let me ask it this way. Who

operates the website that's named in the

Commission's request? Is that a component of -
it looks -- they did an impact statement

themselves about the website, the DOD did, which

is obviously a federal agency, or will be

considered under the definition.

So who is going to actually operate the website? Somebody has to. I assume it's not the Commission. Is it the DOD?

MS. SHAPIRO: So the way I understand it works is that the user uploads the data, and then it's downloaded by the Commission; that DOD doesn't play a role in that other than maintaining the site. They don't store the data. They don't archive the data. It deletes after two weeks I believe is the maximum amount of time.

THE COURT: So say this again. They maintain it?

MS. SHAPIRO: Well, it's their site.

THE COURT: Right. So they receive the data and maintain it for the two weeks?

MS. SHAPIRO: Well, the person uploading the data can set the time that --

THE COURT: And who is uploading the data?

MS. SHAPIRO: The states, for example. If they want to upload the data to the site, they can set an expiration date of -- it must be less than two weeks. So a maximum of two weeks that it can remain on the server.

THE COURT: So DOD, according to you, has no role?

MS. SHAPIRO: That's right, other than, of course, that it runs the SAFE system.

I did want to address, since we're talking about that system, the declaration that the plaintiff put in about getting insecure or error messages. If you read through the website for SAFE itself, it's clear that it's tested and certified to work with Windows XP and Microsoft Explorer. So the browsers that EPIC's declarant used were Google and Netscape, I believe, not Explorer. If you plug it into Explorer, it works just fine. And that's in two different places on the website where it makes that clear, that that's the browser that you need to use.

I have actually compiled some of the pertinent information from the SAFE site that I can provide to the Court and a copy for the plaintiff as well, if it's helpful.

THE COURT: Certainly.

So let me see if I understand it. The computer system that's going to operate in terms of this information, you seem to be saying that the website by DOD is sort of like a conduit, shall we say --

MS. SHAPIRO: Yes.

THE COURT: -- to a system of your own.

So you're going to have your own database at the Commission?

MS. SHAPIRO: So I don't know exactly what the Commission -- it will be stored in the White House email, or the White House servers. So it will be on the White House system. But what the Commission is going to do by way of using the data and compiling the data, I can't speak to that yet.

THE COURT: So you're assume it's either going to be the Commission or the White House that would own and operate the computer system on which the data is going to be stored?

MS. SHAPIRO: Yes. And the email address that was provided in the letter to the states is a White House email address that's maintained by the White House, the same system that supports

the president and the vice president and secures their communications.

THE COURT: So it gets on the DOD. Then how is it going to be transferred to the White House computer system? Who is doing that?

MS. SHAPIRO: So my understanding is that the Commission then downloads the information from SAFE, and then it would be kept in the White House systems.

THE COURT: So they have an IT staff that's expected to do this?

MS. SHAPIRO: Well, I don't know how they're using or going to use IT staff, but the Office of Administration, which serves the Office of the President generally is also within the Executive Office of the President and maintains the White House systems.

THE COURT: You also -- I believe it was a letter that gave an email address. Who owns and operates the computer system associated with the email?

MS. SHAPIRO: So that's the White House -- the ovp.gov address.

THE COURT: So this will be on the White House --

MS. SHAPIRO: Yeah.

THE COURT: And so any other agencies, federal agencies provide support services for the White House's computer system?

MS. SHAPIRO: Well, I think that's a complicated question simply because some of the details about how the -- the mechanics of the White House IT is something that may not be appropriate to say in a public setting because --

THE COURT: Well, let me just put it this way. Obviously, I'm trying to see if you're getting any -- your argument is E-Government Act doesn't apply because there's no federal agency that's involved.

MS. SHAPIRO: Yes.

THE COURT: So I'm exploring whether there actually is a federal agency that's involved.

MS. SHAPIRO: I understand, but I think the test is not necessarily to look to see if there's one member or one little piece of support.

THE COURT: No. I'm just trying to see in terms of how the data would be -- would come, be collected, stored, whether you're doing a

separate database or how you're doing this. You seem to be indicating that DOD's website would maintain it at least for the period of time until it got transferred, right?

MS. SHAPIRO: Yes. This conduit system would have it for -- until it's downloaded. So from the time it's uploaded until the time it's downloaded for a maximum of two weeks and shorter if that's what's set by the states.

THE COURT: And then you also talked about at some point, although it would be allegedly anonymous, but what system is going to be used to publish the voter information?

MS. SHAPIRO: Well, one publication I think is unclear at this point because it's not clear what would be published. I think Mr. Kobach made clear that the raw data would not be published. That's just -- we don't know at this point.

THE COURT: So do you know who would be making it anonymous? Who would be involved in doing this?

I guess the other question is: Is the White House server in a position to take -- I mean, this is a lot of information. Assuming

all these states actually provided you the
information, are they going to actually handle
it?

MS. SHAPIRO: I assume -THE COURT: I could see DOD handling it,

THE COURT: I could see DOD handling it, but do you know?

MS. SHAPIRO: I don't know, but I'm assuming they have a way to handle it.

THE COURT: All right. I guess I'll start with you and then work back to EPIC, but this is sort of your best arguments on irreparable harm.

How are the defendants harmed if they're required to conduct and disclose a privacy assessment before collecting voter information?

Is there any harm to you to do this before you had collected it?

MS. SHAPIRO: Well, yes. I mean, because -- our position is that they're not subject to the E-Government Act because they're not an agency, then we would be required to do something that we're not required to do. So I think there's inherent harm there.

And, you know, there's also a certain amount of -- you know, the privacy assessment is normally done by specific officers and agencies.

So it's set up in a way that doesn't fit very well to the Commission. It talks about chief information officers and positions that are appointed as part of the E-Government Act in agencies. But because the Commission is not an agency, it doesn't have those things. So there would be a certain amount of figuring out what to do with that.

THE COURT: Well, I was provided -- I didn't get a chance to look at all of the exhibits, but it looks as if the Government, or DOD, has already done a -- pursuant to the E-Gov Act -- a privacy impact statement for the website issued by DOD that you plan on having all of this data at least be maintained initially?

MS. SHAPIRO: We got the exhibits 30 minutes before we came here. So I haven't studied them, but that's what it appears to be. But DOD is an agency but the Commission is not.

THE COURT: Okay. And any public interest in foregoing this privacy assessment?

MS. SHAPIRO: I'm sorry. Public interest?

THE COURT: Any public interest? I mean,

it's one of the things you have to weigh.

What's your public interest in not doing it?

MS. SHAPIRO: Well, I think --

THE COURT: This is around doing a privacy assessment.

MS. SHAPIRO: I understand.

I think initially plaintiff is seeking extraordinary emergency relief. So, really, the burden is on them, but I think --

THE COURT: I'm going to ask them the same thing, but I'm just asking you. I mean, balancing public interest, is there anything in your perspective?

MS. SHAPIRO: I mean, I think the public interest is that there's, you know, been a priority that there's important work to be done by this commission, and that it should be permitted to go forward, and, you know, do the mission that the president thinks is important to have done. That's in the public interest, to be able to carry on that work.

So, you know, I think there's a public interest in proceeding versus we believe no public interest in the contrary because there's no standing and because there's not an agency involved that's required.

THE COURT: Then, obviously, I have to find 2 standing before we got to this issue. 3 MS. SHAPIRO: Yes. THE COURT: I just wanted to see what your 4 5 answer would be. 6 Okay. Thank you. 7 MS. SHAPIRO: I wanted to say one more 8 thing before I forgot. 9 THE COURT: Certainly. MS. SHAPIRO: When Mr. Kobach filed his 10 declaration, his first declaration I think on 11 July 5th, we said that no information had come 12 into the site. But yesterday the State of 13 Arkansas did transmit information, and it has 14 15 not been downloaded. So it hasn't been 16 accessed, but it is in the SAFE site. 17 THE COURT: So it's on the DOD site? 18 MS. SHAPIRO: Yes. 19 THE COURT: That you called a SAFE site. 20 MS. SHAPIRO: Yes. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MS. SHAPIRO: Would Your Honor want a copy? 23 THE COURT: Yes. If you pass it up to 24 Ms. Patterson, I'd appreciate it, and give it to 25 plaintiffs.

MS. SHAPIRO: Your Honor, I have one more 2 handout, if Your Honor wants it, that relates to standing. It's simply a copy of a decision from 3 4 2014, from Judge Amy Berman Jackson that 5 involves EPIC. It's called EPIC vs. Department 6 of Education, and it addresses the 7 organizational standing really in very 8 closely analogous circumstances. 9 THE COURT: Yeah. I'm familiar with the 10

case. I know what it is.

MS. SHAPIRO: I know you are. Okay.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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But let me just ask one last question. Since DOD is maintaining -- their website is maintaining the data, why shouldn't they do the assessment? They're a federal agency, and they're basically involved in at least maintaining of the data that's being collected. So why shouldn't they, as a federal agency, do an impact statement relating to the data that they have on their website?

MS. SHAPIRO: So I understand that they've done an assessment for the site, and it can't --

THE COURT: But for the site in general.

MS. SHAPIRO: Right. But it can't be the

case that when you have a sharing site like this, it acts as a conduit, that every time information is uploaded, that you have to have a separate Privacy Impact Assessment.

THE COURT: I don't know that that's necessarily true. I mean, it seems to me -I'll have to go back and look at the E-Gov Act, but it seems to me if you were dealing with issues of data and privacy, certainly election registration data may be different than some other data in terms of what it would -- what would be done, why they wouldn't be obliged to do one.

MS. SHAPIRO: Because there are very specific requirements. Even in the E-Government Act, they have to be collecting the information. And I think when they are passive --

THE COURT: Well, aren't they collecting it?

MS. SHAPIRO: Well, no, because they're a passive website that -- I mean, a passive site that people upload the information to. You know, DOD is not monitoring what information is being uploaded. It is a way to be able to send large data sets.

THE COURT: But that's true of anything that they use this website for, but they went ahead and did one.

MS. SHAPIRO: They did one for the system.

THE COURT: Right. But, obviously, they
thought that it was appropriate to do it. I
don't understand the distinction.

MS. SHAPIRO: So I think the distinction is to do it for the security of the site. Writ large is one thing, but to do it every time a user anywhere in the country happens to upload information into it, I don't think it's either required or would be rational.

THE COURT: Well, it may depend on what the information is that's, you know, that's being collected and maintained on the website.

MS. SHAPIRO: I don't think DOD would even know that.

THE COURT: I mean, it may be that they would say their impact statement says there isn't anything further to be said. It's safe as we said before. But I'm just saying, I don't understand why you wouldn't do it if the information is of this type of nature, the nature of this voting registration information.

MS. SHAPIRO: DOD is not monitoring the substance of the information that's coming in. They're not going to know people are uploading different data sets.

THE COURT: Well, it does make a difference. The information is going to sit there. Certainly people could potentially have access to it. It could be hacked or whatever else. Why would you not -- why would they not be required to do one?

MS. SHAPIRO: I think for the reason that the operation of the system, one doesn't fit within the definition of when they're required to do one because they're not collecting as the passive site, but also the practicality of any time somebody uploads information to that site, be it for a day or for the maximum of two weeks, DOD is not monitoring that. They don't know that. They don't know what's in the data. It's a secure passageway.

So the idea --

THE COURT: So are you relying on the E-Gov

Act to say that they would not need to do it

based on their role in this particular case?

I'm trying to figure out what you're relying on.

MS. SHAPIRO: Well, I think that's part of 2 it, yes. So we haven't -- that issue was not 3 before us, so we haven't fully analyzed the 4 requirements of the E-Government Act as applied 5 to DOD, but it does require some active 6 collection. 7 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 8 MS. SHAPIRO: Thank you. 9 THE COURT: Thank you. MR. ROTENBERG: Your Honor, if I may. 10 11 think I have the precise answer to the question 12 you just posed to counsel. THE COURT: All right. 13 MR. ROTENBERG: We attached in our 14 15 supplementary motion this afternoon Exhibit 5, 16 which is, in fact, the Privacy Impact Assessment 17 for the SAFE system, and the very first question asks regarding who the information will be 18 19 received from. The first box, which is "yes" --20 THE COURT: Hold on one second. This is 21 the very last one you put in the file, right? 22 MR. ROTENBERG: Yes. This is the Notice of 23 Filing of Supplemental Exhibits --24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. ROTENBERG: -- relevant to the

questions raised in the Court's order.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. And you're looking at -- which exhibit number is it?

MR. ROTENBERG: We're looking at Exhibit 5, the very first page.

THE COURT: Okay. I see it.

MR. ROTENBERG: And do you see, there are different scenarios. In fact, the DOD is very much aware of who makes use of the website. The first option refers to receiving information from members of the general public. That box is not checked. It's the subsequent box which says from federal personnel and/or federal contractors. That box is checked. And state secretaries would not qualify on that basis.

Moreover, if I may point out, these are pages 32 and 33 in the ECF, the PIA sets out a fairly narrow set of circumstances under which it may be used for the transfer of official information. And as to the question do individuals have the opportunities to object, the basis of saying "yes" is by not sending personally identifiable information through the transfer system.

So we would say by the terms of the

agencies' own Privacy Impact Assessment, it is not suitable for the purpose that the Commission proposes.

But if I may make one other point that is also relevant to this. We actually don't believe that the Commission had the authority to turn to the military agency to receive the information because if you look at both the executive order and the Commission's charter, it is the GAO that is described as providing not only administrative services but also --

THE COURT: GAO or GSA?

MR. ROTENBERG: GSA. Thank you.

It is the GSA that provides not simply administrative services, this is not just, you know, arranging travel plans, this is also facilities and equipment. Those words appear in the president's executive order. And in the charter implementing the work of the Commission, paragraph 6 describes, quote, "The agency responsible for providing support."

And in that paragraph, these terms "administrative services, facilities, and equipment" appear as well.

So it's entirely unclear to us upon what

legal basis the vice chair had to direct the state secretaries of state to send this information to the proposed military website.

And this, by the way, is entirely apart from the factual concerns that have been raised about the adequacy of the security techniques that are deployed with this site for personal information.

THE COURT: All right. Let me get back, then, in terms of looking at the -- back to the standing issues in terms of -- you've indicated -- if you want to respond to what she indicated, why you would not be under the theory that it requires that there be this assessment before you collect -- no, it's the organizational. Excuse me. The organizational in terms of your public interest activities.

She indicated that -- and there was a distinction in terms of what are considered in that Public Interest Activities, what are allowed and what are not allowed in terms of providing you under this PETA case theory organizational standing.

If you want to respond to -- that's where your activities don't fit it.

MR. ROTENBERG: Right. Well, I think we've done this, Your Honor, in our reply brief, if I can just point to pages 20 and 21. In fact, we are relying on PETA in making the argument that we do have organizational standing and the activities we describe is the participation and work of our experts and to seek records from the Commission and to respond to the requests that had been made by the public.

What the language from PETA is relevant on this point is that our activities are, quote,
"In response to and to counteract the effects of defendant's alleged unlawful conduct."

That's page 20 in the reply.

THE COURT: All right. The other question that I had is -- obviously, there needs to be some sort of federal agency connection to the Commission in order for the E-Gov Act to apply. So what is your best argument as to what federal agency is associated with it?

MR. ROTENBERG: Well, we think the

Commission itself is an agency for purposes of
the E-Government Act. That agency tracks the
definition of the Freedom of Information Act and
includes the Executive Office of the President.

So, therefore, the obligation to complete the Privacy Impact Assessment would fall upon the Commission as an agency.

THE COURT: You know, there is a case that talks about -- and I forgot which of the -- it was in the, I believe, the vice president's office, and it indicated that they provided basically personnel issues, those kinds of assistance. It was the executive office of either the president or the vice president. I forgot which, and it was -- that commission had not viewed itself as a federal agency.

MR. ROTENBERG: I'm not familiar with the case, Your Honor. If we could find the cite, we would be happy to provide a response.

I do want to point out, also --

THE COURT: Let me find it for you. It was

Crew vs. The Office Of Administration. It was

the Office of Administration within the

Executive Office of the President. In fact, it

was one of my cases relating to disclosure of

documents to the White House's alleged loss of

millions of emails, and they found that that

commission, based on its functions, was not -
you know, was not considered a federal agency

for different purposes.

MR. ROTENBERG: All right. But I don't think that case implicated either the E-Government Act or the Federal Advisory Committee Act. So at least in the first instance, we would need to look at whether those statutes are relevant in Crew. I would be happy to look more closely, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So besides indicating that you think the Commission itself is a federal agency, any other argument?

MR. ROTENBERG: Well, yes. The GSA, in providing functional services to the Commission, which, as we set out we believe is the expectation contained within the executive order and also the charter of the Commission, would be subject to the agency status. And as you have also suggested, the member of the EAC, by virtue of the association with the EAC, could raise agency concerns.

We found it interesting, for example, that the Election Assistance Commission, not this commission, but the one that Ms. McCormick is a member of, has been subject to scrutiny under the Privacy Impact Assessment by that agency's

Office of Inspector General for similar activity.

Now, there's no wrongdoing. That's not what I'm suggesting. But, rather, the point being with far less data collection at the EAC, for more than 10 years the Office of Inspector General has paid careful attention to the E-Government obligation. That is my point.

THE COURT: But the problem, at least as she presents -- as Ms. Federighi presents it, is that the person that's on the Commission is not there in her official capacity.

MR. ROTENBERG: That's the representation.

THE COURT: Well, I know, but do you have something to counter it?

MR. ROTENBERG: Well, the person who is on the Commission is also affiliated with the most significant election commission apart from the president's commission that would address these issues.

THE COURT: Do you think -- the Department of Defense is not a defendant in this case, but is there any argument as we pursued this issue of the DOD having basically the website and all of this material uploaded to it and maintaining

it at least for a period of time until it gets transferred?

MR. ROTENBERG: Well --

THE COURT: Is that an agency that you would argue is involved with the Commission or not? Do you agree with the argument that it's not?

MR. ROTENBERG: We would say that, in fact, it is involved by virtue of the letter from the vice chair. But by law, under the executive order, it should not be involved. The fact that it is receiving data, and is most certainly subject to the Government Act as is evidenced by the fact they've already had a Privacy Impact Assessment, that is relevant. But the Privacy Impact Assessment reveals that the military website is not set up to receive the personal data that the vice chairman is seeking.

THE COURT: Well, I'm trying to see
whether there is -- you agree with her argument
that you view that it shouldn't be there. That
doesn't get me anywhere in terms of your
argument that the Commission is subject to the
E-Gov Act. I still need a connection to a
federal agency. So I'm just trying to figure

out whether that's an argument you're making or not making.

MR. ROTENBERG: Yes. Well, I would rely in part on opposing counsel's comment that the State of Arkansas has, in fact, transmitted voter data to the military website. So the fact that the military website is now in possession of that data beyond what the authorities provided in the Privacy Impact Assessment under which it is currently operating, and we would argue as well beyond the authority set out in the executive order in the Commission charter, necessarily makes it relevant to the proceeding.

either one of you wants to say? I'm going to take a very short break. I know we're at 5:00, but I need to take a short break and figure out what additional questions, if any, I want to make because I would like to have this be the only hearing, and I'll go through all the information that you've got and then make a ruling.

MR. ROTENBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.

Just very briefly. We raised five counts.

There is the Privacy Impact Assessment that

Should've been completed. There's the Privacy
Impact Assessment that was required as a
condition of receiving the data. There is the
obligation to publish that privacy impact under
the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and we
believe the informational privacy constitutional
claims are actually quite strong here, and we
would like the opportunity at some point to be
able --

THE COURT: At this point, to make a constitutional argument I don't think you're going to do well in this circuit.

MR. ROTENBERG: I understand, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay.

Anything you want to say at the end? I'm going to hear whatever you have to say, and then I need to take a quick break and look through and make sure -- I did a scramble of a bunch of notes because you've been filing things one after the other in terms of my being able to look through it to make sure that this is it and I have the information I need.

MS. SHAPIRO: Yes. Just very briefly. I just wanted to make two points. One is that

using the SAFE site as a tool I don't think
makes that part of the Commission's work. It
would be like saying that the Commission can use
the post office to mail letters because that
would make the post office somehow part of the
Commission. It is a tool for getting the
information.

THE COURT: Well, it's not getting the information. I mean, as a practical matter -- are you talking about the computer? The DOD thing?

MS. SHAPIRO: Yes.

THE COURT: Well, you're uploading it.

They're maintaining the information. I don't know that I'd call it a tool as the post office would be.

I would agree, mailing things through the post office is not going to make them a federal agency as part of the Commission.

MS. SHAPIRO: And my second point is I wanted to just make clear the cases that set out the tests for the agency requirements, in other words, the functional test. The case that you referred to, the Crew vs. Office Of Administration, the case that Your Honor

handled, that involved the Office of
Administration within the Executive Office of
the President, was determined not to be an
agency subject to FOIA. And the E-Government
Act uses the same definition. That's the point
I wanted to make clear, that the definition of
agency is the same that's in FOIA. So the whole
including the Executive Office of the President,
we go back to the line of cases of Soucie v.

David, Mayer v. Bush, which I think is the task
force that Your Honor was referring to. That
was the deregulation Reagan task force with the
vice president as chair. So you have the Mayer
v. Bush, the Soucie vs. David.

So all of those cases mean that the E-Government Act has to apply that same body of case law, and there's -- the functional test that's described in our papers, and we think is very clear that it's not satisfied here.

And the Armstrong case, in addition, makes it clear that just the mere participation of one person doesn't change the character.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me take a short break. I'll figure out if there's anything else, and I'll come back out.

MS. SHAPIRO: Thank you.

(Break.)

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THE COURT: I have just one last question. I have not had an opportunity to review really carefully the last missive that I received from plaintiffs. I did look quickly through and noticed the DOD impact statement. So I need to go through and look at all of it more carefully. But if on reflection, in looking at it and reviewing the cases again and considering the arguments that were made and the answers that were given, if I decide that DOD is the federal agency connection to the Commission, since DOD is not a defendant, does it have to be a defendant in order for the Court to basically -assuming I find standing -- to be able to issue any kind of order since they're the ones at this point maintaining the data on behalf of the Commission?

They're not a defendant now. Would they have to be if I made that decision? I'm not saying I'm going to. I'm just saying if I decided to do it.

Anybody have a position on that?

MR. ROTENBERG: Of course, we just learned

this afternoon that the DOD now possesses data. So we could quickly amend our complaint and add the DOD as a named defendant.

THE COURT: Okay. Any position from DOJ on this?

MS. SHAPIRO: Our position would be that the Court would not be empowered to enter relief against a nonparty so that --

THE COURT: Right. Okay. He would have to make a decision as to whether he wanted to amend the complaint. Let's assume he filed a motion to amend the complaint which would include DOD, what would your position be?

MS. SHAPIRO: That it --

THE COURT: I mean, presumably, at this point they possess data, right? And they're maintaining it, at least at this point?

MS. SHAPIRO: For some ephemeral amount of time.

THE COURT: But they still have it at this point. So if they decided to amend it, I mean, then the Court would have to see whether that works anyway. But I'm just saying that it's clear that if they're not a party, I would not be able to act if I thought that was the -- or

concluded that that was the federal agency connection.

So if they filed a motion to do it, what would your answer be?

MS. SHAPIRO: Well, I think we would respond with arguments similar that the DOD tool that is being used does not convert -- make any difference to the agency -- to the Commission's status as a non-agency or a requirement to do a Privacy Impact Assessment.

THE COURT: So that would -- all right. In terms of doing it, but it doesn't get to whether -- even if he decided to put it in, it doesn't mean that he necessarily will decide that.

So it seems to me, since at this point they do have the data, and they're maintaining it, that they could certainly have grounds to put them in as a party. It doesn't mean I necessarily am going to find, as they would hope, that that is the federal agency connection. But I just wanted to make sure if I started to go down that path, it actually could -- it could be any ruling.

MS. SHAPIRO: I'm sorry. I didn't

understand the last --

THE COURT: All right. I brought this up because this has been a more developed argument about DOD and its role, since that's come out really only in recent times, and the exhibit I got at 3:00. So I haven't had too long to look at it in terms of what's involved with it. And you have indicated that it, at this point, holds data from the State of Arkansas. So it has the information, and it's maintaining it on behalf of the Commission. So that presumably would be their reason to amend it. The Court would still have to make these other decisions. It doesn't change it.

MS. SHAPIRO: Correct.

THE COURT: I just want to see that if I decided to do that, that I actually would be in a position to do it.

MS. SHAPIRO: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. So if you're going to amend it, you need to move swiftly. All right. I don't have anything else, and so I will excuse you.

I will not be doing an oral ruling.

Obviously, it's very complicated. I will be

doing something in writing. I will get it out as quickly as I can understanding the time lines that have been set out. All right? Thank you. Take care. (Hearing concluded.)

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I, Richard D. Ehrlich, a Registered Merit Reporter and Certified Realtime Reporter, certify that the foregoing is a true, complete, and accurate transcript of the proceedings ordered to be transcribed in the above-entitled case before the Honorable Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, in Washington, DC, on July 7, 2017. s/Richard D. Ehrlich July 10, 2017 Richard D. Ehrlich, Official Court Reporter