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Group Comments to HHS on "Parent Locator Databases"

[Filed electronically at http://regulations.acf.hhs.gov/]

Director, Policy Division
Office of Child Support Enforcement
Administration for Children and Families
370 L'Enfant Promenade, SW 4th Fl.
Washington, DC 20447

Re: Comments of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, and World Privacy Forum concerning the State Parent Locator Service.

The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, and World Privacy Forum submit these comments in response to "State Parent Locator Services; Safeguarding Child Support Information."[1]

EPIC is a public interest research center in Washington, D.C. It was established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional values.

The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) is a nonprofit consumer organization with a two-part mission -- consumer information and consumer advocacy. It was established in 1992 and is based in San Diego, California. It is primarily grant-supported and serves individuals nationwide.

The World Privacy Forum is a nonprofit, non partisan organization focused on conducting in-depth research and consumer education in the intersecting areas of technology and privacy.

Because of the volume and sensitivity of personal information made available for child support enforcement purposes, we believe that it is necessary to build in strong rules for access to databases. Our comments below emphasize two privacy protections needed to ensure accountability in the use of child support enforcement databases: the need for audit logs to ensure that the databases are only used for approved purposes, and the need for accuracy provisions to ensure that individuals are not falsely identified as owing child support.

Two recent news stories make clear why audit logs and accuracy provisions are needed. First, the United States Attorney for the Western District of Missouri recently secured a plea in a case where a HHS employee used access to databases to shield her prostitution business from police:

Smith, who had been working as a prostitute, made LexisNexis inquiries for personal reasons even though she knew that it was prohibited to do so, and she used the information to aid her in avoiding arrest and prosecution for her prostitution activities. Smith queried LexisNexis on numerous occasions, without the authority to do so and for her own purpose.[2]

The employee was a bill collector for the Center for Medicaid Services. In addition to using the service to shield her business, the employee also used the database to check up on an ex-husband.[3]

Second, errors in databases can subject innocent people to repeated requests to pay child support. As ABC7 News in San Francisco recently reported:

A San Mateo man has been pursued for child support not once or twice, but four times by county agencies. There's no way he's the father -- and the authorities agree. So why do they keep coming after him? This is such a sensitive issue, we're not using full names.
The head of the Department of Child Support Services Karen Roy declined to be interviewed on camera, but she told ABC7 by phone this latest case is the result of a mistake by a case worker, who hand-copied down the wrong address from a database.
Alex tells us the matter in San Francisco was cleared after he faxed the agency his social security number and the names of his family members. But the stigma attached to this kind of thing is another matter.
Alex, identity victim: "It's another stereotype that people add on to you. 'Oh, he's a person who doesn't pay his bills, doesn't take care of his responsibilities and [is a deadbeat dad].'"

The San Mateo Department of Child Support Services has come after Alex three times now. The most recent incident went the furthest. They contacted his employer and started the process of deducting money from his paycheck.[4]

The man falsely identified by the San Mateo Department of Child Support Services was recently contacted again for payments. He is likely to be continually stigmatized by this database error.

In light of these two problems, we urge that the following changes be made to the proposed rule:



We propose adding a section to this provision that requires maintenance of an audit log to deter employee misuse of databases. Audit logs hold individuals responsible for their use of personal information databases. Such audit logs should record who accesses personal information, and the purposes for which it was accessed.

Once an auditing system is created, it will give the agency a number of approaches to determine employee misuse of the system. For instance, fraud may be present in cases where a certain employee is accessing the database many more times a day than the average employee. Frequent access to the databases may be the result of an employee using the system for personal purposes, or to sell data to others.

In granting individuals access to their personal information, the individual should also be able to obtain the audit log, subject to reasonable exceptions (such as where the individual is currently under investigation, and the audit log would reveal that fact).


303.17 Security and confidentiality for computerized support enforcement systems in operation after October 1, 1997.

Subsection (a) of this provision requires information security and integrity safeguards. These safeguards include a provision for data accuracy. However, we think that these provisions would benefit from greater specificity.

Government agencies cannot rely upon the information stored at commercial data brokers to be accurate. Several independent studies have shown that commercial data brokers' files are "mixed," that is, they contain the information of several different people. Most recently, PrivacyActivism found that commercial data brokers Choicepoint and Acxiom maintain files with significant errors.[5] In the study, 11 people requested their Choicepoint and Acxiom dossiers. Although the sample size was small, the results showed significant problems at both commercial data broker companies. All 11 found errors in their dossiers. 73% of the sample found errors in basic biographic information in their Choicepoint report, which includes name, date of birth, current address, and phone number. Other fields in the reports had errors too, such as length of residence at current and past addresses, real property owned, purchase/sale dates of real property. The group also found that three reports identified individuals incorrectly as officers of corporations.

PrivacyActivism found that only 6 of the 11 requestors were able to obtain their dossier from Acxiom. The 6 that did obtain their reports had to wait an average of 89 days after their request to get a response from Acxiom. 67% of the Acxiom reports had at least one biographical information error. One Acxiom report identified an individual by the incorrect gender.

There must be heightened standards for determining the accuracy of personal information that are used in these databases. As the PrivacyActivism study has shown, simply relying upon private-sector database companies is untenable.

We strongly urge the agency to disclose to the public what tools and data sources are going to be employed to locate individuals. We suggest that these tools and data sources be disclosed in the Federal Register, giving individuals time to comment on the accuracy and reliability of the tools used.

Finally, there must be an easy to use procedure for individuals misidentified by these programs to correct agency records. These database programs are supposed to increase the efficiency in government operations, but that increase in efficiency must be balanced with procedures to ensure fairness for individuals. Additionally, there should be a system to flag errors where files are "mixed" and individuals are incorrectly identified by the agency as in violation of a child support obligation.

Respectfully submitted,

Chris Hoofnagle
Director, West Coast Office
Electronic Privacy Information Center

Beth Givens
Executive Director
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse

Pam Dixon
Executive Director
World Privacy Forum

[1] State Parent Locator Service; Safeguarding Child Support Information, Department of Health and Human Services, 70 Fed. Reg. 60038 (Oct. 14, 2005).

[2] Federal Employee Sentenced for Computer Hacking to Promote Prostitution, Office of United States Attorney, Western District of Missouri, Nov. 30, 2005, available at


[3] Brian Krebs, Prostitution Suspect Used Data Access to Keep Tabs on Cops, Security Fix, Dec. 5, 2005, available at http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2005/12/hhs_hooker_sent.html.

[4] Child Support Services Mistake Man For Deadbeat Dad Asked To Pay Child Support Four Times In Seven Years, ABC7 News, Apr. 5, 2005, available at http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=i_team&id=3355189

[5] Available at http://www.privacyactivism.org/Item/222.

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Last Updated: December 13, 2005
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