Testimony and Statement for the Record of
Chris Jay Hoofnagle
Associate Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center
Hearing on Enhancing Social Security Number Privacy
Before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security
10 AM
Tuesday, June 15, 2004
B-318 Rayburn House Office Building
Introduction
Chairman Shaw, Ranking Member Matsui, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank
you for extending the opportunity to testify enhancing the privacy and integrity
of Social Security Numbers.
My name is Chris Hoofnagle and I am associate director with the Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a not-for-profit research organization
based in Washington, D.C. Founded in 1994, EPIC has participated in cases
involving the privacy of the Social Security Number (SSN) before federal courts
and, most recently, before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.[1] EPIC has
also taken a leading role in campaigns against the use of globally unique
identifiers (GUIDs) involving the Intel Processor Serial Number and the Microsoft
Corporation's Passport identification and authentication system. EPIC maintains
an archive of information about the SSN online at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ssn/.
In previous testimony to this Subcommittee, EPIC has recommended a strong
framework of Fair Information Practices to create rights and responsibilities
for individuals and collectors of the SSN. In 2001, EPIC Executive Director
Marc Rotenberg traced the history of the SSN as an identifier, highlighted
the use of the SSN in the financial services sector, and raised privacy issues
associated with the Social Security Administration's Death Master File.[2]
In 2002, EPIC testified that the problem of identity theft had grown worse,
that the states were acting to limit collection and disclosure of the SSN,
and that 107 H.R. 2036, the Social Security Number Privacy and Identity Theft
Protection Act of 2001 could limit misuse of the SSN.[3] In 2003, EPIC appeared
again to testify in favor of privacy protections, highlighting recent abuses,
the continuing unnecessary use of the SSN as an identifier by both private
and public sector entities, and the developing trends of state legislation
crafted to limit collection and use of the identifier.[4]
Chairman Shaw, we commend you for developing a rich legislative record on
the need to protect the SSN and to combat identity theft. In today's testimony,
we wish to continue to contribute to the record and make a recommendation
that you advance legislation to secure the SSN and protect Americans from
identity theft. First, we provide an overview and recommendations for 108
H.R. 2971, the Social Security Number Privacy and Identity Theft Prevention
Act of 2003. Second, we highlight examples of state SSN regulation that could
be adopted at the federal level to provide an umbrella of protections for
the SSN. In the third section, we argue that identity theft is caused by excessive
reliance on the SSN and by lax credit granting practices.
I. Recommendations for 108 H.R. 2971, the Social Security Number Privacy
and Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2003
Introduced in July 2003, H.R. 2971 is the latest of a series of bills designed
to enhance protections for the SSN and to promote the integrity of the identifier.
It enjoys bipartisan support in the House of Representatives.
Title I of the bill sets forth limitations on government disclosure of SSNs.
Broadly put, this title would prohibit executive, legislative, or judicial
entities from disclosing the SSN, subject to certain exceptions.
We think it important to limit the exceptions for governmental sale of the
SSN. Specifically, we recommend that subsection (V), which allows unlimited
sale of SSNs to thousands of credit reporting agencies (CRAs), be removed
from the bill. This exception is too broad and allows unrestricted transfers
of government records containing social security numbers to CRAs, possibly
for purposes unrelated to credit reporting, including direct marketing.
It is not the role of government to collect SSNs from citizens, who are often
under legal compulsion to provide the identifier, and then release the SSNs
to the private sector for the purpose of compiling dossiers. Professor Daniel
Solove has fully articulated how this model of information flow is unfair
to individuals and privacy invasive:
Imagine that the government had the power to compel individuals to reveal
a vast amount of personal information about themselves - where they live,
their phone numbers, their physical description, their photograph, their age,
their medical problems, all of their legal transgressions throughout their
lifetimes whether serious crimes or minor infractions, the names of their
parents, children, and spouses, their political party affiliations, where
they work and what they do, the property that they own and its value, and
sometimes even their psychotherapists' notes, doctors' records, and financial
information.
Then imagine that the government routinely poured this information into the
public domain - by posting it on the Internet where it could be accessed from
all over the world, by giving it away to any individual or company that asked
for it, or even by providing entire databases of personal information upon
request. In an increasingly "wired" society, with technology such
as sophisticated computers to store, transfer, search, and sort through all
this information, imagine the way that the information could be combined or
used to obtain even more personal information.[5]
If this exception remains in the legislation, we recommend that it be narrowed.
Currently, the exception allows disclosure of the SSN to CRAs without any
limitation on use of the identifier. A narrower exception would allow disclosure
but limit use of the identifier for "credit reporting practices consistent
with the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681."
In section 101, we recommend harmonizing the definition of "sale"
with other references to the term that appear in the legislation. The definition
appearing in section 107, which defines sell as "to obtain, directly
or indirectly, anything of value in exchange for such number," is more
appropriate.
Section 102 specifies the authority of the Attorney General to create exemptions
to the general prohibition on government disclosure of the SSN. We agree with
the standard set forth by the legislationthat SSNs should not be disclosed
absent a compelling interest that cannot be served through the employment
of alternative measures. We are concerned, however, that the Attorney General
will still approve of privacy-invasive transfers of the SSN despite this high
standard. In documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, EPIC
has shown that private-sector commercial data brokers (CDBs) play a large
role in collecting SSNs and other information for sale to law enforcement.[6]
Simply put, there is a risk that the Attorney General will act in self-interest,
and approve broad disclosures of SSNs to CDBs that then resell the identifier
back to law enforcement or other entities.
We recommend several substantive safeguards against permissive regulations
that would allow broad disclosure of the SSN. First, the rulemaking should
be open to public comment. Public polling shows that individuals are concerned
about increasing use of the SSN; allowing public comment will effectively
express popular opposition to expanding use of the identifier.
Second, we think that the qualifier "undue" should be removed from
the standard articulated in Section 101 (a)(I)(ii)(II), and that identity
theft be added as one of the risks to be considered by the rulemakers. As
currently drafted with "undue" as a qualifier and without the special
recognition of identity theft as a risk of SSN disclosure, the language will
tilt the balance in favor of expanding disclosure of the SSN. A more appropriate
balance would be struck with language specifying, "it is reasonably certain
that the social security numbers will not be used to commit or facilitate
fraud, identity theft, or bodily, emotional, or financial harm."
Third, we think that exceptions to the general prohibition should be limited
in duration. A time limit will encourage users of the SSN to transition to
alternative identifiers. Exceptions that are not time limited will ensure
that SSN users never transition to alternative measures.
Last, entities receiving SSNs should be held to technical safeguards to shield
the identifier from employee misuse or theft. We recommend that the following
factor be added to the rulemaking: "(III) the social security numbers
sold, purchased or displayed will be protected by adequate safeguards, including
but not limited to encryption measures and regular auditing of SSN access
and disclosure."
Section 103 would codify an important safeguarda prohibition of printing
SSNs on checks issued by governments. This is a common sense protection against
identity theft. It is necessary because a standard check with a SSN contains
all the personal information necessary for commission of identity theft.
Section 104 would prohibit states from displaying the SSN on driver's licenses.
Again, this is a common sense approach to preventing identity theft. Indeed,
many states already incorporate a ban on printing the SSN on driver's licenses.[7]
Such a prohibition makes it more likely that the SSN will not appear in the
wallet of individuals, thus reducing the risk that a lost or stolen wallet
will provide the personal information necessary to commit identity theft.
We recommend that section 104 also prohibit states from encoding the SSN on
magnetic strips, barcodes, or smartcards on the driver's license, as we are
aware that while some states do not print the SSN on the card, they may embed
the identifier digitally on the card.[8] Anyone with a card reader can swipe
the card and capture the identifier. Increasingly, businesses are capturing
patrons' personal data from driver's licenses.[9] Removing the SSN from encoded
portions of driver's licenses will cut down on unnecessary collection of the
identifier.[10]
Section 106 would prohibit government entities from allowing prisoners to
have access to the SSN. We think that this too is a common sense protection,
in light of the Metromail case, where a company employed prisoners to enter
personal information from surveys into computers. This resulted in a stalking
case where a prisoner harassed a woman based on information she submitted
on a survey. The woman received mail from a convicted rapist and burglar who
knew everything about herincluding her preferences for bath soap and
magazines. The woman sued and as a result of a class-action suit, Metromail
may no longer use prisoners to process personal information.[11] Nevertheless,
a general prohibition on inmate access to SSNs is appropriate, and California
and Kentucky already have passed legislation to keep SSNs out of the hands
of prisoners.[12]
Section 107 generally prohibits disclosure of the SSN in the private sector,
subject to exceptions. We think it important to limit exceptions to the general
prohibition in order to curb private sector use of the SSN. First, the exception
for public health purposes should be limited to "emergency public health
purposes." In its current articulation, this exception could allow medical
providers and insurance companies to continue to rely upon the SSN in normal
operations. Limiting the exception will encourage the industry to shift away
from the identifier. We note that Empire Blue Cross is transitioning its 4.8
million customers away from the SSN as an identifier, demonstrating that it
is possible for large health care operations to use an alternative identifier.[13]
Section 107 contains an exception for SSNs of the deceased, meaning that they
could be freely traded on the market. We think there are important public
policy reasons to place some protections on SSNs of the deceased. SSNs of
deceased individuals should receive protection for the same reasons that justify
protections for living individuals; those reasons include preventing fraud
and identity theft. Additionally, criminals are known to assume the identities
of deceased individuals in order to engage in criminal acts and to avoid law
enforcement. Some protection for these identifiers is justified.
Section 108 codifies a much-needed protection for the SSN. Prior to the implementation
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, CRAs and other entities sold SSNs in credit
headers to individuals outside Fair Credit Reporting Act regulation. We understand
that some businesses are still selling SSNs from credit headers that were
collected before implementation of Gramm-Leach-Bliley. Section 108 would eliminate
this unregulated sale of SSNs by tying the identifier to the credit report,
and thus to protections in the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
Section 109 contains important protections against the practice of "coercive
disclosure," a practice where an entity conditions provision of a product
or service based on disclosure of the SSN. Maine, New Mexico, and Rhode Island
have established protections against coercive disclosure, and we think it
a good idea to federalize this important right to enhance privacy of the SSN.[14]
Title II contains measures to help protect the integrity of the SSN. Section
202, which addresses enumeration at birth, provides an excellent opportunity
to address objections to SSN issuance to children that many Americans posses
based on political or religious beliefs. In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986),
better known as the "Little Bird of the Snow" case, a family that
applied for child welfare benefits sued the Department of Health and Human
Services for requiring that a SSN be issued to their indigent child. The family
alleged that enumeration violated their religious beliefs and that the conditioning
of benefits on issuance of the SSN violated the Free Exercise Clause. The
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the government could require the child
to obtain a SSN in order to receive benefits.
In that case, the trial court found that the government could, in fact, administer
child welfare programs without enumeration. This bill allows Congress to revisit
the issue and provide an alternative for those having a religious or ethical
objection to permanent enumeration. Alternatives could include a tax-identification
number that expires at the age of eighteen, when the child can more fully
consider whether to obtain a SSN. Another could specify heightened security
requirements or anti-fraud measures to administer benefits to those objecting
to enumeration. The study to be performed by the Commissioner of Social Security
should require consideration of these issues.
Title III of the legislation creates new criminal penalties for misuse of
the SSN. Section 302 prohibits individuals from knowingly providing a false
SSN to another person. We think that there should be an exception to this
rule for cases where an individual provides a false SSN without any intent
to commit fraud. For instance, in situations where an entity demands a SSN
without justification, individuals should be able to fabricate one if they
are not engaged in fraud and are simply attempting to protect their privacy.
We think the following language should be added to Section 302 (in the provision
amending Section 1129(a) of the Social Security Act to create a new provision
at 1129(a)(3)(B)): "Notwithstanding the previous sentence, an individual
is permitted to represent a number to be the social security number assigned
by the Commissioner of Social Security to another so long as the individual
does not do so with the intent to engage in fraud or other criminal activity."
II. States Have Innovated Clever Protections for the SSN; Congress
Should Consider Incorporating Them in 108 H.R. 2971
In recent years, state legislatures have functioned in their traditional roles
as "laboratories of democracy," creating new approaches to enhancing
the privacy of SSNs. These privacy protections demonstrate that major government
and private-sector entities can still operate in environments where disclosure
and use of the SSN is limited. They also provide examples of protections that
should be considered at the federal level.
Some States Have Placed Broad Prohibitions on Disclosure and Use by Government
and Private Entities
Two weeks ago, Colorado Governor Bill Owens signed H.B. 1311, legislation
that creates important new protections for the SSN that will take effect later
this summer. The new law will limit the collection of the SSN and its incorporation
in licenses, permits, passes, or certificates issued by the state. The law
requires the establishment of policies for safe destruction of documents containing
the SSN. Insurance companies operating in the state must remove the SSN from
consumers' identification cards. Finally, the legislation creates new penalties
for individuals who use others' personal information to injure or defraud
another person.
A law taking effect in January 2005 in Arizona prohibits the disclosure of
the SSN to the general public, the printing of the identifier on government
and private-sector identification cards, and establishes technical protection
requirements for online transmission of SSNs.[15] The new law also prohibits
printing the SSN on materials mailed to residents of Arizona. Exceptions to
the new protections are limitedcompanies that wish to continue to use
the SSN must do so continuously, must disclose the use of the SSN annually
to consumers, and must afford consumers a right to opt-out of continued employment
of the SSN. Arizona's new law is based on California Civil Code § 1798.85.
Special Protections Have Been Crafted for Students
A number of states have passed legislation limiting colleges and universities
from employing the SSN as a student identifier. Limiting use of the SSN in
this context reduces the risk of identity theft, as databases of student information,
student identity cards, and even posting of grades sometimes contain SSNs.
In Arizona, major universities can no longer use the SSN as the student identifier.[16]
In Colorado, as of July 2003, public and private postsecondary institutions
were required to establish protections for the SSN and discontinue its use
as the primary student identifier.[17] New York and West Virginia prohibit
all public and private schools from using the SSN as a primary identifier.[18]
Kentucky law allows students to opt-out of use of the SSN as student identifier.[19]
Protections Crafted for Public, Vital, and Death Records
Commercial data brokers obtain SSNs from a number of sources, including public
records that individuals are required to file in order to enjoy important
rights and privileges offered by society. For instance, marriage licenses
have been a source for SSNs and a number of states, including Arizona, California,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Ohio, and Michigan, have
enacted legislative protections to prevent their disclosure.[20]
Birth and death records are rich in personal information, and states have
acted to shield SSNs collected in these life events against disclosures. Arizona,
California, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Hampshire, and other states limit the appearance of the parents'
SSN on birth records.[21] Similarly, several states restrict disclosure of
the SSN in records associated with death.[22]
Protections Against Pretexting Should Be Considered
We wish to raise one additional concern hereeven legitimate collection
of the SSN contributes to unauthorized access to the identifier. That is,
we are increasingly aware of manuals for private investigators and other materials
suggesting that SSNs can be obtained from motor vehicle departments, applications
for professional licenses, and even tax returns.[23] In these cases, the investigator
probably obtains the identifier through a friend or contact working at the
institution with a SSN. Alternatively, the manuals suggest the use of "pretexting,"
a practice where an investigator requests personal information from an entity
while pretending to be another person or while pretending to have a legitimate
reason for access to the information. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act prohibits
pretexting with respect to financial, securities, and insurance companies,
but the law doesn't apply to pretexting targeted at employers, utility companies,
or other entities that have SSNs. The Subcommittee should consider whether
expanding protections against pretexting would enhance the privacy of the
SSN.
III. Excessive Reliance on the Social Security Number and Lax Credit
Granting Practices Are Exacerbating the Identity Theft Problem
News media stories abound on the plight of the victim of identity theft. No
one is safe from the crimeimpostors have been able to obtain credit in
the names of young children and even babies.[24] While Congress has heightened
penalties for identity theft, we recommend that further attempts to fight
the crime be centered on the credit granting process, and in particular, the
practice of granting credit only on a SSN match.
Identity thieves can rely on aspects of the instant credit granting system
to commit fraud. The first weakness in the system flows from extreme competition
to acquire new customers. This has resulted in grantors flooding the market
with "pre-screened" credit offers, pre-approved solicitations of
credit made to individuals who meet certain criteria. These offers are sent
in the mail, giving thieves the opportunity to intercept them and accept credit
in the victim's name.[25] Once credit is granted, the thief changes the address
on the account in order to obtain the physical card and to prevent the victim
from learning of the fraud.[26] The industry sends out billions of these pre-screened
offers a year. It 1998, it was reported that 3.4 billion were sent.[27] In
2003, the estimate increased to 5 billion sent.[28]
Competition also drives grantors to quickly extend credit. Once a consumer
(or impostor) expresses acceptance of a credit offer, issuers approve the
transaction with great speed. Experian, one of the "big three" credit
reporting agencies, performs in this task in a "magic two seconds."[29]
In a scenario published in an Experian white paper on "Customer Data
Integration," an individual receives a line of credit in two seconds
after only supplying his name and address.[30] Such a quick response heightens
the damage to business and victims alike, because thieves will generally make
many applications for new credit in hopes that a fraction of them will be
granted.
The second factor that makes identity theft easy to commit is that credit
grantors do not have adequate standards for verifying the true identity of
credit applicants. Credit issuers sometimes open tradelines to individuals
who leave obvious errors on the application, such as incorrect dates of birth
or even the incorrect name. Identity theft expert Beth Givens has argued that
many incidences of identity theft could be prevented by simply requiring grantors
to more carefully review credit applications for obviously incorrect personal
information.[31]
TRW Inc. v. Andrews illustrates the problems with poor standards for customer
identification.[32] In that case, Adelaide Andrews visited a doctor's office
in Santa Monica, California, and completed a new patient's information form
that requested her name, birth date, and SSN.[33] The doctor's receptionist,
an unrelated woman named Andrea Andrews, copied the information and used Adelaide's
Social Security Number and her own name to apply for credit in Las Vegas,
Nevada. On four occasions, Trans Union released Adelaide's credit report because
the SSN, last name, and first initial matched. Once Trans Union released the
credit reports, it made it possible for creditors to issue new tradelines.
Three of the four creditors that obtained a credit report issued tradelines
to the impostor based on Adelaide's file, despite the fact that the first
name, birth date, and address did not match.[34]
A survey of other prominent identity theft litigation shows numerous cases
where credit was granted as a result of a SSN match despite other obvious
inaccuracies. For instance, in Aylward v. Fleet Bank, 122 F.3d 616 (8th Cir.
1997), Fleet Bank of Albany, New York, issued two credit cards to "Ronald
Aylward," allegedly of East Moriches, New York, who used both the victim's
name and SSN in applying for the cards. The victim, however, lived in Missouri
all of his life.
In United States v. Peyton, 353 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2003), impostors obtained
American Express cards using the victims' correct names and SSNs but directed
all the cards to be sent to the impostors' home. In Vazquez-Garcia v. Trans
Union De P.R., Inc., 222 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. P.R. 2002), a resident of Puerto
Rico who was born in 1962 learned that Sears had issued a credit card to a
resident of Nevada who was born in 1960. The impostor had falsely used the
victim's SSN to apply for credit cards in his own name and succeeded in getting
credit despite the mismatch on age and location. In Dimezza v. First USA Bank,
Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (D. N.M. 2000), an impostor obtained credit using
the victim's SSN but a different name and address.
And finally, those who attempt to assign liability for negligent credit granting
have not been successful in the courts. In Huggins v. Citibank, 355 S.C. 329
(S.C. 2003), a plaintiff-victim alleged that banks should be liable when they
negligently extend credit in a victim's name to an impostor.[35] The defendants
argued that no duty existed because the victim was not actually a customer
of the bank. In August 2003, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the
proposed cause of action. Although it expressed concern about the rampant
growth of identity theft, the court found that the relationship between credit
card issuers and potential victims of identity theft was "far too attenuated
to rise to the level of a duty between them."
These cases show that excessive reliance on the SSN can contribute to identity
theft. California has attempted to address this problem by requiring certain
credit grantors to comply with heightened authentication procedures. California
Civil Code § 1785.14 requires credit grantors to actually match identifying
information on the credit application to the report held at the credit reporting
agency. Credit cannot be granted unless three identifiers from the application
match those on file at the credit bureau. The categories to be matched include
"first and last name, month and date of birth, driver's license number,
place of employment, current residence address, previous residence address,
or social security number."[36] Simply requiring credit grantors to look
beyond the SSN as a customer identifier and authenticator will begin to address
a wide range of identity theft.
Conclusion
Thank you, Chairman Shaw, for continuing to develop a rich legislative record
supporting greater privacy for the SSN. We think that the privacy and integrity
of SSNs could be enhanced through the passage of federal legislation that
limits the collection and approved uses of the identifier. We urge the Subcommittee
to examine state laws that have created new, clever protections for the SSN.
We also urge the Subcommittee to consider that excessive reliance on the SSN
contributes to identity theft. We look forward to continuing to work with
the Subcommittee on this and other privacy matters.
[1] Estate of Helen Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., et al, C-00-211-B (N.H.
2002). In Remsburg, the "Amy Boyer" case, Liam Youens was able to
locate and eventually murder Amy Boyer through hiring private investigators
who tracked her by her date of birth, Social Security Number, and by pretexting.
EPIC maintains information about the Amy Boyer case online at http://www.epic.org/privacy/boyer/.
[2] Social Security Numbers and Identity Theft, Joint Hearing Before the House
Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and the House
Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security, Nov. 8, 2001 (testimony of
Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, EPIC), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ssn/testimony_11_08_2001.html.
[3] Hearing on Preserving the Integrity of Social Security Numbers and Preventing
Their Misuse by Terrorists and Identity Thieves, Joint Hearing Before the
House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security and the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, Sept. 19, 2002 (testimony
of Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Legislative Counsel, EPIC), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ssn/ssntestimony9.19.02.html.
[4] Hearing on Use and Misuse of the Social Security Number, Hearing Before
the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security, July 10, 2003 (testimony
of Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Deputy Counsel, EPIC), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ssn/testimony7.10.03.html.
[5] Professor Daniel Solove describes this problem in Access and Aggregation:
Public Records, Privacy, and the Constitution, 86 Minnesota Law Review 1137
(2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=283924.
[6] See e.g. Electronic Privacy Information Center, ChoicePoint, available
at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/; Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother's
Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect,
Process, and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, University of North Carolina
Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation (Spring 2004).
[7] See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-3158; C.R.S. § 42-2-107; C.R.S. §
42-3-302; D.C. Code Ann. § 50-402; O.C.G.A. § 40-3-23; HRS §
286-109; HRS § 286-239; Idaho Code § 49-306; Idaho Code § 49-2444;
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.412; Mont. Code Ann. §61-5-111(2)(b);
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 483.345; .N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §263:40-a;
N.D. Cent. Code 39-06-14; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4501.31; Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 47, § 6-106 (2002); Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1510; Tenn Code
Ann. § 55-50-331; Tex. Trans. § 521.044; Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-342;
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.23.150.
[8] Beatriz da Costa, Jamie Schulte and Brooke Singer, Who is Swiping?, n.d.,
available at http://www.we-swipe.us/research.html.
[9] See e.g. Jennifer 8. Lee, Finding Pay Dirt in Scannable Driver's Licenses,
New York Times, March 21, 2002.
[10] Louisiana has already prohibited embedding the SSN into a driver's license.
La. R.S. § 32:410. West Virginia has attempted to address this problem
of license swiping by allowing the use of license scanners for age verification
purposes but prohibiting the recording of SSNs in the process. W. Va. Code
Ann. § 60-2-22.
[11] During litigation, Metromail claimed that they had not violated the woman's
privacy, that they had no duty to inform individuals that prisoners were processing
their personal data, and that the data processed was not highly intimate or
embarrassing. Beverly Dennis, et al. v. Metromail, et al., No. 96-04451, Travis
County, Texas.
[12] Cal Pen Code § 4017.1, § 5071; Cal Wel & Inst Code §
219.5; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 131.191.
[13] Empire Blue Cross Will End Use Of SSNs, Use Alternate Number System,
Privacy and Security Law Report (Jun. 7, 2004) at 666.
[14] 2003 Me. ALS 512; N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-12B-3; R.I. Gen Laws §6-13-17.
[15] Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1373.
[16] Ariz. Rev. Stat. §15-1823. Rhode Island and Wisconsin have similar
protections. R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-38-5.1; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 36.11(35).
[17] C.R.S. § 23-5-127.
[18] N.Y. Educ. Law § 2-b; W. Va. Code Ann. §18-2-5f.
[19] Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 156.160. See also Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 197.120.
[20] Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-121; Cal Fam Code § 2024.5; Burns Ind.
Code Ann. § 31-11-4-4; Iowa Code § 595.4; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 402.100;
La. R.S. 9:224; 19-A M.R.S. § 651; MCL § 333.2813; Mont. Code Ann.
§ 40-1-107; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3101.05.
[21] See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-322; Cal Health & Saf Code §
102425; 410 ILCS 535/11; K.S.A. § 65-2409a; 22 M.R.S. § 2761; Md.
Ann. Code § 4-208; ALM GL ch. 111, § 24B; Minn. Stat. § 144.215;
Miss. Code Ann. § 41-57-14; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 193.075; Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 454.440; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 5-C:10.
[22] See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16-165; Cal Health & Saf Code § 102231;
Idaho Code § 67-3007; Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 16-37-3-9; La R.S.
§ 23:1671; N.D. Cent. Code § 23-02.1-28.
[23] See e.g. Lee Lapin, How to Get Anything on Anybody 533-543 (Intelligence
Here, 3d ed. 2003) (section titled "How to Find Anyone's Social Security
Number" suggests thirty sources for the SSN, including driver's license
applications, bankruptcy filings, court records, bank files, utility records,
professional and recreational licenses, and employment files).
[24] Identity Theft Resource Center, Fact Sheet 120: Identity Theft and Children,
available at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/vg120.shtml.
[25] Identity crises -- millions of Americans paying price, Chi. Tribune,
Sept. 11, 2003, p2.
[26] Id.
[27] Identity Theft: How It Happens, Its Impact on Victims, and Legislative
Solutions, Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology,
Terrorism, and Government Information, Jul. 12, 2000 (testimony of Beth Givens,
Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (citing Edmund Sanders, Charges are
flying over credit card pitches, L.A. Times, Jun. 15, 1999, p. D-1), available
at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/id_theft.htm.
[28] Rob Reuteman, Statistics Sum Up Our Past, Augur Our Future, Rocky Mountain
News, Sept. 27, 2003, p 2C; Robert O'Harrow, Identity Crisis; Meet Michael
Berry: political activist, cancer survivor, creditor's dream. Meet Michael
Berry: scam artist, killer, the real Michael Berry's worst nightmare, Wash.
Post Mag., Aug. 10, 2003, p W14.
[29] Experian, Inc., Customer Data Integration: The essential link for Customer
Relationship Management White paper 15, 2000, available at http://www.experian.com/whitepapers/cdi_white_paper.pdf.
[30] Id.
[31] Legislative Hearing on H.R. 2622, The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions
Act of 2003, Before the Committee on Financial Services, Jul. 9, 2003 (testimony
of Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Deputy Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center).
[32] 534 U.S. 19 (2001); Erin Shoudt, Comment. Identity theft: victims "cry
out" for reform, 52 Am. U. L. Rev. 339, 346-7 (2002).
[33] Id. at 23-25.
[34] Id.
[35] See also Garay v. U.S. Bancorp, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1331 (E.D.N.Y.
2004); Smith v. Citibank, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25047, (W.D. Mo. 2001); Polzer
v. TRW, Inc., 256 A.D.2d 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
[36] Id.
Last Updated:
July 2, 2004
Page URL: http://www.epic.org/privacy/ssn/ssntestimony6.15.04.html